

Managing Motivation in the Public Service

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of the chapter, you will be able to do the following:

- Define and explain public service motivation (PSM).
- Understand the importance of organizing and managing motivation in the public sector.
- Explain the implications of PSM as a tool for public human resource management (PHRM).
- Discuss the impact of PHRM reform on employee motivation.

Public human resource management (PHRM) reform efforts over the past few decades have aimed to improve the efficiency of the public service. In particular, these efforts have taken aim at the perception of an inefficient bureaucracy composed of public employees who are unmotivated and unproductive. In an effort to increase workplace productivity, many of the PHRM reforms discussed thus far have sought to motivate public employees to be more performance oriented. Motivation is seen as a crucial element of productivity in both the public and private sectors. Jurisdictions, such as the state of Georgia, have implemented performance-based pay and employment at will (EAW) as tools for improving motivation in the public service.

However, the incentives offered via reforms like performance-based pay can be at odds with the factors that have traditionally motivated people working in public service. We now know that public employees are not motivated just by pay and prestige but often respond to a call to serve a higher purpose or common good. Because many PHRM reforms have emphasized monetary rewards, they have failed to boost employee productivity. This lapse is important given that many public sector agencies are still considering using such reforms to motivate their employees. Unless policy makers take stock of the results achieved to date, improving productivity will continue to be problematic. HR managers should consider how the objectives of the

public sector contrast with those of the private sector and appreciate what motivates public employees to pursue a common good.

This chapter will review the literature on **public service motivation (PSM)** and reflect on the impact recent PHRM reforms have had on motivation in the public service. The chapter will also offer approaches that public managers can employ to effectively leverage PSM to achieve productivity and work objectives.

Defining Public Service Motivation

Research into what motivates public sector employees has seen greater activity in recent decades in light of reform activity and its emphasis on private sector know-how. Traditionally, organizational theorists took for granted that people are motivated by similar incentives regardless of the sector they work in—public, private, or nonprofit. More recently, however, the topic has captured the attention of practitioners and scholars alike as uniquely suited to PHRM literature (Crewson 1997; Horton 2008; Houston 2000; Naff and Crum 1999; Oh and Lewis 2009; Perry 1996, 1997; Perry and Porter 1982; Perry and Wise 1990; Rainey 1982). The essential question is, What motivates people to pursue the public good? For researchers, this is a different question from what motivates people to choose work in the public sector over work in other sectors. Rather, this question concerns what drives the public sector employee to recognize and respond to causes uniquely oriented toward the public sector (e.g., the elimination of poverty) (Perry and Wise 1990).

Recent research suggests that the service ethic, a desire to pursue the public interest, or **public service motivation (PSM)** might be behind the decision to pursue public institution causes (Rainey 2009, 266). Findings from this vein of research suggest that motivating factors differ between public and private sector workers. Rainey (1983), in his comparative assessment of managers in state government and the business community, found that people employed in state agencies regarded meaningful public service as more important than did their private sector counterparts. Similarly, federal employees indicated that serving social causes and making a difference in public affairs—much more so than pay and job security—were their primary motivators for entering government employment (Crewson 1995). Rainey (2009) suggested that these findings identify a typology of public servants that includes valuing work that assists others and benefits society, involves self-sacrifice, and promotes responsibility and integrity (267).

These recent findings contradict traditional political behavior literature, which suggests that humans—and, more specifically, public employees—are rational actors who are motivated by self-interest. In the context of bureaucracy, the classical economic explanation is that the public sector worker operates in his or her own self-interest to enhance power and position within the organization, regardless of whether

the policies produced are efficient or in the public interest (Downs 1965; Tullock 1971). PSM challenges the economic rationale that people are self-maximizing individuals motivated only by securing their position within the organization. Rather, individual motivators are complex and include not only prestige and power but also social aspirations.

Perry (2000) further distinguished PSM from general motivation theories by emphasizing the “publicness” of motivation. This quality is shaped by four premises: sociohistorical context, including education, socialization, and other life events; motivational context, including institutional values, beliefs, ideology, job characteristics, organizational incentives, and work environment; individual characteristics, including abilities, competencies, self-concept, and self-regulatory processes; and behavior, including rational choice, rule-governed behavior, and obligation. Working for the federal, state, or local government, one might be shaped by life events (e.g., saying the pledge of allegiance at the beginning of school), values (e.g., constitutional values of equality, liberty, and justice), and/or individual characteristics and behaviors (e.g., a strong work ethic instilled by family members). Over time, individuals come to strongly identify with these life events, values, self-concepts, and behaviors, and their influence on work is unavoidable.

It is clear, then, that PSM theory offers an alternative explanation for why people enter government employment. They do not do so strictly out of self-interest, although that is certainly a consideration in any employment decision, but often also out of a desire to serve the wider public good.

Public Service versus Public Sector Motivation

To be clear, *public service motivation* should be distinguished from *public sector motivation*. People are motivated by many different considerations to work for and in the public sector as opposed to the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. The public sector includes all levels of government (federal, state, local) as well as quasi-public entities (e.g., public corporations or state-owned enterprises). Public sector employment is often attractive because it offers job security, career growth potential, and retirement/health benefits. The conventional perception is that the public sector offers better quality of life, balance of work and family, and opportunity for advancement through training and learning than can be found in the private sector. According to Perry and Hondeghem (2008, 3), these “specific motives for working for and in the public sector lie outside PSM, which refers generally to motives associated with serving the public good.” So, it is important to recognize that some who are motivated to work for the public sector may not necessarily have a strong public service orientation, instead being more influenced by practical matters such as job security or generous health benefits. **Public sector motivation** is the desire to work in a certain type of

organization (i.e., government), whereas **public service motivation** is the desire to do a certain type of work (i.e., serve the public good).

The Motives Underlying Public Service Motivation

Perry and Wise (1990) found three purposes underlying the public service motive: norm-based, affective, and rational. Norm-based and affective reasons for public employment convey more altruistic purposes. **Norm-based motives** include a desire to serve the public interest, a sense of loyalty or duty to government, and a belief in social equity. Valuing social equity might move a person to seek a position in an office responsible for ensuring equal employment opportunity (e.g., a diversity office in a university).

Affective motives constitute a commitment to a specific program out of a personal conviction. For example, citizens may be drawn to serve in veterans affairs agencies out of a sense of loyalty to the men and women in the armed services. According to Frederickson and Hart (1985), one type of affective motive, **patriotism of benevolence**, involves “an extensive love of all people within our political boundaries and the imperative that they must be protected in all of the basic rights granted to them by the enabling documents (i.e., the United States Constitution)” (549).

Finally, persons seeking public sector employment may not be influenced only by altruistic reasons. Indeed, **rational motives**, such as a desire to participate in the policy process, commitment to public programs based on personal identification, and/or advocacy for a special interest may also be motivating factors (Perry and Wise 1990, 370). For example, policy makers are often involved in crafting enabling legislation and then are motivated to see their ideas come to fruition in the form of operationalized programs. Some research suggests that rational motives, while often driven by self-interest, should not be perceived as overtly detrimental to the public good. Self-interest drivers (e.g., promotion, power, prestige, success in politics) may tip the balance in favor of policy pursuits over another career. Policy makers often have an advantage in public sector employment in that they possess the intimate knowledge and expertise requisite to launching a particular initiative. Their expertise is just as important to the policy process as is elected officials’ knowledge of the legislative process required to pass enabling legislation. Ultimately, the fact that policy makers may seek to work on government initiatives benefits citizen end users (Downs 1965; Tullock 1971). The classic example is Niccolò Machiavelli’s Italian prince whose “ends justify the means.”

Given the many factors that motivate individuals to work in the public service, to expect that individuals adopt a purely rational approach to job selection, divorced from their belief systems, is implausible. Thus, PSM is a valuable theoretical construct; rather than seeking to eliminate values and beliefs, PSM embraces their worth as motivational tools.

Identifying Public Service Motivation

For public HR managers, identifying prospective candidates (or current employees) who exhibit PSM-like qualities can be useful in the recruitment and promotion process. How does one go about identifying these qualities in someone? Table 8.1 presents the findings from Perry's research, from which he built a model of PSM, broken into four constructs (or categories). This model could be used as a rough predictor of who might be inclined to exhibit PSM, based on how they respond to various survey questions (Perry 1996). Perry's model frames the questions along both rational and altruistic motivations. The first construct—*Attraction to Policy Making*—is a rational one and gauges individual perceptions of politics and the policy-making process. Persons exhibiting PSM qualities would be inclined to agree with statements in the table, while disagreeing with the statements marked with an asterisk (*). So, as an example, those with PSM would typically not think that *politics* is a dirty word, and they would tend to appreciate the give and take of public policy making.

The remaining constructs assess more altruistic perceptions of public service. *Commitment to the Public Interest* gauges an individual's sense of civic duty, especially as applied to public employees as integral stakeholders in the policy process. Tapping the norm-based motive of social equity, the *Compassion* construct assesses individual commitment to social programs. The questions about compassion also test moral imperatives through emotional responses to humanness (Frederickson and Hart 1985). *Self-Sacrifice* is another aspect of PSM. Self-sacrifice gauges the individual's willingness to put others' interests before his or her own. This sacrifice is demonstrated by the willingness of public servants to forgo financial rewards for the intangible rewards they receive from serving the public (Perry 1996, 7). For example, a public servant who has expertise in finance may have eschewed a lucrative career in the private sector as an investment banker in order to become a regulator for the Federal Reserve; this person is sacrificing a high income in favor of pursuing goals beneficial to the broader public.

While others have experimented with alternative versions of Perry's original constructs, the questions included in Table 8.1 have proven useful. Indeed, Perry's PSM questionnaire has been established as a reliable means for validating public service motives not only among public employees but also among workers in other sectors. International applications of PSM have validated its importance as a universal characteristic in public service employees, with some variation according to national context (e.g., country-specific culture and values) (Vandenabeele and Van de Walle 2008). For example, recent research has suggested that the rational constructs of this model of PSM may not adequately explain the motives of Korean public servants (Kim 2009)

Table 8.1	Identifying Public Service Motivation
*Answering in the negative. Persons exhibiting PSM qualities should disagree with these statements.	
Construct	Statement
Attraction to Policy Making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Politics</i> is a dirty word.* • The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me.* • I don't care much for politicians.*
Commitment to the Public Interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is hard to get me genuinely interested in what is going on in my community.* • I unselfishly contribute to my community. • Meaningful public service is very important to me. • I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the community, even if it harms my interests. • I consider public service a civic duty.
Compassion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged.* • Most social programs are too vital to do without. • It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. • To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. • I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally.* • I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another. • I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves.* • There are few public programs I wholeheartedly support.*
Self-Sacrifice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. • I believe in putting duty before self. • Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds.* • Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. • Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. • I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. • I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else. • I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.
Source: Perry 1996	

Why would it be useful for public HR managers to recruit prospective candidates who exhibit PSM? The following sections explore the influence of PSM in public sector and how it can be leveraged in the organization.

Nonprofits in Focus

Do Public Employees Volunteer?

Now that we've discussed the subject of motivation in the public sector, we turn to consider whether or not such a motive transcends to volunteering. Public service motivation (PSM) suggests that many people in the public sector have answered "a call" to public service. This call stems from a commitment to serving the public interest, serving others, and self-sacrifice. But does this commitment to the public interest and serving others carry over to volunteering for causes outside the scope of paid employment.

David Houston (2006) recently took up this question by analyzing respondents to the 2002 General Social Survey who were employed in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. His primary research question was whether public service employees are more likely than others to engage in volunteer work. To shed light on this query, he studied self-reported levels of giving of time, blood, and money to charitable organizations among the respondents. Houston's research demonstrates that public employees are indeed more likely to volunteer than are their counterparts in the private sector, lending credence to the idea that a strong PSM commitment exists among persons in the public service. His research indicates that nonprofit employees are also more likely to volunteer than their counterparts in the private sector. Nonprofit employees, like their peers in the public sector, exhibit a strong PSM streak in their work.

Why is this discovery important? The predictive power of PSM has important implications for recruiting, retaining, and rewarding employees in both the public and nonprofit sectors. Houston (2006) suggested that recruitment efforts should begin by seeking out individuals in public affairs and nonprofit management programs at universities who exhibit PSM-like qualities. Focusing recruitment efforts on finding such people is crucial to building an applicant pool of qualified and motivated employees. Perhaps most important, Houston argued that the satisfaction that individuals with high PSM find in public and nonprofit employment should be a strong rebuttal to the negative press often given to working in "the faceless bureaucracy." Shedding a light on the positive work these sectors accomplish may be a powerful recruitment tool for persons showing a proclivity for self-sacrifice.

PHRM reforms that seek to utilize private sector know-how might be tapping a set of motivational triggers that are not as effective for persons employed in the public and nonprofit sectors. Reformers would be wise to consider triggers that tap PSM rather than monetary rewards as an inducement for productivity.

Finally, nonprofits are increasingly involved in the formation of public policy. The role of nonprofits in championing social causes has made them key stakeholders in the policy process. This has been especially true of faith-based initiatives supported by the White House meant to buttress the social causes of the public sector. In this context, PSM may be a valuable tool for building overall social capital among the broader public (Brewer 2003). Civically active persons, such as those in the public and nonprofit sectors, may be able to improve communication among various political communities by building trust and legitimizing the work of both sectors (Behn 1998). Given the frequently combative climate of politics, trust and legitimacy may be significant assets.

PSM and Public Human Resource Management

PSM research has gained ground in recent decades, expanding upon the earlier work of Perry and others. PSM has intrigued many scholars and practitioners because it

can be an effective means for tapping employee potential. For example, people demonstrating high levels of PSM may be ideal candidates for leadership positions. While directly relating PSM to productivity has proven problematic (see Alonso & Lewis 2001; Bright 2007, 2013), more indirect measures have demonstrated that PSM is an important construct in the development of productivity and trust in the public workforce (Crewson 1997; Houston 2000; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998; Naff & Crum 1999). In fact, a strong association exists between PSM and job performance, commitment, and retention (Crewson 1997; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown 1998; Perry & Wise 1990). PSM has also proven to be a valuable construct in evaluating the effectiveness of PHRM functions such as recruitment, compensation, performance appraisal, and strategic management.

Job Performance and Satisfaction with the Work Environment

The most direct influence of PSM is its positive association with job performance and satisfaction. Surveys of federal employees have found that PSM is strongly correlated with better performance ratings and more positive work-related attitudes (Alonso and Lewis 2001; Naff and Crum 1999). Those who exhibit high levels of PSM also perceive their organization more positively and feel a more powerful connection with its goals and values. In particular, research on federal employees has shown that PSM is positively associated with commitment to the organization, work satisfaction, perceived performance, lower turnover intention, better relationships with other employees, and more philanthropic attitudes (Houston 2006; Pandey and Stazyk 2008; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008; Park and Rainey 2008).

Interestingly, PSM is also correlated with personal integrity. Assessing perceptions of federal employees regarding whistle-blowing, Brewer and Selden (1998) found that PSM-related qualities were greatest among employees who exposed wrongdoing in the workplace.

When it comes to the future leadership in public service, succession planning might use PSM as a tool for identifying employees with the potential to lead. Qualities identified with PSM—integrity, trust, benevolence—are the same qualities we associate with good leadership. Emphasizing PSM competencies in performance appraisal might help managers identify those employees best suited for promotion (see Chapter 7).

Compensation and Incentives

Research incorporating motivational concepts in the development of compensation and other incentives is particularly relevant/useful to PHRM (Perry 2009). A richer appreciation for the impact of intrinsic motivation has the potential not only to improve our understanding of PHRM but also to link PHRM with broader theoretical themes in organizational behavior, social psychology, and public management (Perry 2009).

Workplace incentives may be based on remuneration and reward (e.g., performance-based pay) or tap into the altruistic behavior embodied in PSM theory. When practitioners understand PSM, they can leverage the intrinsic motivators that may be just as powerful as traditional extrinsic motivators, like financial gain or promotion, to improve organizational performance. PSM is uniquely suited for this purpose because it provides a deeper understanding of the intrinsic factors that motivate employees to be effective in their jobs and fulfill their potential. It should be noted that the traditional merit system values (e.g., job security, procedural fairness, and neutral competence) that have been the foundation of our civil service system are intrinsic in nature.

While much of the PSM research suggests that a calling to public service is a primary motivator for public employment, however, the importance of wages and benefits should not be downplayed. Public employees, like employees in other sectors, are drawn to government employment in no small way by the total compensation package. They may be willing to sacrifice for the greater good, but they are also pragmatic and need to pay the bills. Therefore, developing an incentive system with the right mix of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards is an important goal of HR managers. For example, performance appraisals often focus on the technical aspects of a job in order to measure productivity (e.g., job knowledge, teamwork, customer service). A PSM focus in performance appraisal would supplement such measures with a concern for competencies like the motivation of oneself and others, service orientation, trustworthiness, emotional maturity, relationship building, and the development of self and others.

Job Design

With regard to job analysis, paying more attention to motivation in the design of jobs and work is crucial. While many acknowledge the critical connection between motivation and effective job design, the research on this topic is lacking (Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg 2006; Perry 2009; Perry & Porter 1982). Recent research on emotional labor (covered in Chapter 4) suggests that motivational factors can be incorporated into job design and performance appraisal to emphasize skills related to PSM (e.g., self-sacrifice, service to others) that are often important in the performance of demanding public safety and law enforcement jobs (see Guy, Newman, and Mastracci 2008). However, motivation has also been important to reformers looking to galvanize public sector employees. Unfortunately, reforms have in some cases replaced robust intrinsic motivators (like self-sacrifice and service to others) with a set of less predictable extrinsic rewards (like compensation) (Moynihan 2008; Perry 2009).

Recruitment and Retention

Attracting the right people to the public service is important (see the Nonprofits in Focus box). Hiring decisions have a critical impact on organizational performance.

As previously mentioned, PSM is correlated with commitment to the organization, work satisfaction, perceived performance, lower turnover intention, better relationships with other employees, and more philanthropic attitudes (Houston 2006; Pandey and Stazyk 2008; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008; Park and Rainey 2008). Ensuring you hire the right people may mean selecting employees dedicated to serving others versus serving themselves. Retaining, appraising, rewarding, and motivating employees are crucial HR functions that might benefit from tapping the public service work ethic. What's more, the public sector faces a number of distinctive challenges in recruiting qualified persons with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities. Public HR managers are tasked with recruiting in an increasingly competitive environment in which public service is often not the first choice of new entrants to the labor market (Light 1997; Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton LLP 2010; Ritz & Waldner 2011). Recent college graduates are often drawn to the financial rewards of private sector employment. Further complicating hiring for the public sector is the erosion of job security and other traditional recruitment offerings in the wake of PHRM reforms (Battaglio and Condrey 2009). Therefore, recruiting and selecting people who exhibit PSM-like qualities, who are less concerned about financial compensation, may improve the prospects of finding enough qualified and motivated personnel.

Unfortunately, according to Clerkin and Cogburn (2012), many public agencies lack the HRM capacity to identify people with PSM qualities and recruit them to the public service. Research supports Clerkin and Cogburn's assertion that recruitment to the public sector is a key challenge for 21st-century HRM (MSPB 2010; Partnership for Public Service 2010). Indeed, the economic downturn of the last decade has exacerbated the problem, as many of the unemployed from the private sector have sought work in the public sector. This flood of new applicants has the potential to exhaust PHRM capacities to select the best candidates at all levels of government. For Clerkin and Cogburn, this challenge provides an opportunity for PHRM to refine recruitment practices by using PSM as an additional selection criterion, thereby narrowing the pool of applicants to the strongest group (see also Mann 2006). According to Perry and Wise (1990), employees joining the public service often exhibit PSM-like values before entering the workplace. Therefore, HR managers can use PSM as a recruitment criterion to tap this preexisting sentiment toward the public service. PSM can be a powerful tool for attracting and retaining a motivated workforce in the public sector.

Clerkin and Cogburn (2012) suggested that an awareness of PSM also has the potential to improve HRM practices and reinforce performance outcomes. The need is critical for public HR managers who use pragmatic means to improve recruitment and retention since, as discussed earlier, employees who exhibit PSM tend to be more

motivated at work, be more productive, and experience more job satisfaction. Using tools to evaluate PSM (such as a questionnaire, as shown in Table 8.1) in the hiring process is perhaps the best way to recruit people exhibiting qualities conducive to the public service. PSM may also be incorporated into structured interviews and behavioral interviews during the selection process (Paarlberg and Lavigna 2010; Paarlberg, Perry, and Hondeghem 2008). For example, a hiring manager might query applicants about their interest in serving others and volunteering or their interest in self-development and the development of others through training.

Furthermore, Clerkin and Cogburn (2012) proposed the use of PSM as a part of the overall marketing and recruitment strategy of PHRM (see Jacobson 2011; Ritz & Waldner 2011). Advertising for public service positions should include mention of the positions' potential to make a difference in society, serve the citizenry, and provide for the public good (Doverspike et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2011). To recruit a workforce that embodies PSM-like qualities, public HR managers should make clear their desire for people who exhibit qualities of self-sacrifice, compassion, and commitment and who have an interest in public policy making. Clerkin and Cogburn (2012) asserted that putting this message first and foremost may increase the likelihood that persons who espouse PSM qualities will apply and deter those who are not truly interested in public service. Targeting such recruitment efforts in the appropriate trade publications (e.g., public sector employment websites)—especially when the traditional extrinsic public sector employment motivators such as job security, retirement, benefits, and quality of life are also included—may prove most fruitful (Clerkin and Cogburn 2012, 227). Presenting the practical benefits of public employment alongside the public service motive may be a very persuasive recruiting tactic. In fact, there is also the potential for persons in the private sector who embrace PSM to move to the public sector (Steijn 2008; Wright and Christensen 2010). In this way, public HR managers can be positioned to select from the strongest possible group of job candidates.

Organizational Climate

HR managers with a deep appreciation for PSM have the potential to champion the public service ethic associated with agency mission. For example, PSM may strengthen human capital frameworks that align employee and organizational values, facilitate communication, and, ultimately, enhance buy-in. For human service-related organizations—like the Department of Health and Human Services—service to others and self-sacrifice is mission critical. PSM may be useful in aligning agency goals (e.g., overcoming poverty) with those of staff (e.g., helping individuals one case at a time). Incorporating PSM throughout all PHRM processes can ensure that assessments of applicants during the hiring phase are confirmed and reinforced throughout the employment relationship (Clerkin and Cogburn 2012, 227).

Motivation and PHRM Reform

A central tenet of public management reform is that the public service is seen as inefficient, lacking the motivation and organization necessary to improve productivity and performance; hence, there is a need for reform (Battaglio 2009; Battaglio and Condrey 2009; Kellough and Nigro 2002; 2006). Affording public HR managers greater flexibility in the administration of HR activities and functions (e.g., pay, performance appraisal, hiring, termination) has been viewed as important to improving performance.

Since the 1980s, performance-based pay and deregulation through the use of employment-at-will (EAW) policies have been seen as the primary mechanisms for motivating poor-performing employees to produce better results (Kellough and Nigro 2002; 2006). Reforms have attempted to tap employees' self-interest and incentivize productivity through extrinsic rewards. The assumption underlying performance-based pay is that monetary remuneration is the most important means for motivating employees. Likewise, EAW is seen as a means to strip away the "red tape" associated with the traditional civil service system; EAW is intended to dismantle long and involved hiring and termination processes. The expectation is that market-oriented reforms like EAW and performance-based pay will increase employee (and organizational) productivity (Kellough and Nigro 2002; 2006).

However, scholars have questioned the purported benefits and efficacy of these public management reforms (Battaglio 2009; Houston 2000; Naff & Crum 1999). In reform environments, policies tend to be based on market principles of efficiency, managerial flexibility, and results. These principles differ from the traditional merit system motivators of job security and procedural fairness, to name a few. Any assumption that public employees respond to traditional merit system motives is often minimized or abandoned (Battaglio and Condrey 2006; 2009; Condrey 2002; Condrey and Battaglio 2007). So, gauging the impact that reforms have had on traditional motives for working under a merit system warrants investigation. To this end, recent efforts (see Battaglio and Condrey 2009; Condrey and Battaglio 2007; Kellough and Nigro 2002; 2006) have concluded that these reforms, specifically performance-based pay and EAW, have failed to act as effective motivators for performance.

Performance-Based Pay and Employment at Will

The state of Georgia presents an opportunity to assess the ability of public management reforms to motivate the public workforce. The intent of the Georgia reforms was to develop a more productive and responsive public service by implementing performance-based pay and EAW policies (Condrey and Battaglio 2007; Kellough and Nigro 2002). Unfortunately, Georgia State employees have tended to voice pessimism

about the reforms' ability to achieve the intended purpose (Battaglio and Condrey 2009; Condrey and Battaglio 2007; Kellough and Nigro 2002; 2006). Using more traditional kinds of motivation (e.g., job security, benefits) may be a better means for promoting workforce efficiency (Kellough and Nigro 2006).

The evidence seems to show that the implementation of EAW systems has by and large had a negative effect on motivation levels of those employed in the public service. In Battaglio and Condrey's analysis of a survey of Georgia HR professionals, many indicated a great deal of pessimism about the ability of EAW—the removal of job security in an effort to create a more responsive and motivated workforce—to improve productivity. Any motivating influence of EAW appears to have been muted by the potential for procedural abuse stemming from a lack of due process and the loss of job security. The authors' research has shown that EAW has not worked.

The loss of job security, in particular, has had a significant impact on HR professionals' perceptions of the potential for EAW to motivate employee performance. Why would a public employee be willing to go the extra mile for the employer when the employer is not taking care of the employee and does not have his or her interests at heart? The findings of Battaglio (2009) and others (see Coggburn et al. 2010) suggest that deregulation has not produced a more productive public sector workforce. Indeed, the research suggests that deregulation has negatively impacted motivation and morale among public employees. Public employees expressed significant levels of mistrust regarding management and the use of EAW (Battaglio & Condrey 2009), a significant relationship between the loss of job security and reduced motivation (Battaglio 2010), and a fear that the use of spoils would reappear in a deregulated environment (Battaglio & Condrey 2009; Condrey & Battaglio 2007). Moreover, further research suggests that such misgivings tend to intensify over time (Coggburn et al. 2010). Coggburn and colleagues (2010) found that HR directors in Georgia and Texas, states where EAW has been in place longer, had greater levels of dissatisfaction with EAW than directors in Florida and Mississippi, which have only recently enacted similar deregulation policies. These findings support Kellough and Nigro's (2006) suggestion that retooling management practices alone is not enough to improve productivity and motivation in the public service.

Motivation among Minorities

A troubling finding from this stream of research has been the impact HR reforms have had on motivation among minorities in the public service (Battaglio 2009; Battaglio and Condrey 2009). Civil service employment has a long history of pursuing practices that improve representation and diversity in the workforce. For many African Americans, recent reform efforts have made them rethink their perceptions of the public service as a great equalizer; they may even perceive these reforms as a

move in the wrong direction regarding diversity (see Wilson 2006). By giving managers the upper hand in HR decisions, practices such as EAW may be viewed by African Americans as a tool for “discrimination-induced job dismissals” (Wilson 2006, 178). When a manager does not need to have cause to dismiss a public employee, some worry that a prejudiced public manager would dismiss employees he did not like because of their race. All of the considerations in the Civil Service Reform Act and Civil Rights Act seemed to level the playing field and ensure equal opportunity for all, but the potential for EAW and other reforms to erode years of progress in the promotion of diversity in the public sector must not be ignored. HR managers should take care to remain impartial themselves and to be aware of the potential for EAW to allow discrimination to sneak back into the public workplace.

Public Service Motivation and Compensation

Public service motivation theory offers a promising link between compensation and motivation for those considering performance-based pay. PSM theory posits that public servants are motivated by commitment, compassion, and self-sacrifice with regard to public policy and the public interest (Perry 1996; Perry and Hondeghem 2008). Grounded in the assumption that people who choose public sector work do so based on both rational and altruistic considerations, the theory has garnered considerable empirical support from a variety of social science disciplines (Perry and Hondeghem 2008).

Proponents of performance-based pay assume that managers will apply such pay schemes evenhandedly, rewarding strong performers. Unfortunately, performance-based pay might actually be detrimental to motivation. More nuanced research suggests that pessimism toward performance-based pay may result from a negative view of external control rather than opposition to change in general (Brehm and Gates 1997). In other words, employees are not necessarily dismissive of change; their negativity has more to do with whether they feel those who implement performance-based pay are doing so fairly. Such negative perceptions may be exacerbated in a heightened reform environment. Evidence suggests that performance-based pay may sour employee perceptions of their leadership and the work environment (Kellough and Nigro 2002) and that other reforms, such as EAW, may also negatively impact employee motivation (Battaglio 2009; Battaglio and Condrey 2009). Employees may begin to feel as if a monetary value is being bestowed simply on how much work they can produce and not as though they are valued holistically for the contributions they can make and their worth as individuals.

Perry, Engbers, and Jun (2009) considered the potential for PSM in the performance-based pay arena, suggesting that it may be a valuable factor to include in the equation for assessing job performance and rewarding employees. Because PSM

accounts for the differences in what motivates employees in the public sector versus private sector, it can help managers accurately reward performance in the public sector. Instead of focusing on bottom-line goals or job objectives, PSM can broaden the scope of performance evaluations to include “more applicable levers for improving performance in public agencies” (Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009, 45–46).

Recently, research has suggested that public management reform efforts over the last decade have eroded PSM (Leisink and Steijn 2008; Moynihan 2008). The market-driven atmosphere that emphasizes monetary incentives has proven harmful to intrinsic motivators like those embodied in PSM theory. In fact, the pursuit of extrinsic reward systems, such as performance-based pay, may be futile. The PHRM reforms certainly have value, but some practices may not be the best fit for the public sector. People who choose to work in the public sector are often motivated by intangibles, so attempting to incentivize them with tangible rewards is not likely to be as effective in the public sector as in the private sector.

Looking Ahead: Leveraging PSM

PHRM reforms favor a management-centered, private sector approach that is opposed to the traditional bureaucratic model. Eschewing the perceived problems of bureaucratic systems and civil service protections, reformers have advocated that greater flexibility be afforded to managers. Over time, however, public management reforms may breed a contempt that runs counter to the public interest, thus undermining the very public management systems they were intended to strengthen (Battaglio and Condrey 2009). PSM may prove productive in countering the challenge to public service that PHRM reforms have posed by reinvigorating the public service commitment to self-sacrifice and service to others and the public good. HR managers can leverage PSM by including PSM constructs (see Table 8.1) in the evaluation of public employees.

Moynihan (2008) suggested that public sector managers reconsider how they motivate performance by including intrinsic values—like those personified by the call to public service—in the selection process (260). In fact, these values are really the original principles on which the merit system is based. Unfortunately, establishing agreement on which values are the right ones and linking those values to performance is problematic. However, studies suggest that “pro-social” behavior and motives can be tapped in a way that improves work performance (Rainey 2009 271; see also Grant 2008).

For HR managers, a greater emphasis on PSM constructs—attraction to policy making, commitment to the public interest, compassion, self-sacrifice—is a must given the recent decades of PHRM reform. PHRM reform efforts have targeted public service as outmoded, inefficient, ineffective, and overly bureaucratic. However,

bureaucracy bashing may not be the best path to positive reinforcement of high performance among public servants. HR managers should instead emphasize the positives of public service. A focus on PSM in recruitment, retention, and performance evaluations can be a good start to reinvigorating the public service. HR managers can look for PSM-like qualities in potential public employees during job interviews. Moreover, finding such qualities in persons already employed may be important as well for overall morale. Performance appraisals can be retooled to focus not only on how well the individual is meeting individual and agency objectives but also on the employee's exhibition of PSM-like qualities. Querying stakeholders (e.g., peers, managers, customers) regarding an employee's PSM qualities may be a useful way to assess such constructs (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of 360-degree appraisal methods).

Clearly, a more thorough assessment of the public sector motivation is necessary. What we do know is that many recent reforms have been less than enthusiastically embraced by those who work in the public sector. This is especially true when EAW has been perceived as facilitating racial discrimination or at least showing less emphasis on diversity and proportional representation. Both public service motivation and diversity raise interesting questions for researchers interested in exploring workforce dynamics in employment-at-will systems. Moreover, many HR professionals appear to be conflicted over the potential of PHRM reform efforts to serve as a motivational tool and advance the discussion of HR policy (Battaglio 2009). Although dubious of EAW's ability to encourage policy innovation, managers may also be keenly aware that their jobs are on the line if productivity does not improve. If employees in EAW systems are interested only in meeting minimum requirements—as research findings suggest—then an EAW environment may be problematic. The focus on extrinsic motivators may prove corrosive to underlying intrinsic motives (Moynihan 2008). Policy innovation may take a back seat to keeping one's job.

Recent scholarship on the emotional capacity of individuals within the public service may also serve as an important addition to the literature on PSM and job performance (Guy and Newman 2004; Guy, Newman, and Mastracci 2008). Emotional labor—caring, negotiating, empathizing, relationship building—can be an important aspect of public servant interactions with others in the public service as well as with citizens. For many public servants, the prospect of performing such emotional labor provides a strong call for public service. Much as with PSM, the range of skills that play out in such dynamic situations are often neglected. Therefore, public HR managers have an opportunity to incorporate in job analysis a more robust description of the capacities needed for particular jobs. A more determined focus on emotive job requirements, rather than market determinants, provides public HR managers with an advantage in tapping PSM aptitudes. The research on emotional labor may prove useful to public HR managers looking to revise job

descriptions and performance appraisals to incorporate a broader skill set. Like PSM, emotional labor can contribute to feelings of pride in one's work and a belief that the work one does is meaningful (Guy, Newman, and Mastracci 2008, 186).

Incorporating PSM into PHRM functions must be done with great care. Measuring PSM has proven problematic, resulting in concerns about the reliability and validity of assessments that include it (Clerkin and Cogburn 2012). The need for a more reliable and valid tool for measuring PSM continues to be a concern among scholars and practitioners alike (Kim et al. 2011). Also, PSM is only one measure of public service aspirations, and it does not necessarily consider performance on the job. Furthermore, the inclusion of PSM does not necessarily mean a diminished emphasis on performance-based evaluation and compensation. Public HR managers should include PSM along with the measures of knowledge, skills, and ability that are traditionally included in job analysis and descriptions.

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Additional Resource

International Research Society for Public Management—<http://www.irspm.net>

Case 8.1

"Radical" Civil Service Reform in Georgia

In 1996, the state of Georgia embarked upon an unprecedented experiment in decentralizing personnel authority. Georgia Act 816 removed civil service protections for employees hired after July 1, decentralizing personnel policy and

administration to the agency level. The act was part of a larger reform initiative in the state to establish a new performance management system buttressed by performance-based pay (Kellough and Nigro 2002). The establishment of an EAW system for state personnel in Georgia was the result of a convergence of factors: a very powerful governor (Zell Miller, later a US senator) with experience in HR management and a distaste for the state's numerous and archaic personnel rules and regulations; an imbedded central personnel management hierarchy unwilling or unable to reform itself; well-placed, powerful bureaucratic actors that wanted more direct control over their agencies' personnel management system; and very weak employee unions (Battaglio and Condrey 2006, 121).

The EAW system was put in place piecemeal by filling vacant positions with "unclassified" titles effective July 2, severely limiting State Personnel Board jurisdiction. The establishment of EAW abrogated property interest or tenure rights normally afforded employees after they had served the traditional one-year probationary period. The state of Georgia's efforts mirror a desire among the public and politicians alike for more private sector-oriented management practices in recruitment, hiring, compensation, promotion, downsizing, and discipline (Walters 2002). This is especially true for agency line managers, who now expect to be able to hire immediately and with greater flexibility than under traditional civil service systems. No longer obligated to confer with the central HR department on matters of recruitment and selection, state agencies now have the authority to hire employees at any step within a given pay grade. The intent is to provide agencies with greater flexibility as they compete for a qualified workforce. Managers are also tasked with ensuring consistent and fair salary management practices for agency personnel (Lasseter 2002).

The intent of EAW is to streamline the downsizing and disciplinary functions in the public sector in order to improve productivity. Moreover, Georgia's EAW system removes seniority as a measure of performance, allowing agencies to reassign and relocate at-will employees as needed. Streamlining discipline and grievance practices places unclassified, at-will employees at the mercy of managers, because these employees do not have the right to appeal disciplinary decisions. In contrast, traditional classified employees are disciplined according to a standard progressive method that begins with an oral or written reprimand, then moves to suspension without pay or salary reduction, and leaves dismissal as a last resort. Concerns about cronyism, favoritism, and unequal pay for equal work—features of spoils systems of the past—have proven to be problematic (Battaglio 2010, Battaglio and Condrey 2009; Condrey and Battaglio 2007). Accountability continues to be a concern for future EAW efforts.

Discussion Questions

Clearly, there are concerns about accountability in the Georgia reform model. The lack of uniformity across the various personnel systems in the operating agencies exacerbates this problem. Without a strong state office of personnel management to ensure uniformity in practice, how does one ensure fairness in such a reform model? How might a lack of uniformity of HR policy and practice effect personnel loyalty and commitment? Trust? Motivation?

Exercise

Below are job descriptions for several types of positions within a government agency. The HR manager has tasked you with updating these job descriptions before upcoming job openings are advertised. The HR manager would like you to include language that would attract candidates exhibiting PSM-like qualities. What language might you include or change in the job descriptions below? How might you assess PSM-like qualities in potential candidates for these positions?

Table 8.2 Job Descriptions	
Grade	Description
Clerical	<p>Administrative Assistant. Responds to requests for information; may require interpretation of department rules and regulations. Independently composes and types correspondence for signature of supervisor regarding administrative matters, office policies, or programs. Compiles and types special reports by selecting relevant information from a variety of sources such as reports, documents, correspondence, electronic files, etc. Organizes and maintains files and reference manuals/materials; ensures confidentiality of information, as necessary. Prepares materials needed for meetings, such as agendas, handouts, binders, etc. May perform administrative functions such as payroll preparation, travel reports, supply requisitions, etc. Sets up and types a wide variety of correspondence, reports, tables, records, case histories, hearings, etc. from rough draft, dictation, dictating machine, or instructions. Types materials that involve knowledge of special terminology. Attends meetings and transcribes minutes; may serve as</p>

(Continued)

(Continued)

Grade	Description
Professional	<p>hearings reporter by recording verbatim testimony and transcribing into prescribed format. Proofs typing results for typographical errors, spelling, punctuation, and format accuracy. Establishes and maintains electronic files for identifying, recording, and classifying stored data; extracts, assembles, and merges stored information to create new documents.</p> <p>Park Ranger. Explains rules and regulations to park visitors for the purpose of protecting and preserving natural, historic, and cultural features; sites; and structures. Prepares and maintains various records and reports pertaining to park activities. Performs general painting, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical, and related trades work as required. Cleans and supplies restrooms, removes refuse from trash receptacles and grounds, and performs other general cleanup functions. Operates numerous power tools, trucks, and other equipment. Collects and accounts for fees.</p>
Professional	<p>Human Resource Management Director. Participates in the development and implementation of personnel management programs for the state classified service, including position classification, pay, recruitment, testing and selection, tenure, employee relations, equal employment opportunity, performance appraisal, and career development and training. Provides administrative and technical direction to the various division administrators. Reviews, formulates, or directs the revision of rules, regulations, policies, and procedures for the state classified service. Reviews current and long-range programs, plans, and policies for DSCS and identifies areas of conflict, prepares revisions to enhance operations, and prepares reports of recommendations. Directs all program activities for the department in the absence of the Civil Service Director with line authority over all programs and serves as principal assistant to the director. Meets with the governor, legislators, federal and state officials, classified and unclassified state employees, members of professional organizations, and other special interest groups on matters relating to civil service programs. Prepares or directs the preparation of regular and special reports as required or desired relating to the department's programs. Prepares and reviews correspondence on complex and sensitive matters affecting the department of clerical work and minor administrative and business detail. Knowledge of word-processing, decision-making, and business software required.</p>

Grade	Description
Executive	Agency Undersecretary. Directs the work activities of all programs in the absence of the assistant secretary, serves as principal assistant to the assistant secretary, and has administrative line authority over all programs. Advises the assistant secretary regarding program, office, or departmental problems. Reviews current and long-range programs, plans, and policies for the office, identifying and resolving areas of conflict. Reviews, formulates, or directs the revision of rules, regulations, and procedures for the office. Reviews and evaluates work of subordinates and gives technical guidance when needed. Coordinates budget recommendations. Conducts staff meetings and conferences with subordinates to resolve problems and conflicts. Meets with officials of federal, state, and local agencies, legislators, professional organizations, and interested groups on matters relating to the office. Directs the preparation of special reports relating to office programs. Prepares correspondence on complex and sensitive matters affecting the department or office.

Source: Louisiana Department of State Civil Service, <http://agency.governmentjobs.com/louisiana/>