Introduction

Civil war is a global phenomenon with profound social and political consequences. From 1946 to 2011, a total of 102 countries—about half of the entire world's states—experienced civil wars. During that 60-year period, Africa witnessed the most with 40 of its more than 50 countries experiencing civil wars. In the Americas, 20 countries experienced civil war, Asia saw 18, Europe 13, and the Middle East 11 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).

Civil wars are not only widespread; they also occur more frequently than wars between states. In 2000, a report from the UN Secretary General concluded that while interstate wars had been declining for some time, since the 1990s, most wars have been mainly internal. Indeed, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identified freedom from armed conflict as a UN priority, pointing to the fact that intrastate wars are brutally violent, claim millions of lives, and prey on ethnic and religious differences (United Nations [UN] 2000:43).

Loss of human life is certainly the most significant cost of civil war. The UN report showed that from 1990 to 2000, civil wars claimed more than 5 million lives worldwide, including countless civilians and children. According to one leading research organization, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), there were approximately 350,000 civil war battle-related deaths in Europe and the Middle East between 1946 and 2008, and during the same period, African civil wars produced more than 1.2 million battle-related casualties. The most alarming statistic comes from Asia, which lost more than 3.1 million battle-related lives in brutal civil wars especially in Vietnam, Sri Lanka, India, and China (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

Adding to the loss of life are other tragic factors that affect victims of civil wars. As noted in the UN report,

> Women are becoming especially vulnerable to violence and sexual exploitation. Children are being taken away from parents, ending up as forced laborers and forced to become child soldiers.

Civilian populations are used as covers for the operations of rebel movements. In other cases, civilians face brutalities and become targets of genocides. (United Nations 2000:46)

Another of the profound international consequences of civil wars is human displacement in the form of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) or people who have not crossed international borders to avoid violence but instead remain within their country's borders. At the beginning of 2013 there were over 15 million refugees in the world—most of whom had been displaced by civil conflict (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2014b). Between 1999 and 2004, there were 500,000 displaced from the war in Aceh, Indonesia, alone (Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009), and in a more extreme and short-term example, over 2.5 million people have been internally displaced in Syria since 2011 (UNHCR 2014a). In the past, governments and international organizations have more or less ignored the issue of displacement, but in recent years, partly because of UN and other international pressure, there have been greater efforts to address refugee needs.

International forces have also been mobilized to hold those accountable for crimes committed during civil wars: For instance, in April 2012, the UN-sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted former warlord and President of Liberia Charles Taylor (pictured in the photo on page 3) for crimes, such as mass murders, sex slavery, and using child soldiers (ABC News 2012). Still, the scale, frequency, and severity of civil wars warrants sustained attention and research to understand its many dimensions.

THEME OF THE BOOK

This book focuses on the central factors that explain civil war, including defining what scholars mean by civil war, who the major actors are, why civil wars start, how they are fought, the costs in life and livelihood, what explains their duration, how they end, and what makes them recur. At the end of each chapter, I return to conflict management, the theme of the book. The features of civil war discussed in this book have relevance for conflict management. For example, an understanding of the causes of civil war can help inform conflict prevention. Knowing the determinants of duration can help shape policies to shorten wars, and knowledge of war recurrence and civil war-related terrorism can help shape better peace agreements that are more likely to hold. Each of these features forms the basis of the chapters, but here in the Introduction, we will start with the basics: an overview of theoretical approaches to war in general and civil war in particular and discussion of the key terms and concepts involved in its empirical study.

Conflict management, as the term is applied here, refers to a set of practices, encompassing negotiation, mediation, conflict prevention, peace agreements, "peacebuilding," and peacekeeping operations that are designed to ameliorate, resolve, and even prevent future conflict. While each of these processes is discussed in detail in the relevant chapters, I can describe each of these processes in general terms.

Negotiations are talks between disputants or between a disputant and an outside negotiator. The goal of negotiations might be a cease-fire or peace agreement. Mediation is similar with the exception that the mediator shares information between the disputants either directly (in same room) or indirectly (separate locations). Conflict prevention takes place before a crisis situation escalates to armed violence. Peace agreements are documents containing provisions designed to stem the violence and lead the country toward stable peace. The provisions often address grievances, reconciliation, and power sharing. Agreements are often preceded by mediation and/or negotiations. It should also be mentioned that as peace talks near the agreement stage, they can trigger spoilers who see the process as a threat to their interests. Spoilers sometimes carry out terrorism to disrupt the peace process.

Charles Taylor

Former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, seated during his trial in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in the Netherlands.

Credit: UN Photo/SCSL/AP Pool/Peter DeJong

Peacebuilding is a process that occurs after the violence has ended. It is often preceded by a peace agreement. Peacebuilding often entails building democratic institutions so that peace is consolidated (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Peacekeeping operations (typically under the auspices of the United Nations) are also active after the violence has stopped. As such, they are also sometimes part

of the peacebuilding process. Peacekeeping troops and trained civilians have many roles, such as maintaining law and order, assisting with new constitutions and elections, and, in many cases, patrolling to deter a recurrence of the civil war.

THE BASICS OF CIVIL WAR

There are several basic features of civil war that must first be considered before proceeding on to more advanced topics. These features include the definition of civil war, human costs of civil war, the disputants, and types of civil wars. They form the basic tool kit needed to analyze more advanced topics covered later in the chapter such as onset, duration, termination, and recurrence of civil war.

Definitions of Civil War

Researchers have long drawn a distinction between wars that occur between states, namely, interstate wars, and civil wars that take place between parties within the boundaries of a state. However, there are differences in the various ways that civil war is defined according to empirical standards, and the student of civil war must appreciate the fact that small changes in definitions can give rise to large differences in research discoveries. Indeed, as it will be noted later in the chapter, one of the reasons for varying opinions on what causes civil wars lies with differences in classification as indicated in Table 1.1. Notice that all of the definitions are based on two specific criteria: the number of deaths and the identity of the disputants.

Number of Deaths

I begin with a definition of armed conflict:

> Armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011:532)

While definitions vary, civil war is a type of armed conflict. Of the five major sources of data on civil wars, four define a civil war as a conflict causing 1,000 deaths, though distribution of those deaths across time varies. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), however, provides a benchmark of 25 battle-related deaths per year, which are classified as "civil conflicts." Conflicts involving over 1,000 deaths are "civil wars."

Each of these can be considered civil war, though some researchers may prefer to focus only on one definition over the other. In this book, all intrastate conflicts with at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year are considered a civil war.

TABLE 1.1

Comparing Different Definitions of Civil War

Source of Definition	Sides to Conflict	Deaths	Remarks
Correlates of War (COW) project	Central government and an insurgent force	1,000/year	Insurgent must be capable of inflicting on government army at least 5% of fatalities it sustained
Doyle and Sambanis (2000)	Government versus organized, capable rebel group	1,000 overall, and in at least one of the war years	Occurs within internationally recognized country; both parties will live together after the war
Fearon and Laitin (2003a)	Country versus nonstate group	1,000 overall, with at least 100/year, and at least 100 for both sides	Fighting is over government takeover or a region, or fighting to change government policies
State Failure Project	Government and a political challenger	1,000 overall and at least 100 in any one war year	Each side must possess at least 1,000 soldiers
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute of Oslo (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013)	Of the two parties, one must be the government, fighting an organized, armed, nonstate group	At least 25 battle-related per year in low-intensity civil conflict; 1,000 in civil war	Fighting is over government, territory, or both

If we follow UCDP's definition of civil conflict, then there were 36 active conflicts in 2009 and 30 active conflicts in 2010 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). In contrast, using the higher threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths gives only six civil wars in 2009 and four in 2010. The value or virtue of using the lower threshold is that many low-intensity civil wars are utilized in the analysis. It is important that these wars not be ignored because even though they might be minor in terms of deaths, they can still have a devastating impact on human displacement, democratization, economic growth, and foreign investment.

The UCDP dataset work is highlighted in Box 1.1.

BOX 1.1 Key Civil War Datasets

Since the 1970s, the Peace and Conflict Research Department at Uppsala University, Sweden, has kept track of armed conflicts worldwide through the UCDP. The department compiles on an annual basis every account of civil war, and it produces a comprehensive publication. In collaboration with the Center for the Study of Civil War at PRIO, a detailed, comprehensive dataset covering armed conflicts from 1946 to the present has been maintained. These data are typically referred to as UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (ACD), and they also reflect interstate conflict. The data are employed in quantitative research, meaning statistical techniques are used in a scientific process aimed at analyzing civil war onset, duration, and outcome. The ACD data list all the parties that have been engaged in war, the location of the conflict, years of the war, the intensity of the war, and the type of war, among others factors.

Over time, the Armed Conflict Data continue to be refined, and revisions are published in subsequent issues of *Journal of Peace Research*. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia website is the broadest UCDP publication as it covers conflicts since 1975 and includes a large number of variables relevant for conflict analysis. Thus, there is a dataset with data from 1946 on a limited number of variables and a database with information from 1975 on many variables and containing detailed conflict descriptions (UCDP 2014a).

Wars are classified according to three different categories. A civil war may be of the general type (internal armed conflict) or one that has involved other countries (internationalized internal armed conflict) or perhaps one in which the government of a country fights the rebel group outside the boundary of that country (extra-systemic armed conflict). A more detailed discussion of this is found in Chapter 3.

To be considered a civil war, UCDP/PRIO uses a relatively low threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year. The "incompatibility" of the war describes whether the war is over a disputed territory (war over control of a territory) or over the control of government (war over control of government) or both. Most civil wars happen over one of these issues and not both. The data are available to the public at the UCDP website (http://www .pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/) at no cost. It should be noted that the UCDP also maintains an extensive catalog of datasets on other aspects of armed conflict, such as peace agreements, war termination, and civil war onsets.

The Correlates of War (COW) project maintains datasets comprising various information on civil and interstate wars. Founded by the late Professor J. David Singer of University of Michigan in 1963 and later joined by Professor

Melvin Small, the project maintains data for wars back to 1816. The COW project has data on both interstate and civil wars. A clear difference exists between UCDP/PRIO and COW in terms of what constitutes armed conflict. The COW requires interstate and intrastate to have at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. Some scholars prefer to focus on major wars and some scholars prefer studying a wider range of civil wars from very minor to major. In addition to data on war, the COW houses data on the power of countries as judged by factors such as military and economic power, energy consumption, iron and steel production, and population size. Other times, series information held by the COW includes data on bilateral trade between countries, state membership in intergovernmental organizations, and alliance data. In fact, the COW project was the first major foray into the use of scientific methods in the study of international relations. The data are available to the public online at the COW website, www.correlatesofwar.org (at no cost).

Parties to Conflict: Governments and Rebel Groups

UCDP/PRIO defines a government as the party at that time which is in control of the country's capital (Gleditsch et al. 2002). A government is an organized bureaucracy—elected or unelected—that manages the affairs of state. Governments comprise institutions that make policies for citizens to follow, and its functions include rule making, service delivery, adjudication, and national security. In contrast, rebels usually do not have institutions or provide service delivery. However, in some cases, rebels create and control a de facto state (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka). UCDP/PRIO data and definitions are employed in this text because of their widespread usage in research and their reputation for accuracy.

A key aspect of defining civil war is recognizing what constitutes a rebel group. Whether they use sticks and stones, grenades and machine guns, or the latest weapons, rebel groups and organized criminal groups employ weapons to fight their enemies. They both have a clear leadership with some sort of an organizational structure. Key differences exist between the two, however. For example, a rebel group may or may not be motivated by profits. Although a group may be fighting the government because of discrimination or barriers to progress, Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 2001) view rebel leaders as generating profits from war for self-gain and maintenance of the group. On the other hand, an organized criminal group's goal is always profit (Saab and Taylor 2009:457). Though they fight against government troops and police, the violent drug gangs of Mexico are not considered rebels as they have no formal political agenda, goal to secede,

exact political change policy, or government takeover plan. For the purposes of this book, the UCDP/PRIO definitions and data (e.g., onset, duration, battle deaths, termination type, peace agreements) are utilized to the fullest extent possible because of their international reputation for being comprehensive and accurate.

Governments and rebels may enter into armed conflict for a number of reasons. Two of the main schools of thought here are the grievance and greed models. The former represents a traditional line of reasoning that rebels start civil wars because they have suffered some deprivation at the hands of the government or another ethnic or religious group. This model has been challenged by other scholars who argue that some rebels do not fight because of grievance but rather because they are prospering in war through the exploitation of lootable resources, such as diamonds, drugs, or gold. Working under the auspices of the World Bank, the economist Paul Collier was the leading proponent of this greed perspective at the turn of the century. His findings and methods have been challenged in the last few years (see Fearon 2005). We must be careful not to overgeneralize, but political scientists tend to privilege political explanations for the onset of civil war over economic motivations. For at least some economists, the situation is reversed. The latest trend in the greed-grievance divide is toward the conclusion that lootable resources have a role in prolonging war rather than causing them. Oil, however, has been linked to onset.

Types of Civil War

Borrowing from the UCDP/PRIO methodology, this text breaks civil wars into three major classifications: wars over control of government, wars over territory (secessionist/autonomy wars), and internationalized civil wars. While some scholars may differ in their categorization of war types, this grouping captures the overarching differences. As I describe below, there are several subcategories.

Control Over Government. Wars over control of government involve rebels aiming to topple and replace the government. Examples include the Russian, Cuban, and Chinese revolutions. In each case, the rebels fought to completely sweep away the old regime and redirect government toward a highly centralized socialist system (in the case of Cuba, the socialist nature of the revolution did not become apparent for a few years). All elements of government were replaced as a result of these wars. In the Cuban and Chinese cases, many voluntarily left the country in the years before and after the revolutionaries came to power.

The grievance explanation argues that rebels cannot tolerate a government anymore because it is inefficient, practices discrimination, or imposes restrictions and barriers on minorities, so they initiate a civil war. Grievances can be

caused by, among other factors, rural-urban differences in service delivery or subsidies, differences in income levels and class differences, or unfair treatment of ethnic groups. Of course, in some cases, grievances can combine and reinforce each other.

Ideology, sometimes related to grievances, also plays a role in wars over government. During the Cold War, there were numerous wars involving government takeover. This was because the Cold War divided the world into two distinct ideological groups, communism and capitalist democracy. Both the Soviet Union and the United States lent support to government or rebel leaders with the aim of either converting the country toward their ideology or at least in order to gain influence. For example, the Vietnam War indirectly pitted the Soviets (backing the Communists in the North) against the U.S.-backed South. The situation was similar in the Korean War. Several Cold War-era wars fell into this classification. In large part, wars over control of government were caused by Western colonization, which resulted in inefficient and incompetent institutions that endured decades or centuries of external domination.

Islamic takeover of government is another common cause of governmental conflicts. In the Middle East, these conflicts can be related to the Sunni-Shi'ite religious divide. The 1979 Iranian revolution is a clear example. The post-9/11 conflict in Iraq provides another example. The Sunnis controlled politics during the Saddam Hussein regime, and the Shi'ite majority was envious of this. After the American invasion of Iraq, a power-sharing arrangement between the Sunnis and Shi'ites was established. The "Arab Spring" (referring to the uprisings in the Middle East/North Africa region in 2011 and 2012) added to the list of wars over the control of government in the Middle East and North Africa. Each of the rebellions in the Arab Spring was aimed at government control. The grievance model best explains the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring began in December 2010 in Tunisia when street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze (he died weeks later) to protest harsh treatment by a government official. His action came to represent divisions within Tunisian society as Bouazizi was very poor and struggled to make it in a country with very high unemployment. His protest led quickly to mass uprisings in Tunisia that became so large the president fled the country. Events in Tunisia were not confined to that country. By January 2011, protests broke out in Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and Oman. Uprisings began in Libya that resulted in the ouster of the Gaddafi government. In March, protests began in Syria that eventually resulted in a bloody civil war that persists to this writing (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2012a). The Arab Spring uprisings manifested differently in each country, but one main organizing theme was a desire for change in the autocratic nature of the regional governments.

The long-term effects of the Arab Spring are not yet apparent. While the uprisings have not led to immediate democratization and incipient institutions of freedom of press and speech, they have at least given people in the region an outlet for venting their frustration with regimes that hold on to power for years or even decades and harbor little dissent. The relevance of the Arab Spring to this text is that it directly led to civil wars over control of government in Libya and Syria.

In contrast, the greed explanation argues that the capture of government is about the control of resources. In this model, rebels' greed is the motivation for war, and they fight to exploit diamonds, gold, timber, or other valuable resources. The rebels may also be motivated to fight because of the potential to profit from the sale of illicit drugs. Greed issues can be very prominent if the state has valuable natural resources. For example, leaders in oil-exporting states stand to gain personally over the awarding of oil leases.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels in Angola were thought to be on the verge of being militarily defeated after American support dried up with the Cold War's end. UNITA rebels were able to regroup and even thrive despite the loss of U.S. support in large part because they were able to substitute profits from illicit diamond sales for several years in the 1990s. For its part, the government of Angola sustained its army through oil-lease revenues.

It is important to note that the resources did not cause the war but rather were used to prolong it. The question of whether resource exploitation actually leads to war or if it simply prolongs it is taken up further in Chapter 5.

Secessionist/Autonomy-Seeking Wars. Secessionist-based wars are fought between governments, which are found at the "center" of the country where power is based and a large part of the population resides. Rebels are typically concentrated ethno-religious groups, based in the periphery. Since these groups reside a considerable distance away from the core, they have ample opportunity to mobilize or raise armies. A perfect example of this is Indonesia. There are roughly 9,000 scattered islands in Indonesia. Jakarta, the capital city, simply cannot monitor all activities taking place across all of these islands. Northern Ireland's location is so far from London that there was no way the core could completely control Catholics in Northern Ireland. These rebel groups are ethnically different, such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka who live in the North and Northeast, speak a different language, and practice Hinduism (though some Tamils are Muslims), versus the Sinhalese who live in most other parts of Sri Lanka and are Buddhist. In Indonesia, the Acehnese living far from the center speak a different language than the majority Javanese-speaking Indonesians. People in East Timor in the periphery of Indonesia also speak a different language and practice Catholicism whereas the Javanese are

Muslims. Differences between the core and the periphery may also be seen in Spain (Basques versus Spaniards), the Philippines (Moro-Muslims versus Catholic Filipinos), India (numerous secessionist groups in the Northeast who do not practice Hinduism, the majority religion in India), and the bulk of the sub-Saharan African conflicts involving Christian-Muslim or tribal divides. The list goes on.

It is more likely for distinct groups concentrated in the periphery to have greater disgust with the government and a keen desire to secede than groups in the center. When these groups are poorer than the majority of the country, there is a further reason to secede, even if secession hurts economically. The poor peripheral group chooses self-rule to try and better their lives economically. This may be a reason why secessionist conflicts are the most intractable and the most severe type of conflict (Walter 2003).

The government of an ethnically divided country realizes the impact of geography and ethnic differences. Some governments then decide to reduce the periphery's power to alleviate the chance of war. In doing so, these governments cause exactly the opposite of what was originally desired. One measure is to inject majority group members into the periphery to minimize the influence of the upstart ethnic or religious group. This process is known as transmigration and has been done in the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, the Soviet Union, Botswana, and Argentina.

Transmigration can make grievances even more severe as the incoming group competes for land (leading to deforestation in some cases) and jobs in the region to which they move. The peripheral group sees the migrants as intruders and the government sponsorship of the transmigration as a threat to their cultural and/or religious identity. Tensions increase further when the government extends senior civil service and political positions to the migrant group. This leads to conflict between the migrants and the original group that can extend into civil war against the state. These "sons-of-the-soil" insurgencies have elements of greed but are mainly grievance-related (see Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011).

The case of the sons-of-the-soil war in Aceh, Indonesia, is illustrative as there were resource, ethnic, religious, and transmigration issues at work. The Aceh region is on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. The capital and population hub of Indonesia is Jakarta, located on the island of Java. The separation by water allowed Aceh to retain much of its historical identity at the expense of an incipient sense of national identity. This distinct history included a more conservative brand of Islam.

Large natural gas deposits off the coast of Aceh led to grievances in the 1970s as Acehnese were disenchanted by having to share resource revenues with the rest of the country. Revenue sharing from a resource considered "theirs" was especially problematic as Indonesia is a fragmented state comprising thousands of islands

separated by great distance. The sense of identity caused Acehnese to question why they were forced to share resource wealth with ethnically different people (e.g., Javanese) on distant islands in the far-flung country. To make matters worse, it appeared that governmental investment in Aceh was not commensurate to its contribution to the central treasury. These animosities and differences led the newly formed Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to declare independence in 1976. The secessionist civil war between GAM and the government of Indonesia lasted from 1976 to 2005 with periods of low or no activity interspersed.

Another pattern surrounding territorial conflicts has to do with natural resources. Resources, such as oil, seem to be concentrated in the peripheries of countries. Scholars know that these peripheries contain a different ethno-religious group than the core. The people of the peripheries consider these abundant resources as theirs or as partly theirs. The core, however, claims that they belong to all citizens of the country and typically do not distribute gains made from the resources to the peripheries fairly. Collier et al. (2003) showed that resource-related conflicts are usually territorial. A comprehensive discussion of natural resources and their connection to civil war will be presented in Chapter 5.

While many territorial conflicts are caused by grievances (Kreuzer 2005; Krippendorff 1979) and changing policies of the core (as in Sri Lanka), one important pattern surrounding such conflicts is the historical discourse. Rebel leaders operating from the outer regions (peripheries) commonly cite history as a reason for their struggle. A history of the region having been independent in ancient history or before the colonial masters took over creates a sense of the need to return to independence among citizens in the peripherals (Kearney 1987–1988:568). Sometimes, the periphery refers to its inclusion in the country as illegal (Baruah 2003:323, 330). The leadership of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) rebel group in Thailand, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel groups in the Philippines, and GAM in Aceh, Indonesia, all claim that their peripheral regions were historically sovereign lands and their inclusion in their respective countries was illegal. That is why in the sons-of-the-soil conflicts, any attempt to inject migrants into the outer regions is considered a violation of independence by the people in the periphery.

Secessionist wars are centered on ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic griev-ances. Sometimes, two or more of these dimensions make up the grievances. Difference in economic levels between the core and the periphery can exacerbate existing ethno-religious grievances. Past history can also explain secessionist wars. Kearney (1987–1988:568) argued that a previously independent territory that had been conquered by a colonial power and then forced that territory to be a part of a newly independent state can stir up secessionist sentiment. The inclusion of the

disputed territory within the newly independent state will be considered illegal by the peripheral (outer region) population (Baruah 2003:323, 330).

Resources found in the peripheries provide an opportunity for greed-based secessionist civil wars. Examples of this are the Angolan and Democratic Republic of Congo wars in Africa. Collier et al. (2003) argued that resource-related conflicts are usually territorial.

The American Civil War (1861–1865) was a secessionist war. While the issue of slavery was an important cause of the war, other factors were at play as well. Southern states believed that they had the right to nullify federal laws such as those on tariffs the South considered illegal. The South also did not share the same economic interests with the Northern states. Most of the Northern cities were urban and highly populated, hence more suitable for manufacturing, shipping, and fishing endeavors. The Southern cities were smaller and the region more agrarian based. Slave labor was an important aspect of the economy. If slavery were to be abolished, Southern states' economies would go to shambles. Finally, the election of Abraham Lincoln, an antislavery proponent, also contributed to the war. Although the South had resounding victories in the early stages of the war, the North eventually prevailed. The war's casualties exceeded 500,000.

Burma and India are particularly prone to secessionist wars. These two countries have had and are still experiencing numerous wars where various groups are attempting to split from the motherland. In Burma, Islamic groups in Arakan, Christians in Kachin, and minority ethnic groups in various other parts of the country are fighting the Burmese government for independence. Animist and Christians in Nagaland, Christians in Tripura, Muslims in Kashmir, and tribal and minority ethnic groups in Manipur have been fighting against the Hindu-majority India since before the end of the Cold War.

Internationalized Civil Wars. Civil wars can become internationalized when a second state intervenes in a civil war, for example, the United States' involvement in aiding South Vietnam in the Vietnam War. What was an extra-systemic war that started in 1957 between colonial-power France and the Union of the Populations of Cameroon (UPC) rebel group in Cameroon transformed into an internationalized civil war after Cameroon received independence from France in 1960. In 1990, Zaire sided with the government of Rwanda against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in one of modern history's worst ethnic conflicts.

Nine of 30 civil wars in 2010 were internationalized civil wars, the most cases of this type of war since the end of World War II (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). All but one (Afghanistan) of the internationalized civil wars in 2010 were in the Middle East/North Africa region. The recent Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and 2012 have seen outside interventions. Outside forces intervened in Libya and

Syria. Even though foreign intervention did not directly occur in Egypt and Tunisia, the United States had strong indirect presence in these two countries especially in support of the rebels.

Most internationalized wars do not begin as such. There is usually a period of fighting where domestic parties sort it out themselves. For instance, the war between French colonizers and Cameroonian rebels (UPC), which broke out in 1957 and which took tens of thousands of lives, transformed into an internationalized civil war after Cameroon received independence from France in 1960. As mentioned, Zaire intervened in 1990 on behalf of Rwanda in the latter's fight against the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

There are patterns scholars notice in explaining the onset of internationalized civil wars. Ideology can play a role. This was most common during the Cold War. The civil war in Angola (1975–2002) had Cold War-induced third-party intervention.

Regan (2000) writes that potential third-party interveners use a rational (cost-benefit) decision process before sending troops. Such intervention could be perceived as an embarrassing mistake if the intervening side loses (Pearson 1974). Foreign powers might intervene in civil wars to help an ally, for humanitarian reasons, to protect domestic multinational corporations (MNCs), and to protect embassies and military installations overseas. Other considerations include the potential for success, the duration of the war to that point, and domestic public opinion. States are more likely to intervene in wars with serious humanitarian problems (for example, a large number of refugees or human rights violations) (Regan 2000).

There are several other less common forms of war. Some are related to the types described above.

An extra-systemic war takes place between a rebel group and a government outside of the government's homeland territory (Gleditsch et al. 2002). A recent example is the United States fighting Iraqi insurgents in Iraq after 9/11. Colonial wars are wars fought between locals and their colonial masters. Such wars were very common during the pre-World War II era. Throughout history, the world has seen numerous such wars (Gandhi's independence struggle in India, the Dien Bien Phu battle of Vietnamese against French rule, the American war of independence, Algerian independence war against France, and multiple Latin American independence wars and African independence movements). Irredentist wars are those in which the group that staged the rebellion aims to unite its territory with a neighboring country. The rebels wish to separate from the motherland in order to be a part of the neighboring country. Typically, this type of war happens when the rebel territory's population shares more characteristics (usually ethno-religious) with the neighbor than with its own motherland.

Another category is sometimes mentioned though it is not clearly a type of civil war. Since the end of the Cold War, more and more attention has centered upon nonstate wars—wars between or among nonstate groups. Examples include ethno-religious groups fighting each other in nonstate wars: Hausa versus Igbo in Nigeria, Hindus versus Muslims in India, Catholics versus Protestants in the United Kingdom, and Sunnis versus Shias in the Middle East.

The focus of this text is civil wars between government and rebels. I specifically focus on the first three war types: wars over government control, secessionist/autonomy-seeking wars, and internationalized wars.

CIVIL WAR ONSET

In general, scholars explore the onset, duration, and outcome of civil war. It is not surprising that scholars often study the onset, or outbreak, of civil war because, to put it simply, researchers want to understand why civil wars begin. The researcher isolates the different factors that either separately or collectively caused war to break out that year. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003a) identify 127 civil war onsets between 1945 and 1999. The UCDP data report 229 onsets between 1946 and 2011 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). These UCDP onsets include wars that recur after a peace spell of at least five years. The Appendix at the end of this volume contains a list of civil wars from 1946 to 2009.

Interesting patterns emerge when we break down civil war onset and civil war incidence (observations) according to the different regions of the world as indicated below. Onset of civil war refers to the outbreak of a war between two parties. If there is a 5-year (other durations can be used depending on preference) break in the war and it reignites, this recurrence is considered a new onset. From 1946 to 2011, Europe experienced 25 onsets, the Middle East 29, the Americas 33, Asia 67, and Africa 75 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Clearly, Asia and Africa experienced the greatest number of onsets. This is likely linked to high ethnic and religious diversity exaggerated in some cases by border people ignoring each of these features and variations in government type ranging from democracy to authoritarian military regimes.

Scholars and policy makers do not always agree on the causes of the onset of civil war. Though this will be covered in greater detail in Chapter 4, briefly, the scientific study of causes of civil war is divided between the following explanations:

1. *Civil war is a result of citizens' frustration arising out of continuously or continually having been discriminated against, barriers or restrictions to their progress or practices, and/or the inability to channel complaints to authorities.* As mentioned, this is

commonly referred to as the grievance argument. The line of reasoning here is that rebel groups arise out of group deprivation.

An overreliance on natural resources, such as oil, can be linked to grievance-related civil war (see Ross 2004). For example, a corrupt regime in a developing state that exports oil might enrich itself with money from multinational oil companies at the expense of a legitimate taxation relationship with its people. In such a situation, the regime does not need to worry about keeping the people happy because it does not rely on the people for taxes. Nigeria arguably provides a case in point here.

2. *Civil war is a result of greed and the desire for private gain.* This theory treats rebellion as a business enterprise, where rebel leaders seek gains from the war. Greed basically follows a rational choice calculation of choosing the choice that maximizes benefit to cost. The profit from resources can be used to entice recruits.

3. *Wars result from opportunities.* This theoretical perspective explains war from a state capacity ("weak state") standpoint. Stronger governments are more prepared to control uprisings and thwart rebel recruitment. States with capacity also have a monopoly on the use of violence in all of their territory. There are no regions where rebels can organize with impunity. High-capacity states are more likely to meet the basic needs of the citizens. In weak states, rebels recognize the opportunity to organize and start a war (Fearon and Laitin 2003a:76).

Some wars do not fit neatly into only one category. Further, there are other models that are used to explain the causes of civil war. For instance, there are at least five models (see Chapter 4) that explain why ethno-religious wars happen.

THE DURATION OF CIVIL WARS

The length of civil wars varies. Some last for only days whereas others go on for decades. Twenty-five percent of civil wars last longer than five years and 8 percent of civil wars last longer than twenty years (Cunningham 2006). This brief section provides an overview of duration. Some revolutions and coups are quite short while other wars can last decades. The rebels of South Moluccas fought a war against Indonesia that lasted only a few months in 1950. The Karen National Union, on the other hand, has been fighting against the government of Myanmar since 1948. Most coups last only a very brief time. A military coup in Argentina in 1963 lasted 4 days. Long wars might have a relatively low rate of death but can still

have devastating impacts on human displacement, disease, and development. War duration is an all-important consideration because of the devastation involved.

For the purposes of measuring duration, an incidence (observation) of civil war counts every single year a civil war takes place including the outbreak year. For example, the Israel-Palestinian civil war broke out in 1949 but continues today. The onset of this war was in 1949 whereas its incidence was recorded for every single year there was war including 1949. Hence, the data will contain many more incidences (observations) of wars than onsets.

Across all world regions, there were 1,337 years of civil wars between 1946 and 2011. During this period, Africa had 443 civil wars years, Asia had 420, the Middle East had 215, the Americas had 173, and Europe had only 86. The same trend is observed for both the pre- and post-Cold War eras with Asia and Africa having the most civil war years in both eras. For both eras, Europe and the Americas had the least number of civil wars (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). These low numbers are likely linked to the presence of stable democracy, strong economies in the case of North America and Western Europe, and religious, language, and ethnic similarities in much of Latin America.

Type of War and Duration

Some war types are, on average, longer than others. Fearon (2004) links insurgency strategy to duration. Coups and revolutions seek quick tipping points so that outright victory is achieved. The strategy of peripheral wars—usually with an ethnic component—is to seek dominance to win more favorable terms at the bargaining table. Peripheral wars do not necessarily depend on military victory in order to realize important political goals.

Coup organizers do not set up rebel armies ready and willing to fight many years from a base in the countryside. Coups are fought by members of the government (often the military) who set out to quickly take the reins of power. Coup leaders do not set out to engage the government's army in protracted battle. This is not to say that coups cannot be followed by new coups carried out by different individuals.

Peripheral, territorial wars tend to endure and are unlikely to end conclusively with peace agreements or military victories. Fearon (2004) reasons that a lack of credible commitment on the part of the government leads the rebels not to trust any sort of autonomy deal the government might offer. This means the rebels do not consider the government as a credible partner in negotiations. In other words, the rebels feel the government will renege or not follow through on any commitment it makes. When the rebels are doing well vis-à-vis the government, the latter will offer generous concessions. However, the rebels will expect the government to break these promises as the rebel advantages dwindle.

The government would prefer military victory to an autonomy deal, but it is difficult for the government to end a territorial war militarily as the peripheral group can use the local terrain to its advantage and can blend into the civilian population. In addition, because the rebels do not threaten the control of the central government, the government does not feel compelled to pay the high economic and political costs a military victory would invoke. Another obstacle for the government is that ethnic rebels operating in the periphery often use guerrilla tactics. Examples of these peripheral secessionist wars include several of the wars in Myanmar and the Aceh war in Indonesia. These conflicts are sometimes called sons-of-the soil wars. Fearon also notes that rebel access to contraband resources will further prolong these wars.

Wars over control of government, on the other hand, rely on a tipping effect and typically do not last as long (Fearon 2004). Wars designed to take central government usually involve a large, well-armed rebel army if they are to have a chance at victory. In these wars, the stakes are high because the central government is directly threatened. The government is likely to go all out to defeat the rebels as quickly as possible. Subsequently, on average, these wars are shorter. There are exceptions to this rule, such as the war between Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the government of Colombia that has waged for decades. This is due, in part, to the FARC sale of coca.

Coups are a very brief type of war (some may not even consider these civil wars) as they are generally even more extreme examples of all-or-nothing affairs than wars over government. The hallmark of the coup is that it is carried out by elements from within the current government. Often, the military takes the reins of power. If the coup planners do not achieve a quick victory, there is a high probability the government will kill, exile, or imprison them (see Fearon 2004).

Lootable Resources and War Duration

Certain commodities of value can make for longer wars. The illegal exploitation of resources (sometimes called contraband, black market, or lootable goods) can provide finances to rebels that can be used to pay for food, weapons, recruits, and other miscellaneous supplies (see Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009). Some, most notably Paul Collier, argue that profit from the lootable goods is another mechanism that keeps the war going. Lootable natural resources are effective because they do not rely on legitimate markets that might otherwise preclude profits going to rebels.

Lootable resources potentially prolong the war both because rebels are making money to pay for their operations and because in some cases they are making a profit. However, scholars have arrived at different findings regarding the specific linkages. Humphreys (2005) argued that civil wars relating to natural resources

last longer. Regan and Norton (2005) arrived at the same conclusion for diamonds. However, Ross (2006) could not prove that diamonds had any bearing on the length of conflicts. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) found that secondary diamond production lengthens ethno-religious civil wars and primary diamond production shortened ethno-religious civil wars. Fearon (2004) reported gems, such as secondary diamonds, made sons-of-the-soil civil wars last longer.

Diamonds are an especially useful form of contraband possessing a high value to weight ratio and until recently were fairly easy to sell on the black market. Some forms of alluvial diamonds require very little capital investment as rebels can just wade through rivers and scoop up sediment in their search for diamonds. Diamonds were successfully exploited by UNITA rebels in Angola after the Cold War ended and the United States and South Africa withdrew their support. The international community cracked down on this mechanism through the so-called Kimberley (because talks began in Kimberley, South Africa, in 2000) Process that makes it harder to sell conflict diamonds.

Drugs and black market timber are other forms of lootable goods. The previously mentioned use of drugs by FARC rebels in Colombia and timber by various rebels in Myanmar are prime examples here. The sale of drugs by rebels requires a certain amount of secure territory that is stable enough to grow and/or process the goods. The exploitation of black marker timber requires only a few trucks and chainsaws. Each of these commodities has extended wars.

It is important to note that while lootable goods play a key role in duration, they are not as clearly linked to the onset of the war. One possible exception to this finding is that the war in Aceh can be partially traced back to grievances linked to large natural gas deposits in the region. The local population felt ownership of the resource on their land and was not satisfied about sharing the revenue with the rest of the country.

While Collier and company, Fearon, and others argue that lootable commodities lengthen war, it is also possible that contraband can work against the rebels to shorten war. Weinstein (2005) observes that contraband resources in rebel areas might actually undermine the recruitment of dedicated rebels. This is because rebels drawn to contraband-fueled wars might only be interested in short-term financial gain and not the wider cause. When contraband is lacking, these short-sighted opportunists stay away and more dedicated fighters are recruited.

Spoilers and War Duration

Not all actors favor peace processes. Stephen Stedman (2000) identified another factor that can prolong war: the presence of spoilers both inside and outside a peace process. He defines spoilers as parties who see the peace process as a threat

to their power or worldview. As a result, spoilers will often turn to violence to derail the peace process. Acts of violence during a peace process will understandably generate obstacles to the peace process. Spoilers undermine the peace process because they feel it will threaten their interests or power (Stedman 1997). This may also help explain why mediation sometimes leads to increases in rebel terrorism.

The Real Irish Republican Army was a spoiler group that broke away from the Provisional Irish Republican Army in protest of the peace process.

Foreign Intervention and War Duration

Third parties can impact civil war duration. Surprisingly, interventions tend to lengthen civil wars. Regan (2000) mentions that out of the 190 civil wars that had foreign involvements, only 57 ended. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) agree with Regan's findings that interventions make civil wars longer. This is a point to note for intergovernmental organizations and states that usually intervene (e.g., United States, France, and United Kingdom). As Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) pointed out, it is useful to determine how duration of war is affected by which side the intervener takes. Just as Regan (2000), they found that foreign interventions increase duration whichever side the intervener takes. However, if a foreign power stages military action against the government, the war may be expected to be shorter. A military attack causes the government's power to be significantly reduced and forces it to cede to either the rebel's or the foreign power's demands as was witnessed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attacks on Serbia in the Kosovo war in the 1990s.

UN intervention can be a curse for both government and rebels in a narrow sense. The United Nations makes it harder for either the government or the rebels to win. On the other hand, UN involvement reduces the time taken to strike a truce or a peace treaty (DeRouen and Sobek 2004).

Other Factors Affecting Duration

Civil wars last longer in countries with high ethno-religious fractionalization. This may be attributed to strong ethno-religious bonds that exist in ethnic or religious rebel groups. Rebel group cohesion makes it difficult for the government to practice the divide-and-rule strategy. Hence, a quick victory for the government or government ability to force the rebel group to the negotiation table becomes more difficult, and the result is a long war (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). This explains in part why separatist wars last longer (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Most territorial claims are based on the ethno-religious basis, for instance, in Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Sudan, and Turkey. Studies (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000) have shown that the ethno-religious variable may

be impacting the length of wars in a more complicated manner. Civil war duration increases with increasing ethno-religious fractionalization but becomes shorter after fractionalization peaks in a curvilinear relationship. This is to say that countries with very high and very low fractionalizations will experience shorter wars.

DeRouen and Sobek (2004) assess the impact of state capacity on duration, using two measures of state capacity: the first, bureaucratic quality measured by effectiveness, independence, and stability of the bureaucracy; and second, military size. In our study, we report a bigger military contributes to decreasing the length of wars.

An interesting point to consider is the dynamics at play in the early stages of a civil war. About half or more of all civil wars end within the first year (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). If allowed to continue, however, the rebel group benefits from the continued war. Time is the rebels' ally especially in non-ethno-religious wars in states with low ethno-religious fractionalization with rough terrains. Crushing the rebel group within the first few months or as early as possible is a strategy the government needs to employ. This is because the likelihood of rebel victory increases with time (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). The ease of crushing a rebellion is easier in autocratic countries. Because of this, civil wars tend to be shorter in autocratic states (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).

OUTCOME AND TERMINATION OF CIVIL WARS

Rebels and governments are faced with challenging questions during the course of wars. The decision to continue, give up, or call for a settlement lingers through the course of the war. Such decisions are constrained by various factors.

There are three possible ways a war can end: government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement. Of course, in many years, war does not terminate and simply continues. When one party predicts an obvious victory (by calculating probability of victory), it will continue fighting until it wins the war without considering settlement.

The probability of victory is not the only factor predicting how wars end. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) report an array of factors determining the outcome of civil war—duration of war, battle deaths, foreign intervention, type of war, and state capacity. As previously stated, the longer the war, the more beneficial it is for rebels (see DeRouen and Sobek 2004). The majority of wars in which the government has won were short wars (50 percent in the first year and most of them within the first 5 years). There is an interesting difference between the Mason, Weingarten, and Fett study compared to the others because researchers of this study also found that 56 percent of rebel victories occurred within the first year of war. Nevertheless, the striking statistics on government victory

previously noted suggest that quickly crushing the rebels is a worthwhile strategy if the government aims to be victorious.

Brandt et al. (2008) similarly reported government victories are usually in shorter wars and rebel victories in longer ones. They, however, did not find government victories in the early stages of the war, instead finding that they happen between the fourth and the eighth year. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) showed that after 5 years pass, there is a high likelihood that rebels will force the government to the negotiating table. They showed that government is, however, more likely to win in ethno-religious conflicts. This is bad news for ethno-religious rebels. Because the chance of a rebel victory is slim in ethno-religious conflict (as was also found by DeRouen and Sobek 2004), their best bet therefore would be to secure negotiations. War weariness increases the likelihood that parties to war will be more accepting to third-party negotiations. Hence, negotiated settlements are more likely in long wars with foreign interventions.

This is not the case for shorter wars. The war-weariness explanation also explains why when cost of war increases (measured in number of battle deaths), the outcome is more likely to be a negotiated settlement as found by Brandt et al. (2008). This idea applies only to the government. An increase in battle deaths increases the chance of a rebel victory. This may be attributed to shifting sympathies toward the rebel side from the masses. For the government to balance this, it needs to increase state capacity via an increase in military size (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). As previously stated, it may be a good idea to employ different measures of state capacity when studying duration and outcome of war. State capacity measured by the quality of bureaucracy surprisingly has no effect on the chance of a government victory but greatly curtails the chance of rebel victory (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Weak or corrupted governments help pave a way for rebel victory (Brandt et al. 2008).

The pattern of civil war terminations seems to favor the government. There is a 64 percent chance that the government will win a civil war. Instead of hoping for a victory, the rebel group should rather aspire to force the government to negotiate. This is because 31 percent of the time, wars end in settlements leaving very little chance for rebel victory (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Past experiences of rebels changing their stance from a total independence claim to agreement to autonomy (for instance, the MILF, PULO, and GAM in Asia) bear witness to this.

CIVIL WAR RECURRENCE

Often wars end only to start up again a few years later. The war fought between the Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement, Senegal (MFDC) rebels of the Casamance region and the government of Senegal recurred four times after the

first episode in 1990. Recurrence can be defined as the renewal of fighting after a period of peace. This section summarizes the major factors impacting recurrence.

War Type

Whereas several scholars note that ethnic-secessionist wars are more intractable than wars over government, there is not a wealth of empirical evidence showing these wars are more likely to recur. One exception is Wucherpfennig (2008) who theorizes that recurrence probability goes up in secessionist wars. Prior wars, he argues, lock in the positions of each side. After a war episode, the ethnic rebel's view of its cause as legitimate gets stronger, and the government's position as unwilling to compromise is cemented.

Outcome of the Previous War

DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) model the duration of peace after civil war. This is inherently the same as modeling the recurrence of civil war because if the peace ends, the implication is that the war has recurred. In our research, we find military victories tend to make peace more enduring because one side is completely vanquished as a fighting force. According to Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007), however, civil wars are less likely to recur when rebels win or if there is a peace agreement accompanied by peacekeepers. It is important to note that these two studies used different data.

Walter (2004) diverges from the argument that the previous war's outcome is a critical explanation of recurrence. As discussed, she posits instead that opportunity costs as measured by quality of life and access to democratic institutions will shape the ability of the rebels to recruit. If the economy is growing, the country allows political participation, and rebels will be less likely to join the fight.

Nature of the State at War's End

All things considered, democracy will promote peaceful conflict management practices (see Greig 2005). Democratic regimes should be more able to establish the appropriate peacebuilding institutions. Democratic regimes are more amenable to peaceful resolution of disputes (see DeRouen and Goldfinch 2005; Dixon 1994). Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) find that democracy lengthens the duration of civil war negotiated settlement as these forms of government are best suited to accommodate competing interests and weaken the threat of defections.

The capacity of the state at war's end will also be an important determinant of recurrence. As mentioned, if the economy is solid, it is harder to recruit rebels (Walter 2004). Higher levels of development could also signal greater chance for a peace agreement to obtain and thus a decreased chance of recurrence. DeRouen

et al. (2010) provide case study evidence that state capacity is a critical ingredient of peace agreement implementation. A state needs a certain amount of capacity to implement the peace. Such implementation often includes disarming and reintegrating former rebels, democratizing, holding elections, or establishing an independent judiciary. If the government lacks capacity to implement reforms, the rebels might grow impatient and renew fighting.

Quinn et al. (2007) also find that higher levels of development at war's end reduce the probability of recurrence. It is likely that greater state capacity raises the opportunity costs for rebels. In other words, rebels incur a cost by foregoing an economic opportunity that could well be offered in a prosperous state. This would be expected to undercut rebel recruitment and motivation to fight.

Rebel Recruitment

For a rebel movement to sustain itself to the extent needed to renew a war, it needs a renewable supply of recruits who are willing and capable. Walter's (2004) empirical results lead her to conclude that recruitment of rebels is a function of opportunity costs as measured by quality of life and access to political participation. If the economy is growing and there is some level of democracy, it will be harder to recruit rebels. It stands to reason that if conditions during a war allow potential rebels to freely voice their opinions and/or have a reasonably good chance of finding work in the licit economy, it will be harder for rebels to recruit for a renewed war. In short, the better the state is doing, the harder it is for rebels to recruit and the lower the probability of a recurrence.

Peacekeeping Operations and Military Intervention

Peacekeeping operations are specifically designed to make recurrence less likely. Specifically, peacekeepers typically take up positions between former combatants to lower the probability that one side will take aggressive action against the other. Accordingly, it is important that as researchers we control for their effects lest we attribute too much credit to mediation. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) report the virtues of peacekeeping as an enhancement for local capacity at war's end.

Some wars such as those in Lebanon and Cambodia experienced third-party military intervention. On one hand, these wars should be more likely to be mediated because of the complicating nature of third-party military involvement. This involvement provides a context that would draw in mediators. On the other hand, it could make the party on whose behalf the intervention occurs less likely to agree to mediation. During the Cold War, the civil war in Angola was internationalized with the presence of South African and Cuban troops and significant aid from the superpowers. Mediation becomes less likely in such a situation as actors see their prospects enhanced by the presence of armed foreign allies.

Duration and Death: The Costs of War

The cost of war can be measured in terms of duration and deaths. Toft (2009) finds death rate and total deaths have opposite effects on recurrence. Total death reduces the probability while the average rate increases the probability of the war restarting. It is plausible that a high rate can be more closely linked to an urgent need to resolution.

In general, the costlier the war, the more likely it will be mediated. Greig (2005) reports that the longer the war, the more likely it will be mediated. As noted by Bercovitch and Gartner (2006), deadlier wars attract the attention of mediators. In general, the prospects for mediation should increase with war duration.

As above, deaths and duration each represent a component of the costs of war. The question is whether high costs make recurrence more or less likely. Quinn et al. (2007) argue that war-related deaths should help the postwar peace because these deaths make recruiting more difficult by discouraging fighters and diminishing the recruiting pool. They also note that high casualty rates also cause each side to doubt its ability to win in any case of renewed fighting.

Walter (2004), however, suggests that high-casualty rates could undermine the peace if the government indiscriminately kills great numbers of civilians as part of its retaliation against rebels: Popular support for the insurgency may well grow, and the rebels might be more likely to start fighting again as they attract new and committed recruits. Toft (2009) also finds that death rates have a positive effect on recurrence probability.

The duration of the previous war, on the other hand, is expected to make recurrence less likely. Long wars should increase the chance of mediation and/or negotiated settlements as information is revealed to fighters pertaining to what they are likely to face if the war recurs and on the level of resolve of the other side (Quinn et al. 2007). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also argue that longer wars result in battle fatigue. The longer a civil war that preceded it lasts, the lower the probability of recurrence as the weaker side reaches a point where it knows it cannot prevail on the battlefield (Walter 2004). In other words, the longer the war, the more information will be available to each side in terms of the adversary's power and resolve. A long-lasting civil war might give some actors the opportunity to learn that they do not have sufficient resources to pursue a war. Thus, they will be unwilling to initiate another war.

The war's end begins a spell of peace. The duration of these spells after the war can help determine if a lasting peace will take hold. The duration of peace after a civil war has been shown to have a negative impact on recurrence (see DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). In other words if peace has lasted 20 years after a war has ended, the probability of war in a future year is quite low. There was a civil war in Costa Rica in 1948, but the probability of this war recurring is

virtually zero after 64 years. On the other hand, the probability of a war recurring on two or three years after ending is relatively higher as a stable peace might not have taken hold.

The duration of the war can also be considered a cost of war and as such has relevance for recurrence. If a long war has been fought and ended with government victory or negotiated settlement and the rebels are contemplating renewing the fight, the memory of the long war will be on their minds. The rebels will likely recall the costs and war weariness from the long war that they did not win. On the whole, a long war should lower the probability of recurrence (see DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). A note of caution is that many long wars are relatively low in intensity (rate of deaths), so the rebel cost of fighting is not exceptionally high. From this perspective, a long, low-intensity war might well recur after ending. Very long but low-intensity ethnic wars in Burma match this scenario.

On the whole, we expect that costliness lowers the probability of recurrence. This could be seen as a result of what Zartman calls a "hurting stalemate" (Zartman 1989). The longer and more deadly the previous civil war, the more stable the subsequent peace because belligerents value peace over the uncertainty of another long and/or deadly war.

CIVIL WAR PATTERNS

Figure 1.1 reports data on armed conflict from Themnér and Wallensteen (2011). One very noticeable trend is that there are many more civil wars than interstate wars since World War II. The general trend is an increase in the number of countries experiencing civil war. The number of civil wars also followed an increasing trend.

There was a spike in the number of civil wars and percentage of countries experiencing war in the early 1990s. This is in large part due to wars that broke out as the Cold War ended. This includes wars in Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The End of the Cold War and Its Effect on Civil War

The Cold War was a period of intense rivalry between the two greatest military powers, the United States and the USSR. The United States was the leader of the democratic world while the USSR controlled Communist states.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the newly independent republics. This opened the door to violent power struggles. The fall of the USSR also began the unraveling of communist control in Yugoslavia. Communism had been a key force that united the various ethnicities and religions of the republic.

FIGURE 1.1
Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946–2010

Source: Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen (2011:526). Reprinted with permission.

Huntington's (1993) "clash of civilizations" framework argues that the end of the Cold War will unleash more conflict. He predicted wars will erupt because of cultural differences between such groups as Christians and Muslims. He argues ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic differences threaten international and intrastate stability more than economic competition between and within states (Huntington 1993, 1996). These forces had been more or less held in check during the Cold War. Chapter 4 describes this in greater detail.

There was great emphasis on the effects of democratization within states after the fall of communism. Interest centered upon the effects of freedom on intrastate stability. One finding was that war was more likely in the middle range of political freedom (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002; Sambanis 2001). This situation was common in countries emerging from communism. In these mid-range polities (also called anocracies), citizens will have grievances and a new ability to mobilize collectively. This may even result in armed opposition. In a fully democratic state, citizens have all the freedoms they need including the freedom to criticize leaders and vote them out. There is little need to fight. In the other end of the scale, in very autocratic states, any attempt to mobilize will be crushed. The experiences of Yugoslavia, the former constituents of the USSR (including Russia), Yemen, and Congo each fall within this category.

CONCLUSION

From death, disease, displacement, sexual crimes, child soldiers, torture, economic problems, and terrorism, civil wars cause multiple miseries. The United Nations estimates that over 5 million people died because of civil wars in the 10 years following the end of the Cold War. Between 1946 and 2011, there were approximately 229 civil war onsets. Three main explanations for onset were put forward in this Introduction. The greed perspective posits that rebels are profit-seeking opportunists. Dissecting war from this particular angle therefore puts pressure on governments to tackle the problem of how to prevent selfish rebel leaders from raising a rebel army based on illicit gains from natural resources. Here, rebel leaders treat rebellion as a business. The second perspective is the grievance perspective. Here, rebel leaders raise an army because of various grievances held by themselves and their followers. Grievance may be political in nature or economic, social, and cultural and ethnic. A common grievance is that the government restricts minorities from equal participation or that it fails to provide equal opportunities. Additionally, grievance may be about restriction of their religious or cultural practices. A third perspective is the capacity and opportunity model.

This book is an overview of civil war using the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war as the basis of the analysis. The features of civil war covered in Chapter 1 include the definition of civil war; relevant civil war datasets; types of civil war; causes of onset, duration, outcome, and termination; and patterns of onset and recurrence of civil war. These features provide a foundation for the remainder of the book. The recurring theme of the book is conflict management. As appropriate, the book discusses conflict management in the context of each of these features. A thorough understanding of these features will inform conflict management. In turn, the discussion of conflict management can shed light on civil war.

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