Peter Wallensteen

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

SIXTH EDITION

To Lena

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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PREFACE

This edition was written during the spring of 2022 and updated by December the same year. It is influenced by Russia's invasion ("special military operation") of Ukraine, which affects the possibilities of conflict resolution and leads to a number of unprecedented observations. This has to do with the type of conflict (an inter-state war), the regional consequences (for Europe and the Black Sea Region) as well as the global implications (for principles of conflict resolution). Full attention is also paid to the other 50 or so ongoing armed conflicts and an equal number of dormant, frozen conflict, as identified by Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Only in retrospect will we be able to assess the global and historical dimensions of the events of 2022. For the time being, as researchers, analysts and teachers, we have to follow the events with the available tools, hoping that sense and rationality will determine the future.

This means that the Russia–Ukraine war is discussed in some detail in Chapters 1, 5, 8, and 9. It also affects many of the other chapters. Thus, the 6th edition is a heavily reworked edition, but without leaving the basic focus on conflict resolution, rather to the contrary. For instance, Chapter 1 is enlarged to give considerably more attention to causes of war and of peace. Part IV has been condensed and focused on conditions for conflict resolution in the 2020s. Gender issues have become more mainstreamed through the text.

I am grateful for constructive contributions from my colleagues at UCDP, in particular Therese Pettersson and Stina Högbladh. Joakim Kreutz graciously made special calculations on conflict termination and Erik Melander offered valuable insights on gender equality studies. The vibrant research milieu at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, has inspired my writings, along with research at PAM, the Peace Accords Matrix, at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame. Comments from teachers and reviewers have been most helpful.

As always I extend special thanks to Bill Montross who not only corrected my language but also gave me substantial reactions. Furthermore, this book would not have been completed without the support of my wife, Lena. This book is dedicated to her.

Uppsala, Sweden, December 2022
Peter Wallensteen

PART I
THE PROBLEM AND HOW TO APPROACH IT

1

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1.1 Peacemaking through conflict resolution

The past three decades have been times of negotiated solutions. Increasing global tensions may make this a more difficult task in the coming decade. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the experiences of negotiated agreements to end large-scale organized violence in order to be equipped for new challenges. This book is exactly about this: It provides a framework for thinking about settlements of conflict, demonstrates trends in peacemaking, investigates concrete examples, addresses particular complexities, discusses the role of international action, and considers the aftermath of conflicts. Large Peace Congresses such as those following the Napoleonic Wars in Vienna or the First World War in Paris included the settlement of a host of smaller or larger wars, armed conflicts and political disputes. However, since 1990 there has been no attempt at such a universal settlement of a vast number of issues, although the decades included large conferences on major issues confronting the globe: environment, population, the role of women, human rights, human settlement, desertification, and banning of land-mines, to name only a few. These conferences provide a globally shared framework for how to deal with such issues. In addition to solving practical problems they also led to global agreement on the value of democracy, disarmament, prevention of conflict and long-term cooperation. In line with this problem-oriented focus the world also saw a great number of unique agreements for specific conflicts. Many of them even managed to curtail violence and transform local conflicts into more constructive relations between and among states, peoples and social groups. Others failed, remaining signatures on paper with no effect for humans in the dangers of war. Still these agreements provide a reservoir of ideas for conflict resolution. They constitute a reason for this particular book.

Certainly, there have been ups and downs in the global emphasis on negotiated endings to wars. The events of 11 September 2001 affected the interest in negotiations during the 2000s and the Arab Spring of 2011 throw a shadow over the 2010s. Similarly the COVID-19 pandemic will affect the 2020s. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 threatened to overturn many of the achievements in negotiated settlements of the past three decades. To many observers, it marked the end of the post–Cold War period and the beginning of a new era of increasing uncertainty among states. Inter-state conflict that had been less central again came into focus. This has to colour our discussions on conflict resolution in this book.

There is a need to understand conflict resolution in a new way. It is not enough for the outside world to ask for negotiations and contacts between warring parties. There is also a need to suggest how the parties can develop a will to search for a common solution, what the parties should discuss, how they may agree, how agreements can be turned into reality and, not least, how settlements can be made durable and free new generations from repeating bitter war experiences. It is, furthermore, important to ask what can be learned for effective conflict prevention, and allowing for just aspirations to develop without systematic and deliberate violence. These are major tasks that face any attempt at ending wars through negotiated means. Many of the same challenges, however, also confront victors in a war. This book is an attempt to consolidate what we know today about the negotiated, 'peaceful' ending of war.

In the early 1990s, knowledge in conflict resolution under war conditions was highly limited. By the early 2020s, there are more insights into how to mediate, negotiate and find agreement. At the same time, there has been less use of these understandings. There is a dramatic contrast between the elaborate peace agreement concluded in 2016 by the Colombian government and the guerrilla movement FARC and the shallow document ending the US war in Afghanistan concluded in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020. The former led to a complicated but organized return to peace, the latter resulting in the chaotic Western evacuation from Kabul in August 2021 and a return to Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The many lessons learned on conflict resolution were used in the protracted peace process in Colombia, and by 2022 the agreement was still being implemented while monitored by a third party. In fact, what followed in Colombia was a period of *peacebuilding*. The more recent and less elaborate arrangement for Afghanistan resulted in victory of one side, the Taliban, leading instead to a period of *victory consolidation*. Peacebuilding is a concept covering what follows after a negotiated settlement between the warring parties that successfully ends an ongoing armed conflict. There is a sizeable literature on this. Victory consolidation, instead, addresses what happens after one side has prevailed in a war, eliminating the armed opponent, and building a new situation according to its wishes. There is a limited literature on this topic. Both outcomes have long-term effects for whether the war will restart as well as the type of relationships that will emerge between the (former) adversaries (Wallensteen 2015).

The developments prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were an almost daily demonstration of non-negotiating diplomacy, at the same time that Russia pursued increasingly aggressive military manoeuvres around Ukraine. Russia, Western countries and Ukraine exchanged documents, which only reiterated their previous positions. There was no serious give-and-take. At most, it was a way of mobilizing public opinion. This means that conflict resolution takes on a harsh reality where parties for a longer or shorter period are threatening or using violence, even trying to kill each other. In the management of conflict between employers and employees, there is the risk of strikes and lockouts. This is not the same as when negotiators, their families, relatives, friends and colleagues have been under armed attack by the other side. As it involves issues of life and death, war is a qualitatively different form of conflict. Negotiation and peacemaking in ending wars can learn from other experiences but face distinctive problems. The issues at hand – the incompatibilities – are central to such an analysis and are likely to concern major questions of society and its direction. Furthermore, the ending of a war has to be done without inviting a repetition of the same war. It has to meet standards of justice and, at the same time, provide physical security for the opposing sides. There is a need to acknowledge and compensate for sufferings that cannot be

undone or redressed. Norms of human relations have been violently broken, resulting in the difficult task of identifying sufficiently shared grounds on which to build a new relationship. This means that the opposing sides have to be committed to *viewing an agreement as theirs*, and to taking responsibility for implementing it under conditions which may be novel to all involved as well as to the society as a whole. Thus, there are reasons for sceptics to believe that peacebuilding after war could be a losing proposition. Still, we know it takes place and it seems to be working. How this is possible is also what this book addresses.

It was in the early 1990s that the world started seriously to attend to international and national peacemaking as a way of ending war. During the Cold War, negotiations and agreements on issues that involved the use of weapons were few and limited. There was a peace agreement on Indochina in 1954 but, like its 1973 successor in the same conflict, it was quickly undermined. There were also settlements between India and Pakistan after the 1965 and 1971 wars, achieving a reduction in tension, but not a solution to the incompatibility. The emphasis in the major power confrontation of the time, the Cold War, was victory, not a shared settlement. The ideological components and the historical record made the Cold War an existential battle between two powerful camps. It was waged between right and wrong, democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and socialism, liberation and imperialism. Compromise became morally questionable. The same attitudes were reflected in other disputes of the period, whether they related to the Cold War or not.

There were reasons for this aversion to negotiated resolution. The memory of the flawed and failed agreement at Munich in September 1938 haunted many actors. At that time, the big, democratic powers (Britain and France) entered wilfully into an agreement with a totalitarian state (Nazi Germany) on the dissolution, rather than the protection, of a small, democratic country (Czechoslovakia). Even so, Hitler chose not to honour the agreement. The Munich agreement became part of a rapid series of events leading to the Second World War less than a year later. To Western leaders, it showed the danger of compromising with dictatorships. 'Appeasement' became a synonym for a naive understanding of an opponent and for entering into flawed negotiations. The Soviet leadership may have drawn similar conclusions from its deal with Nazi Germany in August 1939, the agreement that made the Second World War inevitable. Although it aimed at preventing a war between the two – by dividing territory and influence in Poland, Eastern Europe and the Baltic region – Germany attacked the Soviet Union less than two years later. Thus, both sides in the Cold War that followed the joint defeat of Nazi Germany could agree on the dangers of making negotiated accords with an opponent. For both, the conclusion was that lasting peace required solid victory, that is peace through strength, commands and preponderance. The way to such a peace was through accumulating more power than the other(s). This resulted in arms races and very few agreements on political issues in armed conflicts in the following decades. This 'Munich Syndrome' has plagued negotiations across marked ideological lines (Wallensteen 2016/2021).

It is, then, remarkable to find that negotiations were still possible in a particular sphere even among ideological and strategic foes: arms control and disarmament. There were agreements banning nuclear weapons tests, restricting the production of missiles, and even eliminating whole categories of weaponry. These negotiations aimed to reduce the risk of inadvertent war between the major powers, without settling their fundamental incompatibilities. This was an effort at *conflict management*, making sure the relationships between the major powers would not unintentionally get out of hand. In spite of this, the Cold War

tensions continually led to new crises. Basic distrust and confrontation, though possibly contained from becoming a nuclear confrontation, guided the leaderships. All other types of conflict were allowed: Wars were waged by proxy, with secret intrusions through intelligence operations and, at times, open interventions with military means, but only after securing (explicitly or implicitly) the non-activity of the superpower opponent (USA in Guatemala 1954; USSR in Hungary 1956; USA in Vietnam 1959–73, USSR in Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979–89, USA in Panama 1989 are a few examples). The danger of local conflicts escalating into nuclear war was an element in most serious analysis during the Cold War.

An important Cold War lesson is that reductions of weaponry have limited value in actually contributing to *conflict resolution*. After all, the 'political' issues involved in forming the conflict are primary, and weapons are basically used to pursue such interests. Conflict management can help to reduce the dangers of crisis and create a limited degree of confidence, thus, lessening (potential or actual) suffering. Conflict resolution is more ambitious as it tries to affect the basic issues, the incompatibilities that direct the conflicting parties. In the post–Cold War period, the focus has been more on conflict resolution, as exemplified by the many peace agreements, while conflict management has been significant in situations of strong regional or local rivalry. It remains to be seen if this period has definitely ended with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Ideally, we could also focus on *conflict transformation*, which means that the conflict parties actually find a way not only to manage or solve their conflict(s) and restoring their relationship but transforming it into a cooperative relationship or even ceasing to be parties through integration or merger (Lederach 1995; Mitchell 2002; Miall 2004). This is the most far-reaching ambition in ending war, and well beyond the limits of individual decision-makers. It is a matter of setting up an enduring process. There are historical examples of approaching this, notably the transformation of Franco-German relations after 1945, or the historically highly conflict-prone pair of Sweden and Denmark. These actors have not disappeared but the actual use of weapons for solving possible disagreements today is farfetched and highly unlikely. These examples show the possibility of creating a *security community* among former belligerents (Deutsch et al. 1957). The term conflict resolution does not extend that far in changing parties or their relationship, but it might be the long-term outcome making the most recent war also the last one.

These different approaches are useful for making a lasting peace with quality. Conflict management does not in itself lead the parties to that situation and conflict transformation reasonably comes after a solution has been found. Conflict resolution is needed in medium phase and at a practical stage to turn conflicts away from destruction to a form of joint construction. Conflict resolution is in focus in this volume.

1.2 Peace research and conflict resolution

In this book, conflict resolution is approached on the basis of the insights generated in contemporary peace research. This means drawing conclusions from the study of causes of war, disarmament, arms control, conflict dynamics, peace processes and peace agreements. This involves quantitative and qualitative studies. Although conflict resolution in armed conflict has been part of the peace research agenda, it has yet to develop a consistent, replicable set of research-based propositions. The methodological approach taken by many scholars

is comparative. History-oriented methods have dominated. Systematic quantitative research requires access to statistically and relevant data. Such a scholarly infrastructure has been slow in coming in the social sciences, in comparison to natural and medical sciences. However, considerable headway has been made and constitutes an additional basis for this book. This means peace science does not yet have a consolidated set of rules about strategies or conditions for durable agreements. Preliminary insights are continuously expanded making it possible to arrive at plausible understandings which help to highlight policy dilemmas and provide grounds for action (and at the same time stimulate more study).

Peace research, like any other field of enquiry that deals with societal affairs, is coloured by major historical changes and events. Peace research, with its ambition to understand the causes of violence and to find ways to reduce/remove violence, has been sensitive to such changes. Sometimes they have constituted challenges to the existing research paradigms, thus leading to new fields of enquiry. At other times, the historical developments have confirmed the importance of existing research directions. Either way, the dialogue with realities remains a constant feature. As can be seen from Table 1.1, peace research has developed agendas resting

Table 1.1 Traumas and hopes forming the agenda of peace research

Event	Character	Understanding of event	Peace research topics
First World War	Trauma	Loss of crisis control, 1914	History, causes of war
League of Nations	Hope	Aggression, need for rules	International law
Second World War	Trauma	Again, lost control	Strategic study v. peace research
Hiroshima 1945	Trauma	Science used for war	Disarmament, arms control
Gandhi in India	Hope	Use of non-violent means	History, cases of non-violence
United Nations	Hope	International cooperation	International organization
Holocaust	Trauma	Genocide, ethnic violence	Human and collective rights
Cold War	Trauma	Polarization, escalation	Conflict theory, gaming
European Unity	Hope	Overcoming enmity	Integration and democracy theory
Vietnam War	Trauma	Dependence, imperialism	Structural violence
Dissidence	Hope	Democratic challenges	NGOs, civil society
Détente	Hope	Confidence-building	Cooperation, common themes
Bosnia	Trauma	Ethnic identities as element	Ethnic security dilemmas
1990s peacemaking	Hope	Ending of wars	Conflict resolution, peacebuilding
Emancipation	Hope	Gender and peace	Gender as variable, paradigm
11 September 2001	Trauma	Terrorism	Pre-emption v. human security
Arab Spring 2011	Hope/ Trauma	Popular revolts v. repression	Non-violence, social media
Climate Change	Trauma	Cause of conflict, dislocation	Scarcity: conflict v. cooperation
Health, COVID-19	Trauma	Sovereignty v. cooperation	Health-conflict nexus
24 February 2022	Trauma	Dealing with aggression	International order

on the traumatic experiences of the past century, but also drawn from hopeful developments that are integral to the flow of events (Wallensteen 2011/2021). Indeed, traumas and hopes are constantly generated, affecting research directly or indirectly. Which events will have a lasting impact is for history to tell.

Table 1.1 identifies 19 major themes that have served to enlarge the scope of peace research during its first century. It adds 24 February 2022 as a potential 20th such formative topic. This table dates systematic peace study to the period after World War I. Early and notable were the works by Pitirim A. Sorokin (1937) and Quincy Wright (1942). The causes of war remain, to this day, fundamental questions for peace research. The solution to the problem of the origins of war has been enlarged to involve a vast array of analytical questions. Table 1.1 indicates how traumatic issues have come to take a central role.

World War I also generated hopes for a better future, expressed in the creation of the League of Nations. The first section of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 contained the Covenant for this new body. The story of this Treaty, however, was not one negotiated between the parties but mostly one imposed by the victorious nations on the vanquished. John Maynard Keynes warned against the dangers of such a harsh peace already in 1919 (Keynes 1919). He did not, however, dispute the creation of an international institution to overcome the dynamics of war between states. The 1920s in fact saw a series of other such agreements, of lasting quality, notably the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawing war (Hathaway and Shapiro 2018). Table 1.1 lists a century of other calamities or promises, even surprises, that have given rise to new reflections of what peace, conflict resolution and a better world entails.

These 100 years exhibit almost an equal number of traumatic, negative experiences, and hopes, creative events, although with a slight preponderance of traumas so far in the 21st century. The *traumas* are connected with human suffering on a large scale affecting many, also outside the immediate scene of action. The universal impact is true also for the *hopes*, which are not only isolated events, but also processes that have drawn global attention. The common feature of traumas and hopes is that they challenge conventional wisdom and result in breaks in trends, or even paradigm shifts. The traumas suggest limits to established thinking that clearly have to be overcome, and where research can play a role in the process. The hopes signal that reality offers many surprises. Some of them stem from theoretical thoughts of 'utopian' character, which unexpectedly take material forms. This closeness of reality to research is a feature of social science in general but, in peace research, a culture of openness and willingness to challenge one's assumptions has been particularly central.

Certainly, none of the topics mentioned in Table 1.1 is exclusive to peace research. In spite of a vigorous development, peace research *per se* continues to be organizationally distinct and a financially limited field of the full study of war and peace, international relations, foreign policy, sociology, economics, international law, etc. Many subjects for peace research are administratively and intellectually embraced in other disciplines. The debate during the Cold War, positing strategic studies against peace research, subsided, but re-emerged in revised forms following 11 September 2001 or in contemporary commentaries on 'New' Cold Wars (notably between 'The West' and China, possibly also vis-à-vis revisionist Russia). More comprehensive concepts of security are common on both sides, and

their shared understanding has increased to the point where there is today little necessity to draw a sharp line. If there is one, however, it has to do with the close connection to political decision-making in leading countries as well as views of the use of force. Peace research milieus are, so far, mostly placed at universities or independent institutions than in government departments and decision-making units. Also, the strategic, calculated use of violence remains alien to peace research. The idea is instead to search, as far as is possible, for 'peace with peaceful means' (Galtung 1996). War-fighting strategies are not likely to be developed at peace research institutions. Even so, the ideas of an international responsibility to protect populations exposed to the risk of genocide or ethnic persecution with the use of force are debated in peace research institutions, but without formulating practical strategies for such operations. This fits with the broader concern of human security as a means of reducing the risk of future terrorism, rather than the resort to arms for shorter or longer periods.

Some of the traumas and hopes associated with ethnic and gender issues in Table 1.1 have led to resurgence in the study of identity and its role in conflict and in conflict resolution. Gender issues may have been the first where the connections between gender equality and fewer inter-state wars, civil wars and human rights violations were established in the early 2000s (Caprioli 2000, 2005; Melander 2005a, 2005b). Today this has been broadened also to include the significance of LGBTQI issues in conflict formation, conflict behaviour and, consequently, also for peace settlements. Many peace research institutes and departments have an increasing focus on identity issues highlighted by the 'Black Lives Matter' movement in the US: It has had an inspiring effect globally. It relates to issues such as structural racism, slavery and the lingering effects of colonialism. Decolonization is not simply a matter of countries becoming independent from political, military and economic control from colonial states; it also includes a cultural dimension and ways of thinking (epistemology) (Mignolo and Walsh 2018). In many ways, it connects to early writings of WEB DuBois (DuBois 1903). In psychology, the term 'minority stress' highlights such dimensions (Meyer 2003). The implications for conflict analysis and conflict resolution include action that changes structures, for instance, in terms of rights (minority rights, victim rights), recruitment (affirmative actions), criminal procedures (tribunals, commissions and legal action) and compensation (acknowledgement, apologies, compensatory measures). The extent to which such action results in admission of responsibility, improved relations or reconciliation is important to explore. So is the attention to them in peace agreements and the role they have in preventing the recurrence of armed conflict and war. For instance, the Colombian peace agreement of 2016 includes 130 provisions on gender and 80 on ethnic issues, among a total of 578 provisions, according to the Barometer project that monitors the treaty's implementation (Colombia Barometer Initiative Report 2022).

There is a continual generation of new issues, as seen in Table 1.1. On average there are challenging events at least every decade that give rise to reconsideration and modification of present directions or going down entirely new paths. Table 1.1 may actually convey an image of such events being more common in later decades. If this is empirically true or a matter of presentism bias, that is an inability to see recent and present times in the same detached light as is the case for historical epochs, history will tell. However, it could be argued that the 2020s are going to see a host of new challenges, associated with social media manipulation (for instance of democratic elections), cyberattacks (aimed at vital societal functions), space

warfare (i.e. following the creation of a special branch of the Space Force, the newest military service branch within the US Department of Defense) as well as the return of old-style territorial nationalism (as exhibited in Russia's invasion of Ukraine).

Conflict resolution, as Table 1.1 makes clear, is a reasonably recent concept. Its foundations may be found in the Versailles Treaty, international law and conflict theory, as well as terms like cooperation and integration, but it is since the 1990s that it has taken on a new, more significant and central meaning. The literature has grown in recent years. There are – as will be seen throughout this book – mixed experiences in the field of peaceful endings of war. Collecting such lessons, systematizing and making them explicit, is a way to move forward. This book aims at understanding when peace agreements are likely to become durable settlements, meeting high standards of post-war conditions. This requires an analysis of different types of conflict. Agreements, it will be argued, are particularly dependent on identifying the central issues of contention, the incompatibilities. Furthermore, emphasis will be given to the significance of the ways agreements are derived. The processes as such can explain significant elements of the agreements, but are also important for assessing their durability. Durability, furthermore, is to be understood in terms of the quality of the peacebuilding that follows the ending of a war, typically expressed as quality peace (Wallensteen 2015; Joshi and Wallensteen 2018). In addition, it is important to observe the interconnections between conflicts in the same region and the role of the international community. The analysis pursued here builds on the conflict resolution agreements concluded after the Cold War and draws on general theories of conflict, negotiation and mediation. It will also ask, whether the trauma emerging from Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marks the beginning of a new era of increasing uncertainty and with new challenges to conflict resolution. In particular it could mean that the conflict resolution norm of the existing states' territorial integrity is challenged. Chapters 9 and 14 return to this. Thus, this is a book reporting on a record that hopefully will stimulate practice as well as research in the field.

1.3 Defining conflict resolution

Before we can proceed further, there is a need to establish a preliminary definition of conflict resolution. It will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The distinctions between conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict resolution have already been introduced. We have also mentioned the recent phenomenon of peace agreements. Such accords are an integral part of conflict resolution. Without some form of contract among the conflicting parties, it is hard to talk about conflict resolution. However, an agreement, even if implemented, may not be sufficient to establish durable peace. Peace requires more than a deal among the parties. The peace accord is, still, a necessary step to a lasting arrangement. Thus, we can preliminarily define conflict resolution as a situation *where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other*. This means, of course, that conflict resolution necessarily comes 'after' conflict. Thus, we need to begin by developing concepts and tools for the analysis of conflict. This makes conflict theory central. Conflict resolution and conflict theory is the theme of Chapter 2.

Let us scrutinize key elements in this definition. The *agreement* is normally a formal understanding, a document signed under more or less solemn conditions. It is available to all, at least in its main tenets. Naturally, there can be more informal, implicit understandings worked out between the parties. Such agreements may exist in secret documents, for instance, a crucial promise made as a precondition for the formal arrangements, or as more or less explicit deals between the parties. It is likely to see as much dispute around such informal understandings as over the formalized documents. In a way informal pacts require considerable trust between parties that have been at war with one another. They do invite dispute and divergent interpretations. Mostly wars are ended with a formal arrangement, stretching from a document of capitulation to a fully elaborated peace treaty. Thus, the agreed document is important for any peace process both as a goal and as a starting-point for post-conflict relations.

As Nathan has repeatedly pointed out a peace agreement is a political text and is only turned into a legal document if it is formed as an inter-state treaty, or, in case of intra-state conflict leads to a new or reworked national constitution (Nathan 2020).

The definition includes that the parties accept *each other's continued existence as parties*. This is an important element as it distinguishes a peace accord from, for instance, an agreed capitulation. An agreement of capitulation is the strongest consent to victory and defeat. It means that one side lays down its weapons, dissolves its organization, departs from the disputed territory and, in short, ceases to be an actor of influence and significance. An example is a withdrawal agreement. This is an arrangement where one side agrees to remove its troops from an area of dispute and where this is the only matter the agreement regulates. The withdrawing party is not likely, however, to see it as a matter of capitulation, although the essence of the agreement is to end that party's participation in the conflict. An example is the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that was agreed in 1988 and implemented by 1989. It ended the dominant role of the Soviet Union in internal Afghan affairs. In many ways, the Doha agreement in 2020 between the USA and the Taliban does the same, when finally implemented by the end of August 2021 with the US troops leaving and the Taliban taking over the government. There was, however, a commitment by the Taliban not to make Afghanistan a staging ground for attacks on the US and its allies. Another example is the resignation of a party leader from the government, where he/she also leaves the country. This was the case with the departure of Charles Taylor from Liberia in 2003, thus ending a civil war and opening a chance for long-term peacebuilding in the war-torn country, something that now has given the country two decades without war. Lately, there have also been victories without agreements or acts of capitulation. The USA declared the defeat of Iraq to be 'one victory in a war on terror', on 1 May 2003. The government of Sri Lanka won over the Tamil Tigers in May 2009, without a formal consent (i.e. capitulation) from the losing party. The Gaddafi regime in Libya ended with the killing of its leader in October 2011. The long civil war in Syria came to a standstill in the early 2020s, without a formal capitulation of any of the rebels or a government declaration of victory and indeed without a territorial unification of the country.

However, conflict resolution agreements are more complex. They refer to documents in which the fighting parties accept each other also as parties in future dealings. It means that nobody wins all that there is to win, but no one loses all that there is to lose. Such arrangements are more difficult to maintain, no doubt, but they are more frequent than perhaps

recognized at first. Of course, the word 'accept' in the definition does not imply that the parties agree to everything or that they 'like' each other. It only means that they accept the other as much as they need for the agreement to be implemented by the opposing sides.

The formulation that the parties *cease all violent action against each other* is most important. Many times it is part of the same treaty but it can be done as a separate undertaking. Often the cessation of violence is made public at about the same time as the peace agreement is concluded. To the public at large, it means that war fighting ends and the dangers of being killed are reduced. Sometimes, however, cease-fire agreements can precede the actual conclusion of the agreement regulating the incompatibilities between the parties. There is debate whether cease-fires should precede, be simultaneous with, or come after the more political agreements. There are a number of truce agreements that have lasted a long time, without resulting in peace accords. The armistice lines drawn in 1949 separating Israel from its Arab neighbours were used in the agreements with Egypt 30 years later. The same territorial divisions are relevant in the discussions for a final agreement between Israel and Palestine today. These lines have now existed for more than 70 years. The separation lines between Korea's two states in 1953 will soon reach a similarly venerable age. Perhaps an agreement will be achieved earlier on Cyprus, where the territorial divisions that are the references for today's discussions date from the war in 1974. The line presently separating Georgia from South Ossetia dates to the cease-fire of 1992. The cease-fire lines in eastern Ukraine stem from 2014 and are not accepted by the Ukraine government as anything but temporary arrangements. Russia's invasion in 2022 was partly geared at permanently moving these lines further to the West. The short war over Nagorno Karabakh in November 2020 resulted in new territorial limits, but no peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Truce agreements, in other words, are closer to conflict management, as a way of freezing a (new) military status quo, and do not necessarily result in peace efforts. However, a peace agreement, attempting to solve the central incompatibilities between the parties, which do not include a simultaneous undertaking to cease fighting, is not likely to be credible to the parties or to the public. Thus, agreements included as conflict resolution measures are those that solve incompatibilities *and* end fighting.

1.4 Approaching conflict resolution

There are deep philosophical roots behind many of the solutions to the traumas mentioned in Table 1.1. A lot of thinkers have considered the role of violence in society, and the positions vary. The original formative challenge for peace studies and for conflict resolution is that of inter-state conflicts and wars: Table 1.1 starts at World War I, which initially was a matter of unintelligent conflict management in the summer of 1914. The leading actors realized what would happen if the commitments in the big power alliances were activated. The plans were ready and the scenarios were understood in both alliances. Still the war broke out and very quickly derailed from the plans leaving the policy-makers seemingly without options. The war took on its own dynamics and with increasing sacrifices on either side victory was seen as the only option. After this experience it became important for analysts and policy-makers to look beyond the pure management mode used for inter-state rivalries. More structural thinking came into policy circles and the question became: What can be done to prevent the recurrence of war? The well-known suggestions by Immanuel Kant already in 1795 became policy. The

peace movement thoughts on building 'fraternity' among peoples, as stated by Alfred Nobel when creating the original Peace Prize, appeared more useful, and thus the League of Nations was created, to be followed by the United Nations, the European Union, and a plethora of regional and subregional bodies for peace and security. The last trauma in Table 1.1 refers to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and again makes relevant research emerging from the very first trauma, the outbreak of World War I, a hundred years earlier, on issues of international, or at least European, order.

In domestic affairs, the use of power had to do with the state as the sole holder of the legitimate use of lethal violence. Philosophers throughout the ages paid attention to this. This was the turf of Niccolo Machiavelli, advocating a smart Prince that would not antagonize people, deal directly with opponents and retain power, via Thomas Hobbes, suggesting that all power be handed to the sovereign, the Leviathan, in an agreement made among 'men', to John Locke advocating a social contract which could constrain the ruler and Baron de Montesquieu developing a theory of dividing power between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary in a society. Indeed, following Liberal and Socialist thought, the state would not only have the physical powers in the society, but also play a leading role in protecting the well-being of the citizens. The welfare state, in other words, would replace the warfare state.

These thinkers were particularly concerned with the conflicting parties and their relationships. Thus, the state became central. But an analysis will have to go wider if we are to solve the problem. There is an intricate connection between the state and various types of disagreements. Machiavelli and Hobbes focused on the use of the physical power that is associated with the state. In that sense they deal with the actually controlled physical forces the state possesses. To protect that control becomes central. This is *Realpolitik*, that is the use of state power in the form of military, police and intelligence resources that state commands. It is closely associated, but still separate from the reasons, the ideology, that the holders of that power express, that is the ideas do also have an impact on their thinking. This is rather a matter of *Idealpolitik*, that is the use of power for ideals of change (reform, revolution, reaction), not only for keeping and benefiting from the status quo, for framing national and international affairs, in the minds of the power holders.

However, there are also other assets at the disposal of the state, notably the territory with its resources, giving rise to *Geopolitik* (associated with Rudolf Kjellén) as well as to the economic conditions, the *Kapitalpolitik* (building on Karl Marx, of course). Geopolitik considered that in particular the geographical locations as well as natural resources of states were important for a state's development. This framework, furthermore, connected close to military positions and dispositions. In its purest form Geopolitik writers would even talk about 'natural' borders and 'strategic locations' that could be used as arguments for expansionism. The notion of Kapitalpolitik pointed to the growth of industry and capitalism during the 1800s: What was important were not military strategic locations but access to significant resources such as minerals, oil, even food, from which profit could be generated. It was of benefit to states as well as corporations, but then also giving rise to military occupation, rivalry and war.

This book will return to these frameworks when considering different ways of managing or resolving interstate conflicts (Chapter 5), how they connect to internal conflicts (Chapter 8) and can be used for thinking about the 2020s (Chapter 14).

1.5 Limits of conflict resolution

Are all conflicts solvable or are there certain conflicts that can never be solved? These are pertinent questions, and they do not have simple answers. They also relate to moral or normative issues: Would not the conditions be better for all, if a particular party won a war by defeating the opponent substantially and/or sufficiently? The parties to a conflict definitely depart from this position: With 'us' winning the relations will be better for all, they would all maintain. That is the answer normally given by parties to explain what they want to achieve: With 'our' success, the outcome will be a better peace. In the terminology used here, it is a matter of achieving a military victory and consolidating that triumph in a way that prevents further hostility. This is *victory consolidation* and it contrasts a negotiated ending to war and the following period of *peacebuilding*. But would the claim of the utility of war also stand up to detached scrutiny? There are several concerns to consider.

First, empirically, it is possible to observe that all *types* of conflict, as will be shown throughout this text, display examples of having found negotiated solution. Thus, there is nothing to say, logically, that this would not be possible also in outstanding cases. Thus, in principle, all conflicts can be solved by peaceful means.

Second, there is an issue of *credibility of commitment*. Any agreed ending of a war requires as a minimum, that the parties are serious in their negotiations and in their commitment to a settlement and its implementation. This is the argument for why peace treaties have to be voluntary actions by the warring parties. This is what makes a deal serious commitments and turns the agreement into their responsibility. For the parties it is a matter of whether they can trust the opponent to live up to the agreed provisions. That is also the lesson from the Munich Syndrome: Can an authoritarian ruler or a totalitarian system be expected to keep its promises? There are historical cases that demonstrate this might not be the case, not only the experience of Munich in 1938. One can also ask, in the same vein, can democracies, for instance, after the election of a new government, be expected to follow the commitments of the previous administration? The guarantees that have been inserted into the agreement provide indications of the intentions of the agreeing sides. This is why agreements have to be turned into treaties and be ratified by constitutional decisions (normally a qualified majority in a popularly elected parliament) that are difficult to change. A conscious implementation and continuous dialogue between the parties provide measures of their intentions. Indeed, agreed stipulations also provide early warning signals: If they are not upheld, it will affect the parties' confidence in the entire construction and if that is lost a relationship might quickly revert back to war. Non-implementation may be a sign of changed motivations. Thus, an agreement brings ways to measure intentions and to evaluate ambiguities.

In a similar way, a victory also presents uncertainty for the future: Will the subjugated parties accept their loss, or will they gradually rebuild their capacities to demand and obtain revenge? The type of victory consolidation will be determinative. The outcome is decided by what the victor does with the victory, as much as what the loser does with the defeat. At present there are more studies of the conditions for peacebuilding than in victory consolidation. This is remarkable, as the victory option is the primary one for the parties in an armed conflict: Their assumption is that the end of the war will result in their (total) control over society. Certainly, this happens, but data also tell us that conflicts ending through negotiations are as likely as a victory (a topic to be explored in Chapter 2).

This relates to the decision to go to war: Has the party initiating violence really concluded that this is 'the only option' remaining? Have all other options been explored fully? In Chapter VI in the UN Charter, the parties commit themselves to doing that (notably Article 33) for inter-state conflicts in a language that equally well applies to internal conflict and internationalized intra-state conflicts. The Charter provides the legal framework and the member states have committed themselves to that. The different methods of conflict resolution are developed theoretically in Chapter 3 and will be illustrated throughout this book.

We may also ask if a war can create the conditions of a durable peace that inhabitants, neighbours and the entire international community would expect? The outcome of the Second World War suggests that this is possible: Germany and Japan have both moved away from aggressive stands for the past generations and for a longer period of time than seen in the past centuries. This can partly be attributed to their military defeat, of course, but also to the parties learning lessons from previous wars. The victory consolidation that followed after 1945 was a different path than the one found in the Versailles Treaty. The victory combined with a reasonably well-targeted punishment of the defeated leadership and a more generous treatment of the remainder of the population may suggest a formula for the conditions under which victory can be positive. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily typical for victorious actors, as exemplified with the most recent Western victories in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); in Sri Lanka (2009) or what will follow in Afghanistan (post-2021). Indeed, the policies of victory consolidations remain under-researched although it should be of central concern, for instance, in strategic studies. For the time being it has to be concluded that victory consolidation for the most part is not better at producing democratic conditions, tolerance, human and gender rights than peacebuilding. In fact, it is to the contrary (Wallensteen 2015).

Third, the other side may simply be so evil that negotiation is not morally defensible: Only its defeat is possible. There are some issues that invite such absolute conditions: slavery (in the US its abolition of 1865 was preceded by unsatisfactory compromises before the civil war), racism (whether directed against Jews, Africans, or others), apartheid (finally abolished in South Africa in 1994, after decades of largely nonviolent resistance), colonialism (originally challenged by arms in Ireland, by non-violence in India) and a host of other forms of repression. If talks are not acceptable, then is war the *only* answer? No, there remain other avenues to bring about change without the resort to war. Slavery in the US was abolished through a civil war, but that is not the story in other places, going from the United Kingdom to South Africa. Colonialism was defeated in India and Ghana through peaceful campaigns, and the Soviet communist system in much of Eastern Europe was ended through concerted, domestic and popular mobilization.

Thus, war does not have to be a primary option, and indeed empirically it often is not. There is space for diplomacy, negotiations, mediation, arbitration and reforms before policy-makers see the need to go to war or civil war. That space has to be used.

Additionally, conflict resolution is not necessarily identical with peace. There is considerable overlap, however, as most notions of peace are based on the *absence or ending of war*. A conflict, we have just made clear, is not resolved if it does not include an end to armed struggle. At the same time, it is not sufficient that it *only* contains the ending of fighting. Conflict resolution is more than such a limited definition of peace. It is more than the absence of war. The parties are agreeing to respect each other and prepare to live together with one another. However, there are broader understandings of what peace is, such as the presence of cooperation, justice and integration. Conflict resolution may or may not include such larger

values. It will depend on the situation. The preferred definition does not, a priori, include such elements. The definition is dependent on what the parties want or can agree to include. Conflict resolution may, or may not, contain broader aspects.

In the worst of circumstances, a peace agreement may negate widely held values. The accords studied here have been concluded between parties with weapons. They are militarily stronger than other parties in their societies. Thus, there is a danger that the agreed form of conflict resolution will contain *privileges for the armed parties*, at the expense of other interests in the society. There are many examples of this, even where persons who have been responsible for considerable destruction take up government positions, thus becoming legal powerholders. Such developments create fear in parts of society. From a conflict resolution perspective, it is necessary to warn against such arrangements. They may contain the seeds of renewed conflict or initiate entirely new conflict dynamics. The deal, from the population's point of view, is that granting such privileges will stop a war. The hope may be that these privileges can be challenged by a stronger civil society once the war is over. The conditions of peace may require new types of leadership and thus, such a hope may be borne out. A minimum conclusion is to ensure that the peace agreement does not prevent such developments; a better position is that it actually encourages influence of civil society, and a third that such privileges are altogether avoided (i.e. no amnesty to belligerents for what happened during the war and no special security arrangements for them in peacetime).

This means we have to raise an issue that has gained increased importance since the end of the Cold War: the issue of *crimes* committed during a war, as part of the fighting or under the protection or shadow of the war. The international war crimes tribunal was set up in 1993 for the conflict in former Yugoslavia followed by a similar tribunal for Rwanda a year later. By the summer of 1998, a full-fledged International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by an international treaty. With enough ratifications, ICC became operational by 2002 (although the USA chose to remain outside and initially tried to reduce its international reach). The ICC is a dramatically new development. After the Second World War, war crime tribunals were set up for individuals of responsibility in Germany and Japan. They were not permanent institutions and war crimes were seldom pursued internationally in the following decades. The only consistent effort taken up by some countries and some non-governmental organizations was to bring to trial those involved in the Holocaust. The so-called Russell Tribunal which highlighted war crimes committed by the USA during the Vietnam War (1966–7) was a non-governmental initiative that has also been pursued with respect to other wars. However, the Cold War precluded international consensus on the pursuit of war crimes.

Thus, only after the Cold War could a shared understanding again develop on war crimes, necessary procedures and punishments. Nevertheless, there were peace agreements, which included different forms of amnesty to leaders and decision-makers. Amnesty was at the time seen as necessary by negotiators for any agreement at all to be concluded. Leaders could, in other words, protect themselves from legal procedures, the opposing sides and the legitimate anger of their own populations. Although accepted as a necessity in the early 1990s this is no longer the case. Conflict resolution has become more demanding than it was immediately after the Cold War. The first indictment from the ICC concerned the leader of a rebellion in Uganda, at the same time making further negotiations for an end to the civil war more complicated. Thus, the effects of the focus on war crimes can be discussed. Some argue

that it threatens to prolong conflict, as parties fearing to be brought to trial have little incentive to make agreements that endanger their own means of control. Others argue that it deters parties from getting into war in the first place, as the existence of the ICC increases the likelihood that war crimes will be legally pursued, thus, in the long run, preventing new wars. In recent years, furthermore, many national courts (Belgium was a pioneer in such universal jurisdiction in 1993 although later narrowed to Belgian citizens) now have international reach and thus make prosecution of war crimes possible also outside the ICC framework.

Finally, we should also note that conflict resolution is not the same as complete *disarmament*. The agreement may allow the parties to retain a certain arsenal. It is likely, however, that this will be lower than what has been put to use in the war itself. The parties may, nevertheless, maintain that they need special armed protection. Clearly, the higher the level of protection required and agreed, the more likely it is that this creates renewed insecurity in a society. Thus, it is probable that peace agreements will only be durable if they result in some disarmament, as well as changes in all security sectors towards transparency, integrity and a professionalism that includes human rights. Particularly, disarming and demobilization need to be coupled with reintegration and rehabilitation of soldiers, not the least child soldiers. In recent years, such disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have become central efforts in peacebuilding following the ending of wars.

There are also other aspects of peace. Conflict resolution finds itself at a bridge between a very narrow concept of peace (no war) and a very broad one (justice). By leaving conflict resolution as a concept defined by the positions of the parties, it may become difficult to compare one situation to another. However, the fact is that there are increasingly established norms for the content of internationally acceptable peace agreements. International law has set some standards for conflict resolution between states. The end of the Cold War has also led to signposts for the settlement of internal conflicts: Principles of democracy, human rights, criminal justice, reconciliation and economic cooperation are part of this. In this sense, an international understanding of conflict resolution is developing. For instance, the sustainable development goals established in 2015 include matters of peace and rule of law in its 16th goal. Like the others, implementation is under continuous scrutiny. This and other measures contribute to pushing the concept of peace further in the direction of justice. These higher demands of peace can be summarized as a quest for quality peace: a peace that has a greater chance of preventing the recurrence of war and at the same time produces societies or inter-state relationships that are beneficial to all.

1.6 Causes of conflict and conflict resolution

The definition of conflict resolution that is used here does not include larger issues such as the 'removal of the root causes of conflict'. The focus is instead on what the parties engaged in a war can agree to. The assumption is that these root causes will be covered by the stipulations that are included in the deal that the parties can live with. Whether that will be the case is a result of the negotiations, and is likely to vary between agreements. Although some peace documents can be as comprehensive as in the Colombian agreement of 2016 it does not necessarily go as far as implied in the UN Security Council resolution 2282 from April

2016. The conditions for sustaining peace in the context of peacebuilding are 'broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilies, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development'. This resolution was unanimously passed in the Security Council parallel to an identical resolution in the UN General Assembly at about the same time (Resolution 70/262). Thus, the UN is operating with a wide peace definition where conflict resolution is an integral but implicit element. It approaches the notion of 'quality peace' which seeks to capture what can be empirically documented in such a wider context. It may also be a way of describing conflict transformation.

The focus of conflict resolution is on the identification of the issues that are presented by the parties themselves. Ideally, these are operational specifications of grievances or cleavages in the society at large. Strictly speaking, they reflect the understanding of the parties and suggest why they have resorted to violence. A sufficiently detailed peace agreement would be one element in actually starting to tackle root causes of a conflict. The definitions by the UN organs as well as other thoughts about fundamental causes often deal with intrastate conflicts. However, historically philosophers and peace researchers have focused on the causes of inter-state conflict. Thus, peace treaties, such as those of the Napoleonic wars (Vienna 1814–5) and First World War (Versailles 1919), are different from intrastate peace-making. As will be clear in this book, there are important and distinct features among these types of conflict that have to be attended to. Although the new UN definitions make clear that intra-state conflict is part of UN concerns, something that has previously been disputed, the duty of the Security Council is to determine if a situation is a threat to *international* peace and security. The UN originally dealt with interstate conflicts but the reality has become more complex needing attention to all types of armed conflict. As will be reported in this book, notably in Chapter 8, many intrastate conflicts have become highly internationalized creating complex new challenges to understanding the causes of conflict as well as promotion of conflict resolutions.

A closer specification of possible causes of *inter*-state conflict would refer to border issues, military dispositions (provocative postures, arms races), suspicion and distrust, revanchism and/or expansionism. During the earlier periods of peace research, notably the agenda during the Cold War, such interstate factors were in the foreground stemming from the traumas and hopes that were relevant at that time, as could be seen in Table 1.1. It is interesting that only a few of these factors are reflected in the comprehensive UN definition. This testifies to the differences in approach and type of relations. In Chapter 5, this book will pay particular attention to such factors. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 makes this even more urgent. The search for the causes of conflict in *internal* conflicts has been important in peace research since the early 1990s. This adds to the agenda of peace research. It has turned out to be fruitful to separate such conflicts with regard to their incompatibility: Are these conflicts over control over the governance of the existing state (civil wars) or do they concern territorial issues leading to break-up of existing states (state formation conflicts)? Chapters 6 and 7 deal with each of these categories.

1.7 On 'root causes': a methodological note

For both intrastate conflicts and interstate conflicts, the term 'causes' is problematic and most researchers would be careful only to talk about 'correlates': There are variables or phenomena that correlate with the onset, escalation or intensity of intra-state conflicts. It is harder to determine the connections between the variables and thus to identify the actual sequences or mechanisms that make the connections. Particularly, as it has to be demonstrated that other variables may yield stronger correlations. Establishing a causal relation also requires that alternative explanations have been considered and can be convincingly refuted, theoretically and/or empirically. For instance, democratic countries see fewer internal wars statistically speaking, but why would this be the case? Is it because they are also richer? Or are they richer because they do not have internal wars? Or could it be explained by them being more tolerant, exhibiting fewer gender inequalities? Are there other factors to consider?

An actor might be driven by poverty, discrimination or a vision of society that might constitute elements in what analytically could be the 'root causes'. Empirically, it has been demonstrated that issues of discrimination are important elements in initiation of civil wars (Wallensteen 2015; Walter 2022: 44), as countries with such experiences have more armed conflicts than other (Melander 2005a, 2005b). Do democratic societies exhibit less discrimination? The route from discrimination to organized violence is not entirely direct: For opponents it takes the route via formation of actors, amassing of resources, training for military action, mobilizing the public for this position and then initiating armed action. For the government side it is easier to resort to repression or initiate counteractions, as it controls the instruments of power. Rebels or revolutionaries always start from an inferior position. It is, in other words, not easy to make a successful revolution or rebellion. This notwithstanding, the causal chain from one particular 'root cause' to actual combat includes a number of additional elements or sequences.

Indeed, it is not necessarily those most discriminated or poorest that resort to violent action. It might be other actors who have these concerns on their agenda, often with additional elements, notably of their vision of what a society should look like. Still, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and providing for tolerance are important elements in reducing incentives for resorting to weapons and violence. Such measures, for instance, affect the ability to convince and mobilize fighters for rebel causes.

We should also note that the phrase 'removal of root causes' in most conflict situations put the onus on those who want to change current conditions. Analytically, it could be the other way: The fact that the power holders engaged in upholding a particular status quo are willing to do this with military means might be closer to a 'root cause'. Not the least, as just stated, they are more likely to have immediate access to weapons and authority over established institutions. Thus, analysis should equally much or more focus on the power holders and the instruments of status quo. In a sense, this is the operationalization of 'structural violence' (Galtung 1969b): These are the structures that uphold discriminatory practices, for instance, and benefit from prevailing conditions. The notion of 'root causes' of conflict needs to incorporate a structural understanding. A society is maintained by structures, that is institutions, laws, cultures, traditions, that also include the way police, intelligence operations and

military forces operate. The unequal distribution of power is seen in who benefits and who loses in access to scarce and valuable collective resources.

Such inequalities of power are expressed in many terms in *intra*-state affairs, notably dictatorship, totalitarianism, slavery, ethnocracy, kleptocracy, plutocracy, theocracy and patriarchy. These refer, respectively, to political resources, ideological orthodoxy, exploitation, racism, ethnic dominance, corruption, class society, clerical supremacy and male domination, to name some forms that have been exposed to particular scrutiny.

When coming to the removal of causes of conflict, we should point to the fact that also peace has it causes and its concepts. These are associated with terms such as democracy, transparency, human rights, equality, justice and responsibility. They lead our analysis to root causes of conflict resolution and peace.

There are parallel terms for the *international* society: superpower status, nuclear weapon states, hegemony, domination, imperialism, balance of power, alliances, spheres of interests and interventions. They point to factors that have to be considered when dealing with 'causes' of international disputes and war. These notions also have their opposites, such as territorial integrity, state sovereignty, national self-determination, good neighbourly relations, mutually beneficial cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, security community, collective security, common security and the international community. These terms are reflected in other UN documents and some appear in the UN Charter. Thus, there is an awareness of the structural dimensions in international relations, as well as vocabulary for describing conditions of peace.

There is another set of possible causal links: The type of social order within a society, particularly in a leading state, will affect its international behaviour (Wallensteen 1973). Thus, the finding that democratic states tend not fight war with one another, as established in the work of Bruce Russett in the early 1990s, points to such relationships (Russett 1993), but also included international trade relations and international organizations as additional factors (Russett and Oneal 2001). Still, the democratic social order has been determined to be significant (Gleditsch et al. 2013), something which rhetorically has been seen in the way some major powers describe their confrontation with others. There are constant references to their internal social order, i.e. democratic societies vs. dictatorships (Wallensteen 1973, 1981/2021). Some such relations are obviously more difficult than others, but it has still not precluded agreements at times across ideological divides. There have even been international agreements on these issues. An example is the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which included an entire 'basket' on human rights, thus making these rights part of international relations. During the period of close cooperation between major powers in the 1990s democracy and human rights were central in agreements in intra-state conflicts around the globe. In the early 2020s, there were again serious disputes around these notions, with contrasting interpretations of democracy, human rights and interference in internal affairs. With more rigid and protective interpretations of a given social order the more conflict there seemed to be between major states.

A more difficult issue is how to incorporate change in understanding the correlates and causes of conflict. The speed of change has sometimes been seen as an important factor (Walter 2022: 18) meaning that the quicker changes take place in some underlying conditions, the more likely there will be increasing discrepancies between different groups in societies. Slower changes give more possibilities of adapting society, while quicker changes create more

social gaps and increase the possibility of counter-actions from groups seeing their 'normal' society 'disappearing'. The rate of pace then would exacerbate existing cleavages and make them more explosive.

This relates then to the conflict potential of the global climate change that has been the particularly pronounced in the past 50 years. In many respects, it is like a novel factor not considered in classical writings on society. As a 'root cause', we need to consider closely how the undeniably human-induced climate changes translate into conflicts through a chain of factors that include the dynamics described above. There are several possible paths to consider, notably conditions of drought, flooding, reduction of food supplies and many other. All these will require further study but some work has already been reported (von Uexkull et al. 2016).

With respect to the impact of reduced rainfall over a period of time, this is likely to make people living in the exposed area move into others habitats. As much of the planet is already populated the newcomers might quickly be rejected, repressed or become con-querors. This provides an incentive for local authorities to use physical means, which in turn may spark defensive measures from potential targets. Local conflicts arise, leading the state to intervene, and, if siding with one of the parties, increases violence and, thus, a local conflict may quickly escalate. Such sequences have been observed in drought, for instance, in the Sahel region (Global Trends 2021; Wallensteen 1981a/2021). Climate change then strengthens existing cleavages and the speed of that change may further intensify conflicts.

With respect to food production, the chain of events is different: Increasing food prices has historically been associated with urban violence, e.g. attacks on warehouses in harbours or stores in the cities (Tilly 1971, 1990; Rudolfsen 2020, 2021). When taking place in the capitals, governments are particularly sensitive and might resort to repression, which in turn leads to further escalation in a scenario of the type seen in Paris in 1789. It also suggests that food can become a weapon: Those that have an abundance of food can use it to pressure others and that can be used also between states, what has been termed 'agro-power' or 'food power' (Wallensteen 1976/2021; Global Trends 2021). Indeed, the Norwegian Nobel Committee cited the potential use of food as a weapon as reason for awarding the work of the World Food Programme: Humanitarian deliveries could take place also during conditions of war (Nobel Peace Prize Committee 2020, 2021).

Discussion of such scenarios has led many to conclude that the central variable is not the climate change itself, but the ability, capacity and will of the state to find accommodation among groups with competing claims. This, in addition, gives a different direction for the study of the new climate conditions: It might actually lead to strengthening of one state vis-à-vis another and, thus, provide an opportunity for manipulative tactics, even interventions. Such exploitative measures have been observed historically as well as recently.

One tenet in the literature on climate change is the acceleration of change, what is referred to as tipping points: At a certain level of temperature rise (created by emissions of greenhouse gases), the changes in climate will accelerate, leading to much stronger and more dramatic effects (for instance, when Greenland's ice sheet melts it will expose more surface areas which intensifies glacial melting, increases sea level rises and in turn heats up the climate (Lenton et al. 2019)). The established connections among pertinent variables is

reinforced or even outpaced by these new dynamics. If that also applies to connections between climate change and conflict, it suggests societal conditions even less manageable than the present ones. In fact the term 'tipping point' came from one such study, notably of the unexpected reduction in crime in New York (Gladwell 2000). That remains to be studied on a global level.

Not least the dramatic rise in social media during the 2010s also suggests ways in which this may impact conflict as well as peace. Some attention has been paid to the conflict-driving effects through polarizations and algorithms favouring extreme views and reactions (Walter 2022: 102–28) even describing these media as a conflict 'accelerant'. There is also an emerging interest in how the Internet and social media can be turned into a tool for peacebuilding (Schirch 2021). The social media, in other words, can be used for both purposes, although the past ten years have demonstrated more of its conflict generating capacity, not the least in deliberately disseminating disinformation. These are issues that should be of grave concern for the present decade and there is a need to find a way forward that social media connects people in a constructive way. Indeed the CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, reworded the company's mission to be 'bring the world closer together' in March 2021 (Zuckerberg 2021). That remains to be seen.

In a similar vein, there is an interest in Artificial Intelligence (AI), not only for war fighting but also in negotiating conflicts. There are even tools like 'robot mediators' and some experience with their use (Hilborne 2019) at least with regard to economic disputes. Such instruments may be of use also for serious conflicts, at least as support for traditional human mediation.

When observing these societal and technological factors and their dynamics, there are particular mechanisms reported to be driving a situation towards conflict. These very general notions need also to be analysed more closely. They may even make it more possible to predict how a particular grievance or concern might result in conflict. Thus, in Chapter 3, three such considerations and approaches will be scrutinized: mutual escalation, frustration in meeting basic needs and the deliberate exploitation of opportunities and vulnerabilities. From this analysis it is also possible to suggest seven different ways in which conflicts can be resolved.

The 'root causes' in other words involve complex chains of events. Conflict resolution enters at a late stage in these dynamics, the one of on-going armed conflict. It will have to consider the competing claims organized actors have at that particular phase of their relationship. The 'cause' of conflict resolution then is the on-going conflict, perhaps even a particular phase of that conflict where resolution is more possible. Such 'ripeness' for resolution has been suggested as the immediate reason for initiating negotiations and perhaps also concluding the war by peaceful means (Zartman 1989). Observing how similar conflicts have been handled elsewhere is a potential 'cause' for ending a conflict. This is how this book hopes to contribute: There are war endings that warring parties can agree to, and if they do, a peace agreement may result. That then is manifest conflict resolution.

Even so, solutions to conflicts not only grow from the peace agreements. There will have to be supporting factors to make a post-agreement period successful. The quality of the agreement is a central factor as is its implementation. However, much point to the importance of democratic conditions for settling internal armed conflicts. Indeed, many agreements

introduce democratic forms into the society, or reform such previously existing forms. Research also points to the gender dimension; the less of gender inequality the more likely a country can avoid a civil war or widespread human rights violations (Melander 2005a, 2005b; Bjarnegård et al. 2015). Democracy and gender equality may reinforce each other in creating a tolerant society, which thus may be the preferred condition for a durable peace settlement. This, then, is a way to prevent the recurrence of conflict between the same parties on the same issues. In that sense a successful process of peacebuilding is also an achievement in structural conflict prevention: Conditions that may generate a war are removed long before the possibility of war has even entered into the minds of people.

What happens before a conflict breaks out but where a dispute is obvious or even manifested in a non-violent way are measures covered by the notion of 'operational conflict prevention', something we will also deal with in this text. It may, as suggested above, be the resurgence of an old conflict or it may be something quite novel, and thus require action to prevent an escalation to military action. This concept is closer to 'conflict management' that was mentioned earlier. This book also connects but does not go deeply into 'quality peace' which covers the conditions for creating constructive and useful relations between parties with a historical record of armed conflict. The scope of this volume is more limited but should, nevertheless, be of use in the many armed conflicts and wars that are going on at the present time, or in conflicts that find themselves in a frozen, unsolved stage of untenable conditions.

1.8 Outlining this book

The existing peace agreements are important inputs in this work. The analysis, however, has to start with the phenomenon that precedes any peace agreement and may eventually replace it: conflict. It requires some tools for understanding the extent of armed conflict and types of outcome. This is covered in Chapter 2, which gives information on patterns of conflict and peacemaking. Then we will go into the theoretical underpinnings and review some of the elements of contemporary conflict theory that are relevant for peacemaking (Chapter 3). From this, we proceed to the necessary instruments for basic conflict analysis. This is done in Chapter 4, which presents three types of prevalent conflict, the trichotomy of conflict, which require different types of agreement. This completes Part I. In Part II, the peace agreements since the end of the Cold War, as well as previous experiences, are married to this structure to show how the distinctions serve to highlight features for durable agreements (Chapters 5–7). Part III examines particularly complex issues in conflict analysis. These relate to the linkages between different conflicts and how they emerge into regional or global conflict complexes, where the relationships between major powers become crucial in determining conflict dynamics and the chances of conflict resolution (Chapter 8). In Chapter 9, the roles of the United Nations and regional organizations in conflict resolution are assessed. Chapters 10 and 11 focus on tools used in peacemaking. Part IV takes up lessons on conflict resolution, notably the importance of gender equality and consensus on the prevention of genocide and terrorism (Chapter 12), the challenges of climate change for conflict, and the threat of nuclear war (Chapter 13). Finally, Chapter 14 reflects on a set of other issues, including corruption and changes in major power constellations.

▬▬ Classical readings on peace ▬▬

Organized peace research is, of course, not the originator of a discussion on peace, violence or war. Through time, this has been an important concern by many writers. Some important and still highly relevant texts are the following:

DuBois, William Edward Burghardt. 1903. *The Souls of Black Folk*, Chicago, IL: A C McClurg & Co is a classic in US sociology as well as significant for African-American literature. In this context it demonstrates very well the mechanism of racism, repression and supremacy. It not only affects US society but also connects 'Black Folks' around the globe. It is necessary to read for an understanding of the Black Lives Matter movements in the early 2020s.

Kant, Immanuel. 1795. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. The renowned philosopher outlines his approach to a lasting international peace arrangement emphasizing matters such as republican rule, international federations and arms control. These visionary ideas were widely read during the 1800s. It influenced the formation of international organizations in the 1900s and sparked a modern research approach, referred to as the Kantian Peace.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1532. *The Prince*. This text from the 16th century was published after the death of Machiavelli. It gives advice to the political leader who wants to retain power in turbulent times. It is a classical reading for a 'realist' approach emphasizing the importance of power. It has also sparked an ongoing discussion on moral and power.

More, Thomas. 1516. *Utopia*. The work on *Utopia* is contemporary to Machiavelli and can be seen as a critique of the power struggles that went on in Europe at the time. It does so by outlining a vision of a different society, 'Utopia'. The concept is firmly entrenched in European thinking, and has also led to new derivations, such as 'dystopia' as a negative vision of a future society.

For philosophical discussions on these and other writers of relevance for peace, security, justice and development, go to Spotify open website to locate the Regina Theatre, Uppsala, Sweden series of hour-long podcasts from the stage *Philosophy Tea*: https://open.spotify.com/show/1seeRdC4P4Yn9JwndgPgyg?si=taCvLosQQPG-fLYeSZdOMQ&nd=1. Thinkers like Bertrand Russell, Ibn Khaldun, Dag Hammarskjöld, Baruch Spinoza, Hanna Arendt, Mahatma Gandhi, and Voltaire are covered, as well as the lesser known but equally impressive personalities Bertha von Suttner, Karin Boye, William Wilberforce and Charlotte Perkins Gilman and modern writers such as Naomi Klein, John le Carré and Martha Nussbaum are discussed.