RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, & CLASS

NINTH EDITION

The Sociology of Group Conflict and Change

Joseph F. Healey • Andi Stepnick

Race, Ethnicity, Gender, & Class

Ninth Edition

DEDICATION

To Pat: "Grow old along with me, the best is yet to be..."

—Joe

To Shari: You are the best! I'm grateful for your unwavering love, kindness, and companionship.

To the undergraduates reading this book: Be open and curious, be critically skeptical, work hard, and have faith. You are our hope for the future.

—Andi

Only when lions have historians will hunters cease to be heroes.

—African Proverb

Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced.

—James Baldwin

Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class

The Sociology of Group Conflict and Change

Ninth Edition

Joseph F. Healey

Christopher Newport University

Andi Stepnick

Belmont University

⑤SAGE   **⑤SAGE**

Los Angeles I London I New Delhi
Singapore I Washington DC I Melbourne

BRIEF CONTENTS

DETAILED CONTENTS

PREFACE

Of the challenges confronting the United States today, those relating to diversity continue to be among the most urgent and the most daunting. Along with equality, freedom, and justice, discrimination, rejection of "others," prejudice, racism, and sexism are some of our oldest values. Every part of our society, and virtually every item on the national agenda—"welfare" and health care, policing, crime and punishment, family, education, defense, foreign policy, and terrorism—have some connection with dominant–minority relations.

This textbook contributes to our ongoing national discussion by presenting information, raising questions, and deeply examining relevant issues. Our intent is to help you increase your knowledge, improve your understanding of the issues, and clarify your thinking about social inequalities related to race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation. We've written for undergraduate students—sociology majors and non-majors alike. We make few assumptions about students' knowledge of history or sociological concepts, and we try to present the material in a way that you will find accessible and relevant.

For example, we use a unified set of themes and concepts throughout the text. Our analysis is consistent and continuous, even as we examine multiple sociological perspectives and different points of view. We introduce most of the conceptual framework in the first four chapters. Then, in chapters 5 through 12, we apply these concepts and analytical themes to a series of minority groups. Chapter 13 examines groups relations around the globe and, finally, in chapter 14, we review and summarize our main points, bring our analysis to a conclusion, and speculate about the future. Thus, this text follows an explicit structure: introduction (Parts I and II), application and development (Parts III and IV), and conclusion (Part V). We hope that this organization will help you follow the thrust of our analysis and recognize the complexity of group relations, inequality, and conflict.

Our analysis is, generally, macro and comparative. That is, we focus on large groups and social structures—such as social institutions and stratification systems—and we systematically compare and contrast the experiences and situations of America's many minority groups over time. The book follows in the tradition of conflict theory, but it is not a comprehensive statement of that tradition. We introduce and apply other perspectives, but we don't attempt to give equal attention to all current sociological paradigms, explain everything, or include all possible analytical points of view. It couldn't be done! Rather, our goals are (a) to present the sociology of minority group relations in a way that you'll find understandable and intellectually challenging (b) to address the issues (and tell the stories behind the issues) in a way that is highly readable and that demonstrates the power and importance of sociological thinking.

Additionally, every chapter (except the last) presents personal experiences that compellingly and dramatically foreshadow the material that follows. These introductions include the experiences and thoughts of a wide variety of people: immigrants, writers, politicians, racists, slaves, and "regular" people, among others.

In addition to examining diversity across minority groups (e.g., Native Americans and Hispanic Americans), we stress the diversity of experiences within each minority group (e.g., Puerto Ricans and Cubans). We use an intersectional perspective that explores the ways race, ethnicity, social class, and gender influence one another, creating ever-shifting constellations of dominance and subordination. We focus on American minority groups. However, we've included a considerable amount of comparative, cross-national material. For example, in addition to chapter 13, the "Comparative Focus" features in many chapters explore group relations in other societies.

Finally, we stress the ways American minority groups are inseparable from the American experience—from the early days of colonial settlements to tomorrow's headlines. The relative success of our society is due to the contributions of minority groups and those of the dominant group. The nature of

the minority-group experience has changed as society has changed. To understand America's minority groups is to understand some elemental truths about America. To raise the issues of difference and diversity is to ask what it means, and what it has meant, to be an American.

People's feelings about these issues can be intense, and controversy, indifference, and bitterness can overshadow objective analysis and calm reason. We have little hope of resolving our nation's dilemmas until we address them openly and honestly. This book explores topics that involve conflict between groups. That history is tinged with pain. We discuss topics that can be challenging to learn. And, at times, we quote directly from sources that use language that may be offensive or painful to hear. We have included it because we cannot understand (or change) things we do not face.

CHANGES IN THIS EDITION

This edition of *Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class* continues to incorporate many key features

In-Chapter Features

- *Opening vignettes* foreshadow the chapter content and arouse student interest.

- *Learning Objectives* focus student attention and help them organize the material.

- *Questions for Reflection* in major sections of the text help students analyze the material and identify crucial points.

- *Questions to Consider* accompany each Narrative Portrait and Comparative Focus box to help students link the material to the chapter.

- *Applying Concepts* activities provide an opportunity to use key ideas in new ways.

- *Chapter summaries* have been coordinated with the learning objectives listed at the opening of the chapters.

- *Key terms* are defined in the margins of the text for convenience and ease of reference.

Changes

- Research findings and data have been updated. As in the past, this edition relies on the latest information from the U.S. Census Bureau.

- There is an increased intersectional emphasis, For example, Chapter 4 addresses the experiences of enslaved women that result from interlocking systems of racial and gender oppression. The Chapter 8 Narrative Focus features gay Latino men.

- There is an increased emphasis on immigration, particularly in Chapter 1 and Chapters 8 through 10.

- A new Narrative Portrait in Chapter 6 offers an intersectional approach to race, gender, and sexual orientation.

- The Comparative Focus features have been updated.

ANCILLARIES

Teaching Resources

This text includes an array of instructor teaching materials designed to save you time and to help you keep students engaged. To learn more, visit sagepub.com or contact your SAGE representative at sagepub.com/findmyrep.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have been privileged to work on this edition with Andi Stepnick. She has strengthened this text in countless ways and it has been an enormous pleasure to work with a coauthor who brings such unflagging professionalism, scholarship, and attention to detail. I also thank professors Edwin H. Rhyne and Charles S. Green, the teacher–scholars who inspired me as a student, and Eileen O'Brien, who has contributed enormously to the development of this project. Finally, I thank my colleagues, past and present, in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Christopher Newport University: They have been unflagging in their support of this project, and I thank them for their academic, logistical, and intellectual assistance.

—Joseph F. HealeyI am grateful to Joe Healey for being such a thoughtful partner, and for inspiring me with his passion for sociology and social justice. I am indebted to the sociologists and activists who've fought for the democratic ideals of equality and justice for all and who paved the way for this work. I am grateful to many people for their support, wisdom, and humor throughout the years and, especially, while I was working on this book, including: Jerry Adams, Catherine Bush, Kris De Welde, Jennifer Hackett, Jennifer James, Jennifer Thomas, and my colleagues at Belmont University, especially Shelby Longard, Erin Pryor, and Ken Spring owe special thanks to Drs. Patricia Y. Martin and Irene Padavic for helping me become a better sociological thinker, researcher, writer, and teacher. I appreciate the many kinds of support that my parents have given me over the years. Finally, I am indebted to Shari for her incredible love, kindness, and humor. She's made my life rich beyond measure.

—Andi StepnickWe thank Jeff Lasser, Tara Slagle, and Megan OHefferanan of SAGE Publications for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this manuscript, and Dave Repetto, Ben Penner, and Steve Rutter, formerly of SAGE Publications, for their help in the development of this project.

This text has benefited in innumerable ways from the reactions and criticisms of a group of reviewers who proved remarkably insightful about the subject matter and about the challenges of college teaching. We thank them for the countless times when their comments led to significant improvements in the scholarship and clarity of this project. The shortcomings that remain are, of course, our responsibility, but whatever quality this text has is a direct result of the insights and expertise of these reviewers. We thank the following people:

FIRST EDITION REVIEWERS

Audwin Anderson, *University of South Alabama*
Donna Barnes, *University of Wyoming*
Norma Burgess, *Syracuse University*
Steven Cornell, *University of California, San Diego*
Gerry R. Cox, *Fort Hays State University*
Kevin Delaney, *Temple University*
Raul Fernandez, *University of California, Irvine*
Timothy Fiedler, *Carroll College*
Ramona Ford, *Southwest Texas State University*
Joni Fraser, *University of California, Davis*
Nicole Grant, *Ball State University*
Anne Hastings, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
Michael Hodge, *Georgia State University*
Ray Hutchison, *University of Wisconsin, Green Bay*

Joseph J. Leon, *California State Polytechnic University, Pomona*

Seymour Leventman, *Boston College*

Wendy Ng, *San Jose State University*

Carol Poll, *Fashion Institute of Technology*

Dennis Rome, *Indiana University*

Gerald Rosen, *California State University, Fullerton*

Ellen Rosengarten, *Sinclair Community College*

A. Seals, *Kentucky State University*

Charles Smith, *Florida A&M*

Susan Takata, *University of Wisconsin, Parkside*

Joyce Tang, *City University of New York, Queens College*

Maura I. Toro-Morn, *Illinois State University*

Diana Torrez, *University of Texas, Arlington*

Robert Williams, *Jackson State University*

Min Zhou, *University of California, Los Angeles*

Second Edition Reviewers

JoAnn DeFiore, *University of Washington*

Linda Green, *Normandale Community College*

Jeremy Hein, *University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire*

David Matsuda, *Chabot College*

Victor M. Rodriguez, *Concordia University*

Craig Watkins, *University of Texas, Austin*

Norma Wilcox, *Wright State University*

Luis Zanartu, *Sacramento City College*

Min Zhou, *University of California, Los Angeles*

Third Edition Reviewers

Rick Baldoz, *University of Hawaii, Manoa*

Jan Fiola, *Minnesota State University, Moorhead*

David Lopez, *California State University, Northridge*

Peggy Lovell, *University of Pittsburgh*

Gonzalo Santos, *California State University, Bakersfield*

Carol Ward, *Brigham Young University*

Fourth Edition Reviewers

Herman DeBose, *California State University, Northridge*

Abby Ferber, *University of Colorado, Colorado Springs*

Celestino Fernandez, *University of Arizona*

Samuel Leizear, *West Virginia University*

Gregory J. Rosenboom, *University of Nebraska/Nebraska Wesleyan University*

Peggy A. Shifflett, *Radford University*

Debbie Storrs, *University of Idaho*

Carol Ward, *Brigham Young University*

Norma Wilcox, *Wright State University*

Earl Wright, *University of Central Florida*

Fifth Edition Reviewers

Sharon Allen, *University of South Dakota*
Cathy Beighey, *Aims Community College*
Wendy H. Dishman, *Santa Monica College*
Bruce K. Friesen, *University of Tampa*
Susan E. Mannon, *Utah State University*
David McBride, *Pennsylvania State University*
Pam Brown Schachter, *Marymount College, Palos Verdes*
John Stone, *Boston University*
Merwyn L. Strate, *Purdue University*
Leigh A. Willis, *The University of Georgia*

Sixth Edition Reviewers

Tennille Allen, *Lewis University*
Steven L. Arxer, *University of Texas at Dallas*
Leslie Baker-Kimmons, *Chicago State University*
Melanie Deffendall, *Delgado Community College*
Sophia DeMasi, *Montgomery County Community College*
Creaig A. Dunton, *State University of New York, Plattsburgh*
Lisa A. Eargle, *Francis Marion University*
Kimberly H. Fortin, *Cayuga Community College*
Matasha L. Harris, *John Jay College of Criminal Justice*
C. Douglas Johnson, *Georgia Gwinnett College*
Chris Keegan, *State University of New York at Oneonta*
Janice Kelly, *Molloy College*
Patricia E. Literte, *California State University, Fullerton*
Marci B. Littlefield, *Indiana University-Purdue University*
Teri Moran, *Jackson Community College*
Gerald D. Titchener, *Des Moines Area Community College*
Deidre Ann Tyler, *Salt Lake Community College/The University of Utah*
Elsa Valdez, *California State University, San Bernardino*
Margaret A. M. Vaughan, *Metropolitan State University*
Elijah G. Ward, *Saint Xavier University*
Kathy Westman, *Waubonsee Community College*

Seventh Edition Reviewers

Walter F. Carroll, *Bridgewater State University*
Wendy Dishman, *Santa Monica College*
Ramon Guerra, *University of Texas–Pan American*
Jason Hale, *Montclair State University*
Gina Logan, *Norwich University*
Yvonne Merchen Moody, *Chadron State College*
Lisa Speicher Muñoz, *Hawkeye Community College*
Deena Shehata, *Western International University*
Deidre Tyler, *Salt Lake Community College*
Judith Ann Warner, *Texas A&M International University*
Kathleen Westman, *Waubonsee Community College*

Eighth Edition Reviewers

Joyce Altobelli, Western Technical College

Maria Aysa-Lastra, Winthrop University

Robert L. Dahlgren, SUNY Fredonia

Jo Beth DeSoto, Wayland Baptist University

Elsa Dias, Metro State University at Denver

Christopher Gullen, Westfield State University

Rose Suggett, Southeast Community College – Lincoln, NE

Pelgy Vaz, Fort Hays State University

Ninth Edition Reviewers

Sean C. Creech, Jacksonville State University

Jessica Leveto, Kent State University

Kay Mann, Miami University

Tom Brignall, Lewis University

Stephen Valentine, North Carolina Central University

Christy Haines Flatt, Gordon State College

Michelle Steven, St. Francis College

Danvas Ogeto Mabeya, Southeast Community College

Edward Wesakania, Skagit Valley CollegeLarry Williams, North Carolina Central University

Tonja Conerly, San Jacinto College

CalvinJohn Smiley, Hunter College, CUNY

Hiroko Inoue, California State University, San Bernardino

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Joseph F. Healey is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Christopher Newport University in Virginia. He received his BA and MA from the College of William and Mary and his PhD in sociology and anthropology from the University of Virginia. An innovative and experienced teacher of numerous race and ethnicity courses, he has written articles on minority groups, the sociology of sport, social movements, and violence, and he is also the co-author of *Statistics: A Tool for Social Research* (11th ed., 2021) with Professor Christopher Donoghue of Montclair State University

  Andi Stepnick is a Professor of Sociology at Belmont University in Tennessee. She earned her PhD from Florida State University. She's written about a variety of topics, including gender, pedagogy, social problems, and diversity. *Disrupting the Culture of Silence: Confronting Gender Inequality and Making Change in Higher Education (*with Kris De Welde), was named a CHOICE 2015 Outstanding Academic Title. She earned Belmont University's Presidential Faculty Achievement Award for significant contributions to students' intellectual, personal, and professional needs and was its 2015 Simmons Distinguished Lecturer for excellence in teaching and scholarship.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States is a nation of groups as well as individuals. These groups vary in many ways, including their size, wealth, education, race, ethnicity, culture, religion, and language. Some groups have been part of American[1] society since colonial days, while others have formed recently.

Questions of unity and diversity are among the most pressing issues facing the United States today. Who should be considered American? How should these groups relate to one another? Should we celebrate our diversity and preserve the many cultural heritages and languages that currently exist? Should we encourage everyone to adopt Anglo American culture and strive to become more similar? Is it possible to do both?

We begin to address these questions and other related issues in Chapters 1 and 2. Our goal throughout the text is to help you develop a broader, more informed understanding of the past and present forces that have created and sustained the groups that make up the United States. We'll sustain this focus throughout this book.

Chapter 3 addresses prejudice and discrimination—feelings, attitudes, and actions that support and reinforce the dividing lines that separate us into groups. How and why do these negative feelings, attitudes, and actions develop? How are prejudice and discrimination related to inequality and competition between groups? How can we reduce or eliminate them?

1 DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Questions and Concepts

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this chapter, you will be able to do the following:

1.1 Explain the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the United States.

1.2 Understand the concept of a minority group.

1.3 Explain the sociological perspectives that will guide this text, especially as they relate to the relationships between inequality and minority-group status.

1.4 Explain how race and gender contribute to minority-group status.

1.5 Comprehend four of the key concepts in dominant–minority relations: prejudice, discrimination, ideological racism, and institutional discrimination.

1.6 Apply a global perspective to the relationship between globalization and immigration to the United States.

Consider the following six Americans. Each is, of course, a unique person but they also represent millions of other members of our society.

- *Kim Park* is a 24-year-old immigrant from Korea living in New York City. He arrived three years ago and works in his uncle's grocery store. Instead of wages, Kim receives room and board and spending money. He eventually wants to become a U.S. citizen and manage the store when his uncle retires.

  Over the years, many different ethnic and racial groups have called Kim's neighborhood home. As recently as the 1950s, the area was almost exclusively Jewish. The Jewish residents have since died or moved and were replaced by Black, Hispanic, and Asian groups. Today, the neighborhood continues to change.

- One of Kim's regular customers is *Juan Yancy*. Despite Kim's halting English, the two men usually chat when Juan stops by on his way home from his janitorial job at a downtown hotel. Juan's mother is Puerto Rican, his father is Filipino but, when asked, he refers to himself as Puerto Rican.

- Juan lives in the apartment building where *Shirley Umphlett*, a Black woman, spent much of her childhood. In the 1920s, Shirley's family moved from Alabama in search of work. Her father worked construction, but because most labor unions and employers were "white only," he had no access to the better paying, more stable jobs and was often unemployed. Shirley's mother worked as a house cleaner to help meet family expenses. Shirley did well in school, attended college on scholarship, and is now a successful business executive. She is in her 40s, married, and has two children.

- Shirley's two children attend public school. One of their teachers is *Mary Farrell*, a fourth-generation Irish Catholic. Mary's great-grandparents came to New York in the 1880s. Her great-grandfather found work on the docks, and her great-grandmother worked as a

housekeeper. They had seven children and 23 grandchildren, and Mary has more than 50 cousins living within an hour of New York City. Each generation of Mary's family tended to do a little better educationally and occupationally. Mary's father was a firefighter, and her sister is a lawyer.

Several years ago, Mary's relations with her family were severely strained when she told them that she was a lesbian and would be moving in with her long-time partner, Sandra. Mary's parents, traditional Catholics, found it difficult to accept her sexual orientation, as did many of her other relatives. While she has been open with her family (much to their discomfort), she mostly stays "in the closet" at work, fearing the potential repercussions from parents and administrators. Still, she and Sandra are planning to marry soon.

● Mary is friends with *Hector Gonzalez*. Hector's parents came to the United States from Mexico. Every year, they crossed the border with other farm laborers and then returned at the end of the season. With help from a cousin, Hector's father eventually got a job as a cabdriver in New York City, where Hector was raised. Hector thinks of himself as American but is interested in his parents' home village back in Mexico, where most of his extended family still lives. Hector is bilingual and has visited the village several times. His grandmother still lives there, and he calls her once a month.

● Hector regularly eats lunch at a restaurant where most of the servers are Black, and the kitchen workers are Latino. One of the kitchen helpers, *Ricardo Aldana*, is in the country illegally. He left his home village in Guatemala five years ago. He lives with five others and sends 40% of his wages to his family in Guatemala. His most fervent wish is to go home, get married, and start a family.

● The restaurant is in a building owned by a corporation headed by *William Buford III*, a white American. William invests the bulk of his fortune in real estate and owns land and buildings throughout New York. The Bufords have a townhouse in Manhattan but prefer to spend most of their time at their rural Connecticut estate. William attended the finest private schools and, at age 57, he is semiretired, plays golf twice a week, and vacations in Europe. He was raised a Mormon but is not religious and has little interest in the history of his family.

These individuals belong to groups that vary along some of the most consequential dimensions within our society—ethnicity, race, language, immigration status, social class, sexual orientation, gender, and religion—and their lives have been shaped by these affiliations (some more than others, of course). Some of these statuses are privileged, while others are disadvantaged and can evoke rejection and contempt. Each person's statuses are mixed. For example, despite his elite status, William has occasionally felt the sting of rejection because of his Mormon background. Juan ranks low on race and class but enjoys some of the advantages of being a man, while Mary's chances for upward mobility in the school system are reduced by her gender and sexual orientation. Each of these individuals is privileged in some ways and limited in others—as are we all.

As reflected by these individuals, United States is growing more diverse in culture, race, religion, and language. The number of Americans who identify as multiracial or who can connect themselves to different cultural traditions is increasing. Where will this increasing diversity lead us? Will our nation fragment? Could we dissolve into warring enclaves—the fate of more than one modern nation? Or can we find connection and commonality? Could we develop tolerance, respect, or even admiration for one another? Can we overcome the legacies of inequality established in colonial days? Can Americans embrace our nation's increasing diversity and live out our motto, *E Pluribus Unum* (out of many, one)?

This book raises many questions about the past, present, and future of group relationships in America. For example, what social, political, and economic forces shaped those relationships historically and how are they shaping contemporary group relations? How do racial and ethnic groups relate to each other today? What kind of society are we becoming because of immigration? What does it mean to be an American? What kind of society do we want to become and how can we move in that direction?

These questions are complex, and the answers aren't obvious or easy to come by. There is no guarantee that we, as a society, will be willing or able to resolve all the issues related to intergroup relations. However, the issues won't disappear or resolve themselves if we ignore them. We'll never make progress unless we address the issues honestly and with an accurate base of knowledge and understanding. We hope this book helps you develop thoughtful, informed positions on these issues.

Throughout our inquiry, we'll rely on sociology and other social sciences for concepts, theories, and information to gain a greater understanding of the issues. The first two chapters introduce many of the ideas that will guide our investigation. Part 2 explores how relations between the dominant group and minority groups have evolved over time. Part 3 analyzes the current situation of U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups. Finally, Part 4 explores group divisions based on gender and sexual orientation, and patterns of group relationships around the globe. In Part 5, the final section of the book, we explore many of the challenges facing our society (and the world) and offer conclusions from our inquiry.

DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND QUESTIONS

America is a nation of immigrants and groups. Today, about 13.7% of the U.S. population was born in some other nation. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a) The population of some states is more than one fourth foreign-born (e.g., California is 26% foreign-born), (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a) and some cities are more than one-third foreign-born (e.g., New York is 37% foreign-born.), (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b) Since the infancy of our society, Americans have been arguing, often passionately, about inclusion and exclusion and about unity and diversity. Every member of our society is, in some sense, an immigrant or the descendant of immigrants. Even Native Americans migrated to this continent, albeit thousands of years ago. We are all from somewhere else, with roots in other parts of the world. Some Americans came here in chains; others came on ocean liners, on planes, on busses, and even on foot. Some arrived last week, while others have had family here for centuries. Each wave of newcomers has altered our social landscape. As many have observed, our society is continually under construction and seems permanently unfinished.

Today, America is remaking itself yet again. Large numbers of immigrants are arriving from around the world, and their presence has raised questions about what it means to be an American, who should be granted U.S. citizenship, and how much diversity is best for society. How do immigrants affect America? Are they bringing new energy and revitalizing the economy? Are they draining resources such as school budgets, health care, and jobs? Both? How do they affect Black Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and other groups? Are they changing what it means to be an American? If so, how?

In 2008, Americans elected Barack Obama to become our nation's first African American president. To some, this victory suggested that the United States has finally become what people often claim it to be: a truly open, "color-blind" society where one succeeds based on merit. In 2016, Donald Trump became our country's 45th president. Some see the rise of racist and xenophobic speech and actions that emerged during the 2016 and 2020 elections as a kind of backlash—not just against Democrats or the political system, but against the diversity initiatives that expanded under the Obama administration. In 2020, Americans elected Joe Biden as president but the start of his term was marked by an attack on the U.S. Capitol led by a coalition of racist, xenophobic, extremist groups that demonstrated some of the ugliest aspects of American history and culture.

Even as we debate the implications of immigration, other long-standing issues about belonging, fairness, and justice remain unresolved. Native Americans and Black Americans have been a part of this society since its start, but they've existed largely as outsiders—as slaves, servants, laborers, or even enemies—to the mainstream, dominant group. In many ways, they haven't been treated as "true Americans" or full citizens, either by law or custom. The legacies of racism and exclusion continue to affect these groups today and, as you'll see in future chapters, they and other American minority groups continue to suffer from inequality, discrimination, and marginalization.

Even a casual glance at our schools, courts, neighborhoods, churches, or corporate boardrooms—indeed, at any nook or cranny of our society—reveals pervasive patterns of inequality, injustice, and

unfairness and different opportunities. So, which is the "real"[2] America: the land of acceptance and opportunity or the one of insularity and inequity?

Some of us feel intensely connected to people with similar backgrounds and identify closely with a specific heritage. Others embrace multiracial or multiethnic identities. Some people feel no particular connection with any group or homeland. Others are unsure where they fit in the social landscape. Still, elements of our identity influence our lives and perceptions. The groups to which we belong affect our understanding of many social and political issues. Group membership, including our race or ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation, shape our experiences and, therefore, how we think about American society, the world, and ourselves. Additionally, group membership shapes the opportunities available to us and to others in our society.

How do we understand these contrasts and divisions? Should we celebrate our diversity or stress the need for similarity? How can we incorporate all groups while avoiding fragmentation and division? What can hold us together as a nation? The United States may be at a crossroads concerning these issues. Throughout this book, you'll have an opportunity to reexamine the fundamental questions of citizenship and inclusion in our society. This chapter reviews the basic themes to help you do that effectively.

Because our group memberships shape our experiences and worldviews, they also affect the choices we make, including those in the voting booth. People in different groups may view decisions in different ways due to their divergent group histories, experiences, and current situations. Without some knowledge of the many ways someone can be an American, the debates over which direction our society should take are likely to be unmeaningful or even misunderstood.

Increasing Diversity

The choices about our society's future may feel especially urgent because the diversity of American society is increasing dramatically, largely due to high rates of immigration. Since the 1960s, the number of immigrants arriving in America each year has more than tripled and includes groups from around the world.

People's concerns about increasing diversity are compounded by other unresolved issues and grievances. For example, in Part 3, we document continuing gaps in income, poverty rates, and other measures of affluence and equality between minority and dominant groups. In many ways, the problems currently facing Black Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and other minority groups are as formidable as they were a generation (or more) ago. Given these realities, how can the United States better implement its promise of equality for all?

Let's consider the changing makeup of the United States. Figure 1.1 presents the percentage of the total U.S. population in each of the five largest racial and ethnic groups. First, we'll consider this information at face value and analyze some of its implications. Then, we'll consider (and question) the framing of this information, such as group names and why they matter.

Figure 1.1 shows the groups' actual relative sizes from 1980 through 2020 and projected relative sizes of each group through 2060. The declining percentage of non-Hispanic whites reflect the increasing diversity in the United States. As recently as 1980, more than 8 out of 10 Americans were non-Hispanic whites, but by the middle of this century, non-Hispanic white people will become a numerical minority. Several states (Texas, California, Hawaii, and New Mexico) already have "majority minority" populations and non-Hispanic whites are only 49.9% of all children less than 15 (Frey, 2019).

Researchers predict that Black American and Native American populations will increase in absolute numbers but will remain similar in relative size. However, Hispanic American, Asian American, and Pacific Islander populations will grow dramatically. Asian American and Pacific Islander groups together constituted only 2% of the population in 1980, but that will grow to 10% by midcentury. The most dramatic growth, however, will be among Hispanic Americans. In 2002, this group surpassed Black Americans as the largest minority group. Researchers expect it will be almost 30% of the U. S. population by 2060.

Projections about the future are educated guesses based on documented trends, but they suggest significant change. Our society will grow more diverse racially and culturally, becoming less white

FIGURE 1.1 ■ U.S. Population by Race and Ethnicity, Selected Years

Note: Hispanic people may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2020c).

and less European—and more like the world as a whole. Some people see these changes as threats to traditional white, middle-class American values and lifestyles. Other people view these demographic changes as part of the ebb and flow of social life. That is, society has changed ever since it began; this is merely another phase in the great American experiment. Which viewpoints are most in line with your own and why?

What's in a Name?

The group names we used in Figure 1.1 are arbitrary, and no group has clear or definite boundaries. We use these terms because they are familiar and consistent with the labels used in census reports, much of the sociological research literature, and other sources of information. Although such group names are convenient, this doesn't mean that they are "real" in any absolute sense or equally useful in all circumstances. These group names have some serious shortcomings. For example, they reflect social conventions whose meanings change over time and location. To underscore the social construction of racial and ethnic groups, we use group names interchangeably (e.g., Blacks and African Americans; Hispanic Americans and Latino). Nevertheless, issues remain.

First, the race/ethnic labels suggest groups are homogeneous. While it's true that people within one group may share some general, superficial physical or cultural traits (e.g., language), they also vary by social class, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and in many other ways. People within the Asian American and Pacific Islander group, for example, represent scores of different national backgrounds (Japanese, Pakistanis, Samoans, Vietnamese), and the categories of Native American or Alaska Native include people from hundreds of different tribal groups. If we consider people's other social statuses such as age and religious affiliation, that diversity becomes even more pronounced. Any two people within one group (e.g., Hispanics) might be quite different from each other in some respects and like people from "different" racial/ethnic groups (e.g., white people).

Second, people don't necessarily use these labels when they think about their own identity. In this sense, the labels aren't "real" or important for all the people in these racial/ethnic groups. For example,

many white people in the United States think of themselves as "just American." Many Hispanic Americans think of themselves in relation to ethnic origin, such as Mexican or Cuban (see Chapter 7). Or they may identify with a particular region or village in their homeland. For LGBTQIA[3] group members, sexual orientation may be more important to their identity than their race or ethnicity. Thus, the labels don't always reflect the ways people think about themselves, their families, or where they come from. The categories are statistical classifications created by researchers and census takers to help them organize information and clarify their analyses.

Third, even though the categories in Figure 1.1 are broad, several groups don't neatly fit into them. For example, where should we place Arab Americans and recent immigrants from Africa? These groups are relatively small (about one million people each), but there is no clear place for them in the current categories. Should we consider Arab Americans as "Asian," as some argue? Should recent immigrants from Africa be in the same category as African Americans? Should we create a new group for people of Middle Eastern or North African descent (MENA)? The point is that any such classification schemes will have ambiguous boundaries.

Further, we can't neatly categorize people who identify with more than one racial or ethnic group. The number of "mixed-group" Americans is relatively small today—about 3.5% of the total population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2020). However, between 2000 and 2019, the number of people who chose more than one racial or ethnic category on the U.S. census increased by 46% (from 2.4% to 3.5% of the total population) (Jones & Bullock, 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). This trend is likely to continue to increase rapidly because of the growth in interracial marriage.

To illustrate, Figure 1.2 shows dramatic increases in the percentage of "new" marriages (couples that got married in the year prior to the survey date) and all marriages that unite members of different racial or ethnic groups (Livingston & Brown, 2017). Obviously, the greater the number of mixed racial or ethnic marriages, the greater the number of mixed Americans who will be born of such partnerships. One study estimates that the percentage of Americans who identify with two or more races will more than double between 2014 (when it was 2.5%) and 2060 (when it will be 6.2%; Colby & Ortman, 2015, p. 9).

FIGURE 1.2 ■ Interracial and Interethnic Marriages in the United States, 1967–2015

Source: "Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving v. Virginia," Gretchen Livingston and Anna Brown, May 18, 2017. Pew Research Center, Washington, DC. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/.

Finally, we should note that group names are **social constructions**,[4] or ideas and perceptions that people create in specific historical circumstances and that reflect particular power relationships. For example, the group "Native Americans" didn't exist before the European exploration and colonization of North America. Before then, hundreds of separate societies, each with its own language and culture, lived across North America. Native Americans thought of themselves primarily in terms of their own

tribal group, not in terms of the totality of groups spread across the vast expanse of the North American continent. However, European conquerors constructed them as one group: the enemy. Today, many Americans see Native Americans as one group. This reflects their historical defeat and domination by white European colonists, which led to Native Americans' current status as a minority group in a largely white society.

Likewise (although through different processes), African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans came to be seen as separate groups as the result of their unequal interactions with white Americans. These group labels have become real because people *believe* they are real. We use these familiar group labels to help our discussion of complex topics, but they don't reflect some unchangeable truth or reality regarding racial or ethnic groups.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. In the chapter opening, William—the wealthy, white real-estate mogul—has the most privileged statuses compared with the others (e.g., Kim Park, Juan Yancy, Shirley Umphlett). How would you rank the others status? Consider class, gender, sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, etc. Which statuses carry the most weight in our society? Why?

2. Savannah is a white, 27-year-old woman who was raised in Georgia but now lives in South Dakota. She is an Episcopalian, has a degree in computer science, and makes $60,000 a year. She is married to Tom, her college sweetheart. Winona is a 40-year-old woman and a member of the Lakota nation. She was raised in South Dakota but moved to California to pursue her career as a pharmacist. She is married to Robert and they have one child. Although the census would classify Savannah and Winona as belonging to different racial/ethnic groups, they are similar in many ways. In what ways are their similarities more significant than their differences?

3. If asked about your group membership, which of the groups in Figure 1.1 would you choose, if any? Do you feel that you belong to one group or several? How much does your group membership shape your circle of friends, your experiences, and your worldview? How important is your group membership to your self-identity?

4. Over the past 5 to 10 years, what signs of increasing diversity have you seen in your community? What benefits and challenges have come with increasing diversity?

5. What does it mean to be American? If you asked Americans today, a popular answer might be *freedom*. What does that mean to you—freedom to do what? Or freedom from what? How do you think people of other countries or generations might respond?

NARRATIVE PORTRAIT: ON BEING AMERICAN

Carla, now in her 20s, is the adopted daughter of an affluent white family. She grew up in the suburbs and enjoyed a comfortable middle-class lifestyle. She has never met her birth parents but knows that her biological mother was Korean American, and just 16 years old at the time of her birth. She knows nothing about her birth father. Carla is beginning to reconcile herself to how most Americans perceive her.

For much of her life, Carla has felt caught between her biological heritage and that of her adopted family. She often hesitates when people ask about her family or where she is from. Is she Asian American, in the terms of the U.S. Census (Figure 1.1)? Or, should she identify herself to people (or when she fills out employment applications) as "non-Hispanic white" because the only lifestyle she has ever known is white, suburban, middle class? For her, the social construction of race is very real and, at the same time, false.

Here is part of what she has to say about her identity:

When I was growing up, my parents would try to teach me about my Korean heritage. We would read books about Korean history and culture, my mom learned to prepare some Korean dishes, and we even discussed taking a trip to Korea—but never did. Looking back, I really appreciate what they were trying to do, but it all felt foreign to me, you know? Like we were discussing Bolivia or Kenya. . .

But then, someone would make assumptions about me based on my looks. They would think that I was good at math or nerdy or couldn't speak English. I can't tell you how many times someone has

asked me, "Where are you from?" When I said, "I'm from here," most people wouldn't believe me and would ask, "No, where are you *really from*?"

Sometimes I tried to "be Korean" and even attended some meetings of the Asian Student Association when I was in school, but it felt wrong—it just wasn't me. But then, something would happen. . . . Like one time I was just walking through the mall, and some old white guy came up and said, out of the clear blue sky, "You people are ruining this country!" I mean, who did he think I was?

So, yeah, it took a long time to make peace with who I am and how others perceive me. But, now I think that I'm just me, you know? People can look at me one way and put me in all those different categories, but that's their problem. It's not who I am. It's not me!

Source: Personal communication to the authors. Carla's name and exact circumstances have been fictionalized to preserve her privacy.

Questions to Consider

1. Is Carla's confusion about her identity a result of her social and physical characteristics? Or, does is it result from how other people see her? Explain.
2. How might Carla's situation change if she were a man? What if her birth mother were Hispanic or black?

WHAT IS A MINORITY GROUP?

A common vocabulary will help us understand and discuss the issues raised in this text with greater clarity. The mathematical connotation of the term **minority group** implies that minority groups are small. However, they can be quite large—even a numerical majority. For example, most sociologists consider women a minority group, although they are a numerical majority of the U.S. population. White people are a numerical minority in South Africa, accounting for less than 8% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). However, they've been the most powerful and affluent group in that nation's history for centuries Despite the end of **apartheid** (state-sanctioned racial inequality) in South Africa, white people keep their advantage in many ways (e.g., economically, politically). Therefore, sociologists would consider them the dominant group. Sociologists define minority status in terms of the distribution of resources and power. We use the definition of minority group developed by Wagley and Harris (1958) that emphasizes these characteristics:

1. Minority group members experience a pattern of *disadvantage or inequality*.

2. Minority group members share a *visible trait or characteristic* that differentiates them from other groups.

3. Minority group members are *aware* of their shared status with other group members.

4. Group membership is usually *determined at birth*.

5. Members tend to *form intimate relationships* (close friendships, dating partnerships, and marriages) *within the group*.

Next, we briefly explain these five characteristics. Because inequality and visibility are the most important characteristics of minority groups, we'll examine them in detail later in the chapter.

1. **Inequality**. The first and most important defining characteristic of a minority group is its *inequality* (some pattern of disadvantage). The degree of disadvantage varies over time and location and includes such slight irritants as a lack of desks for left-handed students or a policy of racial or religious exclusion at an expensive country club. (Note, however, that you might not agree that the irritant is slight if you're a left-handed student awkwardly taking notes at a right-handed desk or if you're a golf aficionado who happens to be Black or Jewish.) The most significant inequalities include exploitation, such as slavery and **genocide** (the intentional

killing of a group, such as the mass execution of Jewish, Slavic, Roma, gays and lesbians, and other people under Nazi rule in Germany).

Whatever its scope or severity, whether it affects people's ability to gain jobs, housing, wealth, political power, police protection, health care, or other valued resources, the pattern of disadvantage is the key characteristic of a minority group. Because the group has less of what society values, some people refer to minority groups as *subordinate groups*.

The pattern of disadvantage members of the minority group experience results from the actions of another group that benefits from and tries to sustain the inequality. This advantaged group is the **dominant group**. We use the latter term most frequently because it reflects the patterns of inequality and the lack of power experienced by minority groups. Keep in mind that the inequalities we see today were established in the past, sometimes centuries ago or more. Privilege exists even when the beneficiaries are unaware of it.

2. **Visibility.** The second defining characteristic of a minority group is some *visible trait* or characteristic that sets members apart and that the dominant group holds in low esteem. The trait can be cultural (language, religion, speech patterns, or dress styles), physical (skin color, stature, or facial features), or both. Groups defined primarily by their cultural characteristics such as Irish Americans and Jewish Americans are **ethnic minority groups**. Groups defined primarily by their physical characteristics, such as Black Americans and Native Americans, are **racial minority groups**. These categories overlap. So-called ethnic groups may also have what some people see as distinguishing physical characteristics (e.g., the stereotypical Irish red hair or "Jewish nose"). Racial groups may also have (or be thought to have) cultural traits that differ from the dominant group (e.g., differences in dialect, religious values, or cuisine).

These distinguishing traits help identify minority group members and facilitate separating people into different groups. Thus, such traits help to maintain the patterns of disadvantage. That is, the dominant group has (or at one time had) enough power to create the distinction between groups and thus solidify a higher position for itself. These markers of group membership are crucial. Without visible signs, it would be difficult or impossible to identify who was in which group, and the system of minority group oppression would collapse.

The characteristics marking the boundaries between groups usually aren't significant in and of themselves. They are selected for their visibility and convenience and, objectively, may be trivial and unimportant. For example, scientists now conclude that skin color and other so-called racial traits have little scientific, evolutionary, medical, or biological importance (Gannon, 2016; Yudell et al., 2016). For example, darker skin color simply reflects the body's response to sunlight. In areas with greater sunlight (closer to the equator), people's bodies produce melanin, which screens out the sun's ultraviolet rays and protects the skin. Skin color emerged as an important marker of group membership in our society through a complex and lengthy historical process, not because it has any inherent significance. Again, these markers of minority group membership become important because people give them significance (e.g., superiority, inferiority).

3. **Awareness.** A third characteristic of minority groups is that the members are aware of their differentiation from the dominant group and their shared disadvantage. This shared social status can provide a sense of solidarity and serve as the basis for strong intragroup bonds. As noted earlier, minority and dominant groups can experience life differently. Thus, minority group members may have worldviews that are markedly different from those of the dominant group and from other minority groups. For example, public opinion polls often show sizeable group differences about the seriousness and extent of discrimination in America. Figure 1.3 shows persistent and sizeable gaps in the percentage of nationally representative samples of white and Black people who agree that Black and white people have equal job opportunities. Given their different group histories, experiences, and locations in the social hierarchy, it may not surprise you that Black Americans see more racial inequality than white people. Even after

President Obama's election in 2008, the percentage of Black Americans who believed equal opportunity exists was about half the rate of white Americans.

FIGURE 1.3 ■ Do Black Americans Have the Same Chances as White Americans to Obtain the Same Level of Employment? 1963–2020

Source: Brenan (2020).

Both groups have become more pessimistic about equal opportunity in recent years. A 2020 national poll showed that only 64% of Americans believed Black children have the same opportunity as white children to get a good education. This is the lowest percentage on record since Gallup began asking that question in 1962, less than a decade after the Supreme Court voted to desegregate public schools in *Brown v. the Board of Education* (1954). Only 67% believe Black Americans have equal opportunities to get housing, which is the lowest rating on this question since 1989 (Brenan, 2020).

4. **Ascription**. A fourth characteristic of minority groups is that, generally, membership is an **ascribed status** given to them, often at birth. The traits that identify minority group membership are typically hard to change. Thus, minority group status is usually involuntary and for life.

In some cases—with "racial" minority groups, for example—this defining characteristic may seem obvious and hardly worth mentioning. Remember, however, that group labels are social constructions, based on particular historical circumstances and shared cultural perceptions. Thus, group membership can be negotiable and changeable, and a person's status at birth is not necessarily constant throughout his or her lifetime. A member of a racial minority may be able to "pass" as a member of a different group, and a member of a religious minority may be able to change status by changing his or her faith.

It's important to keep in mind the qualification that minority status is *generally* a matter of birth. There are important exceptions to the general rule and a great deal more ambiguity regarding group membership than may appear at first glance. Also, for some groups—gays and lesbian Americans in particular—the notion of membership by ascription is debated. Some say homosexuality is inborn while others say it is learned. We'll address this issue in Chapter 12.

5. **Intimate Relationships.** Finally, minority group members tend to form emotionally close bonds with people like themselves. That is, members tend to choose each other as close friends, dating partners, and legal spouses or cohabitational partners. (Members of the dominant group do this, too.)

Pervasive racial and ethnic segregation of neighborhoods, schools, and other areas of American society influence who one meets or spends time with on a regular basis. In some cases, the dominant group dictates this pattern. For example, many states outlawed interracial marriages until the U.S. Supreme Court declared laws against **miscegenation** unconstitutional in the 1967 case, *Loving v. Virginia* (Bell, 1992).

The Wagley and Harris (1958) multipart definition of a minority group encompasses "traditional" minority groups such as Black Americans and Native Americans but we can apply it to other groups. For instance, women as a group fit the first four criteria, and we can analyze their experience with many of the same concepts and ideas that guide our analysis of racial and ethnic minority groups. Similarly, we can apply this concept to Americans who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender; to Americans with disabilities; to Americans who are left-handed; and to Americans who are very old, very short, very tall, or overweight. We'll consider some of these groups in future chapters. For now, just note that you can apply ideas from this book more broadly than you might think at first. And, we hope that you'll be able to use these insights in your life after your course ends.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

6. Consider the definition of a minority group. Which parts apply to gay and lesbian Americans? Which parts, if any, apply to other groups of interest that are not defined as American minority groups, such as Christians or men? What do your answers suggest about differences between minority and majority groups?

PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY

The most important defining characteristic of minority group status is inequality. As you'll see, minority group membership affects access to jobs, education, wealth, health care, and housing. It is associated with a lower (often much lower) proportional share of goods and services and more limited opportunities for upward mobility.

Stratification is the hierarchical ranking of groups that results in the unequal distribution of goods and services in society. Every human society, except perhaps the simplest hunter–gatherer societies, is stratified to some degree. You can visualize these divisions as horizontal layers (or strata) that differ from one another by the amount of resources they command. Economic stratification results in different **social classes**; Figure 1.4 shows one view of the class system. Many criteria (e.g., education, age, gender, power, parent's social class) may affect a person's social class position and their access to goods and services. Minority group membership is one of these criteria, and it has a powerful impact on the distribution of resources in the United States and in other societies.

The next section considers different theories about the nature and dimensions of stratification. Then, we discuss how minority group status relates to stratification.

Theoretical Perspectives

Sociologists (and other social scientists) have been concerned with stratification and inequality since the formation of sociology in the 19th century. We highlight four of the most significant thinkers in this section. An early and important contributor to our understanding of the significance of social inequality was Karl Marx, the noted social philosopher and revolutionary. Half a century later, sociologist Max Weber (pronounced *Mahks Vay-ber*), a central figure in the development of sociology, critiqued and elaborated on Marx's view of inequality. Gerhard Lenski was a modern sociologist whose ideas about the influence of economic and technological development on social stratification are relevant for comparing societies and understanding the evolution of intergroup relations. Finally, we consider another modern sociologist, Patricia Hill Collins, who argues for an intersectional approach to inequality, which views inequalities based on class, race or ethnicity, gender (and other social statuses) as a single, interlocking system of inequality.

Karl Marx

Although best known as the father of modern communism, Karl Marx was also the primary architect of a political, economic, and social philosophy that has played a significant role in world affairs for

FIGURE 1.4 ■ Class in the United States

Source: Gilbert (2011).

more than 170 years. Marxism is a complex theory of history and social change in which inequality is a central concern.

Marx argued that the most important source of inequality in society was the system of economic production. He focused on the **means of production**, or the materials, tools, resources, and social relationships by which a society produces and distributes goods and services. In an agricultural society, the means of production include land, draft animals, and plows. In an industrial society, the means of production include factories, commercial enterprises, banks, and transportation systems, such as railroads.

In Marx's view, all societies include social classes that struggle over the means of production. In industrial societies, the rise of capitalism created a new class system with two main classes. The **bourgeoisie**, or capitalist class, owns or controls the means of production. It benefits from that arrangement and exploits and oppresses the **proletariat** or working class. Marx called them "two great hostile camps" (Marx & Engels, 1967, p. 1). He believed that class conflict was inevitable and that, ultimately, the working class would revolt against the bourgeoisie and create a society without exploitation, coercion, or inequality. That is, it would create a classless society.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) contributed to the founding of sociology and was one of the authors of the *Communist Manifesto*.

Wikimedia

Marx is consistently named one most influential thinkers of all time; yet, scholars and others have extensively critiqued or modified his ideas. Nevertheless, modern social science owes a great deal to his insights about inequality, class struggle, social conflict, and group relations, as you'll see in upcoming chapters.

Max Weber

One of Marx's major critics was Max Weber, a German sociologist who did most of his work around the turn of the 20th century. Weber saw Marx's view of inequality as too narrow. Weber argued that inequality included dimensions other than one's relationship to the means of production. Weber expanded on Marx's view of inequality by identifying three separate components of stratification.

First, economic inequality is based on ownership or control of wealth (such as property) and income (money from employment, interest on bank holdings, or other payments). This is like Marx's concept of class, and Weber used the term *class* for this specific form of inequality.

A second dimension of stratification involves differences in **prestige**, or the amount of honor, esteem, or respect that people give us. Different factors influence prestige, including one's class position, family lineage, athletic ability, and physical appearance. Group membership also affects prestige. People typically give less prestige to minority group members than dominant group members.

The third component of stratification is **power**, or the ability to influence others, impact the decision-making process of society, and pursue and protect one's self-interest and achieve one's goals. One source of power is a person's standing in politically active organizations that lobby state and federal legislatures, such as labor unions or interest groups. Some politically active groups have access to great wealth and can it to promote their causes. Other groups may rely more on their size and ability to mobilize large demonstrations to achieve their goals. Political organizations and the people they represent vary in the power that they can mobilize to control political decision making.

Max Weber (1864–1920) was a major figure in the establishment of sociology. He took issue with many of Marx's ideas in publications such as *The Protestant Ethic* and *The Spirit of Capitalism*.

akg-images/Newscom

Typically, these three dimensions of stratification go together: wealthy, prestigious classes are generally more powerful (more likely to achieve their goals or protect their self-interest) than low-income groups or groups with little prestige. However, power is a separate dimension: even very impoverished groups have sometimes found ways to express their concerns and pursue their goals.

Weber's concept of stratification offers more complexity than Marx's. For example, instead of simply being bourgeoise or proletariat, Weber suggests that people can be elite in some ways but not in others. An aristocratic family that has fallen on hard financial times might belong to the elite in terms of family lineage and prestige but not in terms of wealth. Or a major figure in the illegal drug trade could enjoy substantial wealth but be held in low esteem.

Gerhard Lenski

Gerhard Lenski was a modern sociologist who expanded on Weber's ideas by analyzing stratification in the context of societal evolution, or the **level of development** of a society (Nolan & Lenski, 2004). Lenski argues that the degree of inequality or the criteria affecting a group's position is closely related to **subsistence technology**, or how the society meets people's basic needs for food, water, shelter, and so on. For example, preindustrial agricultural societies rely on human and animal labor to generate the food necessary to sustain life. Inequality in these types of societies centers on control of land and labor because they are the most important means of production for that level of development.

In modern industrial societies, land ownership isn't as crucial as control of financial, manufacturing, and commercial enterprises. Because the control of capital is more important than control of land for those societies, the level of development and the nature of inequality, differs.

The U. S. and other more-industrialized societies have entered another stage of development, so they are often referred to as **postindustrial societies**. In postindustrial societies, developments in new technology, computer-related fields, information processing, and scientific research create economic growth. Additionally, one's economic success is closely related to formal education, specialized knowledge, and familiarity with new technologies (Chirot, 1994, p. 88; see also Bell, 1973).

These changes in subsistence technology, from agriculture to industrialization to an information-based society, alter the stratification system. As the sources of wealth, success, and power change, so

do the relationships between minority and dominant groups. For example, the shift to an information-based, high-tech, postindustrial society means that the advantages conferred by higher levels of education are magnified. Groups that have less access to schooling will likely rank low on all dimensions of stratification.

Patricia Hill Collins

Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2000) calls for an approach to the study of inequality and group relations that recognizes the multiplicity of systems of inequality and privilege in society. Some stratification systems are based on social class, while others categorize and rank people by their gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, disability, and other criteria. Most people have complex social statuses, some more privileged and some less privileged. For example, consider a heterosexual, college-educated man with a professional job. These social statuses rank high in the United States. But what if he is Latino or bisexual? These latter statuses put him at a disadvantage in a society where whiteness and heterosexuality are more valued.

Collins stresses **intersectionality**, a view that acknowledges that everyone has multiple group memberships and that these crisscross or intersect to create different experiences for people with varying combinations of statuses. For example, the realities faced by gay, white-collar, Mexican American men are different from those faced by heterosexual, blue-collar Puerto Rican women, although both would be counted as *Hispanic* in Figure 1.1. From this perspective, you can see that no singular, uniform Hispanic American (or African American or Asian American) experience exists. Thus, we need to recognize how gender, class, sexual orientation, and other factors intersect with and reinforce one another.

Patricia Hill Collins is a major contributor to the ongoing attempts by American social scientists to analyze inequality and group relations.

Patricia Hill Collins

Collins and other intersectional theorists critique the tendency to see inequality in terms of separate simple dichotomous systems, such as those based on class (blue collar vs. white collar), race (Black vs. white), or gender (men vs. women). An intersectional approach involves seeing how these statuses link together to form a "matrix of domination." For example, white Americans aren't a homogenous dominant group. Some group members, such as women or poor white people, are privileged in terms of their race (white) but subordinate in terms of their gender (women) or class (poor). Collins's ideas help us see that who is the oppressed and who is the oppressor changes across social contexts, and people can occupy privileged and subordinated statuses simultaneously.

The separate systems of domination and subordination overlap and reinforce one another. This matrix of domination shapes people's opportunities, experiences, and perceptions. As you'll see in later chapters, race and gender interact with each other and create especially disadvantaged positions for people who rank lower on both dimensions simultaneously (e.g., see Figure 6.6, which shows that Black women consistently earn less income than either Black men of the same race and white women of the same gender).

Likewise, stereotypes and other elements of prejudice are gendered. For example, some stereotypical traits might be applied to all Black Americans (such as laziness), but others are applied only to women (e.g., "uppity") or men (e.g., "thug").

An intersectional approach stresses the multiplicity of systems of inequality and analyzes the connections between them. It sees groups as complex, not uniform. In this book, we'll use an intersectional lens to explore how class and gender influence racial and ethnic minority group experiences. However, you can apply an intersectional approach to other dimensions of power and inequality, including disability, sexual orientation, and religion.

Minority Group Status and Stratification

The theoretical perspectives we've just reviewed raise three important points about the connections between minority group status and stratification. First, minority group status affects access to wealth and income, prestige, and power. In the United States, minority group status has been and continues to be one of the most important and powerful determinants of one's **life chances**, or opportunities and access to resources such as nutritious food, health care, education, and a job that provides a good income. We explore these complex patterns of inequality in Part 3, but observation of American society reveals that minority groups control proportionately fewer resources and that minority group status and stratification are complexly intertwined. Consider, for example, the life chances of two 18-year-olds. One is white, comes from a wealthy family, was educated in excellent private schools, traveled the world on holiday, and has had the opportunity to network with members of the American elite. The other is a recent immigrant who fled the war in Syria. This one is smart, hardworking, and proficient in English but has a low overall level of education, which makes it hard to find work that pays a living wage. Which person has had and will have greater life chances?

Second, although social class and minority group status are correlated, they are different dimensions of inequality and they vary independently. The degree to which one status affects the other varies by group and across time. Some groups, such as Irish or Italian Americans, have experienced considerable upward **social mobility** (or movement) within the class stratification system although they faced considerable discrimination in the past. Furthermore, as stressed by the intersectional approach, minority groups are internally divided by systems of inequality based on class, status, or power. Some members of a minority group can be successful economically, wield great political power, or enjoy high prestige while the majority of group members experience poverty and powerlessness. Likewise, members of the same social class vary by ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, and other social statuses.

Third, the struggle to control valued goods and services creates dominant–minority group relationships. Minority group structures (such as slavery) emerge so that the dominant group can control commodities such as land or labor, maintain its position at the top of the stratification system, or eliminate perceived threats to its well-being. Struggles over property, wealth, prestige, and power lie at the heart of every dominant–minority relationship. Marx believed that the ruling class shaped all aspects of society to sustain the economic system that underlies its privileged position. The treatment of minority groups throughout American history provides a good deal of evidence to support Marx's point, as you'll see in upcoming chapters.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

7. Consider the people described in the chapter opening (e.g., Kim Park, Juan Yancy). How does an intersectional approach help us understand their lives?

8. Consider the people described in the chapter opening. How do Weber's ideas about prestige and power contribute to our understanding of their social class?

VISIBLE DISTINGUISHING TRAITS: RACE AND GENDER

In this section, we focus on the second defining characteristic of minority groups: the visible traits that represent membership. The boundaries between dominant and minority groups have been established along a wide variety of lines, including religion, language, skin color, and sexuality. Let's consider two of the more visible markers of group membership—race and gender.

Race

Historically, race has been widely misunderstood, but the false ideas and exaggerated importance people have attached to race haven't merely been errors of logic that are subject to debate. At various times

and places, ideas about race have resulted in some of the greatest tragedies in human history: immense exploitation and mistreatment, such as slavery and genocide. Myths about race continue today, though in different forms. To decrease the likelihood of further tragedies, it's important to cultivate accurate understandings about race.

Thanks to advances in genetics, biology, and physical anthropology, we know more about what race is and, more importantly, what race isn't. We can't address everything in these first few pages, but we can establish a basic framework and use the latest scientific research to dispel some of the myths.

Race and Human Evolution

Humans first appeared in East Africa more than 160,000 years ago. Our ancient ancestors were hunters and gatherers who slowly wandered away from their ancestral region in search of food and other resources. Over the millennia, our ancestors traveled across the entire globe, first to what is now the Middle East and then to Asia, Europe, Australia, and North and South America (see Figure 1.5) (Gugliotta, 2008; Hirst, 2017).

"Racial" differences evolved during this period of dispersion, as our ancestors adapted to different environments and ecological conditions. For example, consider skin color, the most visible "racial" characteristic. As noted earlier, skin color derives from a pigment called *melanin*. In areas with intense

---

FIGURE 1.5 ■ Skin Color Variation by Latitude

From lightest . . .
. . . to darkest skin
no data

Source: Emmanuelle Bournay, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/skin-colour-map-indigenous-people

---

sunlight, at or near the equator, melanin screens out the sun's ultraviolet rays, helping to prevent sunburn and, more significantly, skin cancer. Thus, people from equatorial locations produce higher levels of melanin and have darker skin than people who live farther away from the equator (Jablonski & Chaplin, 2010). This almost certainly means that the first humans were dark skinned and that lighter skin colors are the more recent adaptation reflecting migration away from the equator (see Figure 1.6).

The lower concentration of melanin in people adapted to areas with less intense sunlight may also be a biological adaptation to a particular ecology. Lighter skin maximizes vitamin D synthesis, which is important for the absorption of calcium and protection against health problems such as rickets. That is, the skin color of any group reflects the melanin in their skin that helps them balance the need for vitamin D against the need to protect their skin from ultraviolet rays (Jablonski & Chaplin, 2010).

The period of dispersion and differentiation, depicted in Figure 1.5, began to end about 10,000 years ago, when some of our hunting and gathering ancestors developed a new subsistence technology and established permanent agricultural villages. Over the centuries, some settlements grew into larger societies, kingdoms, and empires that conquered and absorbed neighboring societies, some of which differed culturally, linguistically, and racially from each other. The great agricultural empires of the past—Roman, Egyptian, Chinese, Aztec—united different peoples, reversed the process of dispersion and differentiation, and began a phase of consolidation and merging of human cultures and genes.

FIGURE 1.6   ■   The Migration of Anatomically Modern Humans

Source: Gugliotta (2008).

Over the next 10,000 years following the first settlements, human genes were intermixed and spread around the world, eliminating any "pure" races (if such ever existed).

The differentiation created during the period of global dispersion was swamped by consolidation, a process that was greatly accelerated starting about 500 years ago when European nations began to explore and colonize much of the rest of the world (e.g., India, Africa). This consolidation of groups continues today. For example, we can see it with the increasing numbers of Americans who identify as multiracial. We see similar patterns across the world and throughout recent history.

Race and Western Traditions

Europeans had been long aware of racial variation but, aided by breakthroughs in ship design and navigation, the nations of Western Europe began regularly traveling to Africa, Asia, and eventually North and South America in the 1400s. The contact with the peoples of other continents resulted in greater awareness and curiosity about observable physical differences such as skin color.

European travel required tremendous time and resources. The goal wasn't exploration for the sake of exploration, but to lay claim to valued resources (such as gold) that existed elsewhere. In the process, European nations such as England, France, Spain, and Russia conquered, colonized, and sometimes destroyed the peoples and cultures they encountered. This political and military domination (e.g., English colonization of India, French colonization of West and North Africa) required an *ideology* (belief system) to support it. From the beginning, Europeans linked physical variation with judgments about the relative merits of other races: People from conquering nations thought they were racially and culturally superior to the nations and peoples they conquered.

Since then, other countries have justified military conquest, genocide, exploitation, and slavery with similar racist and xenophobic thinking. But, the toxic form of racism that bloomed during the expansion of European power continues to haunt the world today. It was the basis for the concept of race that took root in the United States.

Race and Biology

Europeans primarily used race to denigrate, reject, and exclude people they perceived as nonwhite. However, as the tools of modern science developed, some people tried to apply the principles of scientific research to the concept of race. These investigations focused on constructing typologies or taxonomies to classify every person of every race into a category. Some typologies were quite elaborate, with numerous races and subraces. For example, the "Caucasian" race was often subdivided into Nordics

(blond, fair-skinned Northern Europeans), Mediterraneans (dark-haired Southern Europeans), and Alpines (people between those categories, with qualities from both).

One major limitation of these classification systems is that the dividing lines between the so-called racial groups are arbitrary. There is no clear, definite point where, for example, "Black" skin color stops and "white" skin color begins. The characteristics used to define race blend imperceptibly into one another. Additionally, one racial trait (skin color) can appear with others (e.g., hair texture) in an infinite variety of ways. A given individual might have a skin color that people associate with one race, the hair texture of a second, the nasal shape of a third, and so forth.

Although people vary in their physical appearance, these differences don't sort themselves out in ways that enable us to divide people into precise groups like species of animals. The differences between the so-called human races aren't at all like the differences between elephants and butterflies. The ambiguous and continuous nature of "racial" characteristics makes it impossible to establish categories that have clear, nonarbitrary boundaries. Even the most elaborate racial typologies can't address the fact that many individuals fit into more than one category while others don't fit into any of them. So, who gets to decide how many groups exist and what racial group people belong to? We'll address that question in future chapters.

Over the past several decades, advances in genetic research have provided new insights into race that negate the validity of such racial typologies and the racial myths associated with them. One

FIGURE 1.7A ■ Changes in Racial and Ethnic Categories, 1790–1930

Source: U.S. Census data

significant finding is that genetic variation *within* the traditional racial groups is greater than the variation *between* those groups (American Sociological Association, 2003; Gannon, 2016). That is, any two randomly selected members of the "Black" race will probably vary genetically from each other *at least* as much as they do from a randomly selected member of the "white" race. (See Figures 1.7a and 1.7b.) This finding refutes traditional, nonscientific ideas that racial categories accurately reflect groups of homogeneous people. In other words, the traditional American perception of race as based primarily on skin color has no scientific validity.

FIGURE 1.7B ■ Changes in Racial and Ethnic Categories, 1930––2010

| 1950	1970	1990	2010
American Indian	Indian (Amer.)	Aleut; Eskimo; Indian (Amer.)	American Indian or Alaska Native
Chinese; Filipino; Japanese	Chinese; Filipino; Japanese; Korean	Asian or Pacific Islander: Chinese; Filipino; Korean; Vietnamese; Japanese; Asian Indian; Other API	Asian Indian; Chinese; Filipino; Japanese; Korean; Vietnamese; Other Asian
Negro	Negro or Black	Black or Negro	Black, African Am., or Negro
	Origin or Descent: Mexican; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Central or South American; Other Spanish	Spanish/Hispanic Origin: Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Other Spanish/Hispanic	Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin: Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin
	Hawaiian	Hawaiian; Samoan; Guamanian; Other API	Native Hawaiian; Guamanian or Chamorro; Samoan; Other Pacific Islander
White	White	White	White
Other	Other	Other Race	Some Other Race

1960	1980	2000
Aleut; American Indian; Eskimo	Aleut; Eskimo; Indian (Amer.)	American Indian or Alaska Native
Chinese; Filipino; Japanese	Asian Indian; Chinese; Filipino; Japanese; Korean; Vietnamese	Asian Indian; Chinese; Filipino; Japanese; Korean; Vietnamese; Other Asian
Negro	Black or Negro	Black, African Am., or Negro
	Spanish/Hispanic Origin or Descent: Mexican, Mexican-Amer., Chicano; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Other Spanish/Hispanic	Spanish/Hispanic/Latino: Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
Hawaiian; Part-Hawaiian	Hawaiian; Guamanian; Samoan	Native Hawaiian; Guamanian or Chamorro; Samoan; Other Pacific Islander
White	White	White
	Other	Some Other Race

Source: U.S. Census data

The Social Construction of Race

Sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois (who you'll read about in Chapter 5) wrote that the "problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line" ([1903] 1997, page 45 c.f. Lee & Bean, 2007). He argues that our nation's history of slavery and the resulting discrimination and inequalities were critical to how U.S. race relations have evolved and, by extension, to how they affect society today.

You can begin to understand the social construction of this "color line" when you examine the U.S. Census race/ethnicity categories over time. The U.S. Constitution (Section 2, Article 1) requires a census (or population count) every decade (Blank et al., 2004, p. 206). A state's population influences its political representation in the U.S. House of Representatives, its taxation, and the federal resources it receives (Anderson & Fienberg, 1999).

The census also gatherers important demographic data about household members such as their race, age, gender, occupation, level or education, marital status, and if they own their residence. The first census, in 1790, used only three racial categories. (If you consider gender, four subcategories exist; if you include age, there are five categories.) These categories reflect the de facto color line (and gender/age lines) operating in U.S. society at that time:

- Free whites (males under 16 years old, males over 16 years old, females)

- All other free persons (e.g., Native Americans who paid taxes and free blacks)

- Enslaved people

Although southern states fought to define slaves as property in all other matters (e.g., see *Missouri v. Celia* in Chapter 4), they argued the opposite about census counts because states with more people would get more political power and resources. Such an arrangement would advantage slave holding states and, presumably, give them a reason to enslave more people (Blank et al., 2004). Northern and southern states made a compromise to count slaves as three fifths of a person to distribute power more equitably, writing that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States. . . by adding to the whole Number of free Persons excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons" (Blank et al., 2004, p. 206).

In addition to telling us about the population, census categories also tell us how people think about race at any given time. For example, the first census taken after the Civil War ended used these categories: White, Black, Mulatto, and Indian. (The category of "Mulatto" applied to people with unspecified "mixed" racial heritage.) By 1890, the categories changed, again, to

- **White**

- **Black (a person defined as more than three-fourths Black)**

- **Mulatto (a person classified as three-eighths to five-eighths Black)**

- **Quadroon (*quad* meaning *four*, or one-fourth Black)**

- **Octoroons (*octo* meaning *eight*; that is, people defined as one-eighth or as having any other amount of "Black blood")**

- **Indian**

- **Chinese**

- **Japanese**

The addition of Chinese and Japanese categories reflects Asian immigration to the United States. The subcategories of *quadroon* and *octoroon* were an attempt to measure race in more detail, but still along a Black–white dichotomy (Blank et al., 2004), and reflect concerns about the impact of newly freed slaves on U.S. society (Hochschild & Powell, 2008). Specifically, lawmakers sought "to ascertain and exhibit the physical effects upon offspring resulting from the amalgamation of human species" and see if "the mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons are disappearing and the race becoming more purely Negro" (Hochschild & Powell, 2008). While census takers were advised to "be particularly careful to distinguish between blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons," they were not told how to determine those specific fractions of "black blood" (Hochschild & Powell, 2008).

Identifying the amount of "Blackness" was more complicated than it sounded, and the census didn't use those categories again. However, southern states continued efforts to do so by introducing the "one-drop rule." Under this law, a person with any trace of Black ancestry, even "one drop" of African blood, was defined as Black and subject to the limitations of extreme racial inequality. Thus, it rigidly solidified the Black–white color line in law and in custom.

The racial categories for Black Americans and other groups continued to change over the years—most notably for Black Americans (see Figure 1.7). The Census Bureau continues to add ethnic

categories as new immigrants come to the United States For now, ethnic categories fall under one of these "racial" categories: white, Black/African American, Native American/Alaskan Native, Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean), Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander (e.g., Samoan, Chamorro), and other. The Census Bureau notes that people of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Therefore, it asks people of Hispanic origin to identify their place of origin such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, or Mexico.

The census has changed in other ways, too. In 1960, the Census Bureau mailed its form to urban residences and for the first time, respondents could choose their racial identity. (In prior decades, the census taker determined each person's race. This change was important for giving people agency to self-identify their race, but it may also have produced more accurate information. That is, given the prejudice and discrimination against nonwhites, people may have been more likely to choose *white* when the census taker was nearby.) The first census to ask about Hispanic origin happened in 1980. The 2000 census was the first to allow people to identify as multiracial by selecting more than one category (Lowenthall, 2014). For example, someone could identify as white *and* Cuban.

Yet even with these changes, the category of "white" has remained remarkably consistent over time (see Figure 1.7). Nor has it included gradations of "whiteness"; that is, there are no subcategories of "whiteness" as there were of "blackness" in 1890, for example (Blank et al., 2004). Thus, we might consider the U.S. construction of race as involving a white–nonwhite color line (i.e., white is a dominant, nonchanging category) that reflects assumptions of black inferiority made at the heart of U.S. slavery and Jim Crow segregation.

Despite its scientific limits, the idea of race continues to shape intergroup relations in America and globally. Race, along with gender, is one of the first things people notice about one another. Because race is still a significant way of differentiating people, it remains socially important. In addition to discrimination by out-group members, ideas about race can also shape relations *within* a perceived racial group. For example, people within groups and outside of them may see lighter skinned Black Americans as superior to darker skinned Black Americans; thus, they may treat lighter skinned people better. Walker (1983) named this *colorism*. Such discrimination reflects the dominant racial hierarchy that prefers lighter skin tone and presumed European facial features and body types (Harris, 2008, p. 54). While an important area of study, we (like other researchers) focus on broadly defined racial groups that affect all group members (see Blank et al., 2004, p. 29).

So, how does the idea of race remain relevant? Because of the way they developed, Western concepts of race have social and biological dimensions. Sociologists consider race a social construction whose meaning has been created and sustained not by science but by historical, social, economic, and political processes (see Omi & Winant, 1986; Smedley, 2007). For example, in Chapter 4, we'll analyze the role of race in the creation of American slavery and you'll see that the physical differences between Blacks and whites became important *as a result* of that system of inequality. The elites of colonial society needed to justify their unequal treatment of Africans and seized on the visible differences in skin color, elevated it to a matter of supreme importance, and used it to justify the enslavement of Blacks. That is, the importance of race was socially constructed as the result of a particular historical conflict, and it remains important not because of objective realities, but because of the widespread, shared social perception that it is important.

Gender

You've seen that groups can be internally differentiated by social class and other factors (e.g., sexual orientation). Gender is another source of differentiation. Like race, gender has visible and socially meaningful components that make it convenient for categorizing people and organizing society. Historically, people have used visible biological characteristics such as genitalia to assign people into two sexes, female or male. (Almost 2% the U.S. population are intersex, having have biological characteristics from more than one sex category [see Fausto-Sterling, 1993].)

Americans primarily recognize two gender statuses: boy/man and girl/woman. Babies are given a gender based on their sex. For example, when a fetal ultrasound for sex shows a penis, people declare, "It's a boy!" As you'll learn, gender is also a social construct. These ideas about what is masculine or

feminine influence **gender norms**, or societal expectations about proper behavior, attitudes, and personality traits.

Gender norms vary across time and from one society to another, but sociologists and other social scientists have documented the close relationship between gender and inequality. Typically, men (as a group) have more property, prestige, and power than women. Figure 1.8 provides some perspective on the global variation in gender inequality. The map shows the Gender Gap Index, a statistic that measures the amount of inequality between women and men based on variables such as education, labor market participation, reproductive health (e.g., maternal mortality rate), and political representation. As you can see, gender equality is generally highest in the more industrialized nations of North America and Western Europe and lowest in the less developed, more agricultural nations of Africa (e.g., Niger, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Mauritania, Benin) and the Middle East (e.g., Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iran).

Although Western European and North American societies rank relatively high on gender equality, gender discrimination continues to be a major issue in many of them, as you'll see throughout this book (Chapter 11 in particular). For example, a consistent—and large—gender income gap per-

FIGURE 1.8   ■   Gender Inequality Worldwide

World Economic Forum
Global Gender Gap Report 2020

■ 1 (best) – 31		■ 95 – 125	
■ 32 – 62		■ 125 – 153 (worst)	
■ 63 – 94		■ No Data	

Source: World Economic Foundation (2020).

sists, and women are decidedly underrepresented in the most lucrative and powerful occupations (see Figure 11.1). While many societies have made progress, gender inequality appears likely to continue for generations.

Part of the problem is that all societies, including Western European and North American ones, have strong histories of **patriarchy**, or systems of dominance by men. As with racial and class stratification, dominant groups have greater resources. In patriarchal societies, men (as a group) have more control over the economy and more access to leadership roles in business, politics, education, and other institutions. Parallel to forms of racism that sought to justify and maintain racial inequality, **sexism** is an ideology that justifies and maintains gender inequality. For example, people in some societies view women as "delicate," "too emotional," and physically weak for the demands of "manly" occupations. (In the United States and other societies, these ideas about gender were also racialized, applying only to white women. The same men who placed white women "on a pedestal" didn't hesitate to send enslaved women into the fields to perform the most difficult, physically demanding tasks.)

Even in the most progressive societies, women possess many characteristics of a minority group, especially a pattern of disadvantage based on group membership marked by visible characteristics. Thus, we consider women to be a distinct minority group and we'll examine gender throughout the

book and in, especially in Chapter 11. In keeping our intersectional approach, we'll address women's and men's experiences *within* each racial or ethnic minority group, as well. As stressed in the intersectional approach, the experience of racial or ethnic minority group membership varies by gender (and other social statuses such as age, class). Likewise, the way gender is experienced isn't the same for every racial or ethnic (or other) group. Therefore, some Black women may share common interests and experiences with white women and different interests and experiences compared to Black American men. In other cases, those constellations of interests and experiences would vary. Those in power generally write about history from their own standpoint—ignoring, forgetting, or trivializing minority group experiences. For instance, slave owners wrote much of the history of slavery. Laws against education kept enslaved people illiterate, leaving few mechanisms for recording their thoughts or experiences. A more accurate picture of slavery has emerged only since the mid-20th century, when scholars started to reconstruct the experiences of enslaved Africans from nonwritten documentation (such as oral traditions, including folklore and songs) and from physical artifacts (such as quilts, pottery, and religious objects; e.g., see Fennell, 2013; Levine, 1977).

Despite these advances, the experiences of women minorities are much less well known and documented than men's. One important trend in contemporary scholarship is to correct this skewed focus by systematically incorporating gender as a vital factor for understanding minority group experiences (Baca Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1994; Espiritu, 1996).

The Social Construction of Gender

Social scientists see race as a social construction created under certain historical circumstances (e.g., slavery) when it was needed to justify the unequal treatment of nonwhite groups. What about gender? Have socially created ideas enabled and rationalized men's higher status and their easier access to power, prestige, and property? Figure 1.8 shows that every nation has some degree of gender inequality—though it varies a lot. Does that inequality result from popular ideas about gender? For example, are boys and men "naturally" more aggressive, competitive and independent, and girls and women "naturally" more cooperative, helpful, and fragile? Where do these ideas come from? If gender isn't a social construction, why do ideas about what girls/women and boy/men are like vary across time (e.g., 1400, 1776, 2019) and place (e.g., China, Afghanistan, Sweden)? Why do ideas about what they should and shouldn't do vary? And why does gender inequality vary? Many people look to the role of biology when explaining such variation. Yet, if people's biology (e.g., chromosomes, hormones) is fairly constant across time and location, wouldn't gender be as well? Let's dig a bit deeper.

First, the traits people commonly see as typical for women or men aren't disconnected, separate categories. Every person has them, to some degree. To the extent that gender differences exist at all, they are manifested not in absolutes but in averages, tendencies, and probabilities. Many people consider aggressiveness a masculine characteristic, but some women are more aggressive than some men. As with race, research shows that there is more variation *within* categories (e.g., all women, all men) than between them—a finding that seriously undermines the view that gender differences are biological (Basow, as cited in Rosenblum & Travis, 2002).

Second, gender as a social construction is illustrated by the fact that what people think is "appropriate" behavior for women and men varies over time and from society to society. The behavior people expected from a woman in Victorian England isn't the same as those for women in 21st-century America. Likewise, the gender norms for men in 500 CE China are different from those in Puritan America. This variability makes it difficult to argue that the differences between the genders are hardwired in the genetic code; if they were, these variations wouldn't exist.

Third, the relationship between subsistence technology and gender inequality illustrates the social nature of gender norms. As noted previously, humans evolved in East Africa and relied on hunting and gathering to meet their basic needs. Our distant ancestors lived in small, nomadic bands that relied on cooperation and sharing for survival. Societies at this level of development typically divided adult labor by gender (often men hunting, women gathering). Because everyone's work was crucial to survival, gender inequality was minimal (Dyble et al., 2015). Women's subordination seems to have emerged

with settled agricultural communities, the first of which appeared about 10,000 years ago in what is now the Middle East. People in preindustrial farming communities didn't roam, and people could accumulate (and store) wealth (see Dyble et al., 2015). Survival in these societies required the combined labor of many people; thus, large families were valued. Women became consigned to domestic duties, especially having and raising children. Because the infant mortality rate in these societies was high (approximately 50% or more), women spent much of their lives confined to their homes, pregnant or nursing, far removed from the possibility of participating in other extra-domestic life, such as contending for community leadership roles.

Industrialization and urbanization, linked processes that began in the mid-1700s in Great Britain, changed the cost–benefit ratios of childbearing. As people moved to cities, the expense of having children rose, and work increasingly required education and literacy—for women and men. As women increasingly participated in life outside of their homes, they gained additional resources (e.g., income, networks) that put them on more level footing with men. Thus, it's probably not surprising that the push for gender equality is associated with industrial societies and that gender equality is highest in industrial and postindustrial societies (see Figure 1.7).

Researchers continue to explore the links between biology and gender (e.g., see Hopcroft, 2009; Huber, 2007; Udry, 2000). However, at its core, gender is primarily social, not biological Gender, like race, is a social construction, especially when people treat the supposed differences between men and women as categorical, natural, and fixed and then use those ideas to deny opportunity and equality to women (Booth et al., 2006, pp. 167–191; see also Ridgeway, 2011, pp. 18–23).

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

9. How do gender and race exist apart from people's perceptions of them? How are these constructs similar? Different? Are they *equally* matters of perception?

KEY CONCEPTS IN DOMINANT–MINORITY RELATIONS

When people discuss issues such as dominant–minority group relations, the discussion often turns to matters of prejudice and discrimination. This section introduces and defines four concepts to help you understand dominant–minority relations in the United States.

This book addresses how individuals from different groups interact and how groups interact with each other. Thus, we need to distinguish between what is true for individuals (the more psychological level of analysis) and what is true for groups or society (the sociological level of analysis). Additionally, it's helpful to connect these levels of analysis.

At the individual level, what people *think* and *feel* about other groups may differ from how they *behave* toward members of another group. A person might express negative feelings about other groups in private but deal fairly with group members in face-to-face interactions. Groups and entire societies may display similar inconsistencies. A society may express support for equality in its official documents (e.g., laws) while simultaneously treating minority groups in unfair, destructive ways. For example, contrast the commitment to equality stated in the Declaration of Independence ("All men are created equal") and the actual treatment of enslaved Africans, Anglo American women, and Native Americans at that time.

At the individual level, social scientists refer to the thinking/feeling part of this dichotomy as *prejudice* and the doing part as *discrimination*. At the group level, the term **ideological racism** describes the thinking/feeling dimension and **institutional discrimination** describes the doing dimension. Table 1.1 depicts the differences among these four concepts.

Prejudice

Prejudice is the tendency of an individual to think about some groups in negative ways, to attach negative emotions to those groups, and to prejudge individuals based on their group memberships.

TABLE 1.1 ■ Four Concepts in Dominant–Minority Relations		
Dimension	Level of Analysis	
	Individual	**Group or Societal**
Thinking/feeling	Prejudice	Ideological racism
Doing	Discrimination	Institutional discrimination

Individual prejudice has two aspects: **cognitive prejudice**, or the thinking aspect, and **affective prejudice**, or the feeling part. A prejudiced person thinks about other groups in terms of **stereotypes** (cognitive prejudice), generalizations that they think are true for all group members. Examples of familiar stereotypes include notions such as "women are emotional," "Jews are stingy," "Blacks are lazy," and "the Irish are drunks." A prejudiced person also experiences negative emotional responses to other groups (affective prejudice), including contempt, disgust, arrogance, and hatred.

People vary in their levels of prejudice, and levels of prejudice vary in the same person from one time to another and from one group to another. We can say that people are prejudiced to the extent that they use stereotypes in their thinking about other groups or have negative emotional reactions to other groups.

The two dimensions of prejudice are highly correlated with each other; however, they are distinct and separate aspects of prejudice and can vary independently. One person may think entirely in stereotypes but feel no particular negative emotional response to any group. Another person may feel a strong aversion toward a group but be unable to articulate a clear or detailed stereotype of that group.

Individual prejudice, like all aspects of society, evolves and changes. Historically, Americans' prejudice was strongly felt, overtly expressed, and laced with detailed stereotypes. Overt forms declined after the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s but didn't disappear and vast numbers of Americans came to view them as problematic. In modern societies that emphasize mutual respect and tolerance, people tend to express prejudice in subtle, indirect ways. Prejudice might manifest in language that functions as a kind of code (for instance, when people associate "welfare cheats" or criminality with certain minority groups). We'll explore modern forms of prejudice in Chapter 3, but we need to be clear that you should not mistake the *general* decline of blatant prejudice against minority groups in modern society for its disappearance. As you'll see throughout the book, many traditional forms of prejudice and discrimination have reasserted themselves in recent years.

Discrimination

Discrimination is the unequal treatment of people based on their group membership. For example, an employer might not hire someone because they are Black (or Jewish, Chinese, gay, etc.). If the unequal treatment is based on the individual's group membership (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion), the act is discriminatory.

On January 6, 2021, thousands of supporters of then-President Trump attacked the U.S. Capitol building. Many were members of right-wing extremist and hate groups, and came bearing racist symbols.

Just as the cognitive and affective aspects of prejudice can be independent, discrimination and prejudice don't necessarily occur together. Even highly prejudiced individuals may not act on their negative thoughts or feelings. In social settings regulated by strong egalitarian codes or laws (e.g., restaurants and other public facilities), people who are highly bigoted in their private thoughts and feelings may

follow the norms in public. However, when people approve of prejudice in social situations, such support can produce discrimination from otherwise unprejudiced individuals. In the southern United States during the height of segregation and in South Africa during the period of state-sanctioned racial inequality called *apartheid*, it was usual and customary for white people to treat Black people in discriminatory ways. Regardless of individuals' actual level of prejudice, they faced strong social pressure to conform to the official forms of racial superiority and discrimination.

Ideological Racism

Ideological racism is a belief system asserting that a particular group is inferior; it is the group or societal equivalent of individual prejudice. Members of the dominant group use ideological racism to legitimize or rationalize the unequal status of minority groups. Through the process of socialization, such ideas pass from generation to generation, becoming incorporated into the society's culture. It exists separately from the individuals who inhabit the society (Andersen, 1993, p. 75; See & Wilson, 1988, p. 227). An example of a racist ideology is the elaborate system of beliefs and ideas that attempted to justify slavery in the American South. Whites explained their exploitation of slaves in terms of the supposed innate racial inferiority of Blacks and the superiority of whites.

In later chapters, we'll explore the relationship between individual prejudice and racist ideologies at the societal level. For now, we'll make what may be an obvious point: People socialized into societies with strong racist ideologies are likely to internalize those ideas and be highly prejudiced; for example, a high level of personal prejudice existed among whites in the antebellum American South or in other highly racist societies, such as in South Africa under apartheid. Yet, ideological racism and individual prejudice are different phenomena with different causes and different locations in the society. Racism isn't a prerequisite for prejudice and prejudice can exist in the absence of racist ideology.

Institutional Discrimination

Institutional discrimination is the societal equivalent of individual discrimination. It refers to a pattern of unequal treatment, based on group membership, built into the daily operations of society, whether or not it is consciously intended. Public schools, the criminal justice system, and political and economic institutions can operate in ways that put members of some groups at a disadvantage.

Institutional discrimination can be obvious and overt. For many years following the American Civil War, practices such as poll taxes and rigged literacy tests (designed to ensure failure) prevented Black Americans in the South from voting. Well into the 1960s, elections and elected offices in the South were restricted to whites only. The purpose of this blatant pattern of institutional discrimination was widely understood by Black and white southerners alike: It existed to disenfranchise the Black community and to keep it politically powerless (Dollard, 1937).

At other times, institutional discrimination may operate subtly and without conscious intent. For example, if schools use biased aptitude tests to determine which students get to take college preparatory courses, and if such tests favor the dominant group, then the outcomes are discriminatory—even if everyone involved sincerely believes that they are merely applying objective criteria in a rational way. If a decision-making process has unequal consequences for dominant and minority groups, institutional discrimination may well be at work.

Although individuals may implement and enforce a particular discriminatory policy, it is better to recognize it as an aspect of the institution. For example, election officials in the South during segregation didn't (and public school administrators today don't) have to be personally prejudiced to implement discriminatory policies.

However, a major thesis of this book is that racist ideologies and institutional discrimination are created to sustain the stratification system. Widespread institutional discrimination maintains the relative advantage of the dominant group. Members of the dominant group who are socialized into communities with strong racist ideologies and a great deal of institutional discrimination are likely to be personally prejudiced and to routinely engage in acts of individual discrimination. The mutually reinforcing patterns of prejudice, racism, and discrimination on the individual and institutional levels preserve the respective positions of dominant and minority groups over time.

Institutional discrimination is one way that members of a minority group can be denied access to goods and services, opportunities, and rights (such as voting). That is, institutional discrimination helps sustain and reinforce the unequal positions of racial and ethnic groups in the stratification system.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

10. Like most Americans, you are probably familiar with the stereotypes associated with various groups. Does this mean you are prejudiced against those groups? Does it mean you have negative emotions about those groups and are likely to discriminate against them? Explain.

11. In general, would you say that whiteness is "the norm" in U.S. society? Is racial identity "invisible" to whites? How does racial privilege permit white people to ignore race?

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

In future chapters, we'll discuss additional concepts and theories and apply those ideas to minority groups in the United States. However, it is important to expand our perspective beyond our country. Therefore, we'll also apply our ideas to the histories and experiences of other peoples and places. If the ideas and concepts developed in this book can help us make sense of intergroup relations around the world, we'll have some assurance that they have some general applicability and that the dynamics of intergroup relations in the United States aren't unique.

On another level, we must also take into account how economic, social, and political forces beyond our borders shape group relations in the United States. As you'll see, American society can't be understood in isolation because it is part of the global system of societies. Now, more than ever, we must systematically analyze the complex interconnections between the domestic and the international, particularly with respect to immigration issues. The next section explores one connection between the global and the local.

Immigration and Globalization

Immigration is a major concern in our society today, and we'll address the issue in the pages to come. Here, we'll point out that immigration is a global phenomenon that affects virtually every nation in the world. About 272 million people—about 3.5% of the world's population—live outside their countries of birth, and the number of migrants has increased steadily over the past several decades (International Organization for Migrants, 2020). Figure 1.9 illustrates the global nature of the migration by listing the top 20 destinations for migrants (on the left) and the top 20 nations of origin on the right. Note that the United States and Western European nations are well represented among the receiving nations but so are other nations from around the globe. The sending nations come from every continent and area, including Asia, Central America, and Africa.

What has caused this massive population movement? One very important underlying cause is *globalization*, or the increasing interconnectedness of people, groups, organizations, and nations. This process is complex and multidimensional, but perhaps the most powerful dimension of globalization—especially for understanding contemporary immigration—is economics and the movement of jobs and opportunity from place to place. People flow from areas of lower opportunity to areas with greater opportunity.

To illustrate, consider the southern border of the United States. For the past several decades, there's been an influx of people from Mexico and Central America, and the presence of these newcomers has generated a great deal of emotional and political heat, especially because many of these migrants are undocumented.

Some Americans see these newcomers as threats to traditional American culture and the English language, and may associate them with crime, violence, and drug smuggling. Others see them simply as people trying to survive as best they can, desperate to support themselves and their families. Few, however, see these immigrants as the human consequences of the economic globalization of the world.

What is the connection between globalization and this immigrant stream? The population pressure on the southern border has been in large part a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in 1994. NAFTA united the three North American nations in a single trading

FIGURE 1.9 ■ Top 20 Destination Nations (on the left) and Top 20 Sending Nations (on the Right) for Migrants, 2019 (in millions)

Source: International Organization for Migrants (2020). https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf, p. 44.

bloc—economically globalizing the region—and permitted goods and capital (but not people) to move freely among Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

Among many other consequences, NAFTA opened Mexico to the importation of food products produced at very low cost by the giant agribusinesses of Canada and the United States. This cheap food (corn in particular) destroyed the livelihoods of many rural Mexicans and forced them to leave their villages in search of work. Millions pursued the only survival strategy that seemed at least remotely sensible: migration north. Even the worst job in the United States pays many times more than the average Mexican wage.

Even as NAFTA changed the economic landscape of North America, the United States became increasingly concerned with the security of its borders (especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001) and attempted to stem the flow of people, partly by building fences and increasing the size of the Border Patrol. The easier border crossings were quickly sealed, but this didn't stop the pressure from the south. Migrants moved to more difficult and dangerous crossing routes, including the deadly, forbidding Sonoran Desert in southern Arizona, resulting in an untold number of deaths on the border since the mid-1990s. Since then, immigration has continued to be a concern for Americans. President Donald Trump used this concern as one of his major appeals to voters in his 2016 election campaign. In July 2020, NAFTA was replaced by the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). At the time of writing, it's too early to tell what the effects will be or how the policy might change under the Biden administration.

Figure 1.10 displays one estimate of recent deaths in southern Arizona, but these are only the bodies that have been discovered. Some estimates put the true number at 10 deaths for every recovered corpse, suggesting that that approximately 34,000 migrants have died in Arizona since the mid-1990s.

The relationship between NAFTA and immigration to the United States is only one aspect of a complex global relationship. Around the world, significant numbers of people are moving from less industrialized nations to those with more affluent economies. The wealthy nations of Western Europe, including Germany, Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, are also receiving large numbers of

FIGURE 1.10 ■ Recorded Migrant Deaths Along the Southern Arizona Border, 1999 to 2018

1999 - 2019 Recorded Migrant Deaths and Humane Borders Water Stations

Between October, 1999 and December 2019 Humane Borders collected data on 3496 migrant deaths. Some dots represent more than one death. Over the past 20 years, Humane Borders deployed equipment for over 80 water stations at remote, strategic locations in Mexico and the USA.

Migrant Death Data Sources:
Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner Yuma County Sheriff
Maricopa County Medical Examiner United States Border Patrol
Cochise County Coroner

Humane Borders
Fronteras Compasivas
P.O Box 72024
Tucson, AZ 86726
520-398-5053
www.humaneborders.org

Source: Humane Borders (2020).

immigrants, and many citizens of these nations are concerned about their jobs, communities, housing, and language—and the integrity of the national cultures changing in response. Many Americans have similar concerns. The world is changing, and contemporary immigration must be understood in terms of changes that affect many nations and, indeed, the entire global system of societies.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

12. How does globalization spur immigration? Consider examples outside of the United States, too (e.g., from Africa to Europe).

13. What are the most significant challenges new immigrants will face in the United States and why? Consider the following: (a) Transportation, (b) Communication, (c) Finding a job that pays enough and that you can walk to or is on the bus line, (d) Household matters (e.g., cleaning, food), (e) Safety, (f) Finances (e.g., getting a bank account), (g) Relationships (e.g., friends, dating), and (h) Education. How might prejudice or discrimination influence these challenges?

14. Some people make a distinction between "deserving immigrants" an "undeserving immigrant" (Aptekar, 2015, p. 112). What do you make of this distinction? What are the most important factors to consider when deciding which immigrants to let in. How important are "merits" such as English fluency, education, and religion? How important are other factors such as humanitarian needs for safety or the ability to find work that enables people to obtain food and shelter?

CONCLUSION

Our goal in writing this book is to teach you how to apply the sociological perspective to the world around you. With the concepts, theories, and body of research developed over the years, we can illuminate and clarify the issues. In many cases, we can identify approaches and ideas that are incorrect and those that hold promise. This chapter raises many questions. Sociology can't answer all questions, but it provides important research tools and ideas to help you think with greater depth and nuance about the issues facing our society and the world.

SUMMARY

We've organized this summary around the Learning Objectives at the beginning of the chapter.

1.1 Explain the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the United States.

Rates of immigration are high, and, as shown in Figure 1.1, non-Hispanic white Americans are declining in relative size. By midcentury, they will no longer be a numerical majority of the U.S. population. (Which groups are increasing in relative size? What will the United States look like in the future in terms of ethnicity, race, culture, language, and cuisine?)

Rates of marriage across group lines are also increasing, along with the percentage of the population that identifies with more than one racial or ethnic group. Groups that do not fit into the categories in Figure 1.1 (e.g., Arab Americans, immigrants from Africa) are growing in size.

Many of the grievances and problems that affect American minority groups (e.g., African Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanic Americans) have not been resolved, as we shall see in Part 3 of this text.

1.2 Understand the concept of a minority group.

A minority group has five characteristics. Members of the group

● experience a pattern of disadvantage, which can range from mild (e.g., casual snubs or insults) to severe (e.g., slavery or genocide);

- have a socially visible mark of identification which may be physical (e.g., skin color), cultural (e.g., dress, language), or both;
- are aware of their disadvantaged status;
- are generally members of the group from birth; and
- tend to form intimate associations within the group.

    Of these traits, the first two are the most important.

1.3 Explain the sociological perspectives that will guide this text, especially as they relate to the relationships between inequality and minority-group status.

A stratification system has three different dimensions (class, prestige, and power), and the nature of inequality in a society varies by its level of development. Minority groups and social classes are correlated in many complex ways. Minority groups generally have less access to valued resources and opportunity. However, minority status and inequality are separate and may vary independently. Members of minority groups can be differentiated by gender, social class, and many other criteria; likewise, members of a particular social class can vary by gender, race, ethnicity, and along many other dimensions.

1.4 Explain how race and gender contribute to minority-group status.

Visible characteristics such as skin color or anatomy are widely used to identify and differentiate people (e.g., woman/man, black/white/Native American/Asian/Latino). So-called racial characteristics, such as skin color, evolved as our ancestors migrated from East Africa and spread into new ecologies. During the period of European colonization of the globe, racial characteristics became important markers of "us and them," conqueror and conquered.

Race and gender are socially constructed ideas that become filled with social meaning (e.g., strong, nurturing, smart, lazy). These meanings change over time and across geographic location. Although they are just ideas, these social constructions feel "natural" and "real." Thus, they powerfully influence the way we think about one another. They influence minority-group membership and, therefore, one's life chances such as access to resources and privilege (e.g., education, legal rights, pay, prestige). Sexism and racism attempt to explain patterns of gender and racial inequality in terms group members' "inferiority."

1.5 Comprehend four of the key concepts in dominant–minority relations: prejudice, discrimination, ideological racism, and institutional discrimination.

This text analyzes dominant–minority relationships at both the individual and societal levels. Prejudice refers to individual feelings and thoughts while discrimination is different treatment of people based on their group membership. Individual discrimination is behavior done by individuals. Ideological racism and institutional discrimination are parallel concepts that refer to prejudice and discrimination at the societal level.

1.6 Apply a global perspective to the relationship between globalization and immigration to the United States.

A global perspective means that we will examine dominant–minority relations not just in the United States but in other nations as well. We will be sensitive to the ways group relations in the United States are affected by economic, cultural, political, and social changes across the global system of societies. The relationship between USMCA (which replaced NAFTA) and immigration to the United States illustrates one of the many connections between domestic and international processes.

KEY TERMS

affective dimension of prejudice	discrimination
ascribed status	dominant group
bourgeoisie	ethnic minority groups
cognitive dimension of prejudice	gender norms

genocide	prejudice
ideological racism	prestige
institutional discrimination	proletariat
intersectionality	racial minority groups
level of development	sexism
means of production	social classes
minority group	social constructions
miscegenation	social mobility
patriarchy	stereotypes
postindustrial society	stratification
power	subsistence technology

APPLYING CONCEPTS

We list real and hypothetical events below. Identify which are examples of cognitive prejudice, affective prejudice, individual discrimination, ideological racism, or institutional discrimination, and briefly explain your reasoning. Some incidents may include elements that reflect more than one concept.

Note: Your instructor may ask you to complete this assignment with others as a group discussion.

	Incident	Concept	Explanation
1	After learning that a Hispanic family is purchasing the house next door, Mrs. James, a white American, says, "Well, at least they're not Black."		
2	Three friends put bacon on the door a mosque. They also spray-paint "Muslims not wanted."		
3	The U.S. Secret Service settles a class-action lawsuit with Black agents for repeatedly passing them over for promotions.		
4	Tom Smith, the CEO of Smith's Bank, didn't hire Judy Washington as the head of his human resources department. He worries that she might focus too much on family issues. Although he thinks she seems like a "tough broad," he fears she might get "too emotional" in decision-making and in carrying out difficult tasks like firing people.		
5	A task force investigation finds that the city police disproportionately focused on Black Americans. Black Americans make up about one third of the city's population but were 72% of all investigative street stops. Further, 74% of the 404 people shot by the police between 2008 and 2015 were Black.		
6	Professor Jones is talking with Professor Jimenez and says, "I just can't stand it anymore. Students today are so lazy. They won't read for class. They don't seem to care about their homework. They don't want to listen in class—they just want to text all day. It's disgusting."		

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is the significance of Figure 1.1? What are some of the limitations and problems with the group names it uses? How are the group names social constructions? Does increasing diversity in the United States represent a threat, an opportunity, or both? Should we celebrate group

differences, or should we strive for more unity and conformity? What are the advantages and disadvantages of stressing unity and conformity? Explain your answers in detail.

2. Wagley and Harris developed their five-part definition of a minority group with racial and ethnic minorities in mind. What other groups share those five characteristics? For example, which characteristics apply to religious groups such as Mormons or Muslims? To people who are left-handed, very overweight, or very old? Why is it useful or significant to consider other groups beyond racial, ethnic, class, and gender-based groups?

3. What is a social construction? As social constructions, how are race and gender the same and how do they differ? What does it mean to say, "Gender becomes a social construction—like race—when it is treated as an unchanging, fixed difference and then used to deny opportunity and equality to women"? Consider the changing social constructions of race over time suggested by the Census Bureau categories. What do you make of them? Which categories make sense to you and why? How do those categories reflect particular meanings or ways of thinking at the time?

4. When analyzing dominant–minority relations, why is it important to take a global perspective? What can we learn by looking outside the United States? Besides immigration, how does globalization shape dominant–minority relations in the United States?

5. Explain the terms in Table 1.1. Cite an example of each from your own experiences, those of someone you know, or from current events, then compare them. How does *ideological racism* differ from *prejudice*? How does *institutional discrimination* differ from *individual discrimination*? Why is it important to analyze the societal level in addition to the individual level?

ANSWERS TO APPLYING CONCEPTS

	Concept	Explanation
1	Cognitive prejudice	Mrs. James seems to be thinking in terms of the traditional stereotype regarding the desirability of Black and Hispanic Americans.
2	Discrimination	These hostile behaviors are targeted toward members of the local mosque because of their membership in the group, *Muslims*. The sign on the door is clear; the bacon reflects the rejection of Islamic guidelines against eating pork. It defiles the mosque.
3	Institutional discrimination	In this case, the Secret Service appears to have had a discriminatory policy. This discrimination reflects a broad pattern of treatment, not an individual action.
4	Cognitive prejudice	Mr. Smith uses stereotypical thinking about women as more interested in family issues than work-related ones a human resources director might need to address. Although he sees Ms. Washington as a "tough broad" he puts her in the category of "emotional women."
5	Institutional discrimination	This example comes from an analysis of Chicago policing that suggested a pattern of unequal treatment for Blacks there. Institutional discrimination can be overt (e.g., laws requiring segregated schools). At other times, it's subtle. Behaviors that lead to inequality don't have to be intentional to be discriminatory.
6	Affective prejudice	Professor Jones is expressing strong feelings of anger and contempt for students. (She's also stereotyping them as lazy.)

ENDNOTES

1 When we use *America* or *American*, we are referring to the United States of America and its citizens. We recognize that people living in North and South America are also Americans.

2 We sometimes use quotation marks to indicate social constructs or widely held beliefs about what is real or true. For example, "race" or "Caucasian."

3   LGBTQIA stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex, and asexual/allied.

4   Boldfaced terms are also defined in the glossary at the end of the book.

REFERENCES

American Sociological Association. (2003). The importance of collecting data and doing scientific research on race. *American Sociological Association*. https://www2.asanet.org/media/asa_race_statement.pdf

Andersen, M. L. (1993). *Thinking about women: Sociological perspectives on sex and gender* (3rd ed.). Macmillan.

Anderson, M. J., & Fienberg, S. E. (1999). *Who counts? The Politics of census-taking in contemporary America*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Aptekar, S. (2015). *The Road to citizenship: What naturalization means for immigrants and the United States*. Rutgers University Press.

Baca Zinn, M., & Dill, B. T. (Eds.). (1994). *Women of color in U.S. Society*. Temple University Press.

Bell, D. (1973). *The coming of post-industrial society*. Basic Books.

Bell, D. (1992). *Race, racism, and American law* (3rd ed.). Little, Brown.

Blank, R. M., Dabady, M., Citro, C. F., & Committee on National Statistics. Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. (2004). *Panel on methods for assessing discrimination*. Committee on National Statistics, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. https://www.nap.edu/read/10887/chapter/1

Booth, A., Granger, D., Mazur, A., & Kivligham, K. (2006). Testosterone and social behavior. *Social Forces*, *86*, 167–191.

Brenan, M. (2020). Optimism about black Americans' opportunities in U.S. falls. *Gallup Polls*. https://news.gallup.com/poll/320114/optimism-black-americans-opportunities-falls.aspx

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 247 U.S. 483(1954).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2020). *World factbook*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html

Chirot, D. (1994). *How societies change*. SAGE.

Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2015). Projections of the size and composition of the U.S. population, 2014 to 2060. *Current Population Reports*. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf

Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment* (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Dollard, J. (1937). *Caste and class in a southern town*. Yale.

Dyble, M., Salali, G. D., Chaudhary, N., Page, A., Smith, D., & Thompson, J. (2015). Sex equality can explain the unique social structure of hunter-gatherer bands. *Science*, *348*(6236), 796–798.

Espiritu, Y. (1996). Colonial oppression, labour importation, and group formation: Filipinos in the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *19*, 29–48.

Fausto-Sterling, A. (1993, March–April). The Five sexes: Why male and female are not enough. *The Sciences*, pp. 20–24.

Fennell, C. C. (2013). Group identity, individual creativity, and symbolic generation in a BaKongo Diaspora. *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, *7*(1), 1–31.

Frey, W. (2019). Less than half of U.S. children under 15 are white. Census shows. *Brookings Institute*. https://www.brookings.edu/research/less-than-half-of-us-children-under-15-are-white-census-shows/

Gannon, M. (2016). *Race is a social construct, scientists argue*. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue/

Gilbert, D. L. (2011). *The American class structure in an age of growing inequality*. Pine Forge Press.

Gugliotta, G. (2008, July). The great human migration. *Smithsonian Magazine*. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-great-human-migration-13561/

Harris, A. P. (2008). From color line to color chart: Racism and colorism in the new century. *Berkeley Journal of African-American Law & Policy*, *10*, 52–69. https://doi.org/10.15779/Z380C9X

Hirst, K. K. (2017, June 26). Out of Africa hypothesis—Did all humans evolve in Africa?. *ThoughtCo*. https://www.thoughtco.com/out-of-africa-hypothesis-172030

Hochschild, J. L., & Powell, B. M. (2008). Racial reorganization and the United States Census 1850–1930: Mulattoes, Half-Breeds Mixed Parentage, Hindoos, and the Mexican Race. *Studies in American Political Development*, *22*(1), 59–96. https://scholar.harvard.edu/jlhochschild/publications/racial-reorganization-and-united-states-census-1850-1930-mulattoes-half-br#_edn64

Hopcroft, R. (2009). Gender inequality in interaction: An Evolutionary account. *Social Forces*, *87*, 1845–1872.

Huber, J. (2007). *On the origins of gender inequality*. Paradigm.

Humane Borders. (2020). *Death maps*. https://humaneborders.org/wp-content/uploads/deathpostercumulative_2019_stewardship_mid_letter.pdf

International Organization for Migrants. (2020). *World migration report*. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf

Jablonski, N. G., & Chaplin, G. (2010). *Human skin pigmentation as an adaptation to UV radiation*. www.pnas.org/content/107/Supplement_2/8962.full

Jones, N., & Bullock, J. (2012). The two or more races population: 2010. *U.S. Census Bureau*. https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-13.pdf

Lee, J., & Bean, F. D. (2007). Reinventing the color line: Immigration and America's new racial/ethnic divide. *Social Forces*, *86*(2), 561–586.

Levine, L. (1977). *Black culture and black consciousness*. Oxford University Press.

Livingston, G., & Brown, A. (2017). Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 years after Loving v. Virginia. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/

Lowenthall, T. A. (2014). Race and ethnicity in the 2020 census: Improving data to capture a multiethnic America. *Leadership Conference Education Fund*. https://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Census-Report-2014-WEB.pdf

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1967). *The communist Manifesto*. Penguin. (Original work published 1848)

Nolan, P., & Lenski, G. (2004). *Human societies*. Paradigm.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1986). *Racial formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Ridgeway, C. (2011). *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world*. Oxford University Press.

Rosenblum, K. E., & Travis, T.-M. C. (2002). *The Meaning of difference: American constructions of race, sex and social class, and sexual orientation* (3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill.

See, K. O., & Wilson, W. J. (1988). Race and ethnicity. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), *Handbook of sociology* (pp. 223–242). SAGE.

Smedley, A. (2007). *Race in North America: Origin and evolution of a worldview* (3rd ed.). Westview.

Udry, R. (2000). Biological limits of gender construction. *American Sociological Review*, *65*, 443–457.

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020). *Total population, 2019 American community survey*. https://data.census.gov/cedsci/advanced

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020a). *Total population. 2019 American community survey*. https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Foreign%20Born&tid=ACSDP1Y2019.DP02&hidePreview=false

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020b). *Demographic turning points, 2020 to 2060*. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020c). *Demographic turning points, 2020 to 2060*.

Wagley, C., & Harris, M. (1958). *Minorities in the new world: Six case studies*. Columbia University Press.

Walker, A. (1983). *In search of our mother's gardens: Womanist Prose*. Harcourt.

World Economic Foundation. (2020). *Global gap report, 2020*. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf

Yudell, M., Roberts, D., DeSalle, R., & Tishkoff, S. (2016). Taking race out of human genetics. *Science*, *351*(6273), 564–565. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4951

2 ASSIMILATION AND PLURALISM

From Immigrants to White Ethnics

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this chapter, you will be able to do the following:

2.1 Explain types of assimilation, including Anglo-conformity, the "melting pot," and the "traditional" model of assimilation. How does human capital theory relate to each of these types?

2.2 Explain types of pluralism, including cultural pluralism and structural pluralism.

2.3 Discuss and explain other types of group relationships such as separatism.

2.4 Describe the timing, causes, and volume of European immigration to the United States, and explain how those immigrants became "white ethnics."

2.5 Understand the European patterns of assimilation and major variations in those patterns by social class, gender, and religion.

2.6 Describe the status of the descendants of European immigrants today, including the "twilight of white ethnicity."

2.7 Analyze contemporary immigration using sociological concepts in this chapter. Explain how the traditional model of assimilation does or does not apply to contemporary immigrants.

We have room for but one flag, the American flag. . . . We have room for but one language and that is the English language, . . . and we have room for but one loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people.

—Theodore Roosevelt, 26th president of the United States, 1915

If we lose our language [Ojibwa] . . . I think, something more will be lost. . . . We will lose something personal. . . . We will lose our sense of ourselves and our culture. . . . We will lose beauty—the beauty of the particular, the beauty of the past and the intricacies of a language tailored for our space in the world. That Native American cultures are imperiled is important and not just to Indians. . . . When we lose cultures, we lose American plurality—the productive and lovely discomfort that true difference brings.

—David Treuer (2012, pp. 304–305)

Welcome to America. Now, speak English.

—Bumper sticker, 2021

In the United States, people speak 350 different languages, including more than 150 different Native American languages. Although most of these languages are spoken or signed by small numbers of people, the sheer number of languages suggest the scope of diversity in America today.

What do you think about the quotations that opened the chapter? Does the range of languages and cultures create confusion and inefficiency in the United States? Is there room for only one language, as Roosevelt suggested? Or does diversity enrich our society? How much does it matter if a language disappears? Would we, as Treuer suggests, lose our sense of ourselves, our culture, beauty, and the "productive and lovely discomfort" of difference?

Americans (and the citizens of other nations) must consider such questions as we address issues of inclusion and diversity. Should we encourage groups to retain their unique cultural heritage, including language? Or, should we stress conformity? How have we addressed these issues in the past? To what effect? How should we approach them in the future?

In this chapter, we'll continue looking at how ethnic and racial groups in the United States could relate to each other. Two sociological concepts, assimilation and pluralism, are key to our discussion. **Assimilation** is a process where formerly distinct and separate groups merge socially and come to share a common culture. As a society undergoes assimilation, group differences decrease. **Pluralism** exists when groups maintain their individual identities. In a pluralistic society, groups remain distinct, and their cultural and social differences persist over time.

Assimilation and pluralism are different processes, but they aren't mutually exclusive. They may occur in various combinations within a society. Some racial or ethnic groups may assimilate while others maintain (or even increase) their differences. Some members assimilate while others preserve or revive traditional cultures. For example, some Native American groups are pluralistic. They live on or near reservations and are strongly connected to their heritage. Members may practice "traditional ways" and native languages as much as possible. Other indigenous Americans are mostly assimilated into the dominant society. They live in urban areas, speak English only, and know relatively little about their traditional cultures.

American sociologists became interested in these processes, especially assimilation, due to the massive migration between the 1820s and the 1920s when more than 31 million people crossed the Atlantic from Europe to the United States. Scholars have devoted tremendous amounts of time and energy to documenting, analyzing, and understanding the experiences of these immigrants and their descendants. These efforts have resulted in a rich and complex body of knowledge about how newcomers were incorporated into American society in the past. We'll call this the "traditional" perspective.

Next, we'll consider the traditional perspective on assimilation and pluralism, and briefly examine other possible group relationships. Then, we'll apply the traditional perspective to European immigrants and their descendants and we'll develop a model of American assimilation based on those experiences. We'll use this model of American assimilation throughout this book to analyze other minority group experiences.

Since the 1960s, the United States has experienced a second mass immigration. These newest immigrants differ in many ways from those who came earlier. Therefore, one important issue to consider is if theories, concepts, and models based on the first mass European immigration apply to this second wave. We'll briefly discuss some of these issues in this chapter and we'll explore them in detail in Part 3. Finally, we'll consider the implications of Chapters 1 and 2 for our exploration of intergroup relations throughout the rest of the book.

ASSIMILATION

We begin with the topic of assimilation because the emphasis in American group relations has historically focused on the goal of assimilation rather than pluralism (Lee, 2009). This section presents key sociological theories and concepts used to describe and analyze 19th-century European immigrant assimilation into American society.

Types of Assimilation

Assimilation is a general term for a process that takes different forms. One type of assimilation is expressed in the idea of the **melting pot**—a metaphor based on smelting pots used to melt different metals together. This type of assimilation occurs when diverse groups come together and create a

The melting pot is a popular and powerful image for Americans.

Source: University of Iowa Libraries Special Collections Department

new, unique society with a common culture. The idea of the melting pot suggests that America would change immigrants and immigrants would, in turn, change America (Thernstrom, 2004). This popular view of assimilation emphasizes sharing and inclusion, sees assimilation positively, and suggests the new immigrants will continuously change the United States.

Although it's a powerful image, the melting pot metaphor doesn't accurately describe how assimilation occurred (Abrahamson, 1980). Whites excluded some minority groups from the "melting" process, resulting in a society with a distinct Anglocentric flavor. As Schlesinger (1992) argues, "For better or worse, the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition was for two centuries—and in crucial respects still is—the dominant influence on American culture and society" (p. 28). Therefore, assimilation in the United States is more accurately called **Americanization** or **Anglo-conformity.**

Americanization (or **Anglo-conformity**) is assimilation where the dominant culture pressures other groups to conform to Anglo-American culture and society.

President Roosevelt's quote in the chapter opening offers a good example of the historic emphasis on Anglo-conformity. Today, many Americans agree. A 2016 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 70% of Americans think it's very important to speak English to truly be an American. Those findings were consistent among Black (71%), white (71%), and Hispanic Americans (who can be of any race) (70%). A 2013 Gallup poll produced similar results: 72% of respondents agreed that "it is essential that immigrants living in the U.S. learn to speak English." Specifically, 77% of white, 67% of Black, and 58% of Hispanic Americans agreed, respectively (Jones, 2013).

Under Anglo-conformity, immigrant and minority groups are expected to adapt to Anglo-American culture as a precondition of acceptance and access to better jobs, education, and other opportunities. This type of assimilation means that minority groups have had to give up their traditions and adopt Anglo-American culture. Certainly, many groups and individuals were (and remain) eager to undergo Anglo-conformity, even if it meant losing most or all of their heritage. For others, the emphasis on Americanization created conflict, anxiety, demoralization, and resentment. In Part 3, we consider how different minority groups have experienced and responded to the pressures of Anglo-conformity.

The "Traditional" Perspective on Assimilation: Theories and Concepts

Traditional assimilation theory emerged from research about European immigrants who came to America between the 1820s and the 1920s. Sociologists and other scholars using the traditional perspective made invaluable contributions, and their thinking is complex and comprehensive. This doesn't mean, however, that they've exhausted the possibilities or answered (or asked) all the significant questions. Theorists working in the pluralist tradition and contemporary scholars studying the experiences of recent immigrants have critiqued aspects of traditional assimilation theory and you'll also learn about their important contributions, too.

Robert Park

Robert Park's research provided the foundation for many theories of assimilation. In the 1920s and 1930s, Park was one of a group of scholars who played a significant role in establishing sociology as an academic discipline in the United States. Park felt that intergroup relations go through a predictable set of phases that he called a **race relations cycle**. When groups first come into contact (e.g., through immigration, conquest, or by other means), relations are conflictual and competitive. However, the process (cycle) eventually moves toward assimilation, or the "interpenetration and fusion" of groups (Park & Burgess, 1924).

Park argued further that assimilation is inevitable in a democratic and industrial society. Specifically, he believed that in a political system based on democracy, fairness, and impartial justice, all groups should eventually secure equal treatment under the law. Additionally, in industrial societies, people's abilities and talents—rather than their ethnicity or race—would be the criteria used to judge them. Park believed that as the United States continued to modernize, urbanize, and industrialize, race and ethnicity would gradually lose their importance, allowing the boundaries between groups to eventually dissolve. The result, he thought, would be a more "rational" and unified society (see also Geschwender, 1978; Hirschman, 1983).

Social scientists have long examined, analyzed, and criticized Park's conclusions. One frequent criticism is that he didn't specify how long it would take to completely assimilate. Without a definitive time frame, researchers can't test his idea that assimilation is "inevitable" and we can't know whether his theory is wrong or if we haven't waited long enough for it to occur. Another criticism of Park's theory is that he doesn't describe the assimilation process in detail. How would assimilation proceed? How would everyday life change? Which aspects of the group would change first? What do you think about these criticisms?

Milton Gordon

Gordon sought to clarify some issues Park left unresolved. He made a major contribution to theories of assimilation in his book, *Assimilation in American Life* (1964). Gordon broke down the overall process of assimilation into seven subprocesses; we'll focus on the first three. Before considering these phases of assimilation, let's consider some new concepts.

Gordon makes a distinction between the cultural and the structural components of society. **Culture** encompasses a group's way of life, including language, beliefs systems, values, norms of behavior, customs, technology, and the ideas that people use to organize and interpret their lives. **Social structure** includes relatively enduring networks and patterns of social relationships (e.g., families, organizations, communities), social institutions (e.g., the economy, media, government), and stratification systems. Social structure organizes societal labor and connects individuals to one another and to the society.

Sociologists often separate social structure into primary and secondary sectors. The **primary sector** includes small, intimate, and personal relationships such as families and groups of friends. The **secondary sector** consists of large groups and organizations that are task oriented and impersonal such as businesses, schools, factories, and other bureaucracies.

Table 2.1 summarizes Gordon's earliest stages of assimilation.

1. **Acculturation** or **cultural assimilation.** Minority group members learn and adopt the dominant group's culture. This may include changes great and small, such as learning the

primary language, changing eating habits, adopting new values and norms, and altering the spelling of family names.

TABLE 2.1 ■ Gordon's Stages of Assimilation	
Stage	**Process**
Acculturation (cultural assimilation)	The minority group adopts the dominant group's culture.
Integration (structural assimilation) ● At the secondary level ● At the primary level	The minority group has full access to the dominant (majority) society's organizations and institutions. Minority group members enter friendships, clubs, and interpersonal networks with majority group members.
Intermarriage (marital assimilation)	Widespread patterns of marriage between minority and majority group members.

Source: Adapted from Gordon's Stages of Assimilation, *Assimilation in American Life,* Oxford University Press, 1964.

2. **Integration** or **structural assimilation.** The minority group has full access to the society's social structure. Integration typically begins in the secondary sector and gradually moves into the primary sector. Specifically, before people form friendships, they must become acquaintances. Initial contact between group members typically occurs first in public sectors such as schools and workplaces (secondary sector). Then, integration into the primary sector—and the other stages of assimilation—will follow (although not necessarily quickly). Greater integration of minority groups into the secondary sector, the greater the equality between minority and majority groups in education, income, and occupational prestige. Measures of integration into the primary sector include the extent of people's interpersonal relationships (e.g., acquaintances, close friends, neighbors) with members of other groups.

3. **Intermarriage** or **marital assimilation.** People are most likely to select spouses from their primary relations. Thus, in Gordon's view, widespread primary structural integration typically comes before the third stage of assimilation—intermarriage.

Gordon argued that acculturation was a prerequisite for integration. Given the stress on Anglo-conformity in the United States, an immigrant or minority group member couldn't compete for jobs or other opportunities in the secondary sector until they adopted the dominant group's culture. Gordon recognized, however, that successful acculturation doesn't ensure that a group will begin the integration phase. The dominant group may still exclude the minority group from its institutions and limit their opportunities. Gordon argued that "acculturation without integration" (or Americanization without equality) is a common situation for many minority groups, especially the racial minority groups.

In Gordon's theory, movement from acculturation to integration is crucial to the assimilation process. Once integration occurs, the other subprocesses would occur, although movement through the stages could be slow. Gordon's idea that assimilation proceeds in a particular order echoes Park's ideas about the inevitability of assimilation.

Recent scholarship calls some of Gordon's conclusions into question. For example, the individual subprocesses that Gordon saw as occurring in order can happen independently (Yinger, 1985). For example, a group may integrate before it acculturates. Other researchers reject the idea that assimilation is a linear or one-way process (Greeley, 1974). For example, minority groups (or its members) may revive parts of their traditional culture such as language and foodways. This process has been called "reactive assimilation," "reverse assimilation," or "indigenization," among other names.

Ngo (2008), among others, offers critiques of assimilationist models such as Gordon's, suggesting that a one-size-fits-all, unidirectional (stage) approach to acculturation overlooks critical issues. For example, because immigrants in the second (post-1960) wave are more diverse compared to those in the first wave (1820s–1920s), it's logical to think that their assimilation process would, too. An intersectional approach helps us understand this critique and the diversity of immigration experiences. For example, how might the immigration and assimilation process be for a 16-year-old, middle-class, heterosexual Catholic girl from Russia moving to Nashville, TN? How would that experience be different for a 40-year-old gay Muslim man from Nigeria? How would age, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, gender, and class shape their immigration process and their lives?

Additionally, traditional assimilation models rarely account for the influence that one minority group has on another. For example, Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2020) analyzed data from the "Great Migration" of Black Americans out of the south that began in the early 20th century (see Chapter 5). They argue that as areas diversified, native-born whites perceived more in common with white immigrants as a reaction to newly arrived Black Americans. In areas where Blacks settled in larger numbers, white immigrants experienced higher levels of assimilation (e.g., higher rates of intermarriage) as a result.

Gans observes that many early scholars of assimilation were white men who had little experience with immigrants or speaking foreign languages. Thus, their conceptualization of the assimilation process may reflect their own backgrounds and, perhaps, ethnocentric assumptions that assimilation into the dominant culture is desirable and completely possible (1979, c.f. Ngo, 2008). Critics argue that such models ignore power dynamics, as if assimilation is merely a matter of personal effort and will. Do all immigrants have an equal chance at full assimilation? To what degree should we consider structural and cultural inequities that immigrants face? For example, can people fully assimilate if the dominant culture doesn't want them?

Indeed, some scholars suggest that models such as Gordon's idealize assimilation; others question assimilation as a goal. Therefore, they argue, any use of such frameworks for national immigration or educational policy—is akin to a form of colonization (see Ngo, 2008). As you'll see in Part 3, the degree of minority groups' assimilation into the dominant culture varies. Because of such critiques, scholars have developed other models of assimilation. For example, Berry (1980) offers a bidimensional model and argues that we need to consider people's cultural identity and connection to or participation in the dominant society. When we consider these factors, four possibilities result: (1) assimilation (which he defines as a desire to interact with the new culture and low interest in retaining one's ethnic heritage), (2) separation (immigrants maintain their cultural heritage and reject the dominant culture), (3) integration (immigrants keep their cultural heritage but also adopt the majority culture), and (4) marginalization (immigrants reject their cultural heritage and that of the host nation).

These critiques and others are useful to consider because as social life changes, our theoretical models for understanding them need to change. It would be useful to assess assimilation in other ways (e.g., psychological well-being). However, most of the research continues to assess contemporary immigrant experiences in Gordon's terms. Because language acquisition, generation, and time in the country remain relevant, we'll use his model to guide our understanding, particularly in the Part 3 case studies (Alba & Nee, 1997).

Human Capital Theory

Why did some European immigrant groups acculturate and integrate more rapidly than others? Although not a theory of assimilation per se, **human capital theory** offers one possible answer. This theory states that a person's success (status attainment) results from individual traits (e.g., educational attainment, values, skills). From this perspective, education is an investment in human capital, like an investment a business might make in machinery or new technology. The greater the investment in a person's human capital, the higher the probability of success. Blau and Duncan (1967), in their pioneering work on status attainment theory, found that even the relative advantage that comes from having a high-status father is largely mediated through education. That is, high levels of affluence and occupational prestige aren't due to being born into a privileged status as much as they result from the advanced educational attainment that affluence makes possible.

Human capital theory answers questions about the different pace of upward mobility for immigrant groups in terms of group members' resources and cultural characteristics, especially their education levels and English proficiency From this perspective, people or groups who "fail" haven't tried hard enough, haven't made the right kinds of educational investments, or have values or habits that limit their ability to compete with others which limits their movement up the social class ladder.

Human capital theory is consistent with traditional American beliefs. Both (a) frame success as an individual phenomenon, a reward for hard work, sustained effort, and good character; (b) assume that success is equally available to everyone with rewards and opportunities distributed fairly; and (c) generally see assimilation as a highly desirable, benign process that blends diverse peoples and cultures into a strong, unified society. From this standpoint, people or groups that resist Americanization or question its benefits threaten societal cohesion.

Human capital theory is an important theory of upward mobility; we'll use it occasionally to analyze the experiences of minority and immigrant groups. However, because human capital theory resonates with American "common sense" views of success and failure, people may use it uncritically, ignoring its flaws.

We'll offer a final judgment on the validity of human capital theory at the end of the book, but you should be aware of its major limitations. First, human capital theory is an incomplete explanation of the minority group experience because it doesn't consider all factors that affect assimilation and mobility. Second, its assumption that American society is equally open and fair to all groups is simply wrong. We'll illustrate this issue and note this theory's other strengths and limitations throughout this book.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. What are the limitations of the melting-pot view of assimilation?

2. Why does Gordon place acculturation as the first step in the assimilation process? Could one of the other stages occur first? Why or why not?

3. What does human capital theory leave out? In what ways is it consistent with American values?

PLURALISM

Sociological discussions of pluralism often begin with a consideration of Horace Kallen's work. Kallen argued that people shouldn't have to surrender their culture and traditions to become full participants in American society. He rejected the Anglo-conformist, assimilationist model and contended that the existence of separate ethnic groups, even with separate cultures, religions, and languages, was consistent with democracy and other core American values. In Gordon's terms, Kallen believed that integration and equality were possible without extensive acculturation and that American society could be a federation of diverse groups, a mosaic of harmonious and interdependent cultures and peoples (Kallen, 1915a, 1915b; see also Abrahamson, 1980; Gleason, 1980).

Assimilation has been such a powerful theme in U.S. history that in the decades following the publication of Kallen's analysis, support for pluralism was low. In recent decades, however, some people have questioned whether assimilation is desirable. People's interest in pluralism and diversity has increased, in part because the assimilation that Park (and many Americans) anticipated hasn't occurred. Indeed, as the 21st century unfolds, social distinctions and inequalities between dominant and minority groups show few signs of disappearing. Unfortunately, as you'll learn in upcoming chapters, some have increased.

The significance of white identity has generally weakened and changed form over time. A nationally representative survey found that just 15% of white participants say that being white is extremely or very "important to their identity" (Horowitz et al., 2019). However, rhetoric during the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections stoked a sense of "cultural, economic, and physical threats posed to whites from non-whites" has amplified a sense of white identity among some Americans (Sides et al., 2017, p. 2). We'll explore issues of "white ethnicity" at the chapter's end.

Another reason for the growing interest in pluralism is the everyday reality of increasing diversity in the United States (see Figure 1.1), particularly related to illegal immigration. Controversies over issues such as "English only" language policies, bilingual education, family separation and immigrant detention, birthright citizenship, immigrant eligibility for government benefits, and border wall construction are common and often bitter. In 2019, Pew Research Center (2019) found that nearly one third (32%) of Americans feel that diversity or pluralism has exceeded acceptable limits and that the unity and identity of the nation is at risk.

Finally, developments around the world have stimulated interest in pluralism. Several nation–states have reformed into smaller units based on language, culture, race, and ethnicity. Recent events in India, the Middle East, former Yugoslavia, the former USSR, Canada, and Africa (to mention a few) have provided dramatic and often tragic evidence of how ethnic identities and hostilities can persist for decades (or even centuries) of submergence and suppression in larger national units.

People often couch contemporary debates about diversity and pluralism in the language of **multiculturalism**, a general term for programs and ideas that stress mutual respect for all groups and for the multiple heritages that have shaped the United States. Some people find aspects of multiculturalism controversial and, therefore, oppose them (Kymlicka, 2010). In many ways, however, these debates merely echo a recurring argument about the character of American society, a debate we'll revisit throughout this book.

Types of Pluralism

You can distinguish distinct types of pluralism by using concepts from our discussion of assimilation. **Cultural pluralism** exists when groups haven't acculturated and maintain their unique identities. The groups might speak different languages, practice different religions, and have different value systems. The groups are part of the same society and might live in adjacent areas, but in some ways, they live in different worlds. Many Native Americans are culturally pluralistic and are committed to preserving their traditional cultures. The Amish, a religious community sometimes called the Pennsylvania Dutch, are a culturally pluralistic group, also. They are committed to a way of life organized around

Mulberry Street, New York City, around 1900, a bustling marketplace for Italian immigrants.

Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

farming, and they maintain a culture and an institutional life that's largely separate from the dominant culture (see Hostetler, 1980; Kephart & Zellner, 1994; Kraybill & Bowman, 2001).

Following Gordon's subprocesses, a second type of pluralism exists when a group has acculturated but not integrated. That is, the group has adopted the Anglo-American culture but, because of the resistance of the dominant group, doesn't have equal access to the institutions of the dominant society. In this situation, called **structural pluralism**, cultural differences are minimal, but the groups are socially segregated; they occupy different locations in the social structure. The groups may speak with the same accent, eat the same food, pursue the same goals, and subscribe to the same values, but they may also maintain separate organizational systems, including different churches, clubs, schools, and neighborhoods.

Structural pluralism occurs when groups practice a common culture but do so in different places and with minimal interaction across group boundaries. For example, local Christian churches may have congregations affiliated with specific racial or ethnic groups. Worshipers share a culture and express it through statements of core values and beliefs, rituals, other expressions of faith. However, they do so in separate congregations in different locations.

A third type of pluralism reverses the order of Gordon's first two phases: integration without acculturation. This situation is exemplified by a group that has had some material success (e.g., measured by wealth or income) but hasn't become fully "Americanized" (e.g., become fluent in English or adopted uniquely American values and norms). Some immigrant groups have found niches in American society in which they can survive and occasionally prosper economically without acculturating very much.

Two different situations illustrate this pattern. First, an **enclave minority group** establishes its own neighborhood and relies on interconnected businesses, usually small in scope, for its economic survival. Some of these businesses serve the group, while others serve the wider society. The Cuban American community in South Florida and Chinatowns in many larger American cities are two examples.

A second, similar pattern of adjustment, the **middleman minority group**, also relies on small shops and retail firms. However, the businesses are more dispersed throughout a large area rather than concentrated in a specific locale. For example, Cuban American bodegas (small corner stores) throughout Miami are one example. Indian American–owned motels across the United States are another (Dhingra, 2012; Portes & Manning, 1986). We discuss these types of minority groups further in Part 3.

The economic success of enclave and middleman minorities is partly due to the strong ties of cooperation and mutual aid within their groups. The ties, based on cultural bonds, would weaken if acculturation took place. Contrary to Gordon's idea that acculturation is a prerequisite to integration, whatever success these groups enjoy is due, in part, to the fact that they *haven't* Americanized. Kim Park, who you read about in Chapter 1, is willing to work in his uncle's grocery store for room and board and the opportunity to learn the business and gain experience. His willingness to forego a salary and prioritize the group's needs over his own needs reflects the strength of family and kin relationships. At various times and places, Jewish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Cuban Americans have been enclave or middleman minorities, as you'll see in future chapters (see Bonacich & Modell, 1980; Kitano & Daniels, 2001).

The situation of enclave and middleman minorities—integration without acculturation—can be considered either a type of pluralism (emphasizing the absence of acculturation) or a type of assimilation (emphasizing the relatively high level of economic equality). Keep in mind that assimilation and pluralism aren't opposites; they can occur in many combinations. It's best to think of acculturation, integration, and the other stages of assimilation (or pluralism) as independent processes.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

4. Is the United States becoming more pluralistic? Explain. What are some costs and benefits to pluralism?

5. How do middleman and enclave minority groups differ? How do these groups challenge the assumption that assimilation progresses in a certain order?

OTHER GROUP RELATIONSHIPS

Separatism and revolution are two other possible relationships that minority groups may want (Wirth, 1945). **Separatism** is when the minority group desires self-determination; thus, it may seek to sever political, cultural, and/or geographic ties with the society. Some Native American communities have expressed pluralist and separatist goals. Other groups, such as Native Hawaiians and the Nation of Islam, have pursued separatism. Separatist groups exist around the world, for example in French Canada, Scotland, Chechnya, Cyprus, Algeria, Spain, Mexico, and many other places.

A minority group promoting **revolution** seeks to become the dominant group or to create a new social order, sometimes in alliance with other groups. In the United States, this goal is relatively rare although some groups have pursued it (e.g., the Black Panthers; see Chapter 6). Revolutionary minority groups occur more commonly in countries that another nation has conquered and controlled (e.g., in Morocco, India, Mozambique colonized by France, the United Kingdom, and Portugal, respectively).

The dominant group may also pursue: **forced migration** (expulsion), **continued subjugation**, or **genocide** against minority groups. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) is an example of expulsion. The law forbid immigration from China and the government made concerted efforts to compel Chinese people to leave the country (see Chapter 8). Similarly, the U.S. government forced tribal communities out of their homelands via the Indian Removal Act (1830). This expulsion, and other harmful policies, led to what many people consider genocide of indigenous people. (See Chapters 4 and 7.)

Continued subjugation occurs when the dominant group exploits a minority group and tries to keep them powerless. Systemic slavery and Jim Crow segregation are good examples. (Many people argue that the Middle Passage, slavery, and Jim Crow constitute genocide. See Chapters 4 to 6.)

Finally, the dominant group may pursue genocide against minority groups. Millions of people have been killed in contemporary genocides (e.g., in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia). and genocide continues today in Myanmar and Sudan, against the Yazidi in Iraq and the Uyghurs in China.

The most well-known genocide is the Holocaust (1941–1945) which killed at least six million Jews and millions of other people (e.g., Poles, Russians, Roma, gays and lesbians). Germany's defeat in World War I (1914–1918) and the economic destruction that followed laid the foundation for the Holocaust. Hitler became the leader of the Nazi party in 1921. His charisma and promises to restore Germany's economic prosperity and power on the world's stage made him popular. He was appointed as Chancellor of Germany in 1933 and quickly expanded his powers and those of his party (The National WWII Museum, n.d.).

Like other forms of group relations, genocide is a process. Nazi propaganda—including Hitler's speeches and writing—portrayed Jews as animals (e.g., rats, roaches), outsiders, deviants, and enemies of the state. Such dehumanization paved the way for widespread discrimination that, ultimately, led to horrific, systematic murder. For example, early laws banned Jews from public spaces (e.g., restaurants, theaters, parks, public schools) and professions (e.g., law, medicine, teaching). Then, Jews were forced to identify their minority status by wearing the Star of David and by adding Jewish identifiers to their official names (e.g., on passports and other documents). The Nazis stole their possessions, evicted them from their homes, segregated them into ghettos, banned them from intermarriage, rescinded their citizenship, and forbid their escape.

Researchers have documented more than 42,500 locations in 21 countries (U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2021) where people were imprisoned or killed, including 30,000 slave labor camps; 1,150 ghettos; 980 concentration camps; and 1,000 prisoner-of-war camps. It's hard to imagine. Yet, thousands of "regular people" worked at these facilities or saw them regularly. Some acted as informants by reporting anything "suspicious" to the police and security officials (Gellately, 2002). Still others supported the Holocaust by refusing to "to ask any questions" because they didn't want to know what was happening (c.f. Ezard, 2001).

Dominant groups may simultaneously pursue different policies with different minority groups and policies may change over time. This book will explore these diverse group relations but concentrates on assimilation and pluralism because they're the most typical forms in the United States.

FROM IMMIGRANTS TO WHITE ETHNICS

Next, we'll explore the experiences of the minority groups that stimulated the development of what we're calling the traditional perspective of assimilation. Massive immigration from Europe began in the 1820s. Over the next century, millions of people made the journey from the Old World to the New. They came from every corner of the European continent: Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Ukraine, and scores of other nations and provinces. They came as young men and women seeking jobs, as families fleeing religious persecution, as political radicals fleeing the police, as farmers seeking land and a fresh start, and as paupers barely able to scrape together the cost of their passage. They came as immigrants, became minority groups upon their arrival, experienced discrimination and prejudice in all its forms, went through all the varieties and stages of assimilation and pluralism, and eventually merged into the society that had once rejected them so viciously. Figure 2.1 shows the major European sending nations.

These immigrants were a diverse group, and their experiences in America varied along crucial sociological dimensions. For example, native-born (white European) Americans marginalized and rejected some groups (e.g., Italians and other Southern Europeans) as racially inferior while they viewed others (Irish Catholics and Eastern European Jews) as inferior because of their religions. And, of course, gender shaped the immigration experience—from start to finish—which was decidedly different for women and men.

Social class was another major differentiating factor: Many European immigrants brought few resources and very low human capital. They entered American society at the bottom of the economic

FIGURE 2.1 ■ Approximate Number of Immigrants to the United States for Selected European Nations, 1820–1920

ladder and often remained on the lowest occupational and economic rungs for generations. Other groups brought skills or financial resources that led them to a more favorable position and faster rates of upward mobility. All these factors—race, gender, and class—affected their experiences and led to very different outcomes in terms of social location, mobility paths, and acceptance within American society.

This first mass wave of immigrants shaped America in many ways. When the immigration started, America was an agricultural nation clustered along the East Coast, not yet 50 years old. The nation was just coming into contact with Mexicans in the Southwest, slavery was flourishing in the South, and conflict with Native Americans was intense and brutal. When this period of intense immigration ended in the 1920s, the U.S. population had increased from fewer than 10 million to more than 100 million. Society had industrialized, stretched from coast to coast, established colonies in the Pacific and the Caribbean, and become a world power.

It was no coincidence that America's industrialization and rise to global prominence occurred simultaneously with European immigration. These changes were intimately interlinked and were the mutual causes and effects of one another. Industrialization fueled the growth of American military and political power, and the industrial machinery of the nation depended heavily on the flow of labor from Europe. By World War I, for example, 25% of the American labor force was foreign-born, and more than half the workforce in New York, Detroit, and Chicago consisted of immigrant men. Immigrants were the majority of the workers in many important sectors of the economy, including coal mining, steel manufacturing, the garment industry, and meatpacking (Martin & Midgley, 1999; Steinberg, 1981).

In the sections that follow, we'll explore these groups' experiences. First, we'll review the forces that caused them to leave Europe and come to the United States. Then, we'll assess their present status.

Industrialization and Immigration

What forces stimulated this mass movement of people? Like any complex phenomenon, immigration from Europe had a multitude of causes, but underlying the process was a massive and fundamental shift in subsistence technology: the **Industrial Revolution**. We mentioned the importance of subsistence technology in Chapter 1. Dominant–minority relations are intimately related to the system a society uses to satisfy its basic needs, and those relations change as the economic system changes. The immigrants were pushed out of Europe as industrial technology wrecked the traditional agricultural way of life. They were drawn to America by the jobs created by the spread of the very same technology. Let's consider the impact of this fundamental transformation of social structure and culture.

Industrialization began in England in the mid-1700s, spread to other parts of Northern and Western Europe, and then, in the 1800s, to Eastern and Southern Europe. As it rolled across the continent, the industrial revolution replaced people and animal power with machines and new forms of energy (steam, coal, and eventually oil and gas), causing an exponential increase in the productive capacity of society.

At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, most Europeans lived in small, rural villages and survived by traditional farming practices that had changed very little over the centuries. The work of production was **labor intensive**, done by hand or with the aid of draft animals. Productivity was low, and the tasks of food production and survival required the efforts of virtually the entire family working ceaselessly throughout the year.

Industrialization destroyed this traditional way of life as it introduced new technology, machines, and sources of energy to the tasks of production (e.g., steam engines) The new technology was **capital intensive** (dependent on machine power). As agriculture modernized, the need for human labor in rural areas decreased. During this time, landowners consolidated farmland into larger and larger tracts for the sake of efficiency, further decreasing the need for human laborers. Yet, as survival in this rapidly changing rural economy became more difficult, the rural population began growing.

In response to these challenges, peasants left their home villages and moved to urban areas. Factories were being built in or near the cities, opening up opportunities for employment. The urban population tended to increase faster than the job supply. Thus, many migrants couldn't find work and had to move on; many of them responded to opportunities in the United States. At the same time, the abundance of frontier farmland encouraged people to move westward, contributing to a fairly constant demand for labor in the East Coast areas, places that were easiest for Europeans to reach. As industrialization took hold on both continents, the population movement to European cities and then to North America eventually grew to become one of the largest in human history. The timing of migration from

Europe followed the timing of industrialization. The first waves of immigrants, often called the **Old Immigration**, came from Northern and Western Europe starting in the 1820s. A second wave, the **New Immigration**, began arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe in the 1880s. Figure 2.2 shows the waves and rates of legal immigration up to 2019. Note that the New Immigration was much more volu-minous than the Old Immigration, and that the number of immigrants declined drastically after the 1920s. Later, we'll explore the reasons for this decline and discuss the more recent (post-1965) increase in immigration—overwhelmingly from the Americas (mostly Mexico) and Asia—in Chapters 8 and 9.

European Origins and Conditions of Entry

European immigrants varied from one another in innumerable ways. They followed different pathways to America, and their experiences were shaped by their cultural and class characteristics, their countries of origin, and the timing of their arrival. Some groups encountered much more resistance than others, and different groups played different roles in the industrialization and urbanization of America. To discuss these diverse patterns systematically, we distinguish three subgroups of European immigrants:

FIGURE 2.2 ■ Legal Migration to the United States, 1820 to 2019

Sources: *1820–2010*: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2014); *2010 to 2019*: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2020).

Protestants from Northern and Western Europe, the largely Catholic immigrant laborers from Ireland and from Southern and Eastern Europe, and Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. We look at these subgroups in the approximate order of their arrival. In later sections, we'll consider other sociological variables such as social class and gender that further differentiated the experiences of people in these groups.

Northern and Western Protestant Europeans

Northern and Western European immigrants included Danes (from Denmark), Dutch, English, French, Germans, Norwegians, Swedes, and Welsh. These groups were like the dominant group in their racial and religious characteristics. They also shared many American values, including the **Protestant ethic**—which stressed hard work, success, and individualism—and support for the principles of demo-cratic government. These similarities eased their acceptance into a society that was highly intolerant of religious and racial differences. These immigrant groups experienced a lower degree of ethnocentric rejection and racist disparagement than the Irish and immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.

Northern and Western European immigrants came from nations as developed as the United States. Thus, these immigrants tended to be more skilled and educated than other immigrant groups, and often brought money and other resources with which to secure a comfortable place in their new society. Many settled in the sparsely populated Midwest and in other frontier areas, where they farmed the fertile land that became available after the conquest and removal of Native Americans and Mexican Americans (see Chapter 3). By dispersing throughout the midsection of the country, they lowered their visibility and their degree of competition with dominant group members. Two brief case studies, first of Norwegians and then of Germans, outline these groups' experiences.

Newly arrived Ruthenian immigrant.
New York Public Library / Wikimedia Commons

Immigrants From Norway Norway had a small population, and immigration from this Scandinavian nation to America was never large in absolute numbers. However, on a per capita basis, Norway sent more immigrants to America before 1890 than any other European nation except Ireland (Chan, 1990).

The first Norwegian immigrants were moderately prosperous farmers searching for cheap land. They found abundant, rich land in the upper Midwest states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin. However, the local labor supply was too small to cultivate the available land effectively. Many used their networks of relatives and friends to recruit a labor force from their homeland. Once chains of communication and migration linked Norway to the Northern Plains, Norwegian immigrants flocked to these areas for decades (Chan, 1990). Farms, towns, and cities of the upper Midwest still reflect this Scandinavian heritage.

Immigrants From Germany The stream of immigration from Germany was much larger than that from Norway. In the latter half of the 19th century, at least 25% of the immigrants each year were German (Conzen, 1980, p. 406) and they left their mark on the economy, political structure, and cultural life of their new homeland. In 2015, about 45 million Americans (14.4%) traced their ancestries to Germany—more than to any other country, including England and Ireland (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016a).

The German immigrants who arrived in the early 1800s moved into the newly opened farmland and the rapidly growing cities of the Midwest, as had many Scandinavians. By 1850, Germans had established communities in Milwaukee, St. Louis, and other Midwestern cities (Conzen, 1980). Some German immigrants followed the trans-Atlantic route of the cotton trade between Europe and the southern United States and entered through the port of New Orleans, moving from there to the Midwest and Southwest.

German immigrants arriving later in the century were more likely to settle in urban areas, in part because fertile land was less available. Many of these city-bound German immigrants were skilled workers and artisans, and others found work as laborers in the rapidly expanding industrial sector. The influx of German immigrants into the rural and urban economies is reflected in the fact that by 1870, most employed German Americans were involved in skilled labor (37%) or farming (25%) (Conzen, 1980, p. 413).

German immigrants took relatively high occupational positions in the U.S. labor force, and their sons and daughters were able to translate that relative affluence into economic mobility. By the dawn of the 20th century, large numbers of second-generation German Americans were finding their way into white-collar and professional careers. Within a few generations, German Americans had achieved parity with national norms in education, income, and occupational prestige.

Assimilation Patterns Assimilation for Norwegian, German, and other Protestant immigrants from Northern and Western Europe was consistent with the traditional model discussed earlier. Although members of these groups felt the sting of rejection, prejudice, and discrimination, their movement from acculturation to integration and equality was relatively smooth, especially when compared with the experiences of racial minority groups. Table 2.3, later in this chapter, illustrates their relative success and high degree of assimilation.

Immigrant Laborers From Ireland and Southern and Eastern Europe

The relative ease of assimilation for Northern and Western Europeans contrasts sharply with the experiences of non-Protestant, less educated, and less skilled immigrants. These immigrant laborers came in two waves. The Irish were part of the Old Immigration that began in the 1820s, but the bulk of this group—Bulgarians, Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, Russians, Serbs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and scores of other Southern and Eastern European groups—made up the New Immigration that began in the 1880s.

Peasant Origins Most immigrants in these nationality groups (like many recent immigrants to America) were peasants or unskilled laborers, with few resources other than their willingness to work. They came from rural, village-oriented cultures in which family and kin took precedence over individual needs or desires. Family life for them tended to be patriarchal and autocratic; Specifically, men dominated decision making and controlled family resources. Parents expected children to work for the good of the family and forgo their personal desires. Arranged marriages were common. This cultural background was less consistent with the industrializing, capitalistic, individualistic, Protestant, Anglo-American culture of the United States and was a major reason that these immigrant laborers experienced a higher level of rejection and discrimination than the immigrants from Northern and Western Europe.

The immigrant laborers were much less likely to enter the rural economy than were the Northern and Western European immigrants. Much of the better frontier land had already been claimed by the time these new immigrant groups arrived, and a large number of them had been permanently soured on farming by the oppressive and exploitative agrarian economies from which they were trying to escape (see Handlin, 2002).

Regional and Occupational Patterns The immigrant laborers of this time settled in the cities of the industrializing Northeast and found work in plants, mills, mines, and factories. They supplied the armies of laborers needed to power the industrial revolution in the United States, although their view of this process was generally from the bottom looking up. They arrived during the decades when the American industrial and urban infrastructure was being constructed. They built roads, canals, and railroads and the buildings that housed the machinery of industrialization. For example, the first tunnels of the New York City subway system were dug, largely by hand, by laborers from Italy. Other immigrants found work in the coalfields of Pennsylvania and West Virginia and the steel mills of Pittsburgh, and they flocked by the millions to the factories of the Northeast.

Like other low-skill immigrant groups, these newcomers were employed in jobs where strength and stamina were more important than literacy or skilled labor. In fact, as industrialization proceeded through its early phases, the skill level required for employment declined. To keep wages low and take advantage of what seemed like an inexhaustible supply of cheap labor, industrialists and factory owners developed technologies and machines that required few skills and little knowledge of English to operate. As mechanization proceeded, unskilled workers replaced skilled workers. Frequently, women and children replaced men because they could be hired for lower wages (Steinberg, 1981).

Assimilation Patterns Eventually, as the generations passed, the prejudice, systematic discrimination, and other barriers to upward mobility for the immigrant laborer groups weakened, and their descendants began rising out of the working class. Although the first and second generations of these groups were largely limited to jobs at the unskilled or semiskilled level, the third and later generations

rose in the American social class system. As Table 2.3 shows (later in this chapter), the descendants of the immigrant laborers achieved parity with national norms by the latter half of the 20th century.

Eastern European Jewish Immigrants and the Ethnic Enclave

Jewish immigrants from Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe followed a third pathway into American society. These immigrants were a part of the New Immigration and began arriving in the 1880s. Unlike the immigrant laborer groups, who were generally economic refugees and included many young, single men, Eastern European Jews were fleeing religious persecution and arrived as family units intending to settle permanently and become citizens. They settled in the urban areas of the Northeast and Midwest. New York City was the most common destination, and the Lower East Side became the best known Jewish American neighborhood. By 1920, about 60% of all Jewish Americans lived in the urban areas between Boston and Philadelphia, with almost 50% living in New York City. Another 30% lived in the urban areas of the Midwest, particularly in Chicago (Goren, 1980, p. 581).

Many "breaker boys" who worked in coal mines came from immigrant families.

Lewis Hine / National Archives and Records Administration / Wikimedia Commons

Urban Origins In Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe, Jews had been barred from agrarian occupations and had come to make their livelihoods from jobs in the urban economy. For example, almost two thirds of the immigrant Jewish men had been tailors and other skilled laborers in Eastern Europe (Goren, 1980). When they immigrated to the United States, these urban skills and job experiences helped them find work in the rapidly industrializing U.S. economy of the early 20th century.

Other Jewish immigrants joined the urban working class and took manual labor and unskilled jobs in the industrial sector (Morawska, 1990). The garment industry became the lifeblood of the Jewish community and provided jobs to about one third of all Eastern European Jews residing in the major cities (Goren, 1980). Jewish women, like the women of more recent immigrant laborer groups, created ways to combine their jobs and their domestic responsibilities. As young girls, they worked in factories and sweatshops. After marriage, they did the same work at home, sewing precut garments together or doing other piecework such as wrapping cigars or making artificial flowers, often assisted by their children (Amott & Matthaei, 1991).

An Enclave Economy Unlike most European immigrant groups, Jewish Americans became heavily involved in commerce. Drawing on their experience in the "old country," many started businesses and

Hester Street, New York City, was the center of the Jewish immigrant enclave a century ago.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

small independent enterprises. Jewish neighborhoods were densely populated and provided a ready market for all kinds of services such as bakeries, butcher and candy shops, and other retail enterprises.

Capitalizing on their residential concentration and close proximity, Jewish immigrants created an enclave economy founded upon dense networks of commercial, financial, and social cooperation. The Jewish American enclave survived because of the cohesiveness of the group; the willingness of wives, children, and other relatives to work for little or no monetary compensation; and the commercial savvy of the early immigrants. Also, a large pool of cheap labor and sources of credit and other financial services were available within the community. The Jewish American enclave grew and provided a live-lihood for many of the immigrants' children and grandchildren (Portes & Manning, 1986). As with other enclave groups that we'll discuss in future chapters—including Chinese Americans and Cuban Americans—Jewish American economic advancement preceded extensive acculturation. That is, they made significant strides toward economic equality before they became fluent in English or were other-wise Americanized.

Americanized Generations One way an enclave immigrant group can improve its position is to develop an educated and acculturated second generation. The Americanized, English-speaking children of these immigrants used their greater familiarity with the dominant society and their language facility to help preserve and expand the family enterprise. Furthermore, as the second generation appeared, the American public school system was expanding, and education through the college level was free or inexpensive in New York City and other cities (Steinberg, 1981). There was also a strong push for the second and third generations to enter professions, and as Jewish Americans excelled in school, resistance to and discrimination against them increased. By the 1920s, many elite colleges and universities, such as Dartmouth, had established quotas that limited the number of Jewish students they would admit (Dinnerstein, 1977). These quotas weren't abolished until after World War II.

Assimilation Patterns The enclave economy and the Jewish neighborhoods the immigrants estab-lished proved to be an effective base from which to integrate into American society. The descendants of the Eastern European Jewish immigrants moved from their ethnic neighborhoods years ago, and their positions in the economy—their pushcarts, stores, and jobs in the garment industry—were taken up by more recent immigrants. When they left the enclave economy, many second- and third-generation Eastern European Jews didn't enter the mainstream occupational structure at the bottom, as the immi-grant laborer groups tended to do. They used the resources generated through the hard work, skills, and entrepreneurship of the early generations to gain access to prestigious and advantaged social class positions (Portes & Manning, 1986). Today, Jewish Americans, as a group, surpass national averages in levels of education and income (Masci, 2016) and occupational prestige (Sklare, 1971; see also Cohen, 1985; Massarik & Chenkin, 1973). The relatively higher status of Russian Americans (shown in Table 2.3) is due, in part, to the fact that many are of Jewish heritage.

Chinatowns were the centers of social and economic life for Chinese immigrants.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs

Chains of Immigration

Immigrants tend to follow chains established and maintained by group members. Some versions of the traditional assimilation perspective (especially human capital theory) treat immigration and status attainment as purely individual matters. To the contrary, scholars have demonstrated that immigration to the United States was in large measure a group (sociological) phenomenon. Immigrant chains stretched across the oceans, held together by the ties of kinship, language, religion, culture, and a sense of connection (Bodnar, 1985; Tilly, 1990).

Here's how chain immigration worked (and, although modified by modern technology, continues to work today): Someone from a village in, for instance, Poland would make it to the United States. This successful immigrant would send word to the home village, perhaps by hiring a letter writer. Along with news and adventure stories, they would send their address. Within months, another immigrant from the village, another relative perhaps, would show up at the address of the original immigrant. After months of experience in the new society, the original immigrant could lend assistance, provide a place to sleep, help with job hunting, and orient the newcomer to the area.

Before long, others would arrive from the village in need of the same sort of introduction to the mysteries of America. The compatriots would typically settle close to one another, in the same building or on the same block. Soon, entire neighborhoods were filled with people from a certain village, province, or region. In these ethnic neighborhoods, people spoke the old language and observed the old ways. They started businesses, founded churches or synagogues, had families, and began mutual aid societies and other organizations. There was safety in numbers and comfort and security in a familiar, if transplanted, set of traditions and customs.

Immigrants often responded to American society by attempting to recreate as much of their old world as possible within the bustling metropolises of the industrializing Northeast and West Coast. They did so, in part, to avoid the harsher forms of rejection and discrimination and for solidarity and mutual support. These Little Italys, Little Warsaws, Little Irelands, Greektowns, Chinatowns, and Little Tokyos were safe havens that insulated the immigrants from the dominant U.S. society and helped them to establish bonds with one another, organize group life, pursue their own group interests, and have some control over the pace of their adjustment to American culture. For some groups and in some areas, the ethnic subcommunity was a short-lived phenomenon. For others—such as the Jewish

enclave discussed earlier—the neighborhood became the dominant structure of their lives, and these networks functioned long after the arrival of group members in the United States.

The Campaign Against Immigration: Prejudice, Racism, and Discrimination

Today, it may be hard to conceive of the bitterness and intensity of the prejudice that greeted the Irish, Italians, Jews, Poles, and other new immigrant groups (though it parallels anti-immigrant sentiment held by some Americans today). Even as immigrants became an indispensable part of the workforce, Americans castigated, ridiculed, attacked, and disparaged them. The Irish were the first immigrant laborers to arrive; thus, they were the first to experience this intense prejudice and discrimination. White Americans waged campaigns against them; mobs attacked Irish neighborhoods and burned Roman Catholic churches and convents. Some employers blatantly refused to hire the Irish, often posting signs that read "No Irish Need Apply." Until later arriving groups immigrated and pushed them up, the Irish were mired at the bottom of the job market (Blessing, 1980; Dolan, 2010; Potter, 1973; Shannon, 1964).

Other groups felt the same sting of rejection as they arrived. Italian immigrants were particularly likely to be the victims of violent attacks; one of the most vicious took place in New Orleans in 1891. The city's police chief was assassinated, and rumors of Italian involvement in the murder were rampant. The police arrested hundreds of Italians, and nine were brought to trial. All were acquitted. Anti-Italian sentiment ran so high that a mob lynched 11 Italians while police and city officials did nothing (Higham, 1963; Zecker, 2011).

Anti-Catholicism

Much of the prejudice against the Irish and the new immigrants was expressed as anti-Catholicism. Prior to the mid-19th century, Anglo-American society had been almost exclusively Protestant. Catholicism, with its Latin masses, saints, celibate clergy, and cloistered nuns seemed alien, unusual, and threatening to many Americans. The growth of Catholicism in the United States, especially because it was associated with non-Anglo immigrants, raised fears among Protestants that their religion was threatened or would lose status. This fear was stoked by false rumors that the pope prohibited Protestants from worshiping in Rome (Franco, 2008) and that with increasing numbers of Catholics in the United States, such prohibitions could make their way to America (Wilensky-Lanford, 2015).

Although Protestant Americans often stereotyped Catholics as a single group, Catholic immigrants differed, primarily by their home country. For example, the Catholicism that people practiced in Ireland differed significantly from the Catholicism practiced in Italy, Poland, and other countries (Inglis, 2007). Therefore, Catholic immigrant groups often established their own parishes, with priests who could speak their native language. These cultural and national differences often separated Catholic groups, despite their common faith (Herberg, 1960).

NARRATIVE PORTRAIT: THE LOST BOYS OF SUDAN

The "Lost Boys of Sudan[1]" escaped the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), which killed more than two million people and injured and displaced many more (The Lost Boys of Sudan, IRC). To survive, between 20,000–25,000 of them, most 8 to 18 years old, walked nearly 1,000 miles from South Sudan to Ethiopia. They suffered from exhaustion, starvation, dehydration, exposure to the elements, and threats to their lives from animals and people. They occasionally crossed into war zones where some were captured, threatened, beaten, or conscripted into the army as "child soldiers." They stayed in Ethiopia for about five years until war drove them out (personal communication with author). They walked to Kenya and resettled in the Kakuma Refugee Camp where they lived for years. Only about half of the original group made it. Of those, about 3,000 were girls (Jack, 2010, p. 22).

Gender affects people's experiences, including experiences of war. "Lost boys" could escape the war because they were tending cows away from their villages making it easier to run or hide. Some girls escaped, but when they arrived in Ethiopia, gender conventions influenced the decision to segregate them

Children in a refugee camp in Kakuma, Kenya.

SOPA Images/Contributor/Getty Images

from the boys, usually by placing them in foster families. Thus, they typically could not take advantage of education, counseling, or sports programs in the camp. When the U.S. government decided to accept some of these refugees, they stipulated that they be orphans. Because the girls had been living with families for several years, they did not meet that requirement. Hence, of the 2,000 South Sudanese refugees to settle in the United States, only 89 were girls (Jack, 2010, p. 22).

As new immigrants, the Lost Boys faced many challenges of adapting to American culture while trying to maintain their cultural identities as Dinka and Nuer. The following excerpt describes John Bul Dau's arrival to the United States.

The airport hummed with so much activity, so many people moving so fast in so many directions. My first look at Americans in America, I thought. What do they look like? So many of them were short by Dinka standards, and they walked like crazy, almost as if they were running. They seem to all be in a hurry. The woman behind the immigration desk asked for papers by saying, "Next." That was all she said. "Next. Next. Next." I gave her my precious, sealed envelope. She opened it and looked it over. She signed my name to some documents and gave me more papers. Then she motioned me through, very fast. "Next," she said.

I had questions about how to find the waiting area. Sometimes, busy Americans don't even speak to answer. They just pointed... we were hungry and tired, and I felt sick from the malaria medicine . . . I walked into the men's room at LaGuardia and saw the toilets and fancy sinks. I had seen pictures of them at orientation, but they still seemed strange. I have watched a lesson on how to work a toilet, and I used it without incident. But the sink was another matter. It had no faucets. I needed to wash my hands... without warning, when I moved my hands... the water came on by itself. This is a magic country, I thought, and white people—that's how I thought of Americans—are so cunning. They make things easy for themselves; they make things work for them. I wondered if that made it tempting to be lazy.

. . . I had no bags . . . I stepped into a brightly lit room and spotted three Lost Boys, now Sudanese Americans, who had come to greet me. There were some white people, including a woman and her son . . . "Welcome," said the woman who first greeted me, and everyone joined in.

Welcome to Syracuse. Welcome to America. Welcome.

Questions to Consider

1. What concepts from Chapters 1 and 2 are most applicable to this passage? Why?
2. What are the most significant challenges the Lost Boys—or other refugees—will face in the United States?

3. The "Lost Boys" are what some people call "deserving immigrants" who presumably differ from "undeserving immigrants" who enter the country illegally (Aptekar, 2015, p. 112). What do you make of this distinction? What are the most important factors to consider when deciding which immigrants to let in. How important are "merits" such as English fluency, education, and religion.? Can "merit" be balanced against human needs (e.g., safety, work)? How?

4. Most of the Sudanese refugeed worked extremely hard to assimilate—working, taking classes, and adopting American norms. Yet, many struggled to find good jobs and attain financial security, especially in the years after their arrival. Discuss this situation considering human capital theory.

Anti-Semitism

Biased sentiments and negative stereotypes of Jews have, unfortunately, been common for centuries. For example, Christians chastised and persecuted European Jews as the "killers of Christ" and stereotyped them as materialistic moneylenders and crafty business owners (Cohen, 1982; Dollinger, 2005; Rozenblit, 2010).

Europeans brought these stereotypes with them to the new world. For example, in 1654, 23 Jews sought asylum in the New Netherland (present-day New York). The Dutch government gave them permission to enter. However, the local director general hoped to expel them, saying they were a "deceitful race . . . [who should] be not allowed to further infect and trouble this new colony" (Jacobson, 1999, p. 171).

Before the mass immigration of Eastern European Jews began in the l880s, **anti-Semitism** in the United States was relatively mild, perhaps because the group was so small. However, it intensified when large numbers of Jewish immigrants began arriving from Russia and Eastern Europe. These Jews experienced forced migration, fueled in part by violent anti-Jewish pogroms. In Russian, *pogrom* means "to wreak havoc, to demolish violently." Pogroms involved the theft and destruction of Jewish-owned property as well as the physical and emotional assault of Jewish people. One of the first pogroms occurred in 1821. Between 1881–1884, pogroms had become widespread in Russia and Ukraine. Between 1918–1920 another wave happened in Belarus and Poland. Overall, perpetrators of the pogroms killed tens of thousands of Jews (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.).

The most well-known pogrom, Kristallnacht (*The Night of Broken Glass*), took place in 1938 throughout Germany, Austria, and the Sudetenland (now part of Czechoslovakia). In just two days, attacks orchestrated by Nazi leaders, left a path of destruction: 7,500 Jewish-owned businesses were plundered or destroyed, 267 synagogues were destroyed (usually by being burned down), and Jewish cemeteries were desecrated. Thousands of Jews *were* terrified, physically attacked, or forced to perform humiliating acts. Approximately 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and sent to concentration camps. After Kristallnacht, the Nazis passed many anti-Jewish laws and required Jews to pay an "atonement tax" of 1 billion Reichsmark, equivalent to 2.49 billion dollars (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). In 2020, after being adjusted for inflation, Jews would have been taxed the equivalent of $46, 496, 370 (Friedman, n.d.).

As Jews entered the United States in record numbers, many Americans held on to their biases. For example, in the late 19th century, white Americans began banning Jews from social clubs, summer resorts, hotels, and other organizations (Anonymous, 1924; Kennedy, 2001; Meenes, 1941; Shevitz, 2005). Some businesses posted notices such as, "We prefer not to entertain Hebrews" (Goren, 1980, p. 585) and "Patronage of Jews is Declined" (Bernheimer, 1908, p. 1106). Such language attempted to mask white resistance to Jewish integration as a matter of preference. This prejudice and blatant discrimination hinted at forms of modern racism to come.

By the 1920s and 1930s, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other extreme racist groups espoused anti-Semitism. Because many of the political radicals and labor leaders of the time were Jewish immigrants, anti-Semitism seemingly merged with a fear of Communism and became prominent among American prejudices (Muller, 2010).

Some well-known Americans championed anti-Semitic views. For example, Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motor Company and one of the most famous men of his time, believed "the Jews" were responsible for WWI and a host of other things. In 1919, he bought a newspaper to communicate his views, most notably in a 91-week series called "The International Jew, the World's Foremost Problem," that he published later as a book. According to Logsdon (n.d.), it was "the largest and most damaging campaign against Jews ever waged in the United States." Additionally, it had tremendous influence on Hitler and, by extension, the Nazis. Similarly, Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest, reached millions of people through his radio program (Selzer, 1972) and through a newsletter for an organization he started, the National Union for Social Justice (NUSJ). The NUSJ had millions of members who pledged to "restore America to the Americans" (Carpenter, 1998, p. 71). A federal investigation declared him pro-Nazi and guilty of restating enemy propaganda (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.).

Anti-Semitism peaked before World War II, then decreased before reemerging after the war (Norwood, 2013). Social norms at the time made it easy for people to express anti-Semitic views or to discriminate against Jews. Unfortunately, anti-Semitism didn't stop with greater knowledge of the Holocaust at World War II's end. Research based on a sample of 53,100 people in 100 countries suggests that more than one billion people worldwide have anti-Semitic beliefs (Anti-Defamation League, 2017). However, attitudes vary by country and change over time. A 2015 poll of 10,000 people in 18 of the countries originally surveyed in 1964 and in subsequent years showed increases in anti-Semitism in Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania. Decreases occurred in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. The 2019 survey showed increases in Argentina, Brazil, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine. Austria, Canada, and Italy showed decreased anti-Semitic attitudes while attitudes remained consistent in several countries. In America, anti-Semitic attitudes decreased significantly since the 1960s. However, it increased in recent years though it wasn't included in the 2019 survey (Anti-Defamation League, 2017, 2019).

Starting in n the 1960s, people began expressing anti-Semitism in subtler forms (Benowitz, 2017; Borstelmann, 2009; Nirenberg, 2014). One notable exception to this is anti-Semitism within many extremist groups, which remains significant, overt, and hostile. In the past few years, the number of such groups has increased, as have anti-Semitic incidents. Though some groups names are recognizable (e.g., Aryan Nations, KKK), others mask the groups' beliefs (e.g., Creativity Movement, Vanguard America, Vinlanders Social Club). Not all groups share the same exact ideology; for example, white nationalists, "skinheads," and KKK-related organizations are slightly different. However, many came together in August 2017 for a "Unite the [Alt] Right" rally in Charlottesville, VA, which made their anti-Semitism clear. For example, some shouted "Jews will not replace us" and "blood and soil"—the latter is a reference to Nazi ideology (Swaney, 2004).

Some targeting of Jews increases during economic recession and may be related to the stereotypical view of Jewish Americans as extremely prosperous and materialistic, as often depicted in media such as film and television (Cohen, 1982). The type of prejudice that occurs under these conditions is called "envious prejudice" (Cuddy et al., 2008).

Recent years have seen a sharp increase in anti-Semitic attacks. The Ant-Defamation League (ADL) reports that there were 2,100 Anti-Semitic attacks in 2019, the highest number the group has recorded since 1979 and 2020, a year in which most Americans stayed home because of the pandemic, saw the third highest number of attacks (Harris & Shammas, 2021). We'll discuss hate crimes against Jewish Americans a bit more in Chapter 3.

A Successful Exclusion

The prejudice and racism directed against the immigrants also found expression in organized, widespread efforts to stop the flow of immigration. Various anti-immigrant organizations appeared almost as soon as the mass European immigration started in the 1820s. The strength of these campaigns waxed and waned, largely in harmony with the strength of the economy and the size of the job supply. Anti-immigrant sentiment intensified, and the strength of its organized expressions increased during hard times and depressions and tended to soften when the economy improved.

The campaign ultimately triumphed with the passage of the National Origins Act in 1924, which established a quota system limiting the number of immigrants that America would accept each year from each sending nation. This system was openly racist. For example, the quota for European nations was based on the proportional representation of each nationality in America as of 1890. Legislators chose this year because it predated the bulk of the New Immigration and, therefore, gave nearly 70% of the available immigration slots to the nations of Northern and Western Europe, despite the fact that immigration from those areas had largely ended by the 1920s.

Moreover, the National Origins Act banned immigration from Asian nations altogether. At this time, various European nations still colonized most of Africa, which received no separate quotas. (Specifically, the quota for African immigrants was zero.) The National Origins Act drastically reduced the number of immigrants that would be admitted into the United States each year. Figure 2.2 shows the effectiveness of the numerical restrictions. By the time the Great Depression took hold of the American economy in the 1930s, immigration had dropped to the lowest level in a century. The National Origins Act remained in effect until 1965.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

6. What caused people to leave Europe and come to North America? How did these reasons change from time to time and from place to place?

7. What influenced resistance and discrimination in the United States? How did the exclusionists triumph? What role did class play in these processes?

PATTERNS OF ASSIMILATION

In this section, we'll explore common patterns of assimilation European immigrants and their descendants followed: assimilation by generation, ethnic succession, and structural mobility. These patterns are consistent with Gordon's model of assimilation.

The Importance of Generations

People today—social scientists, politicians, and ordinary citizens—often do not recognize the time and effort it takes for a group to become completely Americanized. For most European immigrant groups, the process took generations. It was the immigrant's grandchildren or the great-grandchildren (or even great-great-grandchildren) who completed acculturation and integration. Mass immigration from Europe ended in the 1920s. However, the assimilation of some European ethnic groups wasn't completed until late in the 20th century.

Here's a summary of how assimilation proceeded for European immigrants: The first generation, the actual immigrants, settled into ethnic neighborhoods, such as Little Italy in New York City. They made limited movement toward acculturation and integration. They focused their energies on social relationships within their own groups, especially family networks. Many of them—usually men—had to leave their neighborhoods for work and other reasons, and this required some familiarity with the society. The people had to learn some English and taking a job outside the neighborhood is, almost by definition, a form of integration. Nonetheless, this first generation of immigrants primarily lived within a version of the old country, which they recreated within the new.

The second generation—the immigrants' children—were psychologically or socially marginalized because they were partly ethnic and partly American but not full members of either group. They were born in America but in households and neighborhoods that were ethnic, not American. They learned the old language first and were socialized in the old ways. As they entered childhood, however, they entered the public schools and became socialized into the Anglo-American culture.

Often, what they learned at school conflicted with their home lives. For example, old country family values included expectations for children to put family interests before self-interests. Parents arranged marriages, or at least heavily influenced them; marriages were subject to parents' approval.

These customs conflicted sharply with American ideas about individualism and romantic love. Cultural differences like these often created painful conflict between the ethnic first generation and their Americanized children.

As the second generation progressed toward adulthood, they tended to move away from the old neighborhoods, often motivated by desires for social mobility. They were much more acculturated than their parents, spoke English fluently, and enjoyed a wider range of opportunities, including occupational choices. Discriminatory policies in education, housing, and the job market sometimes limited them. However, they were upwardly mobile, and in pursuit of their careers, they left behind their ethnic communities and many of their parents' customs.

The third generation—the immigrants' grandchildren—were typically born and raised in non-ethnic settings. English was their first (and often only) language, and their beliefs and values were thoroughly American. Family and kinship ties with grandparents and the old neighborhood often remained strong and weekend and holiday visits along with family rituals revolving around the cycles of birth, marriage, and death connected the third generation to the world of their ancestors. However, they were American; their ethnicity was a relatively minor part of this generation's identities and daily life.

The pattern of assimilation by generation progressed as follows:

● The first generation began the process of assimilation and was slightly acculturated and integrated.

● The second generation was very acculturated and highly integrated (at least into the society's secondary sectors).

● The third generation finished the acculturation process and enjoyed high levels of integration at the secondary and the society's primary sectors.

Table 2.2 illustrates Italian American's patterns of structural assimilation. As the generations change, this group's educational and occupational characteristics converge with those of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). For example, the percentage of Italian Americans with some college shows a gap of more than 20 points between the first and second generations and WASPs. However, third- and fourth-generation Italians are virtually identical to WASPs on this measure of integration in the secondary sector of society. Likewise, the other differences between Italians and WASPs shrink from generation to generation.

TABLE 2.2 ■ Some Comparisons Between WASPs and Italian Americans				
		Generation		
Indicators	**WASPS***	**First**	**Second**	**Third and Fourth**
Percentage with some college	42.4%	19.0%	19.4%	41.7%
Average years of education	12.6	9.0	11.1	13.4
Percentage with white-collar jobs	34.7%	20.0%	22.5%	28.8%
Percentage with blue-collar jobs	37.9%	65.0%	53.9%	39.0%
Average occupational prestige	42.5	34.3	36.8	42.5
Percentage of "unmixed" Italian men marrying non-Italian women	N/A	21.9%	51.4%	67.3%

*Note: White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) weren't separated by generation, and some of the differences between groups may be the result of factors such as age. That is, older WASPs may have levels of education more comparable to first-generation Italian Americans than to those of WASPs as a whole.

Source: Adapted from Alba (1985, Tab. 5-3, 5-4, 6-2). Data are originally from the NORC General Social Surveys (1975–1980) and the Current Population Survey (1979). Copyright © 1985 Richard D. Alba.

Table 2.2 shows the first five measures of educational and occupational attainment the generational pattern of integration (or structural assimilation). The sixth measures marital assimilation, or intermarriage. It displays the percentage of men of "unmixed" (100% Italian) heritage who married women outside the Italian community. Note once more the tendency for integration, now at the primary level, to increase across the generations. Most first-generation men married within their group—only 21.9% married non-Italians. By the third generation, 67.3% of the men married non-Italians.

This model of step-by-step, linear assimilation by generation fits some groups better than others. For example, immigrants from Northern and Western Europe (except for the Irish) were generally more similar, culturally, to the dominant group in America. They tended to be more educated and skilled. Thus, they were accepted more quickly than other immigrant groups, which helped them complete the assimilation process in three generations or less.

In contrast, immigrants from Ireland and from Southern and Eastern Europe were mostly uneducated, unskilled people who were more likely to join the huge groups of industrial laborers who ran the factories, mines, and mills. These immigrants were more likely to remain at the bottom of the American class structure for generations; indeed, they only attained middle-class prosperity in the second half of the 20th century. As mentioned earlier, Eastern European Jews followed a distinctly different pathway to assimilation. Although widespread anti-Semitic attitudes and policies limited them, they formed an enclave that served as a springboard to launch the second and third generations into the society.

It's important to keep generational patterns in mind when examining current immigration to the United States. It's common for people to criticize contemporary newcomers (especially Hispanics) for their slow pace of assimilation. But this process should be considered in the light of the generational time frame for assimilation followed by European immigrants. Modern forms of transportation allow immigration to happen quickly. Assimilation, however, is slow.

Ethnic Succession

A second factor that shaped the assimilation experience is captured in the concept of **ethnic succession**, or the ways European ethnic groups unintentionally affected one another's positions in the society's class structure. The overall pattern was that each European immigrant group tended to be pushed to higher social class levels and more favorable economic situations by the groups that arrived after it. As more experienced groups became upwardly mobile and moved from the neighborhoods that served as their ports of entry, new groups of immigrants replaced them and began the process anew. Some cities in the Northeast served as ethnic neighborhoods—the first haven in the new society—for various successive groups. Some places, such as the Lower East Side of New York City, continue to fill this role today.

This process of ethnic succession can be understood in terms of the second stage of Gordon's model: integration at the secondary level (see Table 2.1), or entry into the public institutions and organizations of the larger society. Three pathways of integration tended to be most important for European immigrants: politics, labor unions, and the church. We'll discuss each in turn, illustrating with the Irish, the first immigrant laborers to arrive in large numbers; but the general patterns apply to all white ethnic groups.

Politics

The Irish tended to follow the Northern and Western Europeans in the job market and social class structure and were, in turn, followed by the wave of new immigrants. In many urban areas of the Northeast, they moved into the neighborhoods and took jobs left behind by German laborers. After a period of acculturation and adjustment, the Irish began creating their own connections to mainstream American society to improve their economic and social positions. They were replaced in their neighborhoods and at the bottom of the occupational structure by Italians, Poles, and other immigrant groups arriving after them.

As the years passed and the Irish gained more experience, they forged more links to society. Specifically, they aligned with the Democratic Party and helped construct the political machines that

dominated many city governments in the 19th and 20th centuries, including Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago (Erie & Kogan, 2016). Machine politicians were often corrupt and even criminal, regularly subverting the election process, bribing city and state officials, using city budgets to fill the pockets of the political bosses and their followers, and giving city jobs to people who provided favors and faithful service. Nevertheless, the political machines gave their constituents and loyal followers valuable social services. Machine politicians, such as Boss Tweed of Tammany Hall in New York City, found jobs, provided food and clothing for the destitute, aided victims of fires and other calamities, and intervened in the criminal and civil courts (Golway, 2014; Warren, 2008).

Much of the urban political machines' power resulted from their control of city budgets. The machines' leaders used municipal jobs and city budgets as part of a "spoils" or patronage system that granted rewards to their supporters and allies. To represent diverse workers' as a single social class, union leaders had to coordinate and mobilize the efforts of many people and connected Irish Americans to a central and important institution of the dominant society. Using the resources controlled by local governments as a power base, the Irish (and other immigrant groups after them) began integrating into American society (Menes, 2001).

Labor Unions

The labor movement provided another connection among the Irish, other European immigrant groups, and American society. Although virtually all white ethnic groups had a hand in the creation and eventual success of the movement, many of the founders and early leaders were Irish. For example, Terence Powderly, an Irish Catholic, founded one of the first American labor unions. In the early 20th century, about one third of union leaders were Irish and more than 50 national unions had Irish presidents (Bodnar, 1985; Brody, 1980).

As the labor movement grew in strength and acquired legitimacy, its leaders gained status, power, and other resources, and the rank-and-file membership gained job security, increased wages, and better benefits. In short, the labor movement provided another channel through which resources, power, status, and jobs flowed to the white ethnic groups.

Because of how Union work typically required communication and cooperation across ethnic lines. The American workforce at the turn of the 20th century was multiethnic and multilingual. To represent diverse workers' as a single social class, union leaders had to coordinate and mobilize the efforts of many different cultural groups. Thus, labor union leaders became important intermediaries between society and European immigrant groups.

European immigrant women were heavily involved in labor movement and some filled leadership roles, including top positions, such as union president (although usually in women-dominated unions). One of the most important union activists was Mother Jones, an Irish immigrant who worked tirelessly to organize miners:

> *Until she was nearly one hundred years old, Mother Jones was where the danger was greatest—crossing militia lines, spending weeks in damp prisons, incurring the wrath of governors, presidents, and coal operators—she helped to organize the United Mine Workers with the only tools she felt she needed: "convictions and a voice."* (Forner, 1980, p. 281)

Women workers often faced opposition from men workers and from employers. The major unions weren't only racially discriminatory but also hostile to organizing women. For example, in the early 20th century, companies required women laundry workers in San Francisco to live in dormitories and work from 6 a.m. until midnight. When they applied to the international laundry workers union for a charter, men union members blocked them from joining. The women eventually went on strike and won the right to an eight-hour workday in 1912 (Amott & Matthaei, 1991). Women in other protest movements have had to deal with similar opposition from men, as you'll see in future chapters.

Women led some of the labor movement's most significant events. For example, one of its first victories was the Uprising of 20,000 (also known as the New York Shirtwaist Strike of 1909). Thousands of mostly Jewish and Italian girls and women (many in their teens) staged a strike opposing the garment industry's abusive working conditions (Kheel Center, 2017). Despite factory owners and machine bosses hiring people to attack the strikers and the local police unlawfully assaulting the participants,

the strike lasted four months. The strikers eventually won union recognition from many employers, a reversal of a wage decrease, and a reduction in the 56- to 59-hour workweek (Goren, 1980).

Despite their efforts, European immigrant women were among the most exploited segments of the labor force, often relegated to the lowest paying jobs in difficult or unsafe working conditions. (Today, we'd call them *sweatshops*.) For example, they were the primary victims of one of the greatest tragedies in U.S. labor history. In 1911, a fire swept through the Triangle Shirtwaist Company, a garment industry shop on the 10th floor of a building in New York City. The fire spread rapidly, fueled by paper and fabric scraps. Because of concerns that workers would take breaks or steal fabric, management locked and guarded the doors (von Drehle, 2004). Overcrowding and a lack of exits (including a collapsed fire escape) made escape nearly impossible. Many workers leaped to their deaths to avoid being killed by fire. One hundred forty-six people were killed, 120 of them were young immigrant women, the youngest only 14 years old. The disaster outraged the public, and more than a quarter of a million people attended the victims' funerals. The incident fueled a drive for reform and improvement of work conditions and safety regulations (Amott & Matthaei, 1991; see also Kheel Center, 2017).

Women striking for a 40-hour work week.
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

Religion

Religious institutions provided a third avenue of mobility for the Irish and other white ethnic groups. The Irish were the first large group of Catholic immigrants to come to the United States and therefore were in a favorable position to dominate the church's administrative structure. The Catholic priesthood became largely Irish and, as these priests were promoted through the Church hierarchy, they eventually became bishops and cardinals. The Catholic faith was practiced in different ways in different nations. As other Catholic immigrant groups began arriving, conflict within the Irish-dominated church increased. Italian and Polish Catholic immigrants demanded their own parishes in which they could speak their own languages and celebrate their own customs and festivals. Dissatisfaction was so intense that some Polish Catholics broke with Rome and formed a separate Polish National Catholic Church (Lopata, 1976).

The other Catholic immigrant groups eventually began supplying priests and other religious functionaries and to occupy Church leadership positions. Although the Irish continued to disproportionately influence the Church, it served as a power base for other white ethnic groups to gain acceptance and become integrated into mainstream American society (McCook, 2011).

Other Pathways

Besides party politics, the union movement, and religion, European immigrant groups forged other not-so-legitimate pathways of upward mobility. One alternative to legitimate success was offered by crime, a pathway that has been used by every ethnic group to some extent. Crime became particularly lucrative and attractive when Prohibition, the attempt to eliminate alcohol use in the United States, went into effect in the 1920s. The criminalization of liquor didn't lower the demand, and Prohibition created an economic opportunity for those willing to take the risks involved in manufacturing and supplying alcohol to the American public.

Italian Americans headed many of the criminal organizations that took advantage of Prohibition. Criminal leaders and organizations with roots in Sicily, a region with a long history of secret antiestablishment societies, were especially important (Alba, 1985). The connection among organized crime, Prohibition, and Italian Americans is well known, but it isn't widely recognized that ethnic succession operated in organized crime as it did in the legitimate opportunity structures. The Irish and Germans had been involved in organized crime for decades before the 1920s. The Italians competed with these established gangsters and with Jewish crime syndicates for control of bootlegging and other criminal enterprises. The patterns of ethnic succession continued after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, and members of groups newer to urban areas, including African Americans, Jamaicans, and Hispanic Americans, have recently challenged the Italian-dominated criminal families.

You can see ethnic succession in sports, too. Since the beginning of the 20th century, sports have offered a pathway to success and affluence that has attracted millions of young people. Success in many sports requires little in the way of formal credentials, education, or English fluency; historically, sports have been particularly appealing to the young men in minority groups who've had limited opportunities or resources (Eitle & Eitle, 2002).

For example, at the turn of the 20th century, the Irish dominated boxing, but boxers from the Italian American community and other new immigrant groups eventually replaced them. Each successive wave of boxers reflected the concentration of a particular ethnic group at the bottom of the class structure. The succession of minority groups continues today, with boxing now dominated by Black and Latino fighters (Rader, 1983). We can see a similar progression, or "layering," of ethnic and racial groups in other sports.

The institutions of American society, whether legitimate or illegal, reflect the relative positions of minority groups at a moment in time. Just a few generations ago, European immigrant groups dominated crime and sports because they were blocked from legitimate opportunities. Now, it's racial minority groups, still excluded from the mainstream job market and mired in the urban underclass, which supply disproportionate numbers of people for these alternative opportunity structures.

Continuing Industrialization and Structural Mobility

We've already mentioned that dominant–minority relations typically change with changes in subsistence technology. The history of European immigrant groups throughout the 20th century illustrates this relationship. Industrialization is a continuous process. As it proceeded, work in America evolved and changed and created opportunities for upward mobility for the white ethnic groups. One important form of upward mobility throughout the 20th century, called **structural mobility**, resulted more from changes in the structure of the economy and the labor market than from any individual effort or desire to get ahead.

Structural mobility is the result of the continuing mechanization and automation of the workplace. As machines replaced people in the workforce, the supply of manual, blue-collar jobs that had provided employment for so many first- and second-generation European immigrant laborers dwindled. At the same time, the supply of white-collar jobs increased, but access to the better jobs depended heavily on

educational credentials. For white ethnic groups, a high school education became much more available in the 1930s, and college and university programs expanded rapidly in the late 1940s, spurred in large part by the educational benefits made available to World War II veterans. Each generation of white ethnics, especially those born after 1925, was significantly more educated than the previous generation, and many were able to translate their increased human capital into upward mobility in the mainstream job market (Morawska, 1990).

The descendants of European immigrants became upwardly mobile not only because of their individual ambitions and efforts but also because of the changing location of jobs and the progressively greater opportunities for education. Of course, the pace and timing of this upward movement was highly variable from group to group and from place to place. Ethnic succession continued to operate, and the descendants of the most recent European immigrants (Italians and Poles, for example) tended to be the last to benefit from the general upgrading in education and the job market.

Still, structural mobility is key to the eventual successful integration of all ethnic groups. In Table 2.3, you'll see differing levels of educational attainment and income for white ethnic groups. During these same years, racial minority groups, particularly Black Americans, were excluded from the dominant group's educational system and from the opportunity to compete for better jobs. We'll discuss these patterns of exclusion more in Parts 2 and 3.

VARIATIONS IN ASSIMILATION

In the previous section, we discussed patterns common to European immigrants and their descendants. Now we address some of the sources of variation and diversity in assimilation, a complex process that's never identical for any two groups. Sociologists have paid particular attention to how similarity, religion, social class, and gender shaped the overall assimilation of the descendants of the mass European immigration. They've also investigated how immigrants' reasons for coming to the United States have affected different groups' experiences.

Degree of Similarity

Since the dominant group consisted largely of Protestants with ethnic origins in Northern and Western Europe and especially in England, it isn't surprising to learn that the degree of resistance, prejudice, and discrimination encountered by the different European immigrant groups varied, in part by how much they differed from these dominant groups. The most significant differences included religion, language, cultural values, and, for some groups, physical characteristics (often viewed as "racial"). Thus, Protestant immigrants from Northern and Western Europe experienced less resistance than the English-speaking Catholic Irish, who in turn were accepted more readily than the new immigrants, who were non–English speaking and overwhelmingly non-Protestant.

The dominant group's preferences correspond roughly to the arrival times of the immigrants. The most similar groups immigrated earliest, and the least similar tended to be the last to arrive. Because of this coincidence, resistance to any one group of immigrants tended to fade as new groups arrived. For example, anti-German prejudice and discrimination never became particularly vicious or widespread (except during the heat of the World Wars) because the Irish began arriving in large numbers at about the same time. Concerns about the German immigrants were swamped by the fear that the Catholic Irish could never be assimilated. Then, as the 19th century drew to a close, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe—even more different from the dominant group—began arriving and made concerns about the Irish seem trivial.

Additionally, the New Immigration was far larger than the Old Immigration (see Figure 2.2). Southern and Eastern Europeans arrived in record numbers in the early 20th century. The sheer volume of the immigration raised fears that American cities and institutions would be swamped by hordes of what were seen as racially inferior, unassimilable immigrants, a fear that resonates today in our debates about modern immigrants.

Thus, a preference hierarchy was formed in American culture that privileged Northern and Western Europeans over Southern and Eastern Europeans, and Protestants over Catholics and Jews.

These rankings reflect the ease with which the groups assimilated and have made their way into society. To further illustrate the hierarchy of ethnic preference and prejudice, see the social distance scores in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. The anti-ethnic prejudices illustrated in the table are much more muted today than at the peak of immigration.

Religion

Gordon and other scholars of American assimilation recognized that religion was a major factor that differentiated the experiences of European immigrant groups. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish immigrants lived in different neighborhoods, occupied different niches in the workforce, formed separate groups and networks of affiliation, and chose their marriage partners from different groups.

Sociologist Ruby Jo Kennedy's research (1944) documented the importance of religion for European immigrants and their descendants. Specifically, she studied intermarriage among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in New Haven, Connecticut from 1870 to 1940. She found that immigrants generally chose marriage partners from certain ethnic and religious groups. For example, Irish Catholics married other Irish Catholics, Italian Catholics married Italian Catholics, Irish Protestants married Irish Protestants, and so forth for all the ethnic and religious groups that she studied.

However, later generations showed a different pattern: The immigrants' children and grandchildren continued to select marriage partners from groups bounded by religion, but not much by ethnicity. For example, later generations of Irish Catholics continued to marry other Catholics (religion) but were less likely to marry other Irish (ethnicity). As assimilation proceeded, the ethnic group boundaries faded (or "melted"), but religious boundaries didn't. Kennedy (1944) described this phenomenon as a **triple melting pot**: a pattern of structural assimilation within each of the three denominations (Catholics, Jews, Protestants).

Will Herberg (1960), another important scholar of American assimilation, also explored the connection between religion and ethnicity. He noted that the pressures of acculturation didn't equally affect all aspects of ethnicity. European immigrants and their descendants were strongly encouraged to learn English. However, they weren't as pressured to change their beliefs, and religion was often the strongest connection between later generations of immigrants and their immigrant ancestors. The American tradition of religious tolerance allowed the European immigrants' descendants to preserve this connection to their ethnic heritage without others seeing them as un-American. Therefore, the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths eventually came to occupy roughly equal degrees of legitimacy in American society.

Thus, for the descendants of the European immigrants, religion became a way to express their ethnicity. For many members of this group, religion and ethnicity were fused, and ethnic traditions and identities came to have a religious expression.

Social Class

Social class is a central feature of social structure, and it isn't surprising that it affected the European immigrant groups in several ways. First, social class combined with religion to shape the social world of the descendants of the European immigrants. Gordon (1964) concluded that United States in the 1960s incorporated four melting pots (one for each of the major ethnic or religious groups and one for Black Americans), each internally subdivided by social class. In his view, the most significant structural unit within American society was the **ethclass**, defined by the intersection of the religious, ethnic, and social class boundaries (e.g., working-class Catholic, upper class Protestant). Thus, people weren't "simply American" but tended to identify with, associate with, and choose their spouses from within their ethclass.

Second, social class affected structural integration. The vast majority of the post-1880s European immigrants were working class. They "entered U.S. society at the bottom of the economic ladder, and . . . stayed close to that level for the next half century;" thus "ethnic history has been essentially working-class history" (Morawska, 1990, p. 215; see also Bodnar, 1985). For generations, many groups of Eastern and Southern European immigrants didn't acculturate to middle-class American culture but

to an urban working-class, blue-collar one. Even today, ethnicity for many groups remains interconnected with social class factors.

Gender

Historically, scholars didn't study women's lives. They either didn't consider it important, or they assumed that women's lives were the same as men's lives. At the time, societal norms encouraged women to focus on home and family and discouraged women from interacting with men they didn't know. Women were discouraged from having a public life, which resulted in them having much less access to education, fewer leadership roles in the community, and less outside employment, especially in prestigious or high-paying occupations. Immigrant women may have felt these prohibitions most strongly and they, like others, may have been wary of researchers. This made it harder to gain access to immigrant women for the few researchers who were interested in women's lives. Due to lack of education and interaction in the greater society, immigrant women had fewer opportunities to learn English. So, in cases where access was possible, language barriers could complicate matters. Thus, although a huge body of research about immigration exists, the bulk of it focuses on immigrant men. As with women of virtually all minority groups, researchers documented immigrant women's experiences far less often (Gabaccia, 1991; Weinberg et al., 1992). However, the research that has been done shows that immigrant women played multiple roles during immigration and the assimilation process. The roles of wife and mother were central, but they were involved in many other activities.

Generally, men immigrants preceded women, and sent for the women (and children) in their lives only after securing lodging, jobs, and some stability. However, women immigrants' experiences were quite varied, often depending on the economic situation and cultural traditions of their home societies. In some cases, women were prominent among the "first wave" of immigrants who began the process of acculturation and integration. For example, during the latter part of the 19th century, more than one million Irish people sought refuge elsewhere, in large part due to the Great Famine, sometimes called the *Great Hunger* or the *Irish Potato Famine*, which killed more than one million of them.

The famine led to changes in rules of land ownership, marriage, and inheritance, which made it hard for single women to marry and to find work (Flanagan, 2015; Jackson, 1984). Interestingly, Kennedy (1973, p. 66) notes that more Irish women (55,690) than men (55,215) emigrated between 1871 and 1891; a high percentage of Irish immigrants were young, single women. They came to America seeking opportunities for work. Typically, they worked as domestics, doing cooking, cleaning, and childcare (Maurer, 2017), a role that permitted them to live "respectably" in a family setting. In 1850, about 75% of all employed Irish immigrant women in New York City worked as servants. The second most common form of employment was in textile mills and factories (Blessing, 1980; see also Steinberg, 1981). This pattern continued, and as late as 1920, 81% of employed Irish-born immigrant women worked as domestics.

Due to the economic situation of immigrant families, other immigrant women typically worked outside of their homes, too, though the type and location of the work varied. For example, Italian women rarely worked outside the home because of strong patriarchal norms in Italian culture, including a strong prohibition against contact between women and men they didn't know (Alba, 1985). Thus, Italian women primarily worked from home: taking in laundry or boarders or doing piecework for the garment industry. Those employed outside the home tended to work in single-gender settings among other immigrant women. Thus, Italian women tended to be far less acculturated and integrated than Irish women.

Eastern European Jewish women experienced another pattern of assimilation. Most came with their husbands and children as refugees from religious persecution. Therefore, few were breadwinners. They "worked in small shops with other family members" while others worked in the garment industry (Steinberg, 1981, p. 161).

Generally, social norms dictated that immigrant women, like other working-class women, should quit working after they married, while their husbands were expected to support them and their children. However, many immigrant men couldn't earn enough to support their families, and their wives and children were required by necessity to contribute to the family budget. Immigrant wives sometimes

continued to work outside the home, or they found other ways to make money. They took in boarders, did laundry or sewing, tended gardens, and participated in many other activities that permitted them to contribute to the family income while staying home attending to family responsibilities.

A 1911 report on Southern and Eastern European households found that about half kept lodgers. The income from this activity amounted to about 25% of the husbands' wages. Children contributed to the family income by taking after-school and summer jobs (Morawska, 1990, pp. 211–212). Compared with immigrant men, immigrant women spent much more time at their homes and in their neighborhoods. Thus, they were less likely to learn to read or speak English or otherwise acculturate.

Woman worker at a textile mill, early 20th century.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

However, this made them significantly more influential in preserving the heritage of their groups.

When they sought employment outside the home, they found opportunities in the industrial sector and in clerical and sales work, occupations that quickly became stereotyped as "women's work." Employers saw working women as wanting only to supplement family finances, and they used that assumption to justify lower wages for women. In the late 1800s, "whether in factories, offices, or private homes . . . women's wages were about half of those of men" (Evans, 1980, p. 135). This assumption hurt all immigrant women but single and widowed women the most because they didn't have husbands who could bring in most of the necessary income.

Finally, in addition to their other responsibilities, women were the primary keepers of "old country" traditions. Husbands were often more involved in the society, giving them greater familiarity with Anglo culture and the English language. Women, even when employed, tended to spend more time at home and in the neighborhood. They tended to be more culturally conservative and more resistant to Anglo values and practices than immigrant men. Therefore, immigrant women were more likely to practice traditional foodways and dress, speak to their children in the old language, and observe the time-honored holidays and religious practices. Thus, they performed crucial cultural and socialization functions. This pattern remains among many immigrant groups today in the United States and in Western Europe.

Sojourners

Some versions of the traditional perspective and the taken-for-granted views of many Americans assume that assimilation is desirable and therefore desired by immigrants. However, European immigrant groups varied widely in their interest in Americanization; this attitude greatly shaped their experiences.

Some groups were very committed to Americanization. For example, Eastern European Jews came to America because of religious persecution. They came fearing for their lives. They planned to make America their home because they couldn't return and had nowhere else to go. (Israel wasn't founded until 1948.) They committed to learning English, becoming citizens, and familiarizing themselves with their new society as quickly as possible, although, as we have noted, it was their children who Americanized most readily.

Other immigrants had no intention of becoming American citizens and, therefore, had little interest in becoming Americanized. These sojourners, or "**birds of passage**," intended to return to the old country once they accumulated enough capital to be successful. Because immigration records aren't very detailed, it's hard to know the exact numbers of immigrants who returned to the old country (see Wyman, 1993), but we know, for example, that a significant percentage of Italian immigrants were sojourners. Although 3.8 million Italians landed in the United States between 1899 and 1924, around 2.1 million departed during that same time (Nelli, 1980, p. 547).

8. To understand the process of assimilation, why do we need to consider generation(s)?

9. What were the major institutional pathways through which European immigrants adapted to American society? Can you cite evidence from your home community of similar patterns for immigrant groups today?

10. What are some important variations how European immigrants adjusted to the United States?

11. What was the triple melting pot, and how did it function?

12. What important gender differences existed in European immigrant groups?

THE DESCENDANTS OF THE IMMIGRANTS TODAY

Geographical Distribution

Figure 2.3 shows the geographical distribution of 20 racial and ethnic groups across the United States in 2010 (the most recent year available). The map displays the single largest group in each county and offers great detail. However, we'll focus on some of the groups mentioned in this chapter, including Norwegian, German, Irish, and Italian Americans. (The Jewish population is too small to appear on this map.)

FIGURE 2.3 ■ Ancestry with Largest Population in Each County, 2000

As noted in Figure 2.3, Germans are the single largest ancestry group in America (see the predominance of gray from Pennsylvania to the West Coast). Also note how the map reflects this group's original settlement areas, especially in the Midwest. Norwegian Americans are numerically dominant in some sections of the upper Midwest (e.g., northwestern Minnesota, northern North Dakota). Irish Americans and Italian Americans are concentrated in their original areas of settlement—the Irish in Massachusetts and the Italians concentrated more around New York City.

Thus, almost a century after the end of mass immigration from Europe, many of the immigrants' descendants haven't gone far from where their ancestors settled. The map also shows that the same point could be made for other groups, including Blacks (concentrated in the "black belt" across the states of the old Confederacy), and Mexican Americans (concentrated along the southern border from Texas to California).

Given all that has changed in American society over the past century—industrialization, population growth, urbanization, and massive mobility—the stable location of white ethnics (and other

ethnic and racial groups) seems remarkable. Why aren't people distributed more randomly across the nation's landscape?

That stability is easier to explain for some groups than others. African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans were limited in their geographic and social mobility by institutionalized discrimination, racism, and limited resources. We'll examine the power of these constraints in later chapters.

For white ethnics, however, the power of exclusion and rejection waned as the generations passed and immigrants' descendants assimilated and integrated. Their current locations may suggest that the United States is a nation of groups and of individuals. Our group memberships, especially family and kin, exert a powerful influence on our decisions about where to live and work and, despite the transience and mobility of modern American life, can keep people connected to their relatives, the old neighborhood, their ethnic roots, and the sites of their ancestors' struggles.

Integration and Equality

One crucial point about white ethnic groups (the descendants of the European immigrants) is that they are almost completely assimilated today. Even the groups that were the most despised in earlier years (e.g., the Irish) are now acculturated, integrated, and thoroughly intermarried. Consider Table 2.3, which shows the degree to which nine of the more than 60 white ethnic groups had become integrated as far back as 1990. The groups include the two largest white ethnic groups (German and Irish Americans) and seven others that represent a range of geographic origins and times of immigration.

TABLE 2.3 ■ Median Household Income, Percentage of Families Living in Poverty, and Educational Attainment for Selected White Ethnic Groups, 1990				
	Median Household Income	**Percentage of Families Living in Poverty**	**Percentage Who Completed High School or More**	**Percentage Who Received an Undergraduate Degree or More**
All Americans	$30,056	10%	75.2%	20.3%
Russian	$45,778	3.6%	90.8%	49%
Italian	$36,060	4.9%	77.3%	21%
Polish	$34,763	4.3%	78.5%	23.1%
Ukrainian	$34,474	4%	77.5%	28.3%
Swedish	$33,881	4.5%	87.3%	27.4%
German	$32,730	5.5%	82.7%	22%
Slovak	$32,352	3.8%	78.2%	21.6%
Norwegian	$32,207	5.1%	85.9%	26%
Irish	$31,845	6.5%	79.6%	21.2%

The table shows that by 1990, the nine groups were at or above national norms ("all Americans") for all measures of equality. Variation exists among the groups, but all exceeded the national averages for high school and college education, and they had dramatically lower poverty rates, usually less than half the national average. All nine groups exceed the national median for household income—some by a considerable margin—Russians, for example, many of whom are also Jewish.

The evidence for assimilation and equality in other areas is persuasive. For example, the distinct ethnic neighborhoods that these groups created in American cities (e.g., Little Italy, Greektown, Little Warsaw) have faded away or been taken over by other groups. Additionally, the rate of intermarriage between members of different white ethnic groups is quite high. For example, data from the 1990

census showed that about 56% of all married whites have spouses with ethnic backgrounds different from their own (Alba, 1995, pp. 13–14).

The Evolution of White Ethnicity

Integration into the American mainstream was neither linear nor continuous for the descendants of European immigrants. Over the generations, white ethnic identity sporadically reasserted itself in many ways; two are especially notable. First, later generations tended to be more interested in their ancestry and ethnicity than earlier generations. Hansen (1952) captured this phenomenon in his **principle of third-generation interest**: "What the second generation tries to forget, the third generation tries to remember" (p. 495). Hansen observed that the immigrants' children tended to minimize or deemphasize ("forget") their ethnicity to avoid society's prejudice and intolerance and compete on more favorable terms for jobs and other opportunities. As they became adults and started families of their own, the second generation (the immigrants' children) tended to raise their children in nonethnic settings, with English as their first and only language.

By the time the third generation (the immigrants' grandchildren) reached adulthood, American society had become more tolerant of white ethnicity and diversity (especially of New Immigrant groups that arrived last). Unlike earlier generations, the third generation had little to risk and, therefore, tried to reconnect with its grandparents and roots. These descendants wanted to understand the "old ways" and their ethnic heritage and they wanted to incorporate it into their personal identities, giving them a sense of who they were and where they belong.

Ironically, the immigrants' grandchildren couldn't recover much of the richness and detail of their heritage because their parents had tried to forget it. Nonetheless, the desire of the third generation to reconnect with its ancestry and recover its ethnicity shows that assimilation isn't a simple, one-dimensional, or linear process.

In addition to this generational pattern, the strength of white ethnic identity also responded to the changing context of American society, including other groups. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a notable increase in the visibility of and interest in white ethnic heritage, an upsurge sometimes called the **ethnic revival**. The revival manifested itself in many ways. Some people became more interested in their families' genealogical roots, and others increased their participation in ethnic festivals, traditions, and organizations. The "white ethnic vote" became a factor in local, state, and national politics, and appearances at the churches, meeting halls, and neighborhoods associated with white ethnic groups became almost mandatory for candidates for office. People organized demonstrations and festivals celebrating white ethnic heritages, often sporting buttons and bumper stickers proclaiming their ancestry. Politicians, editorialists, and intellectuals endorsed, legitimized, and reinforced the ethnic revival (e.g., see Novak, 1973), which were partly fueled by the desire to reconnect with ancestral roots—although by the 1960s most groups were well beyond their third generations. More likely, ethnic revival was a reaction to the increase in pluralistic sentiment at the time, including the pluralistic, even separatist assertions of other groups. In the 1960s and 1970s, virtually every minority group generated a protest movement (e.g., Black Power, Red Power, Chicanismo) and proclaimed a recommitment to its own heritage and to the authenticity of its own culture and experiences. The visibility of these calls for cultural pluralism helped make it more acceptable for European Americans to express their own ethnic heritage.

The resurgence of white ethnicity also had some political and economic dimensions that relate to issues of inequality and competition for resources. In the 1960s, a white-ethnic urban working class made up mostly of Irish and Southern and Eastern European groups remained in the neighborhoods of the industrial Northeast and Midwest and they continued to breathe life into the old networks and traditions (see Glazer & Moynihan, 1970; Greeley, 1974). While many Americans were beginning to view cultural pluralism as legitimate, this ethnic working class began feeling threatened by minority groups of color (Blacks, Hispanics) who increasingly lived in adjoining neighborhoods, therefore in direct competition with white ethnics for housing, jobs, and other resources.

Many white ethnic working-class people saw racial minority groups as inferior and perceived the advances made by these groups as unfair, unjust, and threatening. Additionally, they reacted to what

they saw as special treatment based on race, such as affirmative action. They had problems of their own (e.g., declining number of good, unionized jobs; inadequate schooling) and believed that their problems were being given lower priority and less legitimacy because they were white. The revived sense of ethnicity in the urban working-class neighborhoods was, in large part, a way of resisting racial reform and expressing resentment for the racial minority groups. Thus, competition for resources and opportunities also fueled the revival of white ethnicity that began in the 1960s. As you'll see throughout this book, such competition frequently leads to increased prejudice toward people who are perceived as different—while it simultaneously creates a sense of cohesion among people who see themselves as similar.

The Twilight of White Ethnicity?[2]

As the conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s faded, white ethnic groups left their old neighborhoods and rose in the class structure. This contributed to the slow demise of white ethnic identity. Today, white ethnic identity has become increasingly nebulous and largely voluntary. Sociologists call this **symbolic ethnicity** or an aspect of self-identity that symbolizes one's roots in the old country but is otherwise insignificant. That is, these descendants of the European immigrants might feel vaguely connected to their ancestors, but this doesn't affect their lifestyles, circles of friends and neighbors, job prospects, eating habits, or other everyday routines (Gans, 1979; Lieberson & Waters, 1988). They may express this part of their identities only on occasion; for example, by joining ethnic or religious celebrations such as St. Patrick's Day (Irish Americans) or Columbus Day (Italian Americans). Because many people have ancestors from more than one ethnic group, they may change their sense of group affiliation over time, sometimes emphasizing one group's traditions and sometimes another's (Waters, 1990). In stark contrast to their ancestors, members of racial minority groups, and recent immigrants, the descendants of the European immigrants have choices: They can emphasize their ethnicity, celebrate it occasionally, or ignore it completely. In short, symbolic ethnicity is superficial, voluntary, and changeable.

White ethnic identity may be on the verge of disappearing. For example, based on a series of in-depth interviews with white Americans from various regions of the nation, Gallagher (2001) found a sense of ethnicity so weak that it didn't even rise to the level of "symbolic." His respondents were the products of ancestral lines so thoroughly intermixed and intermarried that any trace of a unique heritage from a particular group was completely lost. They had virtually no knowledge of their immigrant ancestors' experiences or the cultures of the ethnic communities they'd inhabited. For many, their ethnic ancestries were no more meaningful to them than their states of birth. Their lack of interest in and information about their ethnic heritage was so complete that it led Gallagher (2001) to propose an addendum to Hansen's principle: "What the grandson wished to remember, the great-granddaughter has never been told."

At the same time, as more specific white ethnic identities are disappearing, they're also evolving into new shapes and forms. In the view of many analysts, a new identity is developing that merges the various ethnic identities (e.g., German American, Polish American) into a single, generalized European American identity based on race and a common history of immigration and assimilation. This new identity reinforces the racial lines of separation that run through contemporary society, but it does more than simply mark group boundaries. Embedded in this emerging identity is an understanding, often deeply flawed, of how white immigrant groups succeeded and assimilated in the past and a view, often deeply ideological, of how the racial minority groups and many recent immigrants should behave today. These understandings are encapsulated in "immigrant tales"—legends that stress heroic individual effort and grim determination as key ingredients leading to success in the old days. These tales feature impoverished, victimized immigrant ancestors who survived and made a place for themselves and their children by working hard, saving their money, and otherwise exemplifying the virtues of the Protestant ethic and American individualism. They stress the idea that past generations became successful despite the brutal hostility of the dominant group and with no government intervention, and they equate the historical difficulties faced by European immigrants with those suffered by racial minority groups (e.g., slavery, segregation, and attempted genocide). They strongly imply—and sometimes blatantly assert—that the latter groups could succeed in America by simply following the example set by the former (Alba, 1990; Gallagher, 2001).

These accounts mix versions of human capital theory and traditional views of assimilation with prejudice and racism. Without denying or trivializing the resolve and fortitude of European immigrants, equating their experiences and levels of disadvantage with those of African Americans, Native Americans, and Mexican Americans is widely off the mark, as you'll see in future chapters. These views support an attitude of disdain and lack of sympathy for the multiple dilemmas faced today by the racial minority groups and many contemporary immigrants. They permit a subtler expression of prejudice and racism and allow whites to use these highly distorted views of their immigrant ancestors as a rhetorical device to express a host of race-based grievances without appearing racist (Gallagher, 2001).

Alba (1990) concludes as follows:

> *The thrust of the [emerging] European American identity is to defend the individualistic view of the American system, because it portrays the system as open to those who are willing to work hard and pull themselves out of poverty and discrimination. Recent research suggests that it is precisely this individualism that prevents many whites from sympathizing with the need for African Americans and other minorities to receive affirmative action in order to overcome institutional barriers to their advancement.* (p. 317)

What can we conclude? The generations-long journey from immigrant to white ethnics to European American seems to be ending. The separate ethnic identities are merging into a larger sense of whiteness that unites immigrants' descendants with the dominant group and provides a rhetorical device for expressing disdain for other groups, especially Black Americans and undocumented immigrants.

As attachment to specific white ethnic groups fades, the generalized white identity seems to be growing in importance in American politics and other areas of everyday life. While relatively few white Americans espouse the most virulent forms of racism or support the most extreme white racist groups like the Ku Klux Klan or the Proud Boys (see Chapter 3), many express strong attachments to their white racial identity (Jardina, 2019) and feel threatened by the increasing percentage of non-whites in the population (see Figure 1.1). These feelings of anxiety and racial resentment can be exploited and harnessed by political leaders, as displayed in the presidential campaigns of 2016 and 2020.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

13. Why do many people see European immigrants and their descendants as successful? What facilitated the success of the group?

14. What is Hansen's principle? Why is it significant? What is Gallagher's addendum to this principle? Why is it important?

15. Does white ethnic identity have a future? Why or why not?

CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRANTS: DOES THE TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE APPLY?

Does the traditional perspective—based on the experiences of European immigrants and their descendants—apply to more recent immigrants in the United States? Will contemporary immigrants duplicate the experiences of earlier groups? Will they acculturate before they integrate? Will religion, social class, and race be important forces in their lives? Will they take three generations to assimilate? More than three? Fewer? What will their patterns of intermarriage look like? Will they achieve socioeconomic parity with the dominant group? When? How?

Sociologists (policymakers and the public) differ in their answers to these questions. Some social scientists believe that the traditional perspective on assimilation doesn't apply and that the experiences of contemporary immigrant groups will differ greatly from those of European immigrants. They believe that assimilation today is fragmented (known as **segmented assimilation)** and will have several different outcomes: Some contemporary immigrant groups will integrate into the middle-class

mainstream, but others will be permanently mired in the impoverished, alienated, and marginalized segments of racial and ethnic minority groups. Still others may form close-knit enclaves based on their traditional cultures and become successful in America by resisting the forces of acculturation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

In stark contrast, other theorists believe that the traditional perspective on assimilation remains relevant and that contemporary immigrant groups will follow the established pathways of mobility and assimilation. Of course, the process varies by group and location, but even the groups that are the most impoverished and marginalized today will, eventually, move into mainstream society.

Is the United States growing more tolerant of diversity, more open and equal? If so, this would seem to favor the traditionalist perspective. If not, this trend would clearly favor the segmented-assimilation hypothesis. Although we won't resolve this debate, we'll consider the traditional and segmented views on assimilation as a useful framework to understand the experiences of these groups (see Part 3).

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

16. What is segmented assimilation, and why is this an important concept? How would social class and gender relate to debates about whether contemporary assimilation is segmented?

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXAMINING DOMINANT–MINORITY RELATIONS

Chapters 1 and 2 introduced many of the concepts and themes that form the foundation of this book. Although the connections between the concepts are complex, we can summarize the key points so far.

First, we discussed the five components of minority group status in Chapter 1. Being in a minority group has much more to do with lack of power and the distribution of resources than with the size of the group. Additionally, we addressed themes of inequality and differentials in status in our discussion of prejudice, racism, and discrimination. To understand minority relations, we must examine some basic realities of human society: inequalities in wealth, prestige, and the distribution of power. To discuss changes in minority group status, we must be prepared to discuss changes in how society does business, makes decisions, and distributes education, income, police protection, jobs, health care, and other opportunities.

Second, we've raised questions about how the United States could develop. We've discussed assimilation and pluralism, including their variations. For more than a century, social scientists have extensively studied both paths. Additionally, political leaders, decision-makers, and citizens have discussed them. Yet, in many ways, Americans seem more divided than ever about which path the country should take. We'll continue to analyze and evaluate both pathways throughout the book.

U.S. society currently faces a variety of crises, all of which are linked to patterns of assimilation, pluralism, and the distribution of power, equity, and injustice. Rising income inequality, access to health care during the COVID-19 pandemic, and police violence are just some of the "hot button" issues filling headlines, news broadcasts, and social media. How shall we approach these and similar issues? What policies are most likely to lead to a more just and fair society?

COMPARATIVE FOCUS

IMMIGRATION AND IRELAND

Just as the United States has been a major receiver of immigrants for the past 200 years, Ireland has been a major supplier. Mass migration from Ireland began with the potato famines of the 1840s and continued through the end of the 20th century, motivated by continuing hard times, political unrest, and unemployment. This mass out-migration—combined with the death toll of the famines—cut the 1840 Irish population of over eight million in half in a few decades. The population today is still only about 4.9 million.

History rarely runs in straight lines. In the 1990s and into the 21st century, after nearly 200 years of supplying immigrants, Ireland (along with other nations of Northern and Western Europe) became a receiver. As Figure 2.4 shows, the number of newcomers entering Ireland soared between 1987 and 2007, and the number of people leaving decreased. Around 2007, the trend reversed: The number of newcomers plummeted, and the historic pattern of out-migration reappeared. Then, in the most recent years, the pattern changed again as migration to Ireland increased and out-migration leveled off and began decreasing.

FIGURE 2.4   ■   Migration Into and Out of Ireland, 1987–2020

Source: Central Statistics Office (Ireland) (2020).

What explains these patterns? Fortunately, answers aren't hard to find. The influx of immigrants starting in the late 1980s was largely a response to rapid economic growth. The Irish economy—the so-called Celtic Tiger—had entered a boom phase, spurred by investments from multinational corporations and the benefits of joining the European Economic Union. Irish nationals who had left to seek work abroad returned home in large numbers, and people from Europe and other parts of the world also began arriving. Ireland also began receiving refugees and people seeking asylum from Africa, the Middle East, and other troubled areas.

The changes from 2007 to about 2012 have an equally obvious cause. The global economy faltered badly in 2007, and the Irish economy followed suit. Banks failed, companies went bankrupt, the housing market collapsed, and jobs disappeared. The Irish returned to their historic role as a supplier of immigrants to other economies around the world. In recent years, the Irish economy recovered from the global Great Recession and migration patterns shifted accordingly. We should also note that recent immigration into Ireland is much more global and shares many characteristics with recent immigrants to the United States (O'Connell, 2016).

These migration patterns have created significant changes in Ireland. For example, the number of Irish of African and Asian descent has increased by a factor of 8 since 1996. (They are, respectively, 1% and 2% of the total population.) Over the centuries, many diverse groups (e.g., Vikings, Spanish, and Anglo-Normans) have become part of Ireland but for the first time, the Irish are considering issues of racial diversity.

Questions to Consider

1. What similarities can you see between immigration to Ireland and immigration to the United States?
2. Do you suppose that immigrants to Ireland will assimilate in the same way as immigrants to the United States? If you could travel to Ireland, what would be helpful to know about the assimilation process?

SUMMARY

We organize this summary to parallel the chapter's Learning Objectives.

2.1 Explain types of assimilation, including Anglo-conformity, the "melting pot," and the "traditional" model of assimilation. How does human capital theory relate to each of these types?

Assimilation is one broad pathway of development for intergroup relations. In the United States, assimilation hasn't followed the melting pot model (where people from different groups contribute fairly equally to a new culture). Instead, Anglo-conformity (or Americanization) has been the dominant model. Gordon theorized that assimilation occurs in stages: acculturation, integration at the secondary and primary levels, and intermarriage. He saw integration as the most crucial. Human capital theory is a perspective on social mobility that stresses individual effort and is especially compatible with the traditional model of assimilation.

2.2 Explain types of pluralism, including cultural pluralism and structural pluralism.

Pluralism is a second broad pathway of development for group relations. Under pluralism, group differences remain over time. In cultural (or "full") pluralism, groups differ both culturally and structurally. Under structural pluralism, groups share essentially the same culture but occupy different locations in the social structure.

2.3 Discuss and explain other group relationships such as separatism.

Group relations other than assimilation and pluralism include separatism, revolution, forced migration and expulsion, genocide, and continued subjugation.

2.4 Describe the timing, causes, and volume of European migration to the United States, and explain how those immigrants became "white ethnics."

The period of mass European immigration stretched from the 1820s to the 1920s and included both "Old" (from Northern and Western Europe) and "New" (from Southern and Eastern Europe) phases. More than 30 million people made the journey from Europe to the United States during this time. People moved for many reasons, including the pursuit of religious and political freedom, but the underlying motive force was industrialization and urbanization. European immigrants were minority groups at first but, over a series of generations, assimilated, became upwardly mobile and integrated, and Americanized. Their experiences varied by religion, social class, gender, race, and the extent of sojourning. Generally, most groups followed the "traditional" model of assimilation (which was based on these groups).

2.5 Understand the European patterns of assimilation and major variations in those patterns by social class, gender, and religion.

Assimilation for European immigrant groups generally followed a three-generation pattern, with the grandchildren of the original immigrants completing the process. Ethnic succession occurred when newly arrived groups of immigrants pushed older groups up the occupational structure in the occupational structure. The three major pathways of integration were politics, labor unions, and religion, but others included organized crime and sports. Structural mobility occurred as the American industrial economy matured and changed. Continuing mechanization and automation changed the sort of work, creating more opportunities in the middle-class, white-collar areas. The descendants of the immigrants were generally able to take advantage of expanding opportunities for education and move higher in the class structure than their parents and grandparents did. The experience of assimilation varied by the physical appearance of the group, its religion, social class, gender, and extent of sojourning.

2.6 Describe the status of the descendants of European immigrants today, including the "twilight of white ethnicity."

These groups are, on the average, at or above national norms for affluence and success. White ethnicity seems to be fading although it remains important for some. It also may be being absorbed into a broader sense of "whiteness" in racially divided America.

2.7 Analyze contemporary immigration using sociological concepts in this chapter. Explain how the traditional model of assimilation does or does not apply to contemporary immigrants.

Research is ongoing but, at least for some immigrant groups, assimilation today may be segmented and may have outcomes other than equality and acceptance. (We'll consider these possibilities in Part 3.)

KEY TERMS

Acculturation

Americanization

Anti-Semitism

Assimilation

birds of passage

Capital-intensive technology

Cultural pluralism

Culture

Enclave minority group

Ethclass

Ethnic succession

Human capital theory

Industrial Revolution

Integration

Intermarriage

Labor-intensive production

Melting pot

Middleman minority group

Multiculturalism

New Immigration

Old Immigration

Pluralism

Primary sector

Protestant ethic

Race relations cycle

Revolution

Secondary sector

Segmented assimilation

Separatism

Social Structure

Structural mobility

Structural pluralism

Triple melting pot

APPLYING CONCEPTS

To practice using Gordon's model of assimilation (see Table 2.1), we've written some questions about immigrant assimilation experiences to consider. Sociologists document social patterns. Yet each of you has a unique family history of one form or another. Therefore, we've provided you with some options based on what's most appropriate for you:

1. If you're a third- or fourth-generation immigrant whose family came from Europe, you may be able to interview your grandparents or great-grandparents about your family's assimilation experiences, which would make this exercise particularly meaningful, interesting, and fun.

2. If your family immigrated from somewhere else and you have older family members that you can interview (e.g., grandparents, great-grandparents), ask them about their immigration experience.

3. Interview older people that you know, such as teachers or neighbors. Imagine what answers a third- or fourth-generation immigrant might say based on what you've learned.

Next, identify which part of Gordon's model each question tests. If you think of other questions that would fit, consider them, too. Place the letter of each question in the appropriate row of the box.

A. What language did you speak at home when you were growing up?

B. What was your total household income last year?

C. (If married/partnered) Does your spouse/partner share your religious faith?

D. (If married/partnered) Does your spouse/partner share your ethnic background?

E. Did your parents have the same ethnic background? How about your grandparents?

F. Did you vote in the most recent presidential election?

G. What percentage of your friends share your ethnic background?

H. What percentage of your friends share your religious faith?

I. What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

J. Have family names changed or become Americanized? If so, what was the original name and what did it become? If you feel comfortable sharing, explain how and why that change occurred?

Stage	Items A–J
Acculturation	
Integration (secondary level)	
Integration (primary level)	
Marital assimilation	

See the answers after the Review Questions.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Summarize Gordon's model of assimilation. Identify and explain each stage and how the stages are related. Use Gordo's model to explain Table 2.2.

2. Explain this statement: "Human capital theory is not so much wrong as it is incomplete." What are the strengths and weaknesses of human capital theory? Consider underlying assumptions in your answer.

3. Explain how and why people's experience of assimilation can vary.

4. Define pluralism and explain how it differs from assimilation. Why has interest in pluralism increased? Explain the difference between structural and cultural pluralism and give examples of each. Describe enclave minority groups in terms of pluralism and in terms of Gordon's model of assimilation. How have contemporary theorists added to the concept of pluralism?

5. Define and explain segmented assimilation. Then, explain how it differs from Gordon's model. What evidence suggests that assimilation for recent immigrants isn't segmented? What is the significance of this debate for the future of American society? For other minority groups (e.g., Black Americans)? For immigrants?

6. Do American theories and understandings of assimilation apply to Ireland? Do you think that immigrants to Ireland would assimilate similarly to immigrants to the United States? To answer, what questions would you ask about the assimilation process there?

ANSWERS TO APPLYING CONCEPTS

Stage	Items
Acculturation	A, J
Integration (secondary level)	B, F, I
Integration (primary level)	G, H
Marital assimilation	C, D, E

ENDNOTES

1 This name is a reference to Peter Pan and the "lost boys" who took care of one another in Never Never Land. The name is problematic because it linguistically erases girls. Interviews with the refugees suggest mixed appeal. A common negative response was like this one, "I don't like the name because we are not lost. Being called lost means that you don't know where you come from. If I were to change the name I would make it the 'Young Generation of Sudan.'" (Muhindi & Nyakato, 2002, p. 12).

2 This phrase comes from Alba (1990).

REFERENCES

Abrahamson, H. (1980). Assimilation and pluralism. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 150–160). Harvard University Press.

Alba, R. (1985). *Italian Americans: Into the twilight of ethnicity*. Prentice Hall.

Alba, R. (1990). *Ethnic identity: The transformation of white America*. Yale University Press.

Alba, R. (1995). Assimilation's quiet tide. *The Public Interest*, *119*, 9–19.

Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration. *International Migration Review*, *31*, 826–875.

Amott, T., & Matthaei, J. (1991). *Race, gender, and work: A Multicultural history of women in the United States*. South End.

Anonymous. (1924, October). The Jew and the club. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1924/10/the-jew-and-the-club/306258/

Anti-Defamation League. (2017). *The ADL global 100: An index of anti-Semitism*. http://global100.adl.org/

Anti-Defamation League. (2019, November 21). *ADL global survey of 18 countries finds hardcore anti-semitic attitudes remain pervasive*. https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-global-survey-of-18-countries-finds-hardcore-anti-semitic-attitudes-remain

Aptekar, S. (2015). *The Road to citizenship: What naturalization means for immigrants and the United States*. Rutgers University Press.

Benowitz, J. M. (2017). *Encyclopedia of American women and religion* (2nd ed.). ABC-CLIO.

Bernheimer, C. S. (1908, November 12). Prejudice against the Jews in the United States. *The Independent*, p. 65.

Berry, J. W. (1980). Acculturation as varieties of adaptation. In A. M. Padilla (Ed.), *Acculturation: Theory, models, and some new findings* (pp. 9–25). Westview.

Blau, P. M., & Duncan, O. D. (1967). *The American occupational structure*. Wiley.

Blessing, P. (1980). Irish. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (pp. 524–545). Harvard University Press.

Bodnar, J. (1985). *The transplanted*. Indiana University Press.

Bonacich, E., & Modell, J. (1980). *The Economic basis of ethnic solidarity: Small business in the Japanese American community*. University of California Press.

Borstelmann, T. (2009). *The Cold War and the color line*. Harvard University Press.

Brody, D. (1980). Labor. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 609–618). Harvard University Press.

Carpenter, R. (1998). *Father Charles E. Coughlin: Surrogate spokesman for the disaffected*. Greenwood.

Central Statistics Office (Ireland). (2020). *Population and migration estimates*. https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2020

Chan, S. (1990). European and Asian immigrants into the United States in comparative perspective, 1820s to 1920s. In V. Yans-McLaughlin (Ed.), *Immigration reconsidered: History, sociology, and politics* (pp. 37–75). Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J. (1982). *The Friars and the Jews: The evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism*. Cornell University Press.

Cohen, S. M. (1985). *The 1984 national survey of American Jews: Political and social outlooks*. American Jewish Committee.

Conzen, K. N. (1980). Germans. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 405–425). Harvard University Press.

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal dimensions of social perception: the stereotype content model and the BIAS map. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental psychology* (Vol. 40, pp. 61–149). Elsevier Academic Press.

Department of Homeland Security. (2020). *Table 2 Persons obtaining lawful permanent resident status by region and selected Country of last residence*. https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019

Dhingra, P. (2012). *Life behind the lobby: Indian American motel owners and the American dream. United States*. Stanford University Press.

Dinnerstein, L. (1977). The East European Jewish immigration. In L. Dinnerstein & F. C. Jaher (Eds.), *Uncertain Americans* (pp. 216–231). Oxford University Press.

Dolan, J. P. (2010). *The Irish Americans: A history*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Dollinger, M. A. (2005). African American–Jewish relations. In R. S. Levy, D. P. Bell, & W. C. Donahue (Eds.), *Antisemitism: A historical encyclopedia of prejudice and persecution* (Vol. 1, pp. 4–5). ABC-CLIO.

Eitle, T. M., & Eitle, D. (2002). Race, cultural capital, and the educational effects of participation in sports. *Sociology of Education*, *75*(2), 123–146. https://doi.org/10.2307/3090288

Erie, S. P., & Kogan, V. (2016). Machine bosses, reformers, and the politics of ethnic and minority incorporation. In R. H. Bayor (Ed.), *Handbook of American immigration and ethnicity* (pp. 302–318). Oxford University Press.

Evans, S. M. (1980). *Personal politics: The Roots of women's liberation in the civil rights movement and the new left*. Vintage Books.

Ezard, J. (2001, February 16). Germans knew of Holocaust horror about death camps: Details of deaths of Jews and other groups in concentration camps were well publicized. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/17/johnezard

Flanagan, M. S. (2015). *Irish women's immigration to the United States after the potato famine, 1860–1900. Dominican University of California*. https://scholar.dominican.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=senior-theses

Forner, P. S. (1980). *Women and the American labor movement: From World War I to the present*. Free Press.

Franco, M. (2008). *Parallel empires: The Vatican and the United States—Two centuries of alliance and conflict*. Double Day.

Friedman, M. (n.d.). *Inflation calculator*. https://westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi

Gabaccia, D. (1991). Immigrant women: Nowhere at home? *Journal of American Ethnic History*, *10*(4), 61–87.

Gallagher, C. (2001, April 4–7). *Playing the ethnic card: How Ethnic narratives maintain racial privilege* [Paper presentation]. The Annual Meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, GA.

Gans, H. (1979). Symbolic ethnicity: The Future of ethnic groups and cultures in America. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *2*, 1–20.

Gellately, R. (2002). *Backing Hitler: Consent and coercion in Nazi Germany*. OUP.

Geschwender, J. A. (1978). *Racial stratification in America*. William C. Brown.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1970). *Beyond the melting pot* (2nd ed.). MIT Press.

Gleason, P. (1980). American identity and Americanization. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 31–57). Harvard University Press.

Golway, T. (2014). *Machine made: Tammany Hall and the creation of modern American politics*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Gordon, M. M. (1964). *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins*. Oxford University Press.

Goren, A. (1980). Jews. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 571–598). Harvard University Press.

Greeley, A. M. (1974). *Ethnicity in the United States: A preliminary reconnaissance*. Wiley.

Handlin, O. (2002). *The uprooted: The epic story of the great migrations that made the American people*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Hansen, M. L. (1952). The third generation in America. *Commentary*, *14*, 493–500.

Harris, S., & Shammas, B. (2021). *Who is protecting US?*. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/antisemitic-attacks/2021/05/23/8907864e-bbdd-11eb-83e3-0ca705a96ba4_story.html

Herberg, W. (1960). *Protestant—Catholic—Jew: An essay in American religious sociology*. Anchor.

Higham, J. (1963). *Strangers in the land: Patterns of American nativism, 1860–1925*. Atheneum.

Hirschman, C. (1983). America's melting pot reconsidered. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *9*, 397–423.

Horowitz, J. M., Brown, A., & Cox, K. (2019). Race in America, 2019. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/04/09/the-role-of-race-and-ethnicity-in-americans-personal-lives/

Hostetler, J. (1980). *Amish society*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Inglis, T. (2007). Catholic identity in contemporary Ireland: Belief and belonging to tradition. *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, *22*(2), 205–220.

Jack, A. E. (2010). Education is my mother and father: The invisible women of Sudan. *Refuge*, *27*(2), 19–29.

Jackson, P. (1984). Women in 19th century Irish emigration. *International Migration Review*, *18*(4), 1004–1020.

Jacobson, M. F. (1999). *Whiteness of a different color*. Harvard University Press.

Jardina, A. (2019). *White identity politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Jones, J. M. (2013, August 9). Most in U.S. Say it's essential that immigrants learn English. *Gallup*. https://www.gallup.com/poll/163895/say-essential-immigrants-learn-english.aspx?version=print

Kallen, H. M. (1915a). Democracy versus the melting pot I. *Nation*, *100*(2590), 190–194.

Kallen, H. M. (1915b). Democracy versus the melting pot II. *Nation*, *100*(2591), 217–222.

Kennedy, R. (2001). Racial trends in the administration of criminal justice. In N. Smelser, W. Wilson, & F. Mitchell (Eds.), *America becoming: Racial trends and their consequences* (Vol. 2, pp. 1–20). National Academy Press.

Kennedy, R. E. (1973). *The Irish: Emigration, marriage, and fertility*. University of California Press.

Kennedy, R. J. (1944). Single or triple melting pot? Intermarriage trends in New Haven, 1870–1940. *American Journal of Sociology*, *49*, 331–339.

Kephart, W., & Zellner, W. (1994). *Extraordinary groups*. St. Martin's Press.

Kheel Center, Cornell University. (2017). *The 1911 triangle factory fire*. https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/index.html

Kitano, H., & Daniels, R. (2001). *Asian Americans: Emerging minorities* (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall.

Kraybill, D. B., & Bowman, C. F. (2001). *On the backroad to heaven: Old order Hutterites, Mennonites, Amish, and Brethren*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (2010). The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies. *International Social Science Journal*, *61*, 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/issj.12188

Lee, C. (2009). Sociological theories of immigration: Pathways to integration for U.S. immigrants. *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment*, *19*(6), 730–744.

Lieberson, S., & Waters, M. C. (1988). *From many strands*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Logsdon, J. R. (n.d). *Power, ignorance, and anti-Semitism: Henry Ford and his war on Jews*. https://history.hanover.edu/hhr/99/hhr99_2.html

Lopata, H. Z. (1976). *Polish Americans*. Prentice Hall.

Martin, P., & Midgley, E. (1999). Immigration to the United States. *Population Bulletin*, *54*(2), 1–44.

Masci, D. (2016). How income varies among U.S. religious groups. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/11/how-income-varies-among-u-s-religious-groups/

Massarik, F., & Chenkin, A. (1973). United States National Jewish Population Study: A first report. In *American Jewish committee, American Jewish year book, 1973* (pp. 264–306). American Jewish Committee.

Maurer, E. L. (2017, March 14). Raising a glass to Irish American women. *National Women's History Museum*. https://www.womenshistory.org/articles/raising-glass-irish-american-women

McCook, B. (2011). *The borders of integration: Polish migrants in Germany and the United States, 1870–1924*. Ohio University Press. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0821443518

Meenes, M. (1941). American Jews and anti-Semitism. *The Journal of Negro Education*, *10*, 557–566.

Menes, R. (2001). *Corruption in cities: Graft and politics in American cities at the turn of the twentieth century*. *The National Bureau of Economic Research*. George Mason University.

Morawska, E. (1990). The sociology and historiography of immigration. In V. Yans-McLaughlin (Ed.), *Immigration reconsidered: history, sociology, and politics* (pp. 187–238). Oxford University Press.

Muhindi, Martin., & Nyakato, Kiganzi. (2002). Integration of the Sudanese 'Lost Boys' in Boston Massachusetts.. MIT Center for International Studies, https://cis.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/IntegrationOfTheSudaneseLostBoys.pdf

Muller, J. Z. (2010). *Capitalism and the Jews*. Princeton University Press.

The National WWII Museum. (n.d). *How did Hitler happen?* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/how-did-hitler-happen

Nelli, H. S. (1980). Italians. In S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, & O. Handlin (Eds.), *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups* (pp. 545–560). Harvard University Press.

Ngo, V. H. (2008). *A Critical examination of acculturation theories. Critical Social Work*, *9*(1). https://www1.uwindsor.ca/criticalsocialwork/a-critical-examination-of-acculturation-theories

Nirenberg, D. (2014). *Anti-Judaism: The Western tradition*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Norwood, S. H. (2013). *Antisemitism and the American far left*. Cambridge University Press.

Novak, M. (1973). *The rise of the unmeltable ethnics: Politics and culture in the 1970s*. Collier.

O'Connell, P. (2016). *International migration in Ireland, 2016*. http://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201707.pdf

Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1924). *Introduction to the science of society*. University of Chicago Press.

Pew Research Center. (2019). *In a politically polarized era, sharp divides in both partisan*. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/views-on-race-and-immigration/ (NOTE: This is their rec cite. It's Dec 2019 in case we have others from 2019.)

Portes, A., & Manning, R. (1986). The Immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples. In S. Olzak & J. Nagel (Eds.), *Competitive ethnic relations* (pp. 47–68). Academic Press.

Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (2001). *Legacies: The story of the immigrant second generation*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Potter, G. (1973). *To the golden door: The Story of the Irish in Ireland and America*. Greenwood.

Rader, B. G. (1983). *American sports: From the age of folk games to the age of spectators*. Prentice Hall.

Rozenblit, M. L. (2010). European Jewry: 1800–1933. In J. R. Baskin & K. Seeskin (Eds.), *The Cambridge guide to Jewish history, religion, and culture* (pp. 169–207). Cambridge University Press.

Schlesinger, A. M., Jr. (1992). *The disuniting of America: Reflections on a multicultural society*. Norton.

Selzer, M. (1972). *'Kike': Anti-Semitism in America*. Meridian.

Shannon, W. V. (1964). *The American Irish*. Macmillan.

Shevitz, A. H. (2005). Restricted public accommodations. In R. S. Levy, D. P. Bell, & W. C. Donahue (Eds.), *Antisemitism: A historical encyclopedia of prejudice and persecution* (Vol. 1, pp. A–K, 597). ABC-CLIO.

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2017). Donald Trump and the rise of white identity politics. The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: Tumult at Home, Retreat Abroad? conference. *Ohio State University*. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Donald-Trump-and-the-Rise-of-White-Identity-Sides-Tesler/226f15e3527c74521d666b357f805c11aa507a96 (NOTE: Info is note on their online paper.)

Sklare, M. (1971). *America's Jews*. Random House.

Steinberg, S. (1981). *The ethnic myth: Race, ethnicity, and class in America*. Atheneum.

Swaney, K. R. (2004). An ideological war of "blood and soil" and its effect on the agricultural propaganda and policy of the Nazi party, 1929–1939. *The Gettysburg Historical Journal*, *3*(6).

Thernstrom, S. (2004). Rediscovering the melting pot—Still going strong. In T. Jacoby (Ed.), *Reinventing the melting pot: The new immigrants and what it means to be American* (pp. 47–59). NY Basic Books.

Tilly, C. (1990). Transplanted networks. In V. Yans-McLaughlin (Ed.), *Immigration reconsidered: History, sociology, and politics* (pp. 79–95). Oxford University Press.

Treuer, A. (2012). *Everything you wanted to know about Indians but were afraid to ask*. Borealis Books.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. (n.d.). *Jewish losses during the holocaust by country*. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-losses-during-the-holocaust-by-country

U.S. Census Bureau. (2016a). American Community Survey, 2016, 5-year estimates. *Fact Finder*. https://fac tfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_5YR_B04006&prodTy pe=table

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2014). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2013. Table 2 Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2013.". http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ yb_2013_0.pdf

Von Drehle, D. (2004). *Triangle: The fire that changed America*. Grove Press.

Warren, K. F (Ed.). (2008). *Encyclopedia of U.S. campaigns, elections, and electoral behavior*. SAGE.

Waters, M. (1990). *Ethnic options*. University of California Press.

Weinberg, S. S., Gabaccia, D., Diner, H. R., & Seller, M. S. (1992). The Treatment of women in immigration history: A call for change [with comments and response]. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, *11*(4), 25–69.

Wilensky-Lanford, B. (2015, September 22). Coming to America: A brief history of U. S.—Papal diplomacy. *New Republic*. https://newrepublic.com/article/122890/brief-history-us-papal-relations

Wirth, L. (1945). The problem of minority groups. In R. Linton (Ed.), *The Science of man in the world* (pp. 347–372). Columbia University Press.

Wyman, M. (1993). *Round trip to America*. Cornell University Press.

Yinger, J. M. (1985). Ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *11*, 151–180.

Zecker, R. M. (2011). *Race and America's immigrant press: How the Slovaks were taught to think like white people*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1441161996

UNDERSTANDING DOMINANT–MINORITY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY

In Part 3, we'll emphasize the current situation of American racial and ethnic minority groups and investigate how contemporary intergroup relations developed. We'll explore how minority and dominant groups respond to each other and to a changing society. Additionally, we'll examine how minority groups define and pursue their self-interests in interactions with other groups and within the broader society, including its culture and social institutions.

We'll continue using the themes and ideas from earlier chapters to analyze the current situation of specific minority groups. (We'll call these case studies.) Additionally, we've organized Chapters to roughly follow the Blauner hypothesis. That is, colonized groups (e.g., Black Americans, Native Americans) come first, followed by Hispanic Americans, who were created by colonization in the 19th century and have been largely shaped by immigration in more recent years. Finally, we consider minority groups created by immigration, Asian Americans and (Chapter 9) and other "New Americans (Chapter 10)

The history and present conditions of each minority group are unique; no groups have had the same experiences. To help identify and understand these differences, we use prior concepts together with a common comparative frame of reference. We stress assimilation and pluralism; inequality and power; and prejudice, racism, and discrimination. For ease of comparison, the final sections of Chapters 6 through 9 use the same headings and subheadings, in the same order.

Much of the conceptual frame of reference that we'll use to analyze the upcoming case studies can be summarized in seven themes. You've already learned the first six; you'll learn the last theme in Chapters 6 through 9.

1. Consistent with the Noel hypothesis, the present conditions of America's minority groups reflect their contact situations, especially the nature of their competition with the dominant group (e.g., competition for land versus competition for labor) and the size of the group power differential at first contact.

2. Consistent with the Blauner hypothesis, minority groups created by colonization experience economic and political inequalities that have lasted longer and been more severe than those experienced by groups created through immigration.

3. Power and economic differentials and barriers to upward mobility are especially pronounced for groups identified by racial or physical characteristics as opposed to cultural or linguistic traits.

4. Consistent with themes in Chapters 4 and 5, dominant–minority relations reflect the economic and political characteristics of the larger society and change as those characteristics change. Changes in the subsistence technology of the larger society are particularly significant. The shift from a manufacturing to a service economy (deindustrialization) is a key factor shaping contemporary dominant–minority relations.

5. As you learned in Chapter 3, the "mood" of the dominant group over the past four decades combines a rejection of blatant racism with the belief that the modern United States is non-discriminatory and that success is attainable for all who are willing to work hard enough. It is also common for dominant-group Americans to believe that further reforms of the larger society or special programs or treatment for minorities are unnecessary and unjustified. Efforts to address contemporary minority-group problems must deal with the pervasive "modern racism" of the dominant group.

6. The development of group relations, both in the past and for the future, can be analyzed in terms of assimilation (more similarity) and pluralism (more diversity). Group relations in the past (e.g., the degree of assimilation allowed or required of the minority group) mainly reflected the dominant group's needs and wishes. Although the pressure for Americanization is still considerable, more flexibility and variety exist in group relations today.

7. Since World War II, minority groups have gained significantly more control over the direction of group relations. This trend reflects the decline of traditional prejudice in America as well as minority groups' successful efforts to protest, resist, and change patterns of exclusion and domination. These successes have occurred, in large part, because minority groups have increased their political and economic resources.

6

BLACK AMERICANS
From Segregation to Modern Racism and Institutional Discrimination

---

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this chapter, you will be able to do the following:

6.1 Explain the forces that led to the end of de jure segregation, including relevant organizations, leaders, and legal changes.

6.2 Compare and contrast the Civil Rights Movement with the Black Power Movement.

6.3 Explain the most important issues and trends pertaining to Black–white relations since the 1960s, including: the many dimensions of the continuing separation of Blacks and whites, the relationship between the criminal justice system and the Black community, class inequality within the Black community, family forms and family as a social institution, new racial identities, prejudice, and individual and institutional forms of discrimination.

6.4 Analyze the contemporary situation for Black Americans using the concepts of assimilation and pluralism, especially in terms of acculturation, secondary structural assimilation, and primary structural assimilation.

6.5 Use sociological concepts and evidence from the chapter to evaluate the *overall* situation for Black Americans today. Evaluate the progress made compared with remaining problems.

When I was out with my oldest daughter, who's [four years old], we were in a shopping mall, in a garage in Los Angeles . and there was a lady, who was with her husband. And I could tell they were just really nervous around me. And then we went to an ATM—I had to get some money—and there's another couple and I heard the woman say "Hurry up, let's go, let's go." Like I was going to rob them, and my daughter was all like "What happened dad? What was that all about?" And I have to go into this conversation, "Well honey, sometimes people look at the color of my skin and they think I am a threat to them."

Sometimes if I am walking down a street or something, I am whistling Frozen songs just to prove that "Hey I have kids, I am not a threat to you. I just want to go home to my family." So often people just view this as, "Oh gosh, you're just whining," or "they are just making excuses or pulling out some mythical race card that doesn't exist." This is a real thing.

> —Doyin Richards (a blogger who writes about fathers and fathering)

It's like we are seen as animals. Treated like animals. It's not easy.

> —William Jones (high-end retail worker)

[I was] walking home in my beautiful upper-middle-class neighborhood in DC, when the cops start following me—kind of like this cat-and-mouse thing. They are in their car, and you know, every time I move, they move. And we get up to my house and I just stop on the street and say, "What are you doing?" And then they say, "What are you doing?" I say, "I live here." They say, "Prove it." They made me go to my porch, and then when I got there I said, "You know what, I don't have to prove anything." I knew this because I am a law professor. They said, "We are not leaving until you go in the house, because we think you're a burglar." I say, "You're doing this because I am Black." They said, "No, we are not, we're Black too," and that was true. These were African American officers. Even they were [racially] profiling me, another Black man.

—Paul Butler (law professor)

Every day, I live and operate with that feeling of fragility, that feeling that I could be taken out at any time. I am a chokehold away from being Eric Garner.

—Ben Saunders (psychology professor)

These opening narratives describe a common experience for African American men—being seen by others as a threat or an outsider, guilty of something without reason. These perceptions are strikingly similar to the stereotypes about Black men under slavery and Jim Crow. Why do they persist? What are the consequences?

Shopkeepers watch Black boys and men with special attention; police routinely stop, question, and frisk them; and pedestrians may cross the street when they see a Black man approaching. People think Black men are bigger than white men of comparable size (Wilson et al., 2017). They view Black boys over the age of 10 as older than they are—by about 4.5 years—and "less innocent" than other children (Goff et al., 2014; Williams, 2019).

At school, teachers and administers punish Black boys more often and more harshly than white boys, even for the same behaviors. Administrators are more likely to suspend and expel Black children, even *preschoolers*, compared to white children (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2014). Even Black boys with disabilities are disproportionately restrained at school compared with white boys with disabilities (Lewin, 2012; research about Black girls and women report similar findings; see Meyerson, 2017). For example, in 2021 Florida passed the Kaia Rolle Act to prohibit the arrest of children less than 7 years of age. The act was named after Kaia Rolle, a six-year-old girl, who was zipped-tied, finger-printed and arrested, for having a medically related tantrum at school (Deaderick, 2021).

Sometimes the price is quite high. The news is filled with cases in which interactions, shaped by presumptions, have escalated quickly and turned violent. One of the most recent such incidents occurred in Minneapolis in 2020 when George Floyd, an African American, was arrested and killed by Derek Chauvin, a white police officer, who kept his knee on Floyd's neck for more than nine minutes. A video showed Floyd saying that he couldn't breathe 28 times (International Commission of Inquiry, 2021). A jury found Chauvin guilty of second- and third-degree murder as well as second-degree manslaughter (Eligon et al., 2021). Floyd's murder echoed Eric Garner's words in 2014. As with Garner, Floyd's death spurred nation-wide protests. Widely referred to as a "racial reckoning" Floyd's death continues to shed light on issues of policing that we'll discuss later in this chapter.

Black Americans are all-too-aware of these perceptions and incidents which take an emotional and physical toll (Butler, 2018; Davis et al., 2015). These situations demonstrate that on many levels, people (especially whites) continue to see Black Americans as outsiders, apart from and alien to the (white) American mainstream. Certainly, America has made progress toward racial justice and inclusion. However, as this chapter will show, Black Americans still suffer from race-based inequalities that are deeply rooted in the past. Thus, America's struggle for racial equality is far from over. Where do we begin if we want to make changes toward equality and equity?

At the start of the 20th century, Black Americans primarily lived in the rural South. Jim Crow stripped away the legal and civil rights that they briefly enjoyed during Reconstruction (1865–1877). They had limited access to quality education and had few occupational choices. Whites exploited them through the sharecropping system and blocked them from the better paying industrial jobs in urban areas. Additionally, Black Americans had few political rights and few ways to express their concerns and grievances to the larger society or to the world.

Since then, the United States has seen greater equality between the dominant and minority groups, including Black Americans. The election of Barack Obama as president of the United States in 2008 and 2012 is, perhaps, the single most significant sign of progress. If we take a "glass half-full" perspective, we see signs of improvement in most areas of social life. For example, Black Americans are earning advanced degrees in greater numbers than ever before and are employed in diverse occupations. They've reached the highest levels of society, serving on the Supreme Court and in other important government positions, leading some of the most important corporations (e.g., American Express, Time Warner), and teaching at our most prestigious universities. Some of the best known, most successful, most respected people in the world are African American: Martin Luther King Jr. (civil rights leader), Maya Angelou (writer), Thurgood Marshall (Supreme Court Justice), Beyoncé (entertainer), Muhammad Ali (athlete/activist), Serena and Venus Williams (athletes/entrepreneurs), Colin Powell (Secretary of State), Shirley Chisolm (congressperson/activist) August Wilson (playwright), Oprah Winfrey (media mogul), Ta-Nehisi Coates (scholar/writer), Michelle Obama (former First Lady/author) and Toni Morrison (Pulitzer prize–winning author), to name a few.

Additionally, Black Americans continue to break barriers. For example, in 2012, Ana Duverney became the first Black woman to win the Best Director award at Sundance Film Festival (Hall & Renee, 2016). In 2015, Misty Copeland became the first African American woman to become the lead dancer for the world-renowned American Ballet Theatre ("Misty Copeland, Top 100," 2016). That same year, Vincent R. Stewart became the first African American director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Loretta Lynch became the first Black woman to serve as the U.S. attorney general (Chung, 2015), and Michael Curry became the first Black presiding bishop of the Episcopal church (Associated Press, 2005). In 2016, Maurice Ashley became the first African American grandmaster nominated to the U.S. Chess Hall of Fame. Simone Biles won four gold medals (and a bronze medal) in women's gymnastics—the first American woman to do so at a single Olympic game (Hall & Renee, 2016). In 2018, Stacey Abrams became the first African American woman nominated for state governor by a major party. Finally, in 2021, Kamala Harris became the first Black (and Asian) woman vice president of the United States.

Compared with 200 years ago, Black Americans' lives are much improved. However, social scientists caution against using a few examples, such as those listed above, as evidence of larger societal trends. As you'll see, the journey to racial equality is far from accomplished. A large percentage of Black Americans continue to experience exclusion, discrimination, and persistent inequalities in education, health care, housing, employment, and other areas of social life. They have fewer resources to fall back on in challenging times and weaker connections to the sources of power and privilege. The glittering success stories of the most famous Black Americans obscure the significant problems faced by many others.

To understand contemporary Black–white relations, you must understand the watershed events of the recent past: the end of de jure segregation, the triumphs (and limitations) of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the urban riots and Black Power Movement of the 1960s, and the continuing racial divisions within U.S. society since the 1970s. Behind these events were powerful pressures of industrialization and modernization: the shift from rigid to fluid competitive group relations, deindustrialization, modern institutional discrimination, changing distributions of power and forms of intergroup competition, the shift from traditional prejudice to modern racism, and ideas about assimilation and pluralism. In general, you'll see that Black–white relations changed as a direct result of resistance, protest, and the concerted actions of thousands of people of all races and ethnicities.

THE END OF DE JURE SEGREGATION

As a colonized minority group, Black Americans entered the 20th century facing extreme inequality, relative powerlessness, and sharp limitations on their freedom. Their most visible enemy was the system of de jure segregation in the South, the rigid competitive system of group relations that controlled most Black Americans' lives.

Why and how did de jure segregation—segregation by law—end? Recall from Chapter 5 that dominant–minority relationships change as the larger society and its subsistence technology change. As America industrialized and urbanized during the 20th century, a series of social, political, economic, and legal processes were set in motion that ultimately destroyed Jim Crow segregation.

The mechanization and modernization of agriculture in the South had a powerful effect on race relations. As machines replaced people, farm work became less labor intensive and landowners' need for a large, powerless workforce declined (Geschwender, 1978). Thus, one of the primary motivations for Jim Crow segregation and the sharecropping system lost importance.

Additionally, the modernization of southern agriculture helped spur Black Americans' migration northward and to southern urban areas. (See Chapter 5.) Outside the rural South, it was easier for Black Americans to vote and to pursue different avenues for improving their lives. The power of the growing African American vote was first felt in the 1930s and was significant enough to have influence in local, state, and even national elections by the 1940s. In 1948, for example, President Harry Truman recognized that he couldn't be reelected without the support of African American voters. Therefore, the Democratic Party adopted a civil rights plank in the party platform—the first time since Reconstruction that a national political party had taken a stand on race relations (Wilson, 1973, p. 123).

The weight of these changes accumulated slowly. De jure segregation ended as it had begun: gradually and in a series of discrete events. By the mid-20th century, white resistance to racial change was weakening and the power resources of Black Americans were increasing. This enhanced freedom and strength fueled many efforts that hastened the demise of Jim Crow segregation. Understanding why Jim Crow segregation ended is essential to understanding modern Black–white group relations.

Wartime Developments

One of the first successful applications of the growing stock of Black power resources occurred in 1941, as America was mobilizing for war against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Despite the crisis atmosphere, racial discrimination was common, even in the defense industry. A group of Black Americans, led by labor leader A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, threatened to march on Washington to protest discriminatory treatment (Brown, 2015).

To forestall the march, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order banning discrimination in defense-related industries and created a watchdog federal agency, the Fair Employment Practices Commission, to oversee compliance with the new policy (Franklin & Moss, 1994; Geschwender, 1978). This was significant in two ways. First, a group of Black Americans had their grievances heard at the highest level of society and they succeeded in getting what they wanted. Underlying their effectiveness was the rising political and economic power of the African American community outside the South and the need to mobilize everyone for a world war. Second, the federal government made an unprecedented commitment to fair employment rights for Black Americans. This alliance between the federal government and Black Americans was tentative, but it foreshadowed some of the dynamics of racial change that would occur in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Civil Rights Movement

The **Civil Rights Movement** was a multifaceted campaign to end legalized segregation and ameliorate the massive inequalities experienced by Black Americans. The campaign lasted for decades and included courtroom battles, protest marches, education, voter registration drives, boycotts, and other forms of activism. We begin by looking at the movement's successful challenge to legalized racial segregation.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

In 1954, the Supreme Court's ruling on *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* delivered the single most powerful blow to de jure segregation. It reversed the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896 (see Chapter 5) and ruled that racially separate facilities are inherently unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional. Segregated school systems—and all other forms of legalized racial segregation—would have to end.

The landmark *Brown* decision was the culmination of decades of planning and effort by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and individuals such as Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP's chief counsel. (Marshall became a Supreme Court Justice in 1967). The NAACP's strategy was to dismantle Jim Crow laws by finding instances when an African American's civil rights had been violated, then suing the relevant governmental agency.

A demonstration protesting school segregation organized by the NAACP.

Bettmann / Getty Images

The NCAAP intended for the impact of these lawsuits to extend far beyond each specific case. The goal was to persuade the courts to declare segregation unconstitutional not only in the specific instance being tried but also in all similar cases. The *Brown* (1954) decision was the ultimate triumph of this strategy. The significance of the Supreme Court's decision was not that Linda Brown—the child in whose name the case was argued—would attend a different school or even that the Topeka, Kansas, school system would be integrated. Instead, the significance was the court's rejection of the *principle* of de jure segregation in the South and, by extension, throughout America.

Southern states responded to *Brown* (1954) by mounting massive resistance campaigns, which allowed Jim Crow laws to remain on the books for years. Most white southerners strongly supported the system of racial privilege and attempted to forestall change through a variety of means, including violence and intimidation. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK), largely dormant since the late 1920s, reappeared, along with other racist terrorist groups such as the White Citizens' Councils. White politicians and other leaders competed with one another to express the most adamant statements of racist resistance (Wilson, 1973, p. 128). One locality, Prince Edward County in central Virginia, chose to close its public schools for five years rather than integrate them. During that time, white children attended private, segregated academies. The county provided no schooling for African American children (Franklin, 1967, p. 644). If they wanted to attend school, they had to travel outside the county, but most Black families didn't have the resources to send them.

Nonviolent Direct Action Protest.   The principle established by *Brown* (1954) was assimilationist: It ordered the dominant group to open its educational institutions freely and equally to all. Southern states and communities overwhelmingly rejected this principle. Centuries of racist tradition and privilege were at stake and it would take considerable collective effort to overcome southern resistance. The central force in this struggle was a protest movement that many people trace to Montgomery, Alabama. There, in 1955, Rosa Parks was riding the bus home from work. The driver ordered her to surrender her seat to a white man. She refused, and the police arrested her for violating a local segregation ordinance.

Although Parks didn't plan her civil disobedience that day, it didn't "just happen." She'd been fighting for equal rights as a member of the Montgomery chapter of the NAACP. When she joined the organization in 1943, she "was the only woman there" (Theoharis, 2015, p. 17). She first served as the organization's secretary, and over the next decade engaged in other types of activism, such as voter registration and documenting African Americans' experiences of discrimination. Just months before her arrest, Parks attended a desegregation workshop at the Highlander Folk School in Tennessee (now called the Highlander Research and Education) (Theoharis, 2015).

But, it was her work for the NAACP in 1944 that helped lay the foundations for the powerful civil rights protest to come and, according to Parks, that motivated her actions on the bus that day. As you learned in Chapters 4 and 5, sexualized violence (or the threat of it) against enslaved women was a mechanism of social control in the antebellum South and it remained so under Jim Crow. In 1944, in Abbeville, Alabama, six white men stopped Recy Taylor and Fannie and West Daniels as they walked home from church. The men abducted Taylor, a 24-year-old African American woman, at gunpoint, took her to a secluded area, and raped her. The police identified the men but did not arrest them. Police did not arrange for a suspect lineup and Taylor could not identify the men by name. Though the case went to trial, the jury of white men deliberated only for a few minutes before finding the accused men "not guilty" (McGuire, 2010). After the trial, Taylor and her family received threats including an attack on their home. The case sent shockwaves through the Black community, so the NAACP sent Parks to investigate. The information she gathered helped inspire the Committee for Equal Justice to document African American women's experience of violence at the hands of white men (McGuire, 2010, p. 13).

Although Parks says she did not plan her act of civil disobedience on the bus that day, her training and activism helped to prepare her for that moment. Her case galvanized the African American community, which organized a boycott of the city buses, with the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., the new minister of a local Baptist church, leading the boycott. However, it took collective, sustained effort to make the boycott successful. Participants set up carpools, shared taxis, and walked or biked to and from work, school, worship services, and other places—sometimes for miles. The boycott drew attention, sympathy, and resources from people across the world. They stayed off the buses for more than a year until the courts ruled that Alabama's segregated city buses were unconstitutional

Many courageous individuals, before and after Parks, resisted similar treatment and participated in collective and individual nonviolent civil disobedience. For example, from 1905 to 1906, Black Americans in Nashville, Tennessee effectively boycotted the city's streetcars (Cardona, 2015). And in 1953, Blacks in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, successfully boycotted the city's busses and created the model for the Montgomery boycott. Due to space limitations, we can't name all the individuals who paved the way for the Montgomery bus boycott, but here are some:

- **1946, Irene Morgan**, age 27, was riding the bus back to Maryland after visiting her mother in Virginia. When the bus became crowded, the driver asked her to give up her seat; she refused saying that Virginia's law didn't apply to travel across states (Wormser, n.d.). A police officer got involved and grabbed Morgan, but she fought back. A court found her guilty. She paid the $100 fine for resisting arrest (equivalent to about $1,370 in 2021) but wouldn't pay the $10 fine for violating segregation laws. The NAACP took her case before the Supreme Court (*Morgan v. Virginia,* 1946). Instead of arguing the case on the grounds of racial inequality, they contended that segregated seating on interstate travel violated the U.S. Constitution. The Court agreed, saying such practices were "an undue burden on commerce" (Pilgrim, 2007).

- Many southern private bus companies skirted this verdict by passing segregation rules. In 1947, the Congress of Racial Equality organized to fight them. Sixteen men (eight Black and

eight white) traveled by bus on a "Journey of Reconciliation." The white men sat in the colored section and Black men sat in the white section. Some were arrested and jailed, including **Bayard Rustin**, a gay man, who was sentenced to 30 days on a chain gang. Ever the activist, he published a report about his horrific experience, which led to prison reforms. He would go on to become one of the movement's leaders, and the group's action became a model for the Freedom Rides (Rustin, 1947; Rustin, n.d.).

- **1952—Sarah Louise Keys** was traveling across state lines by bus, sitting toward the front. When a new driver boarded, he asked her to move. When she refused, the driver had the other passengers get on a different bus. Local law enforcement arrested, fined, and jailed Keys, and a North Carolina court upheld her conviction. The NAACP took her case before the Supreme Court (*Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company*, 1955). Less than a week before Parks's arrest, it ruled in Keys's favor (Richardson & Luker, 2014, pp. 267–268). The case was heralded as a "symbol of a movement that cannot be held back" (McCabe & Roundtree, 2009, p. 154).

The movement's central strategy was **nonviolent direct action**, which involved confronting de jure segregation head on, not in the courtroom or the state legislature but where people experienced it (e.g., busses, stores, theaters). The movement adopted principles of nonviolence based on Christian doctrine and the teachings of Mohandas K. Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, and others. Dr. King (who earned his undergraduate degree in sociology) expressed this philosophy in numerous speeches and publications: People should confront the forces of evil rather than the people who were doing evil (see King, 1958, 1963, 1968). The movement didn't want to defeat or humiliate its enemies; it wanted to gain their support. As Dr. King (1958) said, it wasn't a method for cowards; it required courage and discipline (pp. 83–84).

The movement used different tactics, including sit-ins at segregated restaurants, protest marches, prayer meetings, and voter registration drives. The police and terrorist groups such as the KKK often responded to these efforts with brutal repression and violence. Protesters were routinely imprisoned and physically attacked not only by white bystanders and by police who used fists and billy clubs but also by police dogs, high-pressure water cannons, and tear gas. The violent resistance sometimes included murder, such as the 1963 bombing of a Black church in Birmingham, Alabama, which took the lives of four little girls, and the 1968 assassination of Dr. King. Resistance to racial equality was intense. It would take more than prayers and protests to end de jure segregation, and Congress finally provided the necessary tools to do so (see D'Angelo, 2001; Halberstam, 1998; Killian, 1975; King, 1958, 1963, 1968; Lewis & D'Orso, 1999; Morris, 1984).

Rosa Parks is fingerprinted following her arrest for violating the Montgomery, Alabama, bus segregation law. The U.S. Congress later called her "the first lady of civil rights" and "the mother of the freedom movement."

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. LC-USZ62-109643.

Landmark Legislation. The successes of the civil rights movement, combined with changing public opinion and the legal principles established by the Supreme Court, coalesced in the mid-1960s to stimulate the passage of two laws that ended Jim Crow. First, in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act (CRA). The law banned discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, or national origin by publicly owned facilities (e.g., city pools), facilities open to the public (e.g., stores, theaters), and programs receiving federal aid (e.g., colleges).

Second was the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA), which required that federal, state, and local governments treat all citizens equally in election practices. For example, it banned literacy tests, whites-only primaries, poll taxes, property requirements, and other practices used to prevent Black Americans from registering to vote. The VRA gave the franchise back to Black Southerners for the first time since Reconstruction and laid the groundwork for increasing Black political power.

We cannot overstate the significance of these two laws for ending state-sponsored racial discrimination and furthering the nation's commitment to equality and justice. The principles of the CRA are now firmly implanted in American culture and law, and the hypocrisies of the past that granted equal rights only to whites seem like hopelessly outdated relics.

Unlike the CRA, the VRA was specifically designed to remedy discriminatory practices occurring in specific states in the mid-1960s. Congress has renewed the VRA periodically, most recently in 2006, when it was extended with bipartisan support through 2031 (Hagler, 2015). However, in 2010, many states began creating new voting regulations that some argue diluted the progress made by the VRA.

The most significant change to the VRA happened in 2013, when the Supreme Court ruled that parts of it were unconstitutional because they violated the "fundamental principle of equal [state] sovereignty" (see *Shelby County v. Holder*, 2013). The majority opinion also said that such protections were unnecessary because "things have changed dramatically" (Roberts, 2013). Justice Ginsberg (2013), writing for the minority, argued with this interpretation, saying the court's decision was "like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet." (We'll consider implications of this decision in the section on political power.)

The Successes and Limitations of the Civil Rights Movement. Why did the Civil Rights Movement succeed? A comprehensive list of reasons would be lengthy; so, we'll focus on important causes most consistent with the points we've made about dominant–minority relations throughout this book.

1. *Changing subsistence technology.* The continuing industrialization and urbanization of America—and the South in particular—weakened Jim Crow's rigid competitive system of minority group control and segregation. (See our discussion of the impact of the changing subsistence technology and the end of paternalistic controls in Chapter 5, including Table 5.2.)

2. *An era of prosperity.* Following World War II, America enjoyed a period of prosperity into the 1960s. Consistent with the Noel hypothesis, this was important because it reduced the intensity of intergroup competition, at least outside the South. During prosperous times, resistance to change weakens. If the economic "pie" is expanding, the "slices" that minority groups claim can increase without threatening to reduce anyone else's portions, and prejudice generated by intergroup competition is held in check (see the Robber's Cave experiment in Chapter 3). Thus, these good times muted the dominant group's sense of threat sparked by the civil rights movement.

3. *Increasing resources in the Black community.* Some economic prosperity of this era found its way into African American communities and increased their economic and political resources. Networks of independent organizations, owned and operated by Black Americans, were created or grew in size and power (e.g., colleges, businesses, churches). This increasingly elaborate infrastructure of the Black community included protest organizations such as the NAACP and provided material resources, leadership, and "people power" to lead the fight against discrimination.

4. *Assimilationist goals.* The Civil Rights Movement demanded civil, legal, and political rights for Black Americans, but within a framework that emphasized liberty, equality, freedom, and fair treatment. Thus, many whites didn't feel threatened by the movement's philosophy and goals, which they saw as consistent with mainstream American values, especially in contrast to the intense, often violent resistance by southern whites.

5. *Coalitions.* Black Southerners had few resources other than their numbers and courage. However, the perceived legitimacy of the movement's goals created opportunities to form alliances with other groups such as white liberals, Jews, and college students. By mobilizing these groups' resources (e.g., legitimacy, money, political power, labor power), Black Southerners were in a much stronger position to challenge their opposition.

6. *Mass media.* Widespread sympathetic mass media coverage, particularly television, was crucial to the movement's success. The frequent broadcasts of whites brutally attacking Black Americans protesting for equal rights outraged many Americans and reinforced the moral consensus needed to eventually reject traditional racial prejudice and Jim Crow segregation (see Chapter 3).

The Southern Civil Rights Movement ended de jure segregation, but its confrontational tactics, effective against Jim Crow, were less useful in fighting race-based inequalities such as the unequal distribution of opportunities and resources between whites and Blacks (such as jobs, wealth, political power, education, and other valued goods and services). These issues had long been the primary concern of Black Americans outside the South and they're what we'll examine next.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. How did broad social changes help end Jim Crow segregation? How did individuals and organizations aid in this process? Which seems most important, and why?

2. How did Supreme Court decisions or other legal changes affect segregation?

3. How do the concepts of *competition* and *power differentials* in the Noel hypothesis apply to the demise of the Jim Crow system of segregation?

4. Explain the important reasons for the success of the civil rights movement. Which seem most significant and why?

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE SOUTH

De Facto Segregation

Chapter 5 discussed some of the difficulties that Black Americans encountered as they left the rural South, such as frequent discrimination by labor unions, employers, and white ethnic groups. Racial discrimination outside the South was less constant and less overt but still pervasive, especially in housing, education, and employment.

The pattern of racial separation and inequality outside the South during this time is called **de facto** ("in fact" or by practice) **segregation**. As opposed to Jim Crow or South African apartheid, no obvious or overt public laws mandated racial separation, but it existed all the same. Consider it as de jure segregation in disguise.

Many people imagine that de facto segregation "just happens" as people choose where to live, work, shop, or worship—perhaps, for example, out of the desire to be with one's "own kind." However, this is not the case. De facto segregation results from intentionally racist decisions and actions by governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, such as real estate boards, school boards, and zoning boards (see Massey & Denton, 1993, pp. 74–114; also see Loewen, 2005). When local and state authorities actively colluded with private citizens behind the scenes, ignored racist practices within their jurisdictions, and "simply refrained from enforcing Black social, economic, and political rights so that private

discriminatory practices could do their work," that was de facto segregation (Massey, 2007, p. 57). For example, shortly after World War I, the real estate board in Chicago, Illinois, adopted a policy requiring its members, on penalty of "immediate expulsion," to enforce racial residential segregation (Cohen & Taylor, 2000, p. 33; Rothstein, 2014, 2019). The city hadn't passed any laws, but the result was the same: Whites treated Blacks unequally.

Black Americans outside the South faced more poverty, higher unemployment, and lower quality housing and schools than whites. Yet, there wasn't an obvious equivalent to a Jim Crow system that was creating inequalities and, therefore, there was no obvious system to fight. The triumphs of the civil rights movement in the South had little impact on the lives of Blacks living elsewhere. In the 1960s, the African American community outside the South expressed its frustration over the slow pace of change in two main ways: urban unrest and the creation of a new movement that rose to prominence as the Civil Rights Movement began to fade.

Urban Unrest

Full racial equality continued to seem remote to many Black Americans living outside the South. In the mid-1960s, the frustration and anger within urban Black communities erupted into a series of violent uprisings. The riots began in the summer of 1965 in Watts, a Black neighborhood in Los Angeles, California.

Racial violence wasn't a new phenomenon in America. Race "riots" had existed as early as the Civil War and sometimes included considerable violence. Earlier race riots involved whites attacking Black Americans, often invading and destroying Black neighborhoods (e.g., see D'Orso, 1996; Ellsworth, 1982; Phillips, 2016)—for example, the Memphis massacre of 1866, Thibodaux massacre in 1887, and the Springfield Race Massacre of 1908. One of the most significant occurred over two days in 1921, when whites destroyed the Greenwood District of Tulsa, Oklahoma, also known as "Black Wall Street." Hundreds of people died, and many more were injured in the Tulsa Race Massacre. Most Black Americans' homes were destroyed, as were their churches, businesses, a hospital, and other community buildings—1,200 buildings total (Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, 2001, p. 12). However, the riots of the 1960s were different.

The urban unrest of the 1960s, in contrast, consisted largely of attacks by Black Americans against white-owned businesses operating in Black neighborhoods and against the police (almost all white), who they saw as an army of occupation and whose use of excessive force precipitated the riots (Conot, 1967; Mozingo & Jennings, 2015; National Advisory Commission, 1968). For example, the 1965 "Watts Rebellion" occurred after police stopped an African American man, Marquette Frye, on suspicion of drunk driving (Alonso, 1998). The situation quickly escalated. (The police claimed that Frye resisted arrest. Frye said that when his mother tried to stop the police from impounding their vehicle, the police "roughed [her] up" and knocked him unconscious.) During the altercation, a large crowd gathered and quickly grew angry, viewing the situation as another example of excessive force by the police (United Press International, 1986). The riot lasted five days. More than $40,000,000 of property was destroyed, 34 people died, 1,032 people were injured, and almost 4,000 people were arrested (Alonso, 1998; Hinton, 2016, pp. 68–72).

Housing discrimination against Blacks (and others) contributed to massive overcrowding in Watts and other minority neighborhoods. Remember from Chapter 5 that approximately 1.6 million Black Americans left the South to live elsewhere in the country during the first wave of the Great Migration. Millions more left during the second wave that began in 1940. Between 1940 in 1965, the Black population of Los Angeles increased almost 5.5 times (Simpson, 2012).

Like other parts of the country, Los Angeles was racially segregated due to redlining and other housing-related discrimination (e.g., higher rents for minorities). Additionally, real estate covenants barred people of color from renting or buying certain properties. Thus, in 1940, Black Americans (and other racial/ethnic minorities) had to live in only 5% of residential Los Angeles, creating significant overcrowding in those parts of the city (Alonso, 1998; Mozingo & Jennings, 2015; Redford, 2017).

As more Black Americans (and Asians and Hispanics) moved into Los Angeles, pressures to find housing increased. Minorities tried moving into other neighborhoods but were subjected to violence or

threats of violence (e.g., cross burnings) from whites who wanted to keep them out of "their" neighborhoods. During this time, the Los Angeles suburbs grew as record numbers of white families left the city because people of color were moving in. This phenomenon, called *white flight*, also occurred throughout the country (see Logan et al., 2017; Woldoff, 2011).

The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 made it illegal for property owners to deny housing to anyone because of race, ethnicity, gender, physical ability, religion, and so on. However, in 1964, Californians approved Proposition 14, which gave property owners the right to "decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses" (Brilliant, 2010, p. 193; Dougherty, 2019). Though the courts ruled Proposition 14 unconstitutional in 1966, "Prop 14" made it harder for people of color (and others) to find housing. Because it contributed to the extreme pressure facing the Watts community, it also contributed to the 1965 riots (Alonso, 1998; Gazzar, 2017; Theoharis, 2006, pp. 47–49).

MY GENDER IS BLACK
HARI ZIYAD

Hari Ziyad is a 2021 Lambda Literary Fellow and the best-selling author of *Black Boy Out of Time*. Ziyad has published in a variety of outlets, including Critical Ethnic Studies, *Vanity Fair*, *Salon*, *The Guardian*, *Ebony*, *Out*, and *Slate*. Formerly the managing editor of the Black Youth Project, Ziyad now works as the editor-in-chief of RaceBaitr, an online platform that explores intersections of race and gender, among other topics. In this Narrative Portrait, Ziyad reflects on how constructions of race and gender are connected—and confining. As such, he calls for new ways to embody Blackness and gender.

My gender is Black. Black gender and anyone who embraces its margins were never supposed to exist comfortably in this world in the first place, a world this boy was taught to try to become part of just like so many of us were––just like I was––even if he is destined always to fail.Black gender has not been used to indicate a shared womanhood or manhood with people within white society, but to highlight how Black people are out of step with womanhood and manhood. Black gender is always gender done wrong, done dysfunctionally, done in a way that is not "normal."

Even if we didn't have the language to describe this experience, all Black people have lived through it. This is why Black boys are hyper-criminalized just as Black girls and other Black non-male children are made invisible when talking about the issues of Black children. But instead of accepting the impossibility of Black gender as reality, and using it to create a different, freer, understandings of Black being, we are pressured to force our way into categories that weren't just not made for us, but designed specifically for our exclusion.

This pressure to salvage something of this anti-Black world rather than reject it fully is part of why we insist on going out of our way to "prove" a manhood and womanhood that was never ours to have in the first place at the expense of trans, non-binary, and queer Black folks alike.

Any attempt to fulfill gender roles as outlined outside of Blackness is not only ultimately futile in gaining Black people some sort of access to human treatment, but it also reinforces the violence against Black people who are attempting to build worlds that embrace their nonconformity.

To argue that "my gender is Black" is not to ignore our different experiences within Blackness, or to erase the unique struggles of different gender nonconforming individuals.

I am not saying that my experience is the same as a Black woman's, or a Black trans person's. I am simply trying to emphasize the importance of recognizing how none of us Black folk can "conform" to manhood and womanhood as those constructs have been formed, nor can we even "conform" to queer, trans and non-binary genders that way either––the way that makes the state recognize us as human.

"My gender is Black" is an argument that is rooted in the understanding that Blackness is not a race, and therefore could never be "race first." . . . Blackness is that which is denied access to humanity, and thus Blackness is denied access to human gender/sexuality identities. Because the Black people we read as queer or as women epitomize this lack of access to gender uniquely, forefronting Blackness is actually an attempt to bring these realities into the conversation about anti-Blackness in a necessary way.

"My gender is Black" is also not an argument against using terms that dictate gender for Black folk.

We are operating within a language that does not make room for us, and I understand that many times we just have to make do.

But part of creating space that does make room for Black people is acknowledging the way our current conception of gender is limited… This requires a (re)discovery of the ways we can relate to our selves and our bodies that are conducive to our freedom.

Gender identity under whiteness is a tool, not an end. How do we get to that end, that world in which all of our genders or lack thereof aren't used as the basis for our inhuman treatment? That is the question.

Questions to Consider

1. What is Ziyad's argument? Do you agree with it? Why or why not?
2. How do Ziyad's relate to the Tizon's Narrative Portrait in Chapter 9?
3. How might people "create space" for the expression of Black gender?

The Black Power Movement

The urban riots of the 1960s were an unmistakable sign that the problems of race relations didn't end with the death of Jim Crow segregation. Outside the South, the problems were different and necessitated different solutions. While the Civil Rights Movement was celebrating its victory in the South, a new protest movement was rising in prominence. The **Black Power Movement** was a loose coalition of organizations and individuals that encompassed a variety of ideas and views, many that differed sharply from those of the civil rights movement. Most Black Power advocates rejected the Civil Rights Movement's assimilationist goals, arguing that integration would cause Black Americans to become part of the very system that had oppressed, disenfranchised, and devalued them for centuries. Instead, Black Power groups embraced Black nationalism and celebrated Black identity, including African heritage, and encouraged racial pride, the latter exemplified by a popular saying of the day, "Black is beautiful!"

Most Black Power supporters believed that white racism and institutional discrimination, buried deep in the core of American culture and society, were the primary causes of racial inequality. They believed that to become truly empowered, Blacks would have to liberate themselves and become self-sufficient. They created alternate ways to meet their needs, such as urban farms and food co-ops, restaurants and other businesses, medical facilities, media, and schools—all owned and run by Black Americans.

The Black Panther Party (for Self-Defense) was one well-known expression of the Black Power movement. In the beginning (1966), it focused on creating armed, open carry street patrols to monitor police and guard against police brutality, which had been frequent. The Panthers argued that every American had the right to own and carry a gun. (Their legal battles began to shift public attitudes about the Second Amendment, which, until that time, was of extremely low importance to most Americans. See More Perfect, 2018.) As they gained national attention, the dominant image of militant Blacks with guns became equated with the broader Black Power movement and it frightened many Americans, especially whites, who remained largely unaware of the social programs (e.g., education, food security, and health care.) created by the Panthers and other Black Power organizations to improve the lives of Black Americans (see Brown, 2016; Potorti, 2017).

The Nation of Islam.   The ideological roots of Black Power were centuries old. In the 1920s, Marcus Garvey popularized many of them. In the 1960s, the Nation of Islam (NOI), sometimes called *Black Muslims*, embraced and further developed them. The NOI is one of the best known and most militant organizations within the Black Power movement. They denounced the hypocrisy, greed, and racism they saw in the larger society and advocated staunch resistance to and racial separation from white America.

The Nation of Islam did more than talk. Pursuing the goals of autonomy and self-determination, members opened businesses in Black American neighborhoods and tried to deal only with Muslim-owned Black companies. Their goal was to create a separate, independent Black-owned economy

that would support and develop the Black American community by supplying jobs and creating capital that would allow them to expand their efforts (Essien-Udom, 1962; Lincoln, 1961; X. Malcolm, 1964;Marable, 2011; Wolfenstein, 1993).

The NOI and other Black Power groups distinguished between racial separation and racial segregation. They viewed the former as empowering because, as a group, they'd grow stronger by becoming more autonomous. They saw the latter as a system of inequality controlled by the dominant group, which kept the Black community powerless. Thus, the Black Power groups worked to find ways in which Black Americans could develop their own resources and deal with the dominant group from a more powerful position, a strategy like the ethnic enclaves created by other minority groups (see Chapter 2).

Malcolm X was the best-known representative for the NOI and was one of the most charismatic figures of the 1960s. He powerfully articulated the values and goals of the Black Power movement. Born Malcolm Little, he converted to Islam while in prison. He rejected his "slave name" and adopted *X* to reflect his unknown heritage. Malcolm X became the group's chief spokesperson and a well-known but threatening figure to many white Americans. After a dispute with Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the NOI, Malcolm X founded his own organization and continued to express and develop the ideas of Black nationalism. In 1965, like so many protest leaders of the era, someone assassinated him (Marable, 2011).

Black Power leaders such as Malcolm X advocated autonomy, independence, and a pluralistic direction for the Black American protest movement. They saw the Black community as a colonized, exploited population that needed liberation from the unyielding racial oppression of white America, not integration into the system that oppressed them. In the 1970s, the group splintered into different factions. One sought greater assimilation into the dominant society. The other seems to have become more radicalized, leading to their classification by some as a hate group (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.).

PROTEST, POWER, AND PLURALISM

The Black Power Movement in Perspective

By the end of the 1960s, the riots had ended, and the most militant and dramatic manifestations of the Black Power Movement had faded. In many cases, the passion of Black Power activists was countered by the violence of the police and other agencies, such as the FBI. Many of the movement's most powerful spokespeople were dead, in jail, or in exile. America's commitment to racial change wavered and weakened as other concerns, such as the Vietnam War, competed for public attention. In 1968, Richard M. Nixon was elected president and indicated that his administration wouldn't ally itself with the Black Protest Movement. The federal government's commitment to racial equality decreased. The boiling turmoil of the mid-1960s faded, but the idea of Black Power had become thoroughly entrenched in the Black American community.

Some pluralistic themes of Black Power were a reaction to the failed assimilation and integration efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. Widely publicized court decisions had chipped away at racial inequalities (e.g., *Brown v. Board of Education*). The government had passed legislation to foster equality (e.g., CRA, VRA). Presidents, congresspeople, ministers and rabbis, and other leaders had pledged support for racial equality. Yet, for many Black Americans, not much had changed. Their parents' and grandparents' problems continued to constrain their lives and many expected that these problems would

Buildings burning during a riot in the Watts area of Los Angeles, 1965.

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, NYWT&S Collection, LC-USZ62-113642.

affect their children's lives, too. The Black Power ideology emerged from America's failure to go beyond the repeal of Jim Crow and fully implement the promises of integration and equality.

Black nationalism, however, was more than simply a reaction to a failed dream. In the context of Black–white relations in the 1960s, the Black Power movement served many purposes. First, along with the civil rights movement, it offered new ways of defining what it meant to be Black in America and new ways of seeing Black Americans. The dominant cultural stereotypes of Black Americans emphasized their supposed laziness, irresponsibility, dangerousness, and inferiority. The Black Power movement rejected these ideas, emphasizing, instead, Black power, seriousness of purpose, intelligence, beauty, assertiveness, independence, and courage.

Second, Black Power served as a new rallying cry for solidarity and unified action. Following the success of the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power focused attention on America's "unfinished business"—continuing inequalities between Blacks and whites.

Finally, Black Power's ideology offered an analysis of the problems of American race relations in the 1960s. The civil rights movement had analyzed race relations in terms of integration, equality of opportunity, and an end to exclusion. After the demise of Jim Crow, that analysis became less relevant. A new language was needed to describe and analyze continuing racial inequality. Black Power argued that the continuing problems of American race relations were structural and institutional, not individual. Therefore, the next steps toward actualizing racial equality and justice would require a fundamental and far-reaching restructuring of society. Ultimately, most white Americans, as the beneficiaries of societal arrangements, didn't support restructuring society. Thus, the necessary energy and commitment had to come from Black Americans pursuing their own self-interests.

The nationalistic and pluralistic demands of the Black Power movement evoked a sense of threat and defensiveness in white society. By questioning the value of assimilation and celebrating a separate African heritage equal in legitimacy with white European heritage, the Black Power movement raised questions about the worth and validity of Anglo-American values and norms. Many Black Power spokespersons condemned Anglo-American values fiercely and openly and implicated them in creating and maintaining a centuries-long system of racial repression. Today, more than 50 years after the successes of the Civil Rights Movement, many people still perceive the demands and critiques from the Black community as threatening.

Memphis sanitation workers on strike for better wages, working conditions, and dignity. Many had served the country fighting overseas yet returned to racial inequality as had Black soldiers before them who fought in the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. Whites, for example, often called them "boy." The I AM A MAN signs speak to that indignity. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who led the march, was assassinated just days after this photo was taken.

Bettmann / Getty Images

Gender and Black Protest

Paradoxically, the Civil Rights and Black Power Movement organizations accepted many of that era's gender stereotypes (some of which remain); for example, that men are "naturally better" leaders or "more intelligent" than women. As in the larger society (e.g., workplaces, schools, places of worship), men dominated leadership positions and many members viewed women as men's supporters, not equal partners, in the fight for racial equality. For example, when Rosa Parks joined the NAACP in 1943, the local leader, Edgar Nixon, reportedly said, "Women don't need to be nowhere but the kitchen" (Theoharis, 2013, p. 28). However, he asked Parks to become the organization's secretary a "woman's job" that opened the door for her later activism. According to activist Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons, even getting resources to do their work was challenging. Women "had to fight for resources" like "good typewriters and a good car because the guys would get first dibs on everything" (Simmons, 2011). The women challenged that sexism. For example, the women in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) wrote position papers to protest their relegation to clerical positions and to being called "girls" (Andersen, 1993, p. 284; Dastagir, 2018).

Similarly, the NOI emphasized girls' and women's subservience, imposed a strict code of behavior (e.g., rules about clothing), and organized many activities by gender. Given the continuing failures of the Civil Rights Movement, some Black women viewed this "patriarchal bargain" with NOI as reasonable, even desirable, if it led to safety, independence, and greater financial stability for themselves and Black Americans as a group (McDuffie, 2018; Taylor, 2017).

Thus, the battle against racism and the battle against sexism were separate struggles with separate, often contradictory agendas (Amott & Matthaei, 1991; Theoharis, 2013). Although often denied organizational leadership roles, Black women were key participants—many people view them as the backbone of both movements. When the protest movements began, Black American women were already heavily involved in communities and used their skills, intellect, creativity, and energy to further the cause of racial equality. Even if relegated to less glamorous but vital organizational work, Black women shaped how the movements developed (Evans, 1979; Taylor, 2017).

Fannie Lou Hamer, an Black American who became a prominent Civil Rights Movement leader, illustrates the importance of women's activism. Born in 1917 to sharecropper parents, Hamer's life was so circumscribed that until she attended her first rally at the beginning of the Cvil Rights Movement, she was unaware that Black Americans could—even theoretically—register to vote. The day after the rally, she quickly volunteered to register:

> I guess if I'd had any sense I'd have been a little scared, but what was the point of being scared? The only thing they could do to me was kill me and it seemed like they'd been trying to do that a little bit at a time ever since I could remember. (Amistad Research Center, n.d.)

She devoted herself entirely to the Civil Rights Movement, helping to organize Mississippi's Freedom Summer, for example. Later, she founded the Freedom Party, which successfully challenged the racially segregated Democratic Party and the all-white political structure of the state of Mississippi. Because of her activism, Hamer lost her job, was evicted from her house, and was jailed and beaten on several occasions (Brown, 2020; Evans, 1979; Hamer, 1967).

Much of the energy that motivated Black protest was forged in the depths of segregation and exclusion, an oppressive system that affected all Black Americans. However, social class and gender significantly shaped Black American's lives. Black women experienced distinct multiple jeopardy created by the interlocking systems of racism and sexism combined with class (particularly within a capitalist economy; Jones, 1949; Stanford Social Innovation Review, 2019). As you'll see in upcoming sections, those patterns still remain.

Fannie Lou Hamer, a leader of the Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi. Among other notable accomplishments, she founded the Freedom Party, which challenged the racially segregated state Democratic Party.

Bettmann / Getty Images

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

5. How did de facto segregation differ from de jure segregation? Were the differences cosmetic or substantial? Explain.

6. How and why did the Black Power Movement differ from the Civil Rights Movement?

7. To what degree did the Black Power Movement succeed in achieving its goals? Explain.

8. What were some of the important gender dimensions of Black protest movements?

9. Compare women's experiences under Jim Crow segregation with that of the antebellum South. How did they reflect the larger society?

10. What were you most surprised to learn so far in this chapter? Why might that be useful to understand?

11. Consider what you've learned so far throughout this book. What connections do you see between the past and present?

BLACK–WHITE RELATIONS SINCE THE 1960S: ISSUES AND TRENDS

Black–white relations have changed since the 1960s and the United States has taken steps toward reducing racial inequality and increasing integration. Barack Obama's election to the presidency—unimaginable just decades ago—stands as one unmistakable symbol of racial progress. Indeed, it was a breakthrough so stunning that many Americans claimed it meant the United States had become postracial and that race no longer influenced people's lives. As you'll see, that argument doesn't hold up to evidence.

Without denying improvements, Americans must also recognize that progress in many areas has stagnated; basic patterns of Black inequality and white dominance persist. Remaining problems are deeply rooted in and inextricably mixed with the structure and operation of society. As in earlier eras, we can't address contemporary racism and racial inequality apart from larger societal changes, especially changes in subsistence technology.

COMPARATIVE FOCUS

RACE IN ANOTHER AMERICA

One of the key characteristics of traditional American anti-Black prejudice is a simple two-race view: Everyone belongs to one and only one race; a person is either Black or white. At its core, this perspective suggests ideas about Black inferiority that were at the heart of the American system of slavery and Jim Crow segregation in the South. Southern states (and a few others) formalized this racial dichotomy in law and in custom, including the "one-drop rule." If a person had any trace of Black ancestry, even "one drop" of "African blood," the law defined them as Black and subjected them to all the related consequences of that label.

FIGURE 6.1 ■ Main Ethnic Groups in Brazil

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Main_ethnic_groups_in_brazil.JPG

The dichotomous white/Black construction of race contrasts sharply with many other nations. Racial histories in Brazil and the United States are parallel in many ways. However, people in each country perceive race differently.

Most people in Brazil identify with one of about 10 racial categories, including *branco* (white), *moreno* (brown), *moreno claro* (light brown), *claro* (light), *pardo* (mixed race), and *negro* and *preto* (Black) (Monk, 2016; Petruccelli, 2015; Telles, 2004, p. 82). However, when the government asked people to describe their race in something equivalent to our census, they got 134 categories, including "pinkish white," "burnt yellow," and "cinnamon," among others (Garcia-Navarro, 2015).

Race is more fluid in Brazil. Qualities such as hair texture, eye color, ethnicity, and social class (e.g., education, occupation, income) affect one's race in Brazil (Caldwell, 2008; Flavia et al., 2003).

For example, people with higher class status are considered "whiter" than those of lower status, regardless of their actual skin color (Bucciferro, 2015; Wade, 1997). Additionally, people may be seen as "whiter" simply by marrying a lighter skinned person (Freelon, 2017; Hernandez, 2007).

Past scholarship has likened Brazil to a racial utopia (Freyre, 1946) and Brazil has taken pride in being called a racial democracy. Yet, more expansive constructions of race don't mean that Brazil is egalitarian if the construction of race connects *whiteness* to wealth, education, and success while associating *Blackness* with poverty, lack of refinement, and other negative qualities.

Prejudice, discrimination, and widespread racial inequalities remain a part of Brazilian society. Brazilian sociologist Antonio Risério says, "It's clear that racism exists in the United States. It's clear that racism exists in Brazil. But they are distinct kinds of racism" (c.f. Reid, 2014, p. 181; Risério, 2007, p. 17). In Brazil, Black and multiracial Brazilians have higher illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty rates and are less likely to have access to a university education than white Brazilians (Bourcier, 2012; Gradín, 2007; IBGE News Agency, 2016; Saraiva, 2019). Additionally, they are more likely than whites to experience police-based violence (Salhani, 2015). Whites dominate the more prestigious and lucrative occupations and the leadership positions in the economy and in politics, while Black Brazilians are concentrated at the bottom of the class system, with multiracial people in between (Haan & Thorat, 2012; Marteleto, 2012). In short, Brazilian patterns mirror our own.

We'll explore this topic further in Chapter 13. For now, consider these points:

- The foundation for contemporary race relations in Brazil and the United States was laid in the distant past. The Portuguese, the colonial conquerors of Brazil, were mostly single men. They married women from other racial/ethnic groups and produced multiracial children. European settlers in the American colonies often already had families. For those that didn't, miscegenation laws prevented intermarriage.
- In Brazil, people didn't equate slavery as thoroughly with race as in America, where slavery, Blackness, and inferiority were tightly linked in the dominant ideology. However, Brazilians did link "Blackness" with inferiority, which contributed to its somewhat fluid construction of race (including the tendency for people to "self-whiten"). Contemporary social inequalities reflect these racial ideologies.

After slavery ended, Brazil didn't go through a period of legalized racial segregation, similar to the Jim Crow system in the American South or apartheid in South Africa. Since groups had always mingled, Brazil had a smoother societal transition after the end of slavery ("Affirming a Divide," 2012).

Question to Consider

1. How would you explain the social constructions of race in America and Brazil?
2. What do you think about the fluidity of racial categories in Brazil compared with those in the United States? What does that tell you about race as a social construct?

Continuing Separation

Just over 50 years ago, a presidential commission charged with investigating Black urban unrest warned that America was "moving towards two societies, one Black, one white, separate and unequal" (National Advisory Commission, 1968, p. 1). The phrase "moving towards" incorrectly suggests that America was racially unified at one time. Nevertheless, the warning seems prophetic.

Black Americans' lives have improved in many ways (e.g., increasing education and wealth, greater political power, increased job opportunities) and contemporary race relations have improved. However, inequality and power differentials between Blacks and whites continue as the legacy of our past. In many ways, Black and white Americans still live in separate worlds, especially when we consider social class and residence. The Black urban poor lead lives that barely intersect with the lives of the affluent whites in suburbia.

The social construction of race, patterns of inequality, and power differentials between the two groups that are the legacy of our racist past structure everyday reality so that many white people see Black Americans as "invaders" pushing into areas where they "do not belong" and aren't wanted. Sometimes, the reactions to these perceived intrusions are immediate and bloody, as you'll learn later in the chapter. Sociological research suggests that attempts to exclude Black Americans remain part of

everyday life. It can be intentional or unintentional, but the result is the same: profound negative effects for Black Americans that often lead to cumulative disadvantage. For example, you read about redlining practices that result in mortgage loans being denied to Black Americans or to Black Americans being charged much higher rates compared with white loan applicants with similar credit scores (see Chapter 5). In 2016, the Department of Justice and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau brought charges against a Mississippi-based bank for its widespread discriminatory lending practices. Compared with white counterparts, the bank denied personal and business loans twice as often for Black American applicants than for comparable whites and charged Blacks higher percentage rates, costing them more over time and, potentially, making it harder to pay back their loans. Moreover, the bank "structur[ed] its business to avoid and discourage consumers in minority neighborhoods from accessing mortgages" (Lane, 2016).

Evidence of continuing racial separation that characterizes much of American society is abundant. For example, the files of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) document many cases. The EEOC is charged with investigating and attempting to resolve charges of different types of discrimination (e.g., by race, gender, disability, age) related to hiring, unequal pay and promotion, and hostile work environments. To illustrate, a 2012 case involving an environmental services company found that Black American employees were subjected to physical threats, implied threats via the repeated displays of nooses, disrespect, and disparagement by being repeatedly called the "N-word," among other forms of harassment. Several plaintiffs claimed the company fired them because of their race. One supervisor said that he could fire that [racial slur] ("*EEOC v. WRS Infrastructure*," 2012). Additionally, several white employees reported being harassed and fired in retaliation for supporting their Black American co-workers. As with many cases of discrimination, the company allowed this systemic, repeated discrimination. They didn't acknowledge, prevent, or rectify it, even when notified by employees. Management even ignored the "extreme symbolism of a noose" intended to intimidate Black Americans. Lastly, they didn't provide a "written policy forbidding racial harassment to its employees, post it at the job-site, or train the employees about what constitutes harassment and how to report it," which allowed the harassment to continue ("*EEOC v. WRS Infrastructure*," 2012). Many similar lawsuits have been brought forth in recent years including those against Bass Pro Outdoor World, Pepsi, Abercrombie & Fitch, BMW, Hillshire Brands (formerly Sara Lee), and Albertsons Grocery Stores (see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, n.d.).

Many cases brought before the courts involve widespread institutional discrimination—discrimination built into organizational policies and procedures—rather than one individual discriminating against another. The largest class action racial discrimination lawsuit to date (*Pigford v. Glickman*) was brought before U.S. District Court for the District of Colombia in 1999 by 13,000 Black farmers who charged the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with widespread discrimination between 1983 and 1997. Evidence showed that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) systematically discriminated against Black farmers in many ways. For example, it was much less likely to give loans to Black farmers to buy necessary farm supplies (e.g., equipment, fertilizer) and Black farmers had to wait three times as long for loan approval compared with white farmers who applied for similar loans. Additionally, the USDA often "supervised" Black farmers, requiring them to get an approval signature from a USDA official before taking their money out of the bank.

When one group is discriminated against, another group is advantaged—even if the group that benefits isn't aware of their advantage and didn't seek it. By some accounts, decades of preferential treatment for white farmers pushed Black farmers out of agriculture. Although USDA policies were "colorblind," the loan application and approval process occurred at the county level. Evidence showed that although many of the counties had majority Black populations, almost no people of color were included on local county loan approval committees. The court awarded nearly $1 billion of payments to the farmers. However, because the suit didn't include 70,000 Black farmers who had been affected, Congress approved another $1.2 billion in restitution payments in 2010.

While Barack Obama's election inspired strong optimism about the future of race relations, the current mood is pessimistic, as national polls over the last two decades show. In 1996, more than half (54%) of the adults surveyed saw racism in America as a "big problem." When Obama took office in 2009, that rate dropped dramatically to 26%. By 2015, people's optimism had faded: 50% of the

respondents saw racism as a major problem, a rate that increased to 57% in 2017 (Neal, 2017). While both whites and Blacks expressed increasing concern about racism, the rate in 2017 was significantly higher for Blacks (81%) than for whites (52%) (Neal, 2017). Brenan (2020) has surveyed Americans about this issue since 2001. Their latest results show the lowest satisfaction levels to date with 65% of Americans dissatisfied with the treatment of Black people. Interestingly, Black Americans' satisfaction ratings have remained consistently low over time. What appears to be driving the overall decrease in satisfaction are changing attitudes among white Americans. Their ratings dropped 10% since the last survey in 2018.

As full racial equality and integration continue to seem remote, frustration and anger run high among Blacks and whites, though sometimes for different reasons. (See our discussion about the differences in Black and white beliefs about race relations in Chapter 1.) Next, we'll explore some signs of the continuing separation between Black and white Americans.

Continuing Separation: The Social Construction of Race, Difference, and Danger

Racial segregation still exists in some forms—in neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and churches, for example. For Black Americans, segregation results in higher rates of unemployment, poverty, incarceration, and lower rates of degree completion, home ownership, and voting.

"Living While Black" (LWB) describes a phenomenon that's recently gained national attention because it illustrates continuing race-based exclusion or segregation. LWB occurs when whites feel concern, suspicion, or discomfort about Blacks and call the police as a result (Lockhart, 2018b). These reactions suggest that some whites feel, at least to some degree, that Black Americans don't belong in particular places, which seems reminiscent of Jim Crow segregation (Billings, 2017).

Whites' apprehension about Black people isn't unfamiliar; what's new about LWB is that (1) these interactions are typically documented with cell phone cameras and (2) the calls are about Black people doing everyday activities in "white spaces" where Blacks "are typically absent, not expected, or marginalized when present" (Anderson, 2015, p. 10). In 2018, for example, white people called the police about Black Americans eating at restaurants, moving into an apartment, working out, napping in a dorm's common area, cashing a check at the bank, sitting in a coffee shop, barbequing, being at the pool, mowing a lawn in their neighborhood, golfing, delivering newspapers, checking out of an Airbnb rental, and calling someone from their hotel lobby (Lockhart, 2018b; Nash, 2018; Patton & Farley, 2018).

These examples may seem trivial to some people, but Anderson (2015, p. 15) argues that they reflect an attempt by white people to protect what they see as "theirs." That assessment, if true, suggests an underlying sense of tension and competition that's at the root of prejudice and discrimination. Additionally, these examples indicate broader suspicions aimed at Black people. For example, 40% of Black Americans surveyed in 2017 as part of a national study reported people being afraid of them specifically because of their race. Ideas about men and masculinity magnified people's fear of Black men. More than half of Black men (57%) reported people being fearful of them (NPR et al., 2017a, p. 10). Just 7% of white people and 11% of white men reported people being afraid of them due to their race (NPR et al., 2017c, p. 12). Similarly, a national survey in 2016 by the Pew Research Center found that almost half (47%) of the Black respondents thought someone had viewed them with suspicion because of their race at some point over the last year. These and other experiences are marginalizing and result in Blacks feeling the need to justify their existence (Lockhart, 2018a) and to carefully navigate predominantly white settings in particular (Anderson, 2018).

Some people might suggest that calling the police simply reflect a desire to stay safe. Others might propose that callers are trying to do good, not harm. We don't have the intimate details of every case; besides, the callers, like most people, probably aren't aware of their biases. We'd offer that these aren't either/or situations (e.g., "they're trying to help" *or* "they're racist") as much as those involving both/and: People want to be safe *and* they've internalized stereotypes of Black people that were created hundreds of years ago and that have largely gone unchallenged. It might be helpful to ask, why don't whites call the police about Asian men or white women doing everyday activities? And why are there so many "white settings" to begin with?

Although whites' attitudes about Blacks have improved, the LWB phenomenon suggests two kinds of continuing separation between Blacks and whites. The first is at the level of abstract thinking and feeling, the other is in the physical world where people go about their daily lives. To create racial equality, we'll have to address both.

Continuing Separation: Protests, Riots, and Activism

One major source of Black discontent and frustration for Black Americans (and others) involves police actions toward them. Several major police-related incidents have sparked violence and riots. One of the most widely publicized examples was incited by the 1991 beating of Rodney King by police officers in Los Angeles. National and international news outlets covered the incident widely, showing video of the police using a Taser and kicking and hitting King with a nightstick, while he lay on the ground. The video stunned the nation; in only 81 seconds, officers kicked or hit him 56 times (Matiash & Rothman, 2016; Sastry & Bates, 2017).

Four officers were charged with assault with a deadly weapon and use of excessive force. Contrary to most people's expectations, an all-white jury acquitted them of most charges. On hearing word of the acquittals, communities in several cities erupted into violence. The worst disturbance occurred in the Watts section of Los Angeles—the same location as the 1965 Watts Rebellion. More than 60 people died and 2,300 were injured. More than 1,100 buildings, valued between $785 million and $1 billion, were destroyed. Police arrested about 12,000 people (Kim & Kim, 1999; Lee, 2015; *Los Angeles Times* Graphics Staff, 2017; Wilkens, 1992).

The 1992 riots illustrate two ingredients that have roused Black collective protest and violence since the 1960s: police behavior and the pervasiveness of recording devices. Today, cell phones and police cameras can supply important visual evidence about these interactions. Yet, focusing closely on micro-level interactions can distract from their social context. For example, in 2009 in Oakland, California, Oscar Grant, a 23-year-old Black man, was returning from New Year's Eve celebrations. Police got reports of a fight on a subway train and detained several people. During the interaction, Officer Johannes Mehserle shot Grant in the back. Mehserle claimed that Grant was reaching for his waistband—possibly for a gun. Grant was unarmed. Videos of the situation went viral (J. McKinley, 2009). Many people saw Grant's death as intentional and unprovoked, since he appeared to be cooperating. Yet, the court found Mehserle guilty of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced him to just two years in prison (McKinley, 2010). The community—primarily Black Americans but also including whites, Asians, and Hispanics—responded with peaceful protests *and* violent rioting (Bulwa, 2010; Egelko, 2009).

In recent years, similar unrest has followed the police-related killings of Black Americans including (but not limited to):

- Eric Garner (July 17, 2014, in Staten Island, New York)
- Michael Brown (August 9, 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri)
- Tamir Rice (November 22, 2014, in Cleveland, Ohio)
- Walter Scott (April 4, 2015, in Charleston, South Carolina)
- Freddie Gray (April 12, 2015, in Baltimore, Maryland)
- Sandra Bland (July 13, 2015, in Hempstead, Texas)
- Philando Castile (July 6, 2016, in Falcon Heights, Minnesota)
- Terence Crutcher (September 16, 2016, in Tulsa, Oklahoma)
- Angel Viola Decarlo (December 18, 2018, in Hopewell, Virginia)
- Nina Adams (March 13, 2019, in Greensburg, Pennsylvania)
- Ariane McCree (November 23, 2019, in Chester, South Carolina)

- Ahmaud Arbery (February 23, 2020, in Brunswick, Georgia)

- Breonna Taylor (March 13, 2020, in Louisville, Kentucky)

- George Floyd (May 25, 2020 in Minneapolis, Minnesota)

- Priscilla Slatter (June 10, 2020 in Harper Woods, Michigan)

- Casey Goodson Jr. (December 4, 2020 in Columbus, Ohio)

- Roger Allen (April 7, 2021 in Daly City, California)

- Anthony J. Thompson Jr. (April 12, 2021 in Knoxville, TN

The shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, sparked some of America's most significant recent protests. The incident garnered international attention and led to investigations by Amnesty International, governmental agencies, and a host of independent researchers. Findings pointed to racial tensions within the predominately Black community that stemmed from persistent discrimination by members of a nearly all-white police (Lowery et al., 2014). The U.S. Department of Justice (2015) noted "a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct" within the police department.

Community members held a candlelight vigil on the evening of the shooting and several hundred went to the police headquarters, held their hands in the air, and chanted, "Hands up, don't shoot" (Lurie, 2014). On the streets, the interaction between police and citizens escalated quickly. As the crowd grew, the police became concerned about unruly individuals; they responded by bringing in 150 police officers with riot gear. Anger mounted and protestors vandalized vehicles, broke windows, looted stores, and confronted the police (Tribune Wire Reports, 2014). The police used riot gear and other crowd control tactics, to little avail. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon turned the situation over to the Missouri State Highway Patrol, who took a different approach. They arrived without riot gear, vowed not to block the streets, and promised to listen to people's concerns (Hartmann, 2014).

Racial tensions in Ferguson persisted and smaller protests continued for several months. A grand jury heard evidence regarding the criminal liability of the police officer (Darren Wilson) who fired the fatal shot. The governor declared a state of emergency in anticipation of the verdict. When the grand jury didn't indict officer Wilson, peaceful protests (and some angry clashes) resumed, lasting eight days and involving tens of thousands of people in 170 American cities, Canada, England, and elsewhere (Almasy & Yan, 2014a, 2014b). Activists had come to Ferguson from across the country, many on long bus trips that echoed the Freedom Rides of the 1960s. Protestors chanted "Black Lives Matter," a phrase first used in 2013 after the death of Trayvon Martin to focus attention on anti-Black racism, especially "state-sanctioned violence" against Blacks (Black Lives Matter Global Network, n.d.).

As in earlier decades, discontent generated a new movement for racial equality: the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Global Network. The movement has adopted some philosophies and tactics from the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, but it's modified and expanded them with a modern, inter-sectional approach. It seeks racial equality, but unlike earlier movements, it's explicitly against sexism, homophobia, and other forms of prejudice and discrimination. For example, the group sought to generate awareness about Black women killed by police or in police custody through #SayHerName (Jacobs, 2017; Tillery, 2019). Neal (2017) shows that as with prior movements, public opinion about BLM is mixed: 55% of Americans support the movement while 34% oppose it (Gale, 2020; Thomas & Horowitz, 2020).

In some ways, recent unrest mirrors the protests and riots that emerged from the civil rights movement. The protests and mass violence were spontaneous and expressed diffuse but bitter discontent with the racial status quo. They signaled the continuing racial inequality, urban poverty and despair, and the reality of separate communities, unequal and hostile.

Continuing Separation: Envisioning the Past and Future

The shooting of Michael Brown became a conduit for societal discussions about race-related issues. One topic that continues to produce fierce debate concerns Civil War monuments and other Confederate-related objects in public places such as parks, school grounds, and town squares.

Americans who disapprove of their presence say they represent a limited view of southern history that's focused on only one perspective of the Civil War. Without sociohistorical context, like one might find in a museum, these objects symbolically honor the system of slavery and the people who supported it. For many, especially Black Americans, the continued presence of these objects, especially in public spaces, suggests formal, continuing approval of anti-Black racism and disregard for Black Americans (Agiesta, 2015). The mayor of New Orleans articulated these concerns in a speech about the city's removal of its remaining Civil War monuments:

> It immediately begs the questions, why there are no slave ship monuments, no prominent markers on public land to remember the lynchings or the slave blocks; nothing to remember this long chapter of our lives; the pain, the sacrifice, the shame . . . So for those self-appointed defenders of history and the monuments, they are eerily silent on what amounts to this historical malfeasance, a lie by omission. There is a difference between remembrance of history and reverence of it. (Landrieu, 2017)

Yet, meaning is subjective. Many Americans, especially southern whites, equate Confederate-era objects with "Southern pride." They say this includes love of family, brotherhood, sacrifice in war, individualism, taking a stand, and the importance of honoring one's ancestors. For them, keeping these objects in the public view is an important reminder of those ideals.

Generally, opinions about confederate symbols fall along racial lines. For example, in a 2015 survey, 75% of southern whites called the Confederate flag "a symbol of pride." The same amount of southern Black Americans (75%) saw it as "a symbol of racism" (Agiesta, 2015). These differing views are part of what fueled protests in 2015 after South Carolina decided to remove the Confederate flag from its State House grounds (Rosenblatt & Siemaszko, 2017), a decision hastened by Dylann Roof's killing of nine Black Americans at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston.

The flag's placement at the capitol goes back to 1961, near the zenith of the civil rights movement. Until the 1940s, people rarely used the flag except in Civil War re-enactments, to honor the dead, or in Confederate veterans' parades (Bruzgulis, 2015; Strother et al., 2017a, 2017b). However, its meaning changed, and it surged in popularity after the "Dixiecrat revolt" of 1948 when white southerners walked out of the Democratic National Convention to protest the party's civil rights goals and actions.

Whatever its historic meaning, the Confederate battle flag became a symbol of segregation. A "flag fad" broke out across the country (and in military bases abroad), peaking between 1950 and 1952 when millions of flags in various forms (e.g., pins, cloth) were sold (Coski, 2009, p. 111). Some southern states began incorporating aspects of it into their state flags as visible reminders of their resistance to civil rights (Coski, 2009). These efforts increased with the decision in *Brown v. the Board of Education*. For example, two years after *Brown,* Georgia changed its state flag to highlight the Confederate emblem. A proposal for its change suggested a desire to honor southern tradition, yet it didn't mention the Civil War or Confederate soldiers as part of its motivation. Rather, it said that school integration was "an affront and challenge to [those] traditions" and it vowed "to protect and maintain the segregation of the races in our schools" (Strother et al., 2017b).

Instead of redesigning its state flag, South Carolina started flying the Confederate flag atop its statehouse in 1961, ostensibly to celebrate the Confederate War Centennial but also showing its segregationist stance. Some 50 odd years later, new civil rights activists would bring the flag down, in the spirit of joy and hope, amidst clamor and resentment, and as part of a continuing struggle between groups.

One of the most shocking instances of this contemporary struggle was in Charlottesville, Virginia, at a white nationalist (WN) rally in 2017. The gathering was one of the largest of its kind in America in decades. White

Removal of Robert E. Lee statue in New Orleans in May 2017.

Infrogmation of New Orleans / Wikimedia Commons

supremacist groups such as the KKK, neo-Nazis, neo-Confederates, the Proud Boys, and various militia came from around the country (Morlin, 2017).

Over the past few years, people have started calling these groups, collectively, the *Alt-Right*—as if they are merely an "alternative" choice. This label is part of a larger effort to become more mainstream. As such, at least one major group has replaced the swastikas on its uniforms and banners with the Odal Rune ( ), a lesser-known Nazi symbol (Kovaleski et al., 2016). Most rally participants proudly displayed symbols of their group membership such as shields emblazoned with Iron or St. Andrew's crosses, white robes and pointed hats, and, for many, confederate flags—in this context, an unmistakable symbol of white supremacy.

They planned to protest the scheduled removal of a Robert E. Lee statue from a local park, but the event was part of a larger mission to "Unite the Right"—specifically, to build a coalition of white Americans who, a century ago, would have felt divided due to ethnic heritage (e.g., Irish, French) or region (e.g., northerners, southerners). One speaker noted this upending of the historical pattern when he rhetorically pitted whites against nonwhites, saying, "We are all White, and that means we are all in the same boat now" (Law, 2017). Participants carried torches and shouted phrases such as "You will not replace us" (sometimes "Jews will not replace us"). On one level, this phrase signifies their resistance to the statue's planned removal. On another, it suggests the participants' sense of being replaced within the nation's changing demographics, what some of them call "white genocide" (Kessler, 2017; Law, 2017). They were met with resistance by locals and activists (including "anti-fascists") from around the country. Most of the protests were peaceful, but violent clashes resulted in three deaths and dozens of injuries, leading the governor to declare a state of emergency (Stolberg & Rosenthal, 2017). Since then, more than 125 such events have occurred (Miller & Graves, 2020).

In the context of the Dixiecrat Revolt (1948) and *Brown* (1954), we can view the addition of the Confederate symbols to state flags, city buildings, and public spaces as symbolic resistance to racial equality generally and to federal civil rights laws of the era specifically (Bruzgulis, 2015; Coski, 2009; Strother et al., 2017a, 2017b). Similarly, we can interpret 21st-century battles about race-related objects, such as Confederate monuments, as representative of group struggles to define meaning, history, and identity. Both provide evidence of the continuing separation between Black and white Americans.

The Criminal Justice System and Black Americans

No area of race relations seems more volatile and controversial than the relationship between the Black community and the criminal justice system. There's a long history of considerable mistrust and resentment between the police and minorities, and it's common for Black Americans to see the system as stacked against them.

A Biased Criminal Justice System? The perception of bias isn't without justification. As we've shown, the criminal justice system has a long history of mistreating or abusing Black Americans (e.g., the Black Codes, during desegregation). Within this context, it's understandable that Black Americans are more likely than whites to view the police and the criminal justice system with suspicion. To illustrate, a 2020 nationally representative survey found that significant racial differences in views of the police. For example, 87% of Black respondents (vs. only 57% of whites) thought that the police did a "poor" job of using appropriate force in various situations and 90% (vs. 57% of whites) thought they did a poor job of treating racial and ethnic groups fairly (Pew Research Center, July 2020).

In 2017, results from a comprehensive national study, Discrimination in America (DIA), showed comparable patterns. This study is interesting because researchers conducted five comparable surveys across five major racial/ethnic groups. In addition to asking about general perceptions about group experiences, questions also asked about *personal* experiences of discrimination that respondents felt happened because of their race. In this way, the surveys also assess perceptions of prejudice. However, it's difficult to say whether someone's personal experiences of discrimination shape general attitudes about discrimination or the reverse. Nevertheless, the findings are striking. Half (50%) of the Black American participants reported personal experiences of discrimination by police because of their race—five times more than whites (10%; NPR et al., 2018, p. 8). More than half (54%) said that Black

Americans, as a group, "often" experience police discrimination and 29% said it "sometimes" happens (NPR et al., 2017a, p. 34, Q16).

Most social science research has documented pervasive bias in the criminal justice system, at all levels, against Black Americans (and other minorities). Even slight acts of racial discrimination throughout the stages of processing in the criminal justice system can have a cumulative effect, resulting in significant differences in racial outcomes. Because they are disproportionately poor, for example Black defendants have less access to bail money, spend more time incarcerated, and have less access to defense counsel and community resources (See also Rosich, 2007; The Sentencing Project, 2020). Black Americans have higher rates of being stopped, handcuffed, and searched by police. They're arrested and convicted at higher rates for offenses ranging from misdemeanors to murder. And they're sentenced to more time than whites, even when criminal history, education, age, and other factors are similar (see, for example, Alexander, 2012; Hetey et al., 2016; Stevenson & Mayson, 2018; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2017).

The War on Drugs policies of the 1980s led to a massive increase in the American prison population and primarily affected Black men, especially those with less formal education (Neal & Armin, 2014). Since 2009, the prison population has declined due to policy reversals and decreased crime. The incarceration rate for Black American men dropped faster than it did for whites, helping to shrink that racial incarceration gap by about 17%. Women's racial incarceration gap declined more dramatically, in part because the incarceration rate for white women increased (The Sentencing Project, 2015, p. 2). Even with this progress, Black Americans are five times more likely to be incarcerated than whites (Gramlich, 2018, 2020; Nellis, 2016). Since incarceration profoundly affects other life experiences, including family life, housing, employment, and the right to vote, it follows that Black Americans would feel those effects more often (Alexander, 2012).

Education is a key factor affecting imprisonment. Pettit and Western (2004) studied men born between 1965 and 1969 and found that 20% of Black Americans, compared with 3% of whites, were imprisoned by the time they were 30 years old. Nearly 60% of the Black American men in this cohort who didn't complete high school went to prison. Similarly, a 2010 study found that nearly a third of Black men, then aged 26 to 29, had dropped out of high school or been otherwise institutionalized as youth (See Borr, 2020; Neal & Armin, 2014, p. 3). By late 2015, 9.1% of Black men ages 20 to 34 were incarcerated compared to 1.6% of white men of the same age, a slight decrease from 1985 rates. Men with lower levels of education suffered disproportionate rates of incarceration, and the racial incarceration gap between Blacks and whites was significantly bigger for those who didn't graduate high school (Pettit & Sykes, 2017, p. 25).

Youth incarceration rates reflect these general patterns: decreasing but with continuing racial disparities. In 2014, just over a million children were arrested; 34% were Black—2.5 times the rate for whites (relative to population size). Additionally, Black youth were more likely to go to prison rather than community-based residential programs and they received adult sentences nine times more frequently than whites (Children's Defense Fund, 2017, pp. 32–33). Once they left the juvenile system, about two thirds dropped out of school, which led to a greater chance of incarceration (Aizer & Doyle, 2015; Children's Defense Fund, 2017, p. 29).

The War on Drugs. Perhaps the most important reason for racial differences in adult incarceration rates is that, since the early 1980s, Black men have been much more likely than white men to be penalized by America's "get tough" policy on drugs, especially crack cocaine. Crack is a cheap, smokable form of powdered cocaine used disproportionately by people of color from impoverished neighborhoods. As concern about a crack epidemic spread, police actively targeted inner-city areas using SWAT teams and "stop and frisk" methods that one federal judge recently called a "policy of indirect racial profiling" that violated constitutional rights (Goldstein, 2013). Street-level dealers (mostly young Black men) felt the brunt of the anti-drug campaign, though it produced little decline in the number of people either dealing or using (Cooper, 2015).

Originally, people thought that crack was much more addictive than powdered cocaine and sentencing guidelines reflected this idea. For example, until 2010, federal law required a mandatory five-year prison term for possession of five grams of crack. A person would need to have one hundred times

more powdered cocaine (500 grams) for a comparable sentence (See Cooley, 2021; Lynch, 2021; Rosich, 2007; Schuppe, 2021). Thus, although it may have seemed race neutral, the "war on drugs" produced significant racial disparities and constituted a form of institutional discrimination. The result was that many more poor minorities were (and still are) serving lengthy prison sentences compared to whites, who tend to use the powdered form of cocaine.

In 2010, the sentencing disparity was reduced by congressional action, and the mandatory five-year prison term for simple possession of crack cocaine was eliminated (Eckholm, 2010), yet Figure 6.2 illustrates the much higher drug arrest rate for Black Americans since the early 1980s. Notice that the arrest rate for Black Americans spiked in the late 1980s, when the war on drugs began.

One national study, in 2020, focused on marijuana arrests and found huge racial disparities in every state except Hawaii. Overall, Black Americans were roughly 3.64 times more likely to be arrested

Trayvon Martin, another victim of a racially biased criminal justice system
©iStockphoto.com/jcenteno89

FIGURE 6.2 ■ Drug Abuse Arrests for Juveniles Age 10–17 by Race, 1980–2019

Source: National Center for Juvenile Justice (2018).

for possession. Is this because Black Americans use the drug more than white Americans? Decidedly not. In fact, marijuana use is slightly higher among whites (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). Other studies on drug use rates show virtually no difference between racial/ethnic groups (Johnston et al., 2012; National Center for Health Statistics, 2019).

So, what explains the huge racial disparity in arrests? Black Americans are more likely to be policed, watched, stopped and frisked, and profiled than whites. Their greater vulnerability to arrest for marijuana, a relatively minor offense, is echoed in patterns throughout the criminal justice system. They go to prison on drug possession charges about five times more than whites; they're also exonerated from wrongful convictions 12 times as often (Gross et al., 2017).

Racial Profiling. Profiling happens when the police use a person's race to help decide if they're suspicious or dangerous (Kennedy, 2001; Smith & Mason, 2016). This practice is significant because it lays the foundation for other racial inequalities in the criminal justice system, including incarceration. It's like the first domino that gets knocked over, causing the others to fall.

Earlier, we reported some findings from the 2017 DIA surveys that compared people's experiences across five racial/ethnic groups. Sixty percent (60%) of Black participants reported that they or a family member had been "unfairly stopped" or "unfairly treated" by the police because of race; that's 10 times higher than whites (6%; NPR et al., 2018, p. 9). Almost two thirds of Blacks (67%) living in the suburbs reported being "unfairly stopped" or "unfairly treated" by police compared with about half (49%) in urban areas (NPR et al., 2017a, p. 8), perhaps seeming "more suspicious" in the suburban context. Another national survey found that 17% of young Black men felt "treated unfairly" by police within the previous 30 days (Newport, 2013). Some argue that humiliating encounters with police (e.g., being questioned for "driving while Black") are so common, they're almost an unwelcome rite of passage for Black men (Butler, 2018; Coates, 2015; Kennedy, 2001, p. 7).

Whether by policy or informal mechanisms, the tendency to focus on Black Americans and to follow, stop, and question them disproportionately is a form of discrimination that generates resentment and increases the distrust and fear many Black Americans feel toward their local police forces (Hall et al., 2016). For example, 61% of Black respondents in the DIA survey felt that local police were "more likely to use unnecessary force on a Black person than on a white person in the same situation." Because of concerns, 27% of Black Americans limited their activities (e.g., driving) to avoid contact with police and 31% didn't call the police, even when needed; the rate for whites (2%) was 15 times lower (NPR et al., 2017a, p. 17)

Data support some of these concerns: Black boys and men (15–34 years old) are killed in officer-related shootings at significantly higher rates than others (9–16 times more, depending on the data used; see also Arthur et al., 2017; Fryer, 2018; Kindy et al., 2015; Swain et al., 2015). In a 2016 survey of more than 8,000 police officers in America, almost half (42%) said they "nearly always or often have serious concerns about their safety." However, Black officers were about twice as likely as white officers (57% vs. 27%) to say that recent deaths of Blacks during encounters with police are signs of broader problems, not isolated incidents (Morin et al., 2017).

The New Jim Crow? Many of the ideas in this section are presented in a thought-provoking, important book, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (Alexander, 2012). Alexander argues that the racial differentials in the war on drugs amount to a new racial control system that has halted Civil Rights era advances. The millions of Black men who have been convicted under the racially biased drug laws aren't only sent to prison; they also carry the stigma of a felony conviction for their entire lives. Their prospects for legitimate employment are miniscule, they lose the right to vote, and they are ineligible for many government programs, including student loans for college. Like the entire Black population under de jure segregation, they are marginalized, excluded, second-class citizens highly controlled by the state.

Increasing Class Inequality

As Black Americans moved out of the rural South and as the repressive force of de jure segregation receded, social class inequality within the Black American population increased. Since the 1960s, the Black middle class has grown, but Black poverty continues to be a serious problem for Black Americans.

The Black Middle Class A small Black middle class, based largely on occupations and businesses serving only the Black American community, had existed since before the Civil War (Frazier, 1957). Has this more affluent segment benefited from increasing societal acceptance, civil rights legislation, and affirmative action programs? Has the Black middle class continued to increase in size and affluence?

The answer appears to be no. Any progress made since the civil rights era seems to have been wiped out by the economic downturn that began in 2007, from which Black Americans have barely recovered.

The size and prosperity of the Black middle class was always less than people assume. For example, one study showed that, between 1996 and 2002, the percentage of Black middle- and upper class Black Americans never exceeded 25% of the Black population. For whites, it was 60%—more than twice the size of Blacks (Killewald & Bryan, 2018; Kochhar, 2004). Prior to the 2007 economic crisis, the Black American middle class was smaller than the white middle class and much less affluent.

Figure 6.3 compares the wealth of Black Americans and whites over more than three decades. Wealth is defined in terms of total assets (houses, cars, investments, and so forth) minus debts. The wealth of Black Americans has been a mere fraction of white wealth, generally running at about 12% of white wealth.

The bad economic times that began in 2007 affected virtually all Americans but were disproportionally hard on Black Americans. In 2016, the median wealth of white households was $171,000, well below the levels for 2007 but 10 times greater than Black households ($17,000) (Asante-Muhammed, 2017; Kochhar & Cilluffo, 2017. See also Kochhar et al., 2011; Pew Research Center, 2016, p. 25; Shapiro et al., 2013, p. 2).

These economic differences are due partly to present discrimination and partly to the racial gaps in income, wealth, and economic opportunity inherited from past generations. Racial differences in homeownership are a key component of the racial wealth gap (Shapiro et al., 2013, p. 4). The greater economic marginality of the Black middle class today is a form of past-in-present institutional discrimination. White parents (and grandparents) enjoyed much higher rates of homeownership, which allowed them to finance their children's college education and subsidize business ventures and other home mortgages (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006). Discriminatory practices such as redlining meant that Black parents (and grandparents) didn't have this same resource and advantage (see Chapter 5).

Not only is their economic position more marginal, but middle-class Blacks commonly report being unable to escape the narrow straitjacket of race. No matter their occupation or professional accomplishments, many people still see race—Blackness—as their primary defining characteristic

FIGURE 6.3 ■ Median Family Wealth by Race, 1983–2016

Source: Asante-Muhammed (2017).

(Benjamin, 2005; Cose, 1993; Hughes & Thomas, 1998). Without denying some advances, many researchers argue that the stigma of race still limits Black Americans' life chances.

Some people express concern that greater class differentiation within the Black American community may decrease its solidarity and cohesion. More income inequality among Blacks exists than ever before; the urban poor are at one extreme and some of the wealthiest people in the world are at the other. If the Black middle class increases, will class divisions grow as they have for whites? If so, will this further marginalize impoverished Blacks, especially those in poor urban areas?

Urban Poverty Black Americans have become an urban minority group, and their fate is inextricably bound to that of America's cities (Figure 5.2). That is, we can't successfully address Black–white relations without dealing with urban issues, and vice versa.

As you saw in Chapter 5, automation and mechanization in the workplace eliminated many manual labor jobs that sustained city dwellers in earlier decades (Kasarda, 1989). The manufacturing (secondary) segment of the labor force has shrunk, and the service sector has continued to expand. The more desirable jobs in the service sector have increasingly demanding educational prerequisites. The service sector jobs available to people with lower educational credentials pay low wages—often less than what's needed for essentials; they offer low security and few (if any) benefits or opportunities for advancement. This form of past-in-present institutional discrimination is a powerful disadvantage for colonized groups such as Black Americans, who were excluded from educational opportunities for centuries.

Furthermore, many blue-collar jobs that escaped automation have migrated from cities. Industrialists have moved their businesses to areas where labor is cheaper, unions have less power, and taxes are lower. This movement to the suburbs and to the Sunbelt has been devastating for people living in city centers (Wilson, 1996). Historically, poor transportation systems, the absence of affordable housing (and housing discrimination and segregation, specifically) combined to keep poor Blacks (and other people of color) confined to center-city neighborhoods, distant from opportunities for jobs and economic improvement (Feagin, 2001; Kasarda, 1989; Massey & Denton, 1993).

Black urban poverty is consequential and persistent over generations. About 67% of Black Americans raised in the poorest neighborhoods (vs. 40% of white Americans) remain there after a generation (Butler & Grabinsky, 2020). After some improvements in the late 20th century, the racial concentration of poverty increased. Since 2000, the percentage of Black Americans living in "high poverty neighborhoods" (with more than 40% of the population living below the poverty level) increased from 19% to 25%. Comparatively, only about 8% of whites lived in high poverty areas (Jargowsky, 2015, p. 6). Persistent poverty is harmful because it limits opportunity for education, the acquisition of job skills, transportation, health care, and myriad other resources across the social, cultural, and economic spectrum (see Saenz, 2005).

Some of these industrial and economic forces affect all poor urbanites, not only minority groups or Black Americans specifically. The dilemmas facing many Black Americans isn't only due to racism or discrimination; the impersonal forces of evolving industrialization and social class structures matter as well. However, when immutable racial stigmas and centuries of prejudice (even disguised as modern racism) are added to these economic and urban developments, the forces limiting and constraining many Black Americans become extremely formidable.

For more than 60 years, impoverished Black Americans were increasingly concentrated in narrowly delimited urban areas ("the ghetto") where poverty was compounded and reinforced by other problems, including joblessness, high school dropout rates, crime, drug use, and teenage pregnancy, and inadequate support to move up the economic ladder. These increasingly isolated neighborhoods were fertile grounds for the development of oppositional cultures, which reject or invert the values of the larger society. The Black urban counterculture may be most visible in music, fashion, and other forms of popular culture, but it's also manifested in a widespread lack of trust in the larger society, especially whites. An **urban underclass**, barred from the mainstream economy and the primary labor force and consisting largely of poor Black Americans and other minority groups of color, has become a prominent and perhaps permanent feature of the American landscape (Kasarda, 1989; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987, 1996, 2009).

Consider this comparison between today's Black American underclass and Black southerners under de jure segregation:

- In both eras, a large segment of the Black American population was cut off from opportunities for success and growth.

- In the earlier era, Black Americans were isolated in rural areas; now, they're more likely to be in urban areas, especially city centers.

- Historically, escape from segregation was limited primarily by political and legal restrictions and blatant racial prejudice; escape from poverty in the present is limited by economic and educational deficits and a subtler and amorphous prejudice.

The result is the same: Many Black Americans remain a colonized minority group—isolated, marginalized, and burdened with a legacy of powerlessness and poverty.

Modern Institutional Discrimination: Networking and Economic Vulnerability

As you recall, institutional discrimination refers to patterns of inequality that operate through the everyday functioning of society. We have examined many of these patterns, including segregated schools, the disenfranchisement of the Black vote under Jim Crow, and banking practices that made it difficult for minority groups to own their own home. Sometimes these practices are blatant and obvious but, in post-Jim Crow United States, they can be indirect and sometimes difficult to measure and document. They often flow from blatant racial discrimination of the past but aren't overtly racial today. They operate through a series of cumulative effects that tend to filter Black Americans into less desirable positions in education, housing, the criminal justice system, and the job market. To better understand this, we'll consider two areas that perpetuate racial class inequalities: employment networks that were closed in the past and remain shut today and the greater vulnerability of the Black community to economic hardships in the larger society.

Closed Networks and Racial Exclusion Royster (2003) dramatically illustrated the continuing importance of race as a primary factor in the perpetuation of class inequality in her study of Black and white graduates of a Baltimore trade school. Her respondents were nearly identical in terms of work credentials. Yet, the Black graduates were employed less often in the trades for which they'd been educated, had lower wages and fewer promotions, and experienced longer periods of unemployment. Virtually every white graduate found secure and reasonably lucrative employment. The Black graduates, in stark contrast, were usually unable to stay in the trades and became low-skilled, low-paid service sector workers instead.

Royster (2003) found that what really mattered wasn't *what* you know but *who* you know. White graduates had access to networks of referrals and recruitment that linked them to the job market in ways that weren't available to Black graduates. In job searches, whites were able to use intra-racial networks of family and friends, connections so powerful that they "assured even the worst [white] troublemaker a solid place in the blue-collar fold" (p. 78).

Rivera's (2015) analysis of elite students uncovered a similar process. Parents and students used social networks to share important information about opportunities (e.g., internships) and to broaden connections—both offered advantages toward getting into elite colleges or working in the best jobs (p. 7).

Similarly, DiTomaso (2013) interviewed 246 working- and middle-class whites and found that more than two thirds (70%) of their jobs came from personal networks (e.g., friends, neighbors, family). Given that white social networks are overwhelmingly white, it stands to reason that Blacks are excluded from these employment networks. Others got jobs as favors. DiTomaso argues that such favors, within informal networks, have the same effect as overt discrimination.

More recently, Padulla and Pager (2019) analyzed the effects of social networks for a representative sample of 2060 job seekers. They found similar processes at play for both black and white applicants;

both used interpersonal networks extensively and, in both cases, networks were more effective in leading to job offers than the formal methods of job-seeking. However, the networks of Black applicants were much less productive, largely because Blacks were much less likely to personally know someone—or someone who knew someone—at the companies that were hiring. Thus, networking was a common job-seeking strategy for all but the networks for Blacks were less connected to the job structure.

These results run contrary to some deeply held American values, most notably the widespread, strong belief that success in life comes from individual effort and self-discipline. A recent survey documents the strength of this faith. Researchers asked a representative sample of adult Americans whether they thought people got ahead by hard work, luck, or a combination of the two. About 70% (said "hard work," and another 17% chose "hard work and luck equally" (National Opinion Research Council, 1972–2020). This overwhelming belief in the importance of individual effort echoes human capital theory and other traditional sociological perspectives on assimilation discussed in Chapter 2.

These results indicate that the American faith in the power of hard work alone is simply wrong. To the contrary, access to jobs is influenced by networks of relationships that aren't open to everyone. These subtle patterns of exclusion and closed intra-racial networks are more difficult to document than the blatant discrimination that was at the core of Jim Crow segregation, but they can be just as devastating in their effects and just as powerful as mechanisms for perpetuating racial gaps in income and employment.

The Differential Impact of Hard Times Consider the unemployment rate, which generally runs twice as high for Blacks as for whites. During the 2007 recession, unemployment increased for all groups. However, as Figure 6.4 shows, the unemployment rate for Blacks rose at a steeper angle and went to a much higher peak. The highest rate for whites was 8.7%, about 55% of the peak rate of 15.8% for Blacks. Also, the white unemployment rate leveled off and began decreasing somewhat earlier than the rate for Black Americans.

Additionally, the recession disproportionately affected Black American homeownership. For most Americans, homeownership both reflects and provides a crucial source of wealth. For example, people can take out business and school loans using their houses as collateral. Therefore, homeownership can help families achieve upward social mobility (Oliver & Shapiro, 2008, p. A9).

FIGURE 6.4 ■ Unemployment Rate by Race, 1972–2020

Source: 1972–2013 (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013), 2014–2016 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016), 2017–2018 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018), 2019, and 2020 U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021).

In addition to the influence of redlining on residential segregation, Oliver and Shapiro (2008) found that Black Americans and other minority groups of color were more than three times as likely as whites to be victimized by toxic subprime home loans and more than twice as likely to suffer fore-closure as a result. Subprime home loans were new financial instruments that enabled many previously ineligible people to qualify for home mortgages. Predatory lenders marketed the loans especially to more vulnerable populations, and the deals had hidden costs, higher interest rates, and other features that made keeping up with payments difficult. One result of the housing market's collapse was "the greatest loss of financial wealth" in the Black American community (Coates, 2014; Oliver & Shapiro, 2008, p. A11). By 2019, only 42% of Black Americans were homeowners versus 72% of non–Hispanic whites (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021a).

Thus, a group that was already more vulnerable and economically marginalized suffered the greatest proportional loss—an economic collapse that will take years to recover from. Societal disasters such as the 2007 recession aren't shared equally by everyone; they're especially severe for the most vulnerable groups with the most tenuous connections to prosperity and affluence. Though not obvious, this persistent racial inequality reflects decades of blatant, direct, state-supported segregation in America's past.

The Family Institution and the Culture of Poverty

Black American family life has been a continuing source of public concern and controversy. Some analysts see Black American families as structurally weak compared to white families. They assert that particular family forms are the cause of Black Americans' problems, such as persistent poverty. The most famous study in this tradition was the 1965 Moynihan Report, which focused on Black Americans' higher rates of divorce, separation, desertion, and children born to unmarried Black women (compared to whites). Moynihan asserted that these factors indicated a crumbling Black family structure that would perpetuate a cycle of poverty for generations (p. iii). Yet, family structure isn't monolithic, there is no "one" family for any race or ethnic group, though we see patterns ebb and flow over time and place. Figure 6.5 compares the percentage of households headed by women (Black and white) with the percentage of heterosexual households headed by married couples. (Note that the trends have stabilized in recent years.)

FIGURE 6.5 ■ Composition of Family Household in the United States by Race, 1970–2020

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1978, p. 43), U.S. Census Bureau (2007, p. 56), U.S. Census Bureau (2017a). U.S. Census Bureau (2021d). Table H1. Households by Type and Tenure of Householder for Selected Characteristics: 2020.

The Moynihan Report implicitly located the problems associated with urban poverty within the Black American community, particularly Black American families. He saw the Black family as "broken." Moynihan's argument is consistent with the idea of a **culture of poverty** or the belief that poor people have maladaptive beliefs, values, norms, and other qualities that make and keep them poor. We'll discuss this idea more in Chapter 8, but to summarize, poverty supposedly encourages **fatalism** or the sense that you can't control destiny. Therefore, you should focus on the present. After all, if you can't guarantee the future, why not enjoy life now? The supposed desire for instant gratification among the poor features prominently in this theory and is juxtaposed with the ability to defer gratification (thought to be essential for middle-class success). According to this theory, other problematic characteristics of the poor include tendencies toward violence, school failure, authoritarianism, alcoholism, and family desertion by men (Lewis, 1959, 1965, 1966; for a recent reprise of the debate over the culture of poverty concept, see Small et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2011).

Belief in a culture of poverty leads to the conclusion that if the poor could adopt "good" (i.e., white, middle-class) values and norms, they wouldn't suffer from the problems of urban poverty. Note that this approach is consistent with the traditional assimilationist perspective and human capital theory.

Another perspective, more consistent with the theories in this book, sees Black American family structure as the *result* of urban poverty rather than a *cause* of it. For example, in impoverished neighborhoods, the number of men able to economically support their families has been reduced by high rates of unemployment, incarceration, and mortality (e.g., through violence). These conditions are, in turn, created by the concentration of urban poverty and the growth of the "underclass" (Butler & Grabinsky, 2020; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1996, 2009).

Even when men are available, they may not bring enough human or social capital to the table for marriage to "make sense." For example, Boo (2001b), Edin and Kefalas (2005), and Raley et al. (2015) suggest that young, poor Black (and Latina) girls and women want to marry, but many do a cost–benefit analysis before settling down. If a man was (or may be) unemployed or incarcerated, they may drain family resources rather than contribute to them. Similarly, Boo (2001a) shows how "welfare reform" disincentivized marriage (and even cohabitation) by cutting off forms of government aid once single women became partnered. Thus, with a smaller pool of eligible partners, impoverished women became heads of households, responsible for all aspects of family life.

Stack's (1974) ethnography of a poor, Black, urban community challenged Moynihan's general assumptions. Because she became a participant in the community, she was able to view it in the long term and from an insider perspective. She argued that participants used adaptive strategies to cope with issues of poverty. Community members defined *family* broadly to include fictive kin (those you "adopt" as family), people moved around as necessity dictated, and members engaged in a lot of "swapping" as needed, sharing resources (food, money) and even long-term childcare in creative, collaborative ways. From an outsider's perspective, such as Moynihan's, these families may have seemed disorganized and lacking in self-sufficiency. Stack shows they weren't fatalistic.

Census data shows the effect of intersecting gender, race, and marital statuses on family income. In 2019, 7.8% of men lived in poverty; the rate for women was 9.2%. That may not seem much, but women's rate is 18% higher than men's (a gender effect). About 1 in 20 (5.4%) of non–Hispanic white women are poor. The rate is more than triple for Black women; 18.5% are poor (a race effect). More than 25% of all single-women–headed households are poor. Given the intersection of these three variables, it may not surprise you that families headed by single Black mothers have higher rates of poverty (30.0%) compared to households headed by single non–Hispanic white mothers (17.2%) (Current Population Surveys, 2020). Families headed by Black women tend to be poor not because they're weak but because of the lower wages accorded to women generally and to Black women specifically (see Figure 6.6. Note that Figure 6.6 includes only full-time, year-round workers and that wages are in 2019 dollars, to control for the effects of inflation). Black woman workers have the lowest wages throughout this period. Also note that the gap between Black women and white men has narrowed over the years. In 1955, Black women earned about a third of what white men earned. In 2019, the gap stood at about 68%, largely because men's wages (for Black Americans and whites) have been relatively flat since the 1970s, while women's wages (for whites and Black Americans) have risen. This pattern reflects the

impact of deindustrialization: the shift from manufacturing, which has eliminated many blue-collar jobs, and the rise of employment sectors in which women tend to be more concentrated.

FIGURE 6.6 ■ Median Incomes for Full-Time, Year-Round Workers by Race and Gender, 1955–2019

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2021a). Historical Income Tables: Table P-36.

The poverty associated with woman-headed households reflects the interactive effects of sexism and racism on Black women, not some weakness in the Black family. Black American poverty results from the complex forces of past and present institutional discrimination, racism and prejudice, the precarious position of Black American women in the labor force, and continuing urbanization and industrialization. The Black American family doesn't need "fixing." The attitudes and values of the urban underclass are more the results of impoverishment than they are the causes. The solution to Black American urban poverty lies in fundamental changes in the urban industrial economy and sweeping alterations in the distribution of resources and opportunities.

Mixed Race and New Racial Identities

As you've learned, Americans traditionally see race as a simple dichotomy: People are either Black or white. Historically, the "one-drop rule" meant that people of mixed racial descent were classified as Black. To illustrate, consider the life of Gregory "Billy" Williams, a boy growing up in the segregated South in the late 1940s and early 1950s. When Billy was 10, his father revealed that he was "half-colored." Under the one-drop rule, that made Billy Black. He at first refused to believe his father: "I'm not colored, I'm white! I look white! I've always been white! I go to the 'whites only' school, 'whites only' movie theaters, and 'whites only' swimming pool" (Williams, 1995, p. 34). Gradually, he came to realize that his life—not only his opportunities and his relations with others but his very identity—had been transformed by his father's revelation.

Historically, people like Williams had few choices: Others classified him as Black, and the rigid social conventions of the day forced him to accept that identity, with all its implications. Today, five decades after the formal end of Jim Crow, Americans are confronting the limitations of this dichotomous racial convention. Multiracial people are increasing in number (Pew Research Center, 2018; Tavernise et al., 2021).

Some are among the most well-known people in America, or even in the world. Former President Obama is one example; others include musicians, actors, athletes, politicians, and entrepreneurs such

as Zendaya, Alicia Keys, Meghan Markle, Jason Momoa, Mariah Carey, H.E.R., Derek Jeter, Halle Berry, Tracee Ellis Ross, Chrissy Teigen, Tiger Woods, and Kamala Harris.

How do people of multiracial descent define themselves today? How do others define them? Have the old understandings of race become irrelevant? Ideas are changing rapidly, especially among young people.

One older study illustrates some possible identities for mixed-race individuals. Rockquemore and Brunsma (2008) interviewed several hundred college students with one white and one Black parent. Their sample isn't representative; their findings might not apply to all biracial Americans. Nevertheless, their study provides insights into the conceptually complex and highly variable nature of multiracial identity (p. 50). They found that the most common identity (58%) was *multiracial*: people who saw themselves as neither black nor white but as a third category linked to both racial groups. One respondent said, "I'm not Black, I'm biracial." Other multiracial people identified as either black (13%) or white (3%) or rejected the concept of race entirely (15%). A small minority (4%) changed identities as they changed groups, slipping effortlessly from Black to white and back to Black. People in this group felt empowered by their flexibility and thought that they possessed a high degree of "cultural savvy."

A more recent study was based on a nationally representative sample of about 1500 multiracial individuals. Interestingly, unlike the college sample summarized above, only a minority (31%) of these respondents considered themselves to be "multiracial," the rest identified with a single racial group. When asked why, the most common reasons cited were that they looked like a specific race or that they were raised in a particular racial group. About a third said that they never knew a family member from a different race. Contrary to America's traditionally dichotomous view of race, only 20% of the respondents said that they felt external pressure to identify with a single race (Pew Research Center, 2015).

What can we conclude? Ideas about race as a dichotomy (e.g., the one-drop rule) live on but in weakened forms. Racial identity is evolving and becoming more complex. Similar to other aspects of self-identity, racial identity isn't permanent or fixed; it's contingent on social context. Multiracial people have choices about identity and they're contingent on different factors (such as personal appearance) but they're always made in the context of a highly race-conscious society with long and strong traditions of racism and prejudice.

Prejudice and Discrimination

In Chapter 3, you learned modern racism (the subtler form of prejudice) dominates contemporary race relations. Although the traditional, more overt forms haven't disappeared, contemporary expressions of prejudice are often amorphous and indirect. For example, the widespread belief among whites that racial discrimination in the United States has been eliminated may be a way of blaming Black Americans—rather than themselves or the larger society—for continuing racial inequality.

As you've learned, a parallel process of evolution from overt forms to more subtle and covert forms has occurred with discrimination. The clarity of Jim Crow has yielded to the ambiguity of modern institutional discrimination and the continuing legacy of past discrimination in the present.

How can the pervasive problems of racial inequality be addressed in the present atmosphere of modern racism, low levels of sympathy for the urban poor, and subtle but powerful institutional discrimination? Many people advocate a "color-blind" approach to the problems of racial inequality: The legal and political systems should simply ignore skin color and treat everyone the same. This approach seems sensible to many people because, after all, the legal and overt barriers of Jim Crow discrimination are long gone and, at least at first glance, there are no obvious limits to the life chances of Black Americans.

Others see a color-blind approach as doomed to fail. They argue that to end racial inequality and deal with the legacy of racism, society must use race-conscious programs that explicitly address the problems of race and racism. They assert that color-blind strategies amount to inaction, which will perpetuate (or widen) the present racial equality gap.

ASSIMILATION AND PLURALISM

In this section, we'll use the major concepts of the Gordon model of assimilation to assess the status of Black Americans. To facilitate comparisons, we'll use the same format and organization in the next three chapters. We can't address all aspects of these patterns or go into much depth, so these sections should be regarded as overviews and suggestions for further research.

Acculturation

The Blauner hypothesis states that the culture of groups created by colonization will be attacked, denigrated, and, if possible, eliminated, and this assertion seems well validated by the experiences of Black Americans. African cultures and languages were largely eradicated under slavery. As a powerless, colonized minority group, slaves had few opportunities to preserve their heritage, although traces of African homelands have been found in Black language patterns, kinship systems, music, folk tales, and family legends (see Levine, 1977; Stuckey, 1987).

Cultural domination continued under the Jim Crow system, albeit through a different structural arrangement. Under slavery, the enslaved and enslavers worked together, and interracial contact was common. Under de jure segregation, intergroup contact diminished, and Black Americans and whites generally became more separate. After slavery ended, the Black Americans had somewhat more autonomy (although still few resources) to define itself and develop a distinct culture.

The centuries of cultural domination and separate development have created a unique Black experience in America. Black Americans share language, religion, values, beliefs, and norms with the dominant society, but have developed distinct variations on the general themes.

The acculturation process may have been slowed (or even reversed) by the Black Power Movement. Since the 1960s, there has been an increased interest in African culture, language, clothing, and history, and a more visible celebration of unique Black experiences (e.g., Kwanzaa) and the innumerable contributions of Black Americans to the larger society. Yet, many of those traditions and contributions have existed all along. Perhaps what really changed was the degree of public recognition.

Secondary Structural Assimilation

Structural assimilation, or integration, involves two different phases. Secondary structural assimilation refers to integration in more public areas, such as the job market, schools, and political institutions. We can assess integration in this area by comparing residential patterns, income distributions, job profiles, political power, and levels of education of the different groups. Each of these areas is addressed in the next sections. We'll then discuss primary structural assimilation (integration in intimate associations, such as friendship and intermarriage).

Residential Patterns.

After a century of movement out of the rural South, Black Americans today are highly urbanized and much more spread out across the nation. As you learned in Chapter 5 (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2), about 90% of Black Americans are urban and a slight majority of Black Americans remain in the South. About 35% of Black Americans now live in the Northeast and Midwest, overwhelmingly in urban

areas. Figure 6.7 shows the concentration of Black Americans in the states of the old Confederacy; the urbanized East Coast corridor from Washington, D.C., to Boston; the industrial centers of the Midwest; and, to a lesser extent, California.

| **FIGURE 6.7** ■ **Geographical Distribution of the Black American Population, 2010** |

Source: Rastogi et al. (2011, p. 11).

Residential segregation between Black Americans and whites peaked toward the end of the Jim Crow era, in the 1960s and 1970s, and has decreased in recent decades. Logan and Stults (2011) used data from each census, 1980 to 2010, to track changes in segregation between white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. They used a statistic called the **dissimilarity index**, which shows the percentage of each group that would have to move to a different area to achieve geographical integration. A score above 60 indicates extreme segregation.

In 1980, the index between Black and white Americans was very high at 73. By 2010, it had fallen to 59. Taking a "glass half full" perspective, there's been progress. Conversely, the score is just one point below the "extreme segregation" threshold. (Scores for Hispanic and Asian Americans remained virtually the same over the 40-year period. We'll discuss those findings in Chapters 8 and 9.)

Frey's (2020) research also shows that residential segregation remains substantial despite high rates of immigration and increased racial diversity in the United States. Figure 6.8 compares the racial/ethnic composition of neighborhoods in the 100 largest metropolitan areas in 2000 and 2014 to 2018. Predominately white neighborhoods show some increasing diversity, primarily by the greater inclusion of Latino and Asian residents, but remained largely white.

Similarly, diversity within predominately Black neighborhoods increased somewhat, primarily because of more Latino residents (5% increase). The author of the study concludes that, while residential segregation has declined since the 1960s, the traditional patterns of segregation at the neighborhood level persist (Frey, 2020, p. 1).

As you've learned, numerous practices encourage residential segregation, including racial steering (guiding clients to same-race housing areas) by real estate agents and barely disguised discrimination. The Great Migration out of the South did little to end residential segregation, which tends to be highest in the older industrial cities of the Northeast and upper Midwest. In fact, the five most residentially segregated large metropolitan areas in 2014 to 2018 weren't in southern or border states but were Milwaukee, New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland (Frey, 2020).

Contrary to popular belief, preference for living in same-race neighborhoods plays just a small role in these patterns. For example, studies generally find that Black Americans prefer to live in areas split 50/50 between Black Americans and whites but that whites much prefer neighborhoods with low percentages of Black Americans or Latinos (e.g., see Havekes et al., 2016; Krysan & Farley, 2002; Lewis et al., 2011). The social class and income differences between Black Americans and whites are also

FIGURE 6.8 ■ Residential Segregation in 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2000 and 2014–2017

Neighborhood of average white resident — 2000: White 79, Black 6, Latino or Hispanic 9, Asian/Other 6; 2014–2018: White 71, Black 8, Latino or Hispanic 12, Asian/Other 9

Neighborhood of average black resident — 2000: White 30, Black 52, Latino or Hispanic 12, Asian/Other 6; 2014–2018: White 31, Black 45, Latino or Hispanic 17, Asian/Other 7

■ White   ■ Black   ■ Latino or Hispanic   ■ Asian/Other

Source: Frey (2020).

relatively minor factors in perpetuating residential segregation, as the Black American middle class is just as likely as the Black American poor to be segregated (see also Dwyer, 2010; Stoll, 2004).

School Integration. In 1954, the year of the landmark Brown desegregation decision, the great majority of Black Americans lived in states operating segregated school systems. Compared with white schools, Jim Crow schools were severely underfunded and had fewer qualified teachers, shorter school years, and inadequate physical facilities. School integration was one of the most important goals of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and, aided by pressure from the courts and the federal government, considerable strides were made toward this goal for several decades.

In recent decades, however, the pressure from the federal government has eased, and school integration is slowing and, in many areas, has even reversed. The high point in the desegregation of public


In 1942, white tenants in a Detroit housing project erected this sign to deter people of color from moving in.

Arthur S. Siegel / Library of Congress

schools was in 1988, nearly four decades ago (Oldfield et al., 2016, p. 3). Since the 1990s, the concentration of Black students in schools that are more than 75% minority has increased from 47% to 58%, as displayed in Figure 6.9. Over the same time period, the percentage of white students in schools that are 10% to 74% minority has increased. In part, the changing location of white students is due to their declining numbers in public schools and the recent increases in immigration and the rising presence of Latino and Asian children (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020, p. 1).

FIGURE 6.9 ■ School Segregation for White and Black Students in Public Schools, K Through 12, 1995 and 2017

Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2020).

Not only has desegregation not been achieved, but Black (and other minority) children have been increasingly concentrated in schools that are segregated by social class and by race. Between the 2000–2001 and 2013-2014 school years, the percentage of Black students that attended "High Poverty" schools rose 16 percentage points, from 32% to 48%. Thus, Black students are doubly isolated: by social class and by race. This increasing economic and racial separation is a deep betrayal of the visions and goals of the civil rights movement.

What accounts for the failure to integrate public schools? One important cause is the declining number of whites in the United States (see Figure 1.1) and in public schools in particular: Between 2000 and 2017, the number of white students in public schools declined from almost 29 million to about 24 million and the percentage of students who were white fell from 61% to 48% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020, p. 1).

Another cause is the widespread residential segregation mentioned previously. The challenges for school integration are especially evident in those metropolitan areas that consist of a largely Black-populated inner city surrounded by largely white-populated rings of suburbs.

Without a renewed commitment to integration, American schools will continue to resegregate. This is a particularly ominous trend because it directly affects the quality of education. Years of research demonstrate that the integration of schools—by social class and race—is related to better educational experiences and improved test scores (e.g., see Orfield et al., 2016).

In terms of the quantity of education, the gap between whites and Black Americans has decreased over the past several decades. Figure 6.10 displays the change from 1940 to 2020 in the percentage of the population older than 25 years, by race and gender, with high school diplomas; there is a dramatic decline in racial differences. Given the increasing demands for higher educational credentials in the job

market, it's ironic that the nation has nearly achieved racial equality in high school education at a time when this credential matters less.

FIGURE 6.10 ■ High School Graduation Rates for People 25 Years and Older in the United States, 1940–2000

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2021b), Table A-2

At the college level, the trends parallel the narrowing gap, as Figure 6.11 shows. In 1940, white men held a distinct advantage over all other race/gender groups: They were about three times more likely than Black men and women to have a college degree. By 2020, the advantage of white men had shrunk, but they were still about 1.5 times more likely than Black men and 1.2 times as likely as Black women to have a college degree. These racial differences grow larger with more advanced degrees, however, and differences like these will be increasingly serious in an economy in which jobs more frequently require an education beyond high school.

FIGURE 6.11 ■ College Graduation Rates of People 25 Years and Older in the United States, 1940–2020

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2021a), Table A-2

Political Power. Two trends have increased the political power of Black Americans since World War II. One is the movement out of the rural South, a process that concentrated Black Americans in areas where it was easier for them to register to vote. As the Black population outside the South grew, so did their representation at the national level. The first Black representative to the U.S. Congress (other than those elected during Reconstruction) was elected in 1928, and by 1954, there were still only three Black members in the House of Representatives (Franklin, 1967, p. 614). In 2021, there were a record number of 60, or 11% of the total membership. This is still slightly less than the proportional share of the national population (13%) (Manning, 2021). Fifty-seven Black Americans are serving in the House and three are in the Senate.

When Barack Obama was elected to the Senate in 2004, he was only the fifth Black senator since Reconstruction to serve in that role. Since then, six more Black Americans have been elected to the Senate: Roland Burris (Illinois, 2009), Tim Scott (South Carolina, 2013), Mo Cowan (Massachusetts, 2013), Corey Booker (New Jersey, 2013), and Kamala Harris (California, 2017), and Raphael Warnock (Geogia, 2021).

The number of Black elected officials at all levels of government increased from virtually zero at the turn of the 20th century to about 10,500 in 2011 (Eilperin, 2013). In Virginia in 1989, Douglas Wilder became the first Black American to be elected to a state governorship, and both Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice have served as Secretary of State, the highest governmental office—along with Supreme Court justice and excluding the presidency—ever held by an African American.

Black communities are virtually guaranteed some political representation because of their high degree of geographical concentration at the local level. Today, most large American cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, New York, and Washington, D.C., have elected Black mayors.

The other trend that has increased Black political power is the dismantling of the institutions and practices of disenfranchisement that operated during Jim Crow. As you learned, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 specifically prohibited many of the practices (poll taxes, literacy tests, and whites-only primaries) traditionally used to keep Black Americans politically powerless.

Since the 1960s, the number of Black Americans in the nation's voting-age population has increased from slightly less than 10% to about 13%. But this increasing potential for political power hasn't always been fully mobilized, and turnout has generally been lower for Black Americans than for whites. In the hotly contested presidential races of 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, and 2020, numerous organizations (such as the NAACP) made a concerted and largely successful effort to increase turnout among Black Americans. In 2008 and 2012, Black turnout was comparable to that of whites, but fell in the 2016 election, only to rise again in 2020.

Overall, Black American political power has increased over the past several decades on national, state, and local levels. Recent state voting restrictions threaten this trend. Since the 2020 presidential election, virtually all states have at least considered new laws that would limit access to the ballot. In the first six months of 2021, 14 states actually passed a total of 22 restrictive laws, a pace that would far exceed the record for number of restrictive laws passed in 2011 (Brennan Center for Justice, 2021) Some of these new laws restrict access to mail-in ballots, shorten the time frame for early voting, or increase the requirements for IDs.

For a variety of reasons (e.g., their relative poverty) Black Americans—and other minority groups of color—are less likely to possess official forms of identification. Thus, these restrictions reduce the likelihood that some black Americans will be able to exercise their right to vote (Chung, 2021).

Some restrictive policies followed the Supreme Court's decision to rule the 1965 Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. Shortly after that decision, Texas announced that a voter identification law, previously blocked, would go into effect immediately (Liptak, 2013), and North Carolina passed one of the most restrictive laws since the Jim Crow era (Brennan Center for Justice, 2013). The latter was declared unconstitutional by the courts on the grounds that it blatantly targeted Black American voters (Liptak & Wines, 2017).

The current wave of restrictive laws is largely a response to claims (virtually none supported by evidence) that the 2020 presidential election was rigged or rife with fraud. Proponents of restrictive voting measures argue that they prevent voter fraud, and the new laws don't mention Black Americans or other minority groups, as is typical of modern institutional discrimination. The result may be a dramatically

lower turnout on Election Day for groups that are less likely to have driver's licenses, passports, or similar documentation, including not only Black Americans but also other minority groups of color, low-income groups, senior citizens, and younger voters.

Jobs and Income. Integration in the job market and racial equality in income follow the trends established in many other areas of social life: The situation of Black Americans has improved since the end of de jure segregation but has stopped well short of equality. Among men, whites are much more likely to be employed in the highest rated and most lucrative occupational areas, whereas Black Americans are overrepresented in the service sector and in unskilled labor (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012b). One comprehensive analysis of race/gender employment trends found that, after some gains in the years following the passage of the landmark legislation of the mid-1960s, employment gains for Black men and women (and white women) have been slight, and that white men disproportionately hold better jobs (Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012, pp. 155–177).

Although huge gaps remain, we should note that the present occupational distribution represents a rapid and significant upgrading, given the fact that as recently as the 1930s most Black men were unskilled agricultural laborers (S. Steinberg, 1981, pp. 206–207). A similar improvement has occurred for Black women. In the 1930s, about 90% of employed Black women worked in agriculture or in domestic service (Steinberg, 1981, pp. 206–207). The percentage of Black women in these categories has dropped dramatically, and most Black women are employed in the two highest occupational categories, although typically at the lower levels of these categories. For example, in the top-rated "managerial and professional" category, women are more likely to be concentrated in less well-paid occupations, such as nurse or elementary school teacher (see Figure 11.1), whereas men are more likely to be physicians and lawyers.

Figure 6.12 depicts the racial income gap in terms of the median, an average that shows the difference between "typical" white and Black households. It reflects racial differences in education and occupations, which result in a persistent racial income gap. The graph presents two kinds of information: the median household incomes for Black Americans and whites (in 2019 dollars) over the time period (read these from the left vertical axis) and the percentage of Black to white household income (read this from the right vertical axis). Additionally, Figure 6.12 shows that median incomes for Black and white households generally moved together over the time period and that both trended upward until the turn of this century. At that point, both lines flattened and then fell, a reflection of hard economic times after 2000 and especially after 2007. In the most recent years, household incomes have risen once again, with white income rising more rapidly.

FIGURE 6.12 ■ Median Household Income by Race, 1967–2019

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2020). Table H-5.

Also note that incomes for Black households remained well below those of white households throughout the period. In the late 1960s, Black household income was about 58% of white household income. The gap remained relatively steady through the 1980s, closed during the boom years of the 1990s, then widened again after the turn of the century. The gap was smallest in 2000 (68%), widened after the 2007 recession and, in the most recent year, was at 64%, reflecting the differential effects of the recession on minority groups of color, as we discussed previously.

Figure 6.13 supplements this information by comparing the distribution of income within each racial group for 2019, and highlights the differences in the percentage of each group in low-, middle-, and upper income categories. To read this graph, note that income categories are arrayed from top to bottom and that the horizontal axis has zero points in the middle of the graph. The percentage of non-Hispanic white households in each income category is represented by the bars to the left of the zero point, and the same information is presented for Black households by the bars to the right of the zero point.

Starting at the bottom, note that the bars representing Black households are considerably wider than those for white households. This reflects the fact that Black Americans are more concentrated in the lower income brackets. For example, 11.5% of Black households were in the lowest two income categories (less than $10,000); this figure is 3.0 times greater than the percentage of white households (3.9%) in this range.

As you move upward, notice the clustering of both Black and white households in the $50,000 to $124,000 categories, income ranges that would be associated with a middle and upper middle-class lifestyle. In this income range, however, it's the white households that are overrepresented: 39% of white households versus only 32% of Black households had incomes in this range. The racial differences are even more dramatic in the two highest income ranges: About 21% of white households had incomes greater than $150,000 versus only 7% of Black households. While Black Americans can be found at all income levels, graphs such as this convincingly refute the notion, common among "modern racists" and many other Americans, that there are no important racial inequalities in the United States today.

Finally, poverty affects Black Americans at much higher rates than it does white Americans. Figure 6.14 shows the percentage of white and Black American families living below the federally established, "official" poverty level from 1967 through 2019. The poverty rate for Black families runs about 2.5 to 3 times higher than the rate for whites.

Note that there was a dramatic decrease in Black poverty during the boom years of the 1990s, only to be followed by an even more sudden rise after 2000. The poverty rates for both groups trended upward between 2000 and 2012, with a sharp spike in Black poverty following the 2007 recession before decreasing in the most recent years Tragically, the highest rates of poverty are among children, especially Black children. Like Figures 6.12 and 6.13, this graph refutes the notion that serious racial inequality is a thing of the past for U.S. society.

Primary Structural Assimilation

Interracial contact in the more public areas of society, such as schools or the workplace, is certainly more common today. As Gordon's model of assimilation predicts, this has led to increases in more intimate contacts across racial lines. To illustrate, one study looked at changing intimate relationships among Americans by asking a nationally representative sample about the people with whom they discuss "important matters." Although the study didn't focus on Black–white relations per se, the researchers did find that the percentage of whites that included Black Americans as intimate contacts increased from 9% to more than 15% between 1984 and 2004 (McPherson et al., 2006). While this increase would be heartening to those committed to a more integrated, racially unified society, these low percentages could also be seen as discouraging because they suggest that about 85% of white Americans maintain racially exclusive interpersonal networks of friends and acquaintances.

A more recent study (Cox et al., 2016) found similar racial patterns in people's social networks. Respondents were asked to name the people with whom they "discussed important matters" and then identify these contacts by race. The vast majority of white respondents maintained racially homogenous

FIGURE 6.13 ■ Distribution of Household Income for Non–Hispanic White and Black Americans, 2019

networks: 91% of their close contacts were also white. Black respondents reported less racial exclusiveness: 83% of their close contacts were also Black. This difference in the racial composition of social networks is partly due to simple math: Because white Americans outnumber Black Americans, they have more choices for friends and acquaintances and, as the dominant group, they can more easily maintain racial exclusiveness.

Another interesting study (Fisher, 2008), which reflects some of the same patterns, looked at interracial friendships on a sample of 27 college campuses across the nation. First-year students were interviewed at the end of their second semester and asked about the group membership of their 10 closest friends on campus. The study found that cross-group friendships were common but that white students

FIGURE 6.14 ■ Families and Children Living in Poverty in the United States by Race, 1967 to 2019

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. (2021c), "Poverty status, Tables 3 and 4."

Note: Family poverty rates and child poverty rates are computed using different units of analysis. Family rates represent the percentage of all families below the poverty line. The rates for children are the percentage of all people younger than 18 in poverty.

had the least diverse circles of friends. For whites, 76% of their friends were also white, a much higher percentage of in-group exclusiveness than Asian (51%), Hispanic (56%), and Black students (27%).

An integrated school, one of the few in the United States in 1955.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. O'Halloran, Thomas J.

Obviously, these percentages reflect the racial composition of the campuses (all were majority white), but it's significant that cross-group choices were positively related to more tolerant attitudes and a history of having a friend from another group in high school. Most interesting, perhaps, was that cross-group choices were positively related to greater diversity on campus. This finding supports the

contact hypothesis and Gordon's assertion that integration at the secondary level leads to integration at the primary level.

Consistent with the decline in traditional, overt prejudice, Americans are much less opposed to interracial dating and marriage today. As noted in Chapter 3, a recent national poll (Livingston & Brown, 2017) found that only 9% of Americans felt that interracial marriage is "a bad thing" for society. Almost 40% felt interracial marriages were "a good thing" (up from 24% in 2010) and the majority (52%) felt that it didn't "make much difference" (p. 24). Support for interracial marriage was especially high among young people (54% of 18- to 29-year-olds said it was "a good thing" vs. only 26% of respondents over 65), the college educated (54% of the college educated said it was "a good thing" vs. only 26% of respondents with a high school degree), and urbanites (45% of city dwellers said it was "a good thing" vs. only 24% of rural respondents) (Livingston & Brown, 2017, p. 25).

Behavior appears to be following attitudes, as the rates of interracial dating and marriage are increasing. Studies find that interracial dating is increasingly common (see Keels & Harris, 2014; Wellner, 2007), and marriages between Black Americans and whites are also increasing, although still a tiny percentage of all marriages. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 65,000 Black–white married couples in 1970 (including persons of Hispanic origin), about 0.10% of all married couples. By 2010, the number of Black–white married couples had increased by a factor of 8.5, to 558,000, but this is still less than 1% (0.9%) of all married couples (see also Livingston & Brown, 2017; U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a, p. 54).

TABLE 6.1 ■ Percentage Married to a Person of the Same Race, 1980 and 2008				
	Whites		**Black Americans**	
Year	**Men**	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**
1980	96%	95%	93%	97%
2008	93%	92%	77%	88%

Source: Qian and Lichter (2011, p. 1072). Copyright © 2011 National Council on Family Relations. Reprinted with permission.

Finally, a study comparing intermarriage based on the 1980 and 2008 censuses found a slight trend toward decreasing in-marriage, particularly for Black men. Table 6.1 summarizes the results. Most Black men who married their race were married to whites (14.4%) and Hispanics (4.8%). Black women who married outside their group showed a similar pattern: 6.5% were married to whites and 2.3% to Hispanics.

A more recent study found rapidly rising rates in racial intermarriage for virtually all groups in American society. For Black Americans, the percentage of marriages that crossed racial lines increased from 5% in 1980 to 18% in 2015 (Livingston & Brown, 2017)

IS THE GLASS HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL?

The contemporary situation of Black Americans is perhaps what might be expected for a group so recently "released" from exclusion and subordination. Figure 6.15 visually represents the length of the periods of subjugation and the brevity of time since the fall of Jim Crow. The average situation of Black Americans improved vastly during the latter half of the 20th century in virtually every area of social life. As demonstrated by the data presented in this chapter, however, racial progress has stopped well short of equality.

In assessing the present situation, one might stress the improved situation of the group (the glass is half full) or the challenges that remain before full racial equality and justice are achieved (the glass is half empty). While Black Americans have occupied the highest levels of the society (including the Oval

Office and the Supreme Court), a large percentage of the Black population have merely traded rural peasantry for urban poverty and face an array of formidable and deep-rooted problems.

The situation of Black Americans is intimately intermixed with the plight of our cities and the changing nature of the labor force. It's the consequence of nearly 400 years of prejudice, racism, and discrimination, but it also reflects broader social forces, such as urbanization and industrialization. Consistent with their origin as a colonized minority group, the relative poverty and powerlessness has persisted for Black Americans long after other groups (e.g., the descendants of the European immigrants who arrived between the 1820s and the 1920s) have achieved equality and acceptance. Black Americans were enslaved to meet the labor demands of an agrarian economy, became rural peasants under Jim Crow segregation, were excluded from the opportunities created by early industrialization, and remain largely excluded from the better jobs in the emerging post-industrial economy.

Progress toward racial equality has slowed since the heady days of the 1960s, and in many areas, earlier advances seem hopelessly stagnated. Public opinion polls indicate that there is little support or sympathy for the cause of Black Americans (see Chapter 3). Traditional prejudice has declined only to be replaced by modern racism. In the court of public opinion, Black Americans are often held responsible for their own plight. Biological racism has been replaced with indifference to racial issues or with blaming the victims.

FIGURE 6.15 ■ Timeline of American Slavery and Segregation

Source: http://zerflin.com/2016/04/06/client-highlight-how-white-supremacy-attempts-to-make-slavery-and-segregation-soooo-long-ago/.

Real improvements have been made in the lives of Black Americans. Compared with their counterparts in the days of Jim Crow, Black Americans today on the average are more prosperous and more politically powerful, and some are among the most revered of current popular heroes (the glass is half full). However, the increases in average income and education and the glittering success of the few obscure a tangle of problems for the many—problems that may get worse. Poverty, unemployment, a failing educational system, residential segregation, subtle racism, and continuing discrimination persist as inescapable realities for millions of Black Americans. In many Black neighborhoods, crime, drugs, violence, poor health care, malnutrition, and a host of other factors compound these problems (the glass is half empty).

Given this gloomy situation, it shouldn't be surprising that Black Americans find significant strength in pluralistic, nationalistic thinking, resentment, and anger. Black Nationalism and Black Power remain powerful ideas, but their goals of development and autonomy for the Black community remain largely rhetorical sloganeering without the resources to bring them to actualization.

The situation of Black Americans in the early 21st century might be characterized as a combination of partial assimilation, structural pluralism, and inequality—a depiction that reflects the continuing effects of a colonized origin. The problems that remain are less visible (or perhaps just better hidden from the average white middle-class American) than those of previous eras. Responsibility is more diffused, and the moral certainties of opposition to slavery or to Jim Crow laws are long gone.

Contemporary racial issues must be articulated and debated in an environment of subtle prejudice and low levels of sympathy for the grievances of Black Americans. Urban poverty, modern institutional discrimination, and modern racism are less dramatic and more difficult to measure than an overseer's whip, a lynch mob, or a sign that reads "Whites Only," but they can be just as real and just as deadly in their consequences.

SUMMARY

We've organized this summary around the Learning Objectives at the beginning of the chapter.

6.1 Cite and explain the forces that led to the end of de jure segregation, including organizations, leaders, and legal changes.

De jure segregation ended because of changing economic, social, legal, and political conditions. Continuing industrialization in the South lessened the need for a large, powerless labor force, but southern resistance to racial change was intense. Crucial events included the threat of a march on Washington during World War II (led by A. Philip Randolph), the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* Supreme Court decision, the Montgomery bus boycott, and the triumphs of the Civil Rights Movement, led by Martin Luther King Jr. and many others. The legal basis for the Jim Crow system ended with the passage of two landmark bills by the U.S. Congress: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

6.2 Compare the Civil Rights Movement with the Black Power Movement.

The civil rights movement was primarily a southern phenomenon designed to combat legalized, state-sponsored racial segregation. Outside the South, problems were different and the strategies that had worked in the South had less relevance. Other movements, organizations, and leaders—including the Black Muslims and Malcolm X—arose to articulate these issues and channel the anger of the urban, northern Black population. The Civil Rights Movement was primarily assimilationist, but the Black Power Movement had strong elements of pluralism and even separatism. Both movements relied heavily on the energy and courage of Black women but tended to be dominated by men.

6.3 Explain the most important issues and trends related to Black–white relations since the 1960s, including the criminal justice system, class inequality, class inequality, family forms, new racial identities, prejudice, individual and institutional forms of discrimination.

Black–white relations since the 1960s have been characterized by continuing inequality, separation, and hostility, along with substantial improvements in status for some Black Americans. Relations with the criminal justice system remain problematic, and the Black community has been victimized by the "war on drugs" on several levels. The Black American middle class has less financial security than the white middle class, and urban poverty continues as a major problem. Class differentiation within the Black American community is greater than ever before. The dominant group has often perceived many Black American families as weak, unstable, and a cause of continuing poverty. The culture of poverty thesis attributes poverty to certain characteristics of the poor. An alternative view sees problems such as high rates of family desertion by men as the *result* of poverty, rather than the cause. New racial identities continue to emerge as cross-racial and cross-ethnic marriages increase. Finally, anti-Black prejudice and discrimination are manifested in more subtle, covert forms (modern racism and institutional discrimination) in contemporary society.

6.4 Analyze the contemporary situation for Black Americans using the concepts of assimilation and pluralism, especially in terms of acculturation, secondary structural assimilation, primary structural assimilation.

Black Americans are largely acculturated but centuries of separation and oppression have created a unique Black experience in American society. There have been real improvements

for many Black Americans, but overall secondary structural assimilation remains low for a large percentage of the group. Evidence of continuing racial inequality in residential patterns, schooling, politics, jobs, income, unemployment, and poverty is massive and underlines the realities of an urban underclass. In primary structural assimilation, interracial interaction and friendships appear to be rising. Interracial marriages are increasing but remain a small percentage of all marriages.

6.5 Use sociological concepts and evidence from the chapter to evaluate the *overall* situation for Black Americans today. Evaluate the progress made compared with remaining problems.

Compared with their situation at the start of the 20th century, Black Americans have made significant improvements, but the distance to true racial equality remains considerable. What evidence of improvements in race relations is presented in this chapter? What evidence is provided for the argument that substantial problems remain? Which body of evidence is more persuasive? Why?

KEY TERMS

Black Power Movement

Civil Rights Movement

Culture of poverty theory

De facto segregation

Dissimilarity index

Fatalism

Nonviolent direct action

Urban underclass

APPLYING CONCEPTS

The table below lists 10 metropolitan areas from across the nation in alphabetical order. Based on what you have learned so far, which cities do you expect to have the highest levels of racial residential segregation? Why?

Rank order the cities from 1 (most segregated) to 10 (least segregated).

	City	Region	Percentage Black, 2010*	Rank
1	Atlanta, Georgia	South	32%	
2	Baltimore, Maryland	Border	29%	
3	Boston, Massachusetts	Northeast	7%	
4	Dallas–Fort Worth, Texas	Southwest	15%	
5	Kansas City, Kansas	Midwest	13%	
6	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Northeast	8%	
7	Richmond, Virginia	South	38%	
8	San Diego, California	West	5%	
9	San Francisco, California	West	8%	
10	Washington, D.C.	South/Border	26%	

* Percentage in entire metropolitan area, including suburbs. Data from U.S. Census Bureau (2012b, p. 31).

TURN THE PAGE TO SEE THE ACTUAL RANKS AND SCORES.

ANSWERS TO APPLYING CONCEPTS

Here are those 10 metro areas listed from most to least segregated. Many American cities are more segregated than Pittsburgh, and some are less segregated than San Diego. These 10 cities were selected to represent a variety of regions and race relations histories, and aren't representative of the society.

	City	Score (Dissimilarity Index)
1	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	64.9
2	Baltimore, Maryland	62.2
3	Kansas City, Kansas	57.7
4	Boston, Massachusetts	57.6
5	Washington, D.C.	56.1
6	Atlanta, Georgia	54.1
7	San Francisco, California	50.5
8	Richmond, Virginia	49.6
9	Dallas–Fort Worth, Texas	47.5
10	San Diego, California	38.6

Source: Data from Glaeser and Vigdor (2012).

REFERENCES

Agiesta, J. (2015, July 2). *Poll: Majority sees confederate flag as southern pride symbol, not racist. CNN*. https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/02/politics/confederate-flag-poll-racism-southern-pride/index.html

Aizer, A., & Doyle, J. J. (2015). Juvenile incarceration, human capital and future crime: Evidence from randomly-assigned judges. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *130*(2), 759–803.

Alexander, M. (2012). *The New Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness*. New Press.

Almasy, S., & Yan, H. (2014a). *London is latest city to see protests as ferguson dismay spreads. CNN*. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/national-ferguson-demonstrations/index.html

Almasy, S., & Yan, H. (2014b). *Protesters fill streets across country as ferguson protests spread coast to coast. CNN*. https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/25/us/national-ferguson-protests/

Alonso, A. A. (1998). *Rebuilding Los Angeles: A lesson of community reconstruction*. https://www.streetgangs.com/academic/1998.Alonso-RLAreport-final-001.pdf

American Civil Liberties Union. (2020). *A tale of two countries: Racially targeted arrests in the era of Marijuana reform*. https://www.aclu.org/report/tale-two-countries-racially-targeted-arrests-era-marijuana-reform

American Civil Liberties Union. (n.d). *Racial profiling: Definition. American Civil Liberties Union*. https://www.aclu.org/other/racial-profiling-definition

Amistad Research Center. (n.d). *Fannie Lou Hamer: Papers of a civil rights activist, political activist, and woman*. https://www.gale.com/binaries/content/assets/gale-us-en/primary-sources/archives-unbound/primary-sources_-archives-unbound_fannie-lou-hamer_papers-of-a-civil-rights-activitist-political-activist-and-woman.pdf

Amott, T., & Matthaei, J. (1991). *Race, gender, and work: A multicultural history of women in the United States*. South End.

Andersen, M. L. (1993). *Thinking about women: Sociological perspectives on sex and gender* (3rd ed.). Macmillan.

Anderson, E. (2015). The white space. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, *1*, 10–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649214561306

Anderson, S. (2018, May 17). *New research shows immigrants may boost employment of natives. Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/05/17/new-research-shows-immigrants-may-boost-employment-of-natives/#39999a861600

Arthur, R., Dolven, T., Hamilton, K., McCann, A., & Sherman, C. (2017, December 11). *Shot by cops and forgotten. VICE News*. https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/xwvv3a/shot-by-cops

116111111.Empty.

Asante-Muhammed, D. (2017). *The road to zero wealth. Institute for Policy Studies*. https://ips-dc.org/report-the-road-to-zero-wealth/#:~:text=In%20this%20report%20%2C%20we%20look,means%20to%20be%20middle%20class

Associated Press. (2005, November 13). *Asian youth persistently harassed by U.S. peers*. *USA Today*. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-13-asian-teens-bullied_x.htm

Batistic, S., & Tymon, A. (2017). Networking behaviour, graduate employability: A social capital perspective. *Education + Training*, *59*(4), 374–388. https://doi.org/10.1108/ET-06-2016-0100

Benjamin, L. (2005). *The Black elite*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Billings, D. (2017). *Deep denial: The persistence of white supremacy in the United States history and life*. Crandall, Dostie & Douglass Books, Inc.

Black Lives Matter Global Network. (n.d.). What we believe. *Black Lives Matter*. https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/

Boo, K. (2001a, April 9). After welfare. *New Yorker*. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/04/09/after-welfare

Boo, K. (2001b, August 18). The marriage cure. *New Yorker*. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/08/18/the-marriage-cure

Borr, T. G. (2019). How the war on drugs kept Black Men out of college. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/05/war-drugs-made-it-harder-black-men-attend-college/588724/

Bourcier, N. (2012, October 23). Brazil comes to terms with its slave trading past. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/23/brazil-struggle-ethnic-racial-identity

Brenan, M. (2020). New low 35% in U.S. Satisfied with treatment of black people. *Gallup*. https://news.gallup.com/poll/317327/record-satisfied-treatment-Black-people.aspx

Brennan Center for Justice. (2013). *Voting laws roundup 2013*. https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2013-voting-laws-roundup

Brennan Center for Justice. (2021, May 2021). *Voting law roundup*. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2021

Brilliant, M. (2010). *The Color of America has changed: How racial diversity shaped civil rights reform in California, 1941–1978*. Oxford University Press.

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U.S. (2021). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf

Brown, D. L. (2017). Civil rights Crusader Fannie Lou Hamer Defied Men - and presidents - Who tried to silence her. October 6. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/06/civil-rights-crusader-fannie-lou-hamer-defied-men-and-presidents-who-tried-to-silence-her/

Brown, N. D. (2015). *The Brotherhood of sleeping car porters: The Civil rights movement*. Thesis, The University of Toledo.

Brown, T. (2016, October). Working with the Panthers to transform health care for poor black communities. *AJPH*, *106*(10), 1756–1757.

Bruzgulis, A. (2015, June 22). *Confederate flag wasn't flown at South Carolina statehouse until 1961, pundit claims*. https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/ jun/22/eugene-robinson/confederate-flag-wasnt-flown-south-carolina-state-/

Bucciferro, J. R. (2015). Racial inequality in Brazil from independence to the present. In L. Bértola & J. Williamson (Eds.), *Has Latin American inequality changed direction* (pp. 171–194). Springer Publishing Company.

Bulwa, D. (2010, July 9). Mehserle convicted of involuntary manslaughter. *San Francisco Chronicle*. https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Mehserle-convicted-of-involuntary-manslaughter-3181861.php

Butler, P. (2018). *Chokehold: Policing black men*. The New Press.

Butler, S., & Grabinsky, J. (2020). Tackling the legacy of persistent urban inequality and concentrated poverty. *Brookings Institute*. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/11/16/tackling-the-legacy-of-persistent-urban-inequality-and-concentrated-poverty/

Caldwell, K. L. (2008). 'Look at her hair': The Body politics of black womanhood in Brazil. *Transforming Anthropology*, *11*(2), 18–29. https://doi.org/10.1525/tran.2003.11.2.18

Cardona, N. (2015, September 22). 50 years before Rosa Parks, a bold Nashville streetcar protest defied segregation [podcast]. *NPR*. https://nashvillepublicradio.org/post/50-years-rosa-parks-bold-nashville-streetcar-protest-defied-segregation#stream/0

Children's Defense Fund. (2017). *The state of America's children*. https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2017-soac.pdf

Chung, A. (2021). U.S. Supreme court gives states more leeway to restrict voting. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/voting-rights-breyers-future-spotlight-us-supreme-court-2021-07-01/

Chung, M. (2015, December 22). Breaking barriers: African-American firsts in 2015. *NBC News*. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/breaking-barriers-african-american-firsts-2015-n478556

Coates, T.-N. (2014, June 24). The Case for reparations. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/projects/reparations

Coates, T-N. (2015). *Between the world and me*. Spiegel & Grau.

Cohen, A., & Taylor, E. (2000). *American pharaoh, mayor Richard J. Daley: His battle for Chicago and the nation*. Little, Brown.

Conot, R. (1967). *Rivers of blood, years of darkness*. Bantam.

Cooley, W. (2021). *Crack and criminal justice in Canton, Ohio, 1987–1999: 'the drug problem has created a MONSTER': Journal of policy history. Cambridge Core*. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-policy-history/article/crack-and-criminal-justice-in-canton-ohio-19871999-the-drug-problem-has-created-a-monster/8649471799829EA8AC38CF1977C22EB1

Cooper, H. L. F. (2015). War on drugs policing and police brutality. *Substance Use and Misuse*, *50*(8/9), 1188–94. https://doi.org/10.3109/10826084.2015.1007669.

Cose, E. (1993). *The rage of a privileged class*. HarperCollins.

Coski, J. M. (2009). *The confederate battle flag*. arvard University Press.

Cox, D., Navarro-Rivera, J., & Jones, R. P. (2016, March 8). Race, religion, and political affiliation of Americans' core social network. *Public Religion Research Institute*. https://www.prri.org/research/poll-race-religion-politics-americans-social-networks/

Current Population Survey. (2020). *Poverty status in 2019*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html

D'Angelo, R. (2001). *The American civil rights movement: Readings and interpretations*. McGraw-Hill.

Dastagir, A. (2018, February 16). The unsung heroes of civil rights are black women you've never heard of. *USA Today.*

Davis, M. E., Vakalahi, H. F. O., & Scales, R. (2015). Women of color in the academy: From trauma to transformation. In K. De Welde & A. Stepnick (Eds.), *Disrupting the culture of silence: Confronting gender inequality and making change in higher education* (pp. 265–277). Stylus Publishing.

Deaderick, L. (2021, March 28). Long-term health problems part of 'toll of racism. *San Diego Tribune*. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/columnists/story/2021-03-28/long-term-health-problems-part-of-toll-of-racism

DiTomaso, N. (2013). *The American non-dilemma: Racial inequality without racism*. Russell Sage Foundation.

D'Orso, M. (1996). *Like judgment day: The Ruin and redemption of a town called rosewood*. Putnam.

Dougherty, C. (2019). Overlooked no more: William BYRON RUMFORD, a civil rights champion in California. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/obituaries/william-byron-rumford-overlooked.html

Dwyer, R. E. (2010). Poverty, prosperity, and place: The Shape of class segregation in the age of extremes. *Social Problems*, *57*, 114–137.

Eckholm, E. (2010, July 28). Congress moves to narrow cocaine sentencing disparity. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/politics/29crack.html?Adxnnl=1&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1382103459-x0tOpZ4wq4lKuhvMAc5weg

The Economist. (2012). Affirming a divide. *The Economist*. https://www.economist.com/node/21543494

Edin, K., & Kefalas, M. H. (2005). *Promises I can keep: Why poor women put motherhood before marriage*. University of California Press.

Egelko, B. (2009, January 15). BART shooting draws Rodney King case parallels. *San Francisco Chronicle*. https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-shooting-draws-Rodney-King-case-parallels-3176756.php

Eilperin, J. (2013). What's changed for African Americans since 1963, By the numbers. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/08/22/whats-changed-for-african-americans-since-1963-by-the-numbers/?utm_term=.32e0026761b3

Eligon, J., Arango, T., Dewan, S., & Bogel-Burroughs, N. (2021, April 20). Derek Chauvin verdict brings a rare rebuke of police misconduct. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/george-floyd-chauvin-verdict.html

Ellsworth, S. (1982). *Death in a promised land: The Tulsa race riot of 1921*. Louisiana State University Press.

Essien-Udom, E. U. (1962). *Black nationalism*. University of Chicago Press.

Evans, S. M. (1979). *Personal politics*. Knopf.

Feagin, J. R. (2001). *Racist America: Roots, current realities, and future reparations*. Routledge.

Fisher, M. (2008). Does campus diversity promote friendship diversity? A Look at interracial friendships in college. *Social Science Quarterly*, *89*, 623–655.

Flavia, C. P., Amado, R. C., Lambertucci, J. R., Rocha, J., Antunes, C. M., & Pena, S. D. J. (2003). Color and genomic ancestry in Brazilians. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *100*(1), 177–182. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0126614100

Franklin, J. H. (1967). *From slavery to freedom* (3rd ed.). Knopf.

Franklin, J. H., & Moss, A. (1994). *From slavery to freedom* (7th ed.). McGraw-Hill.

Frazier, E. F. (1957). *Black bourgeoisie: The rise of a new middle class*. Free Press.

Freelon, K. (2017). Why successful black men in Brazil won't Marry black women. *The Root*. https://www.theroot.com/why-successful-black-men-in-brazil-won-t-marry-black-wo-1790854485

Frey, W. (2020). Even as metropolitan areas diversify, White Americans still live in mostly white neighborhoods. *Brookings Institute*. https://www.brookings.edu/research/even-as-metropolitan-areas-diversify-white-americans-still-live-in-mostly-white-neighborhoods/

Freyre, G. (1946). *The Masters and the slaves: A Study in the development of Brazilian civilization*. Knopf.

Fryer, R. G., Jr. (2018). *Reconciling results on racial differences in police shootings*. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/fryer_police_aer.pdf

Gale. (2020). *Black lives matter. Gale opposing viewpoints online collection*. https://www.gale.com/open-access/black-lives-matter

Garcia-Navarro, L. (2015, August 12). Dark-Skinned or black? How Afro-Brazilians are forging a collective identity. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/08/12/431244962/dark-skinned-or-black-how-afro-brazilians-are-forging-a-collective-identity

Gazzar, B. (2017). Revisiting the Watts Riots 50 years later: 'The explosion was almost predictable'. *Daily News*. https://www.dailynews.com/2015/08/08/revisiting-the-watts-riots-50-years-later-the-explosion-was-almost-predictable/

Geschwender, J. A. (1978). *Racial stratification in America*. William C. Brown.

Ginsberg, R. B. (2013). *Dissent in Shelby County v. Holder 570 U.S. 529*.

Glaeser, E., & Vigdor, J. (2012). *The end of the segregated century: Racial separation in America's neighborhoods, 1890–2010*. Manhattan Institute, Center for State and Local Leadership. https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_66.htm

Goff, P. A., Jackson, M. C., Allison, B., Di Leone, L., Culotta, C. M., & DiTomasso, N. A.. (2014). The Essence of innocence: Consequences of dehumanizing black children. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *106*(4), 526–545. https://doi.org/10.1037/a003566

Goldstein, J. (2013, August 12). Judge rejects New York's stop-and-frisk policy. *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html

Gradín, C. (2007). Why is poverty so high among Afro- Brazilians? A Decomposition analysis of the racial poverty gap. *Discussion Paper Series*. https://ftp.iza.org/dp2809.pdf

Gramlich, J. (2018, January 12). The gap between the number of blacks and whites in prison is shrinking. *Pew Research Center*. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/

Gramlich, J. (2020). Black imprisonment rate in the U.S. Has fallen by a third since 2006. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006/

Gross, S. R., Possley, M., & Stephens, K. (2017). *Race and wrongful convictions in the United States*. The National Registry of Exonerations, Newkirk Center for Science and Society.

Haan, A., & Thorat, S. (2012). Addressing group inequalities: Social policies in emerging economies' great transformation. *European Journal of Development Research*, *24*, 105–124.

Hagler, J. (2015). *It is time to update the voting rights act*. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2015/08/06/118888/it-is-time-to-update-the-voting-rights-act/

Halberstam, D. (1998). *The Children*. Fawcett Books.

Hall, A. V., Hall, E. V., & Perry, J. L. (2016). Shooting black and blue: Exploring racial bias and law enforcement in the killings of unarmed black male civilians. *American Psychologist*, *71*(3), 175–186. http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/887

Hall, M., & Renee, S. (2016, December 30). Breaking barriers in 2016: A year of firsts among African Americans. *NBC News*. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/breaking-barriers-2016-year-firsts-among-african-americans-n701291

Hamer, F. L. (1967). *To praise our bridges: An autobiography of Fannie Lou Hamer*. KIPCO.

Hartmann, M. (2014). *In a stunning reversal, police join peaceful protest in Ferguson*. https://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/08/ferguson-protest-thursday.html

Havekes, E., Bader, M., & Kryson, M. (2016). Realizing racial and Ehtnic neighborhood preferences? Exploring the mismatches between what people want, where they search, and where they live. *Population Research and Policy Review*, *35*, 101–126.

Hernandez, T. K. (2007). Latino inter- ethnic employment discrimination and the diversity defense. *FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History*, *42*, 259–316. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/13

Hetey, R. C., Monin, B., Maitreyi, A., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2016). Data for change: A statistical analysis of police stops, searches, handcuffings, and arrests in Oakland, Calif., 2013–2014. *Stanford SPARQ*. http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oak059291.pdf

Hinton, E. (2016). *The War on poverty to the war on crime*. Harvard University Press.

Hughes, M., & Thomas, M. (1998). The continuing significance of race revisited: A study of race, class, and quality of life in America, 1972 to 1996. *American Sociological Review*, *63*, 785–803.

IBGE News Agency. (2016). Continuous PNAD 2016: 51% of the Brazilian population aged 25 or over had only complete primary education. *Home*. https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-press-room/2185-news-agency/releases-en/19005-continuous-pnad-2016-51-of-the-brazilian-population-aged-25-or-over-had-only-complete-primary-education

International Commission of Inquiry. (2021, March). *Report on systemic racist police violence against people of African descent in the United States*. https://inquirycommission.org/website/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Commission-Report-15-April.pdf

Jacobs, M. S. (2017). The violent state: Black women's invisible struggle against police violence. *William & Mary Journal of Women and The Law*, *24*, 39. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/28/us/i-cant-breathe-police-arrest.html

Jargowsky, P. (2015). The Architecture of segregation: Civil unrest, the concentration of poverty, and public policy. *The Century Foundation*. https://tcf.org/content/report/architecture-of-segregation/

Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., & Schulenberg, J. E. (2012). *Monitoring the future: National survey results on drug Use, 1975-2012. Volume 1: Secondary school students*. The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/mtf-vol1_2012.pdf

Jones, C. (1949). *An end to the neglect of the problems of the negro woman! Political Affairs*. https://palmm.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/ucf%3A4865

Kasarda, J. D. (1989). Urban industrial transition and the underclass. *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, *501*, 26–47.

Keels, M., & Harris, K. (2014). Intercultural dating at predominantly White Universities: The Maintenance and crossing of group borders. *Societies*, *4*, 363–379.

Kendi, I. X. (2020). *Is this the beginning of the end of American Racism? The Atlantic*. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/the-end-of-denial/614194/

Kennedy, R. (2001). Racial trends in the administration of criminal justice. In N. Smelser, W. Wilson, & F. Mitchell (Eds.), *America becoming: Racial trends and their consequences* (Vol. 2, pp. 1–20). National Academy Press.

Kessler, J. (2017). *Yes, Virginia (Dare), there is such a thing as white genocide*. https://www.vdare.com/articles/yes-virginia-dare-there-is-such-a-thing-as-white-genocide

Killewald, A., & Bryan, B. (2018, December). Falling behind. The role of inter and intra generational processes in widening racial and ethnic wealth gaps through early to middle adulthood. *Social Forces*, *97*(2), 705–740.

Killian, L. (1975). *The impossible revolution, phase 2: Black power and the American dream*. Random House.

Kim, K. C., & Kim, S. (1999). The Multiracial nature of Los Angeles unrest in 1992. In K. C. Kim (Ed.), *Koreans in the hood: Conflict with African Americans* (pp. 17–38). Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kindy, K., Fisher, M., Tate, J., & Jenkins, J. (2015, December 26). A year of reckoning: Police fatally shoot nearly 1,000. *Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/

King, M. L. Jr. (1958). *Stride toward freedom: The Montgomery story*. Harper & Row.

King, M. L. Jr. (1963). *Why we can't wait*. Mentor.

King, M. L. Jr. (1968). *Where do we go from here: Chaos or community?* Harper & Row.

Kochhar, R. (2004). The wealth of hispanic households: 1996 to 2002. *Pew Hispanic Center*. https://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf

Kochhar, R., & Cilluffo, A. (2017, November 1). How wealth inequality has changed in the U.S. since the great recession, by race, ethnicity and income. *Pew Research Center*. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/

Kochhar, R., Fry, R., & Taylor, P. (2011). Wealth gap rises to record highs between Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf

Kovaleski, S. F., Turkewitz, J., Goldstein, J., & Barry, D. (2016, December 10). An alt-right makeover shrouds the Swastikas. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/us/alt-right-national-socialist-movement-white-supremacy.html

Krysan, M., & Farley, R. (2002). The Residential preferences of blacks: Do They explain persistent segregation? *Social Forces*, *80*, 937–981.

Landrieu, M. (2017). *Mitch Landrieu's speech on the removal of confederate monuments in New Orleans*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/opinion/mitch-landrieus-speech-transcript.html

Lane, B. (2016, June 29). *Bancorpsouth fined $10.6 million for discriminatory lending, redlining*. https://www.housingwire.com/articles/37405

Law, V. (2017). *The alt-right holds MASSIVE rally to defend White heritage in Charlottesville*. https://altright.com/2017/05/15/alt-right-rallies-to-defend-white-heritage-in-charlottesville/

Lee, S. S-H. (2015). *Asian Americans and the 1992 Los Angeles riots/uprising*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/978019932

Levine, L. (1977). *Black culture and black consciousness*. Oxford University Press.

Lewin, T. (2012, March 6). Black students face more discipline, data suggests. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/education/black-students-face-more-harsh-discipline-data-shows.html

Lewis, J., & D'Orso, M. (1999). *Walking with the wind: A memoir of the movement*. Harvest Books.

Lewis, O. (1959). *Five families: Mexican case studies in the culture of poverty*. Basic Books.

Lewis, O. (1965). *La vida: A puerto rican family in the culture of poverty*. Random House.

Lewis, O. (1966, October). The culture of poverty. *Scientific American*, pp. 19–25.

Lewis, V., Emerson, M., & Klineberg, S. (2011). Who we'll live with: Neighborhood composition preferences of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. *Social Forces*, *89*, 1385–1408.

Lincoln, C. E. (1961). *The black Muslims in America*. Beacon.

Liptak, A. (2013, June 25). Supreme court invalidates key part of the voting rights act. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html

Liptak, A., & Wines, M. (2017). Strict North Carolina voter ID law thwarted after supreme court rejects case. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/politics/voter-id-laws-supreme-court-north-carolina.html

Livingston, G., & Brown, A. (2017). Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 years after Loving v. Virginia. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/

Lockhart, P. R. (2018a, December 31). 911 calls on black people were one of 2018's biggest stories about race. *Vox*. https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/12/31/18159465/living-while-black-racial-profiling-911-police-racism

Lockhart, P. R. (2018b, August 1). Living while black and the criminalization of blackness. *Vox*. https://www.vox.com/explainers/2018/8/1/17616528/racial-profiling-police-911-living-while-black

Loewen, J. (2005). *Sundown towns: A hidden dimension of American racism*. Simon & Schuster.

Logan, J., & Stults, B. (2011). *The persistence of segregation in the metropolis: New findings from the 2010 census*. https://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf

Logan, J., Zhang, W., & Oakley, D. (2017). Court orders, white flight, and school district segregation, 1970-2010. *Social Forces*, *95*(3), 1049–1075.

Los Angeles Times Graphics Staff. (2017, April 26). L.A. riots by the numbers. *Los Angeles Times*. https://www.latimes.com/local/1992riots/la-me-riots-25-years-20170420-htmlstory.html

Lowery, W., Leonnig, C. D., & Berman, M. (2014, August 13). Even before Michael Brown's slaying in Ferguson, racial questions hung over police. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/even-before-teen-michael-browns-slaying-in-mo-racial-questions-have-hung-over-police/2014/08/13/78b3c5c6-2307-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html

Lurie, J. (2014, August 27). 10 hours in ferguson: A visual timeline of Michael Brown's death and its aftermath. *Mother Jones*. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/timeline-michael-brown-shooting-ferguson/

Lynch, S. N. (2021). U.S. Justice DEPARTMENT backs bill to end disparities in Crack Cocaine sentences. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justice-department-backs-bill-end-disparities-crack-cocaine-sentences-2021-06-22/

Malcolm, X. (1964). *The autobiography of Malcolm X*. Grove.

Manning, J. (2021, August 5). Membership of the 117th congress: A profile. *Congressional Research Service*, R46705. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705

Marable, M. (2011). *Malcolm X: A Life of reinvention*. Penguin.

Marteleto, L. (2012). Educational inequality by race in Brazil, 1982–2007: Structural changes and shifts in racial classification. *Demography*, *49*, 337–358.

Massey, D. (2007). *Categorically unequal: The American stratification system*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1993). *American Apartheid*. Harvard University Press.

Matiash, C., & Rothman, L. (2016, March 3). The beating that changed America: What happened to Rodney King 25 years ago. *Time*. http://time.com/4245175/rodney-king-la-riots-anniversary/

McCabe, K., & Roundtree, D. J. (2009). *Justice older than the law: The life of Dovey Johnson roundtree*. University Press of Mississippi. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1604737743

McDuffie, E. S. (2018, May 22). Black women, the Nation of Islam, and the pursuit of freedom. *Black Perspectives*. https://www.aaihs.org/black-women-the-nation-of-islam-and-the-pursuit-of-freedom/

McGuire, D. L. (2010). *At the dark end of the street: Black women, Rape, and resistance - a new history of the civil rights movement from Rosa Parks to the rise of Black Power*. Random House. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0307594475

McKinley, J. (2009, January 8). In California, protests after man dies at hands of transit police. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/09oakland.html

McKinley, J. (2010). *Officer guilty in killing that inflamed Oakland*. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/09verdict.html

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Brashears, M. (2006). Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. *Social Forces*, *71*, 353–375.

Metzger, M. W., & Webber, H. S. (2019). *Facing segregation: Housing policy solutions for a stronger society*. Oxford University Press.

Meyerson, C. (2017, July 6). Adults think Black Girls are older than they are—and it matters. *The Nation*. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/adults-thinks-black-girls-are-older-than-they-are-and-it-matters/

Miller, C., & Graves, H. (2020, August 10). *When the 'Alt-Right' hit the streets: Far-right political rallies in the Trump Era*. https://www.splcenter.org/20200810/when-alt-right-hit-streets-far-right-political-rallies-trump-era

Monk, E. (2016). The consequence of "Race and Color" in Brazil. *Social Problems*, *63*, 413–430.

Morin, R., Parker, K., Stepler, R., & Mercer, A. (2017). What police think about their jobs. *Pew Research Center*. www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge/

Morlin, B. (2017). *Extremists' 'Unite the Right' rally: A possible historic alt-right showcase?* https://www.splcen ter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/07/extremists-unite-right-rally-possible-historic-alt-right-showcase

Morris, A. D. (1984). *The origins of the civil rights movement.* Free Press.

Mozingo, J., & Jennings, A. (2015). 50 years AFTER watts: 'There is still a crisis in the Black Community'. *Los Angeles Times.* https://www.latimes.com/local/wattsriots/la-me-watts-african-americans-2015081 3-story.html

Mozingo, J., & Jennings, A. (2015, August 13). *50 years after Watts: There is still a crisis in the black community.* Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.co/local/wattsriot/la-me-watts-african-americans-20150813-st ory.html

Nash, N. (2018, October 22). To the next "BBQ Becky": Don't call 911. Call 1-844-WYT-FEAR. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/opinion/calling-police-racism-wyt-fear.html

National Advisory Commission. (1968). *Report of the national advisory commission on civil disorders*. Bantam Books.

National Center for Education Statistics. (2020). *Racial and ethnic enrollment in public schools*. https://nces.e d.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp

National Center for Juvenile Justice. (2018). *Juvenile arrest rates by offense, sex, and race*. https://www.ojjdp .gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05274

National Center for Juvenile Justice. (2021). *Drug abuse arrests for Juveniles Age 10–17 by race, 1980–2019*. htt ps://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/data.html#downloadable

Neal, D., & Armin, R. (2014). *The prison boom and the lack of black progress after Smith and Welch*. (NBER Wor king Paper No. 20283). http://www.nber.org/papers/w20283

Neal, S. (2017). Views of racism as a major problem increase sharply, especially among democrats. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/29/views-of-racism-as-a-major-probl em-increase-sharply-especially-among-democrats/

Nellis, A. (2016). The color of justice: Racial and ethnic disparity in state prisons. *The Sentencing Project*. h ttps://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethni c-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf

Newport, F. (2013). Gulf grows in Black-White views of the U.S. Justice System bias. *Gallup Politics*. https:// www.gallup.com/poll/163610/gulf-grows-black-white-views-justice-system-bias.aspx

NPR, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, & Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health.(2017a, October). *Discrimination in America: Experiences and views of African Americans*. https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/f arm/reports/reports/2017/rwjf441128

NPR, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, & Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health.(2017b, November). *Discrimination in America: Experiences and views of Asian Americans*. https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/far m/reports/reports/2017/rwjf441128

NPR, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, & Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health.(2017c, November). *Discrimination in America: Experiences and views of white Americans*. https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/far m/reports/surveys_and_polls/2017/rwjf441554

NPR, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, & Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health. (2018, January). *Discrimination in America: Final summary*. https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/surveys_and_ polls/2018/rwjf443620

Oldfield, G., Ee, J., Frankenberg, E., & Siegel-Hawley, G. (2016). *Brown at 62: School segregation, by race, pov-erty, and state*. Civil Rights Project, UCLA.

Oliver, M., & Shapiro, T. (2006). *Black wealth, white wealth* (2nd ed.). Taylor and Francis.

Oliver, M., & Shapiro, T. (2008, October). Sub-Prime as a black catastrophe. *American Prospect*, pp. A9–A11.

Orfield, G., Ee, J., Frankenberg, E., & Siegel-Hawley, G. (*UCLA*, May 16). Brown at 62: School segregation, by race, poverty, and state. *Civil Rights Project*. https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-educat ion/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-poverty-and-state

Padulla, D., & Pager, D. (2019). Race and networks in the job search process. *American Sociological Review*, *84*, 983–1012.

Patton, S., & Farley, A. P. (2018, May 16). There's no cost to white people who call 911 about black people. There should be. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/16 /theres-no-cost-to-white-people-who-call-911-about-black-people-there-should-be/

Pedulla, D., & Pager, D. (2019). Race and social networks in the job search process. *American Sociological Review*, *84*(6), 983–1012.

Petruccelli, J. L. (2015). Brazilian ethnoracial classification and affirmative action policies: Where are we and where do we go? In P. Simon et al. (Ed.), *Social statistics and ethnic diversity*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20095-8_6.

Pettit, B., & Sykes, B. (2017). Incarceration. *Pathways*, pp. 24–26. https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways_SOTU_2017.pdf

Pettit, B., & Western, B. (2004). Mass imprisonment and the life course: Race and class inequality in U.S. incarceration. *American Sociological Review*, *69*, 151–169.

Pew Research Center. (2015). *Multiracial in America: Proud, diverse and growing in numbers*. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/

Pew Research Center. (2016). On views of race and inequality, blacks and whites are worlds apart. *Pew Research Center*. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-and-economic-well-being/

Pew Research Center. (2018, June 28). Shifting public views on legal immigration into the U.S. *Pew Research Center*. http://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/

Pew Research Center. (2020, July 9). *Majority of public favors giving civilians the power to sue police officers for misconduct*. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-for-misconduct/

Phillips, P. (2016). *Blood at the root: A racial cleansing in America*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Pilgrim, D. (2007). *Irene Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia*. https://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/question/dec07/index.htm

Potorti, M. (2017). 'Feeding the revolution': The black panther party, hunger, and community survival. *Journal of African American Studies*, *21*, 85–110.

Qian, Z., & Lichter, D. (2011). Changing patterns of interracial marriage in a multiracial society. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *75*, 1065–1084.

Raley, R. K., Sweeney, M. M., & Wondra, D. (2015). The growing racial and ethnic divide in U.S. Marriage patterns. *Future Child*, *25*(2), 89–109. https://doi.org/10.1353/foc.2015.0014

Rastogi, S., Johnson, T., Hoeffel, E., & Drewery, M. (2011). *The black population, 2010*. U.S. Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf

Redford, L. (2017). The intertwined history of class and race segregation in Los Angeles. *Journal of Planning History*, *16*(4), 305–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/1538513216676191

Reid, M. (2014). *Brazil: The Troubled rise of a global power*. Yale University Press.

Richardson, C. M., & Luker, R. E. (2014). *Historical dictionary of the civil rights movement*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Risério, A. (2007). *The Brazilian Utopia and the black movements*.

Rivera, L. A. (2015). *Pedigree: How elite students get elite jobs*. Princeton University Press.

Roberts, J. (2013). *Opinion in Shelby County v. Holder 570 U.S. 529*.

Rockquemore, K. A., & Brunsma, D. (2008). *Beyond black: Biracial identity in America* (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.

The Root.(2016). Misty copeland, Top 100. *The Root*. https://onehundred.theroot.com/facewall/the-root-100-2016/#misty-copeland

Rosenblatt, K., & Siemaszko, C. (2017, July 10). Confederate flag raised at South Carolina statehouse in protest by secessionist party. *NBC*. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/confederate-flag-rises-south-carolina-statehouse-protest-secessionist-party-n781331

Rosich, K. (2007). *Race, ethnicity, and the criminal justice system*. American Sociological Association. https://www.asanet.org/images/press/docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf

Rothstein, R. (2014, March 6). Modern segregation. *Economic Policy Institute*. https://www.epi.org/publication/modern-segregation/

Rothstein, R. (2019). The myth of *de facto* segregation. *Phi Delta Kappan*, *100*(5), 35. https://kappanonline.org/myth-de-facto-segregation-rothstein-school-districts/

Royster, D. (2003). *Race and the invisible hand: How white networks exclude black men from blue-collar jobs*. University of California Press.

Rustin, B. (1947). *Twenty-two Days on the Chain Gang at Roxboro, North Carolina*. http://documents.law.yale.e du/sites/default/files/Official-report-chain-gang.pdf

Rustin, B. (n.d). *King encyclopedia*. Stanford University. https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/ru stin-bayard

Saenz, R. (2005). *The Social and economic isolation of Urban African Americans*. Population Reference Bureau.

Salhani, J. (2015, September 6). Why people are calling out cops for being racist in Brazil. *ThinkProgress*. ht tps://thinkprogress.org/why-people-are-calling-out-cops-for-being-racist-in-brazil-d26b4dc2076d

Saraiva, A. (2019, June 19). Education indicators are up, but racial and regional inequalities still remain. *IBGE News Agency*. https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/248 59-education-indicators-are-up-but-racila-and-regional-inequalities-still-remain

Sastry, A., & Bates, K. G. (2017, April 26). When LA erupted in anger: A look back at the Rodney King riots. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodne y-king-riots

Schuppe, J. (2021). Supreme Court ruling on crack sentences 'a shocking loss,' Drug reform advocates say. *NBCNews.com*. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/supreme-court-ruling-crack-sentences-shoc king-loss-drug-reform-advocates-n1270801

The Sentencing Project. (2015). *The changing racial dynamics of women's incarceration*. https://www.sente ncingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/The-Changing-Racial-Dynamics-of-Womens-Incarcerati on.pdf

The Sentencing Project. (2020). *Reducing racial disparity in the criminal justice system*. https://www.senten cingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Reducing-Racial-Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-Syste m-A-Manual-for-Practitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf

Shapiro, T., Meschede, T., & Osoro, S. (2013). *The roots of the widening racial wealth gap: Explaining the black-white economic divide*. Institute on Assets and Social Policy, Brandeis University. https://iasp.brandeis.edu/ pdfs/Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf

Simmons, G. Z. (2011). *Oral history interview conducted by Joseph Mosnier*. https://www.loc.gov/item/afc201 0039_crhp0049/

Simpson, K. (2012, February 15). The great migration: Creating a new black identity in Los Angeles. *KCET*. h ttps://www.kcet.org/history-society/the-great-migration-creating-a-new-black-identity-in-los-angeles

Small, M. L., Harding, D. J., & Lamont, M. (2010). Reconsidering culture and poverty. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *629*, 6. https://ann.sagepub.com/content/629/1/6

Smith, A. L., & Mason, S. E. (2016). The age of racial profiling in the context of terrorism. *Modern Psychological Studies*, *21*(2), Article 10.

Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). (n.d). *Nation of Islam*. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extre mist-files/group/nation-islam

Stack, C. B. (1974). *All our kin: Strategies for survival in a black community*. Basic Books.

Stainback, K., & Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (2012). *Documenting desegregation: Racial and gender segregation in private-sector employment since the civil rights act*. Russell Sage.

Stanford Social Innovation Review. (2019, February 11). *Navigating double jeopardy in the social sector*. https://ssir.org/podcasts/entry/navigating_double_jeopardy_in_the_social_sector

Steinberg, S. (1981). *The Ethnic myth: Race, ethnicity, and class in America*. Atheneum.

Steinberg, S. (2011, January 13). Poor reason: Culture still doesn't explain poverty. *Boston Review*. https://w ww.bostonreview.net/steinberg.php

Stevenson, M., & Mayson, S. G. (2018). The scale of misdemeanor justice. *Boston University Law Review*, *98*, 731.

Stolberg, S., & Alcindor, Y. (2017, September 14). Trump's support for law to protect 'Dreamers' lifts its chances. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers.html

Stoll, M. (2004). *African Americans and the color line*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Strother, L., Ogorzalek, T., & Piston, S. (2017, June 12). The confederate flag largely disappeared after the Civil War. The fight against civil rights brought it back. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/12/confederate-symbols-largely-disappeared-after-the-civil-war-the-fight-against-civil-rights-brought-them-back/?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-politics %3Ahomepage%2Fcard

Strother, L., Ogorzalek, T., & Piston, S. (2017a, June 12). *The Confederate flag largely disappeared after the Civil War. The fight against civil rights brought it back*. Washington Post, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/12/confederate-symbols-largely-dis appeared-after-the-civil-war-the-fight-against-civil-rights-brought-them-back/

Strother, L., Ogorzalek, T., & Piston, S. (2017b). Pride or prejudice? Racial prejudice, southern heritage, and white support for the confederate battle flag. Du Bois Review, 14(1), 295–323.

Stuckey, S. (1987). *Slave culture: Nationalist theory and the foundations of black America*. Harper & Row.

Swain, J., Laughland, O., Lartey, J., & McCarthy, C. (2015, December 31). Young black men killed by US police at highest rate in year of 1,134 deaths. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-counted-police-killings-2015-young-black-men

Tavernise, S., Mzezewa, T., & Heyward, G. (2021, August 13). Behind the surprising jump in multiracial Americans, several theories. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/us/census-multiracial-identity.html

Taylor, U. Y. (2017). *The promise of patriarchy: Women and the Nation of Islam*. University of North Carolina Press.

Telles, E. (2004). *Race in another America: The Significance of skin color in Brazil*. Princeton University Press.

Theoharis, J. (2006). *The Black power movement: Rethinking the civil rights-black power era* (pp. 47–49). Routledge.

Theoharis, J. (2013). *The rebellious life of Mrs. Rosa parks*. Beacon Press.

Theoharis, J. (2015). *The rebellious life of Mrs. Rosa parks*. Beacon Press.

Thomas, D., & Horowitz, J. M. (2020, September 16). Support for Black lives matter has decreased since June but remains strong among Black Americans. *Pew Research Center*. https://Www.Pewresearch.Org/Fact-Tank/2020/09/16/Support-For-Black-Lives-Matter-Has-Decreased-Since-June-But-Remains-Strong-Among-Black-Americans/

Tillery, A. B. (2019). *What kind of movement is black lives matter? The view from Twitter*. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-race-ethnicity-and-politics/article/what-kind-of-movement-is-black-lives-matter-the-view-from-twitter/375801268123BCA397284EFBE36C9F4E

Tribune Wire Reports. (2014, October 11). Riot erupts near St. Louis over police shooting of teen. *Chicago Tribune*. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-missouri-police-shooting- 20140810-story.html

United Press International (UPI). (1986, December 25). *Marquette Frye dead; "man who began riot."*. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/25/obituaries/marquette-frye-dead-man-who-began-riot.html

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013). *Employment status of the civilian non- institutional population by race, Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, sex, and age, seasonally adjusted*. https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea04.pdf

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2016). *Employment status of civilian noninstitutionalized population by sex, age, and race*. https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.pdf

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2018). *Unemployment rates by sex, age, race, and Latino or Hispanic ethnicity*. https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2021). https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm

U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2021a). *Historical time series tables, table A-2*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/educational-attainment/cps-historical-time-series.html

U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2021b). *Historical income tables: People table P-36*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-people.html

U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2021b). *2019 American community survey*. https://data.census.gov/cedsci/advanced

U.S. Census Bureau. (1978). *Statistical abstract of the United States, 1977*. Author.

U.S. Census Bureau. (2007). *Statistical abstract of the United States, 2007*. Author. http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2012a). *Most children younger than age 1 are minorities, Census Bureau reports. Newsroom Archive*. News release. http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-90.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2012b). *Statistical abstract of the United States, 2012*. Government.

U.S. Census Bureau. (2013). *American community survey 3-year estimates, 2010–2012*. http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_sumfile_2010_2012&prodType=document

U.S. Census Bureau. (2017a). *Table H-1. Households by type and tenure of householder for selected characteristics, 2017*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/families/cps-2017.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2017b). *Table P-36 historical income tables: People full-time year-round workers by median income and sex*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-people.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2020). *Table H-5 race and hispanic origin of householder - households by median and mean income*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-households.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2021a). *Age of householder–households by total money income, type of household, race and Hispanic origin of householder, table HINC-02*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/cps/hinc-

U.S. Census Bureau. (2021c). *Poverty status, tables 3 and 4*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-people.html

U.S. Census Bureau. (2021d). *Table H1 households by type and tenure of householder for selected characteristics: 2020*. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/families/cps-2020.html

U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights. (2014). *Civil rights data collection*. Issue Brief No. 1. https://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-School-Discipline-Snapshot.pdf

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. (2015). *Investigation of the Ferguson police department*. https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=95274

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2021a, June 2). *Autos of Dallas Sued by EEOC for race discrimination*. https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/autos-dallas-sued-eeoc-race-discrimination

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2021b, June 3, June 3). *Birmingham beverage to pay $825,000 to Settle EEOC lawsuit for race discrimination*. https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/birmingham-beverage-pay-825000-settle-eeoc-lawsuit-race-discrimination

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2021c, May 26). *Ryder and Kimco Settle EEOC race harassment and retaliation lawsuits for $2 million. Commission*. https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/ryder-and-kimco-settle-eeoc-race-harassment-and-retaliation-lawsuits-2-million

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (n.d). *Significant EEOC race/color cases (Covering private and federal sectors)*. https://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/e-race/significant-eeoc-racecolor-casescovering-private-and-federal-sectors

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2017, November 14). *Demographic differences in sentencing: An update to the 2012 Booker Report*. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf

Wade, P. (1997). *Race and ethnicity in Latin America*. Pluto Press. https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0745309879

Weller, C. E. (n.d). African Americans face systematic obstacles to getting good jobs. *Center for American Progress*. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/12/05/478150/african-americans-face-systematic-obstacles-getting-good-jobs/

Wellner, A. (2007). U.S. Attitudes toward interracial dating are liberalizing. *Population Reference Bureau*. https://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USAttitudesTowardInterracialDatingAreLiberalizing.aspx

Wilkens, R. (1992, May 3). L.A.: Images in the flames; Looking back in anger: 27 years after Watts, our nation remains divided by racism. *Washington Post*, p. C1.

Williams, G. (1995). *Life on the color line*. Dutton.

Williams, V. (2019, October 29). Analysis | Innocence erased: How society keeps black boys from being boys. *The Washington Post*. www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/09/21/innocence-denied-black-boys-who-face-harsher-scrutiny-consequences-than-their-white-peers/

Wilson, J. P., Hugenberg, K., & Rule, N. O. (2017). Racial bias in judgments of physical size and formidability: From size to threat. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *113*(1), 59–80. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi00

Wilson, W. J. (1973). *Power, racism, and privilege: Race relations in theoretical and sociohistorical perspectives*. Free Press.

Wilson, W. J. (1987). *The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy*. University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, W. J. (1996). *When work disappears*. Knopf.

Wilson, W. J. (2009). *More than just race*. W. W. Norton.

Woldoff, R. A. (2011). *White flight/black flight: The Dynamics of racial change in American neighborhood*. Cornell University Press.

Wolfenstein, E. V. (1993). *The Victims of democracy: Malcolm X*. Guilford Press.

Wormser, R. (n.d). *The rise and fall of Jim crow*. https://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_freed.html

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2019/020-508.pdf